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EDITOR'S NOTE
From snowmelt and rain clouds, to streams and rivers, every ounce
of fresh water must endure a long journey on its way to the ocean. The
journey may include a sprinkler system, a turbine, a reservoir, a fish, a
kayaker, or even a trip through a wellhead. This incredibly complex
and diverse hydrologic system inspired the equally diverse system of law
governing the distribution of water. This issue of the Water Law Review
highlights the diversity of the body of law that we casually refer to as
"water law." Collectively, the articles in this issue serve to remind us
that when dealing with a resource that travels beyond jurisdictional
lines, we must often look beyond our state laws to those of neighboring
states as well as federal law, constitutional law, and international law.
In our lead article, Governmental Interference with the Use of Water:
When Do Unconstitutional "Takings" Occur?,James Davenport, Craig Bell,
and other members of the Western States Water Council's Legal
Committee provide a thorough and in-depth review of takings jurisprudence. After evaluating the law on takings, they apply the law to
interests in water to determine when courts might find an unconstitutional taking requiring just compensation. Lastly, the authors discuss
the valuation of just compensation when the government unconstitutionally takes a private interest in water.
Moving from constitutional law to federal law, Kent Holsinger discusses the Colorado River Storage Project Act ("CRSPA") in Colorado
River Storage Project Act Purposes: Does the Tail Wag the Dog?. In this article, Mr. Holsinger explores Congress's intent in passing the CRSPA.
He considers both legislative history and the CRSPA's interaction with
other federal laws addressing the issue of how Congress should operate
CRSPA facilities.
From federal law we transition to state law in Sustaining the Unsustainable: Development of the Denver Basin Aquifers by Eric Potyondy. Mr.
Potyondy first provides a thorough discussion of the hydrology of the
Denver Basin aquifers and Colorado groundwater law. He then goes
on to offer some solutions to resolve the disparity between the science
of groundwater hydrology and the law.
In A Tale of Two River Basins: The Southeast Finds Itself in a Rare Interstate Water Struggle, Andrew Thornley discusses the dispute over interstate waters between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Focusing on two
extremely important southeastern river basins, the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint River system and the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa
River system, Mr. Thornley discusses the desires of each state, the key
issues of the dispute, and the current lack of a solution.
Our "International Perspectives" section addresses an international
issue close to home, the Colorado River. In Saving a Dying Oasis: Utiliz-

ing the United Nations Convention on Non-NavigationalUses of International
Watercourses to Preserve and Restore the Colorado River Delta, Sean Olson
discusses an oft-forgotten part of the Colorado River, the delta where it
discharges into the Gulf of California. Mr. Olson discusses the "Law of
the River" incorporating international law. He concludes by proffering, and evaluating, possible legal solutions that the United States and
Mexico could use to save the deteriorating Colorado River delta.
We hope you find the diversity of law and issues contained within
these articles informative and thought provoking. Additionally, the
Water Law Review values your continued support, and we hope you will
share your thoughts and opinions regarding our publication.
Ryan D. Phillips
Editor-in-Chief

CHARLIE MEYERS

CHARLIE MEYERS RE-REMEMBERED
DEDICATION BYA. DAN TARLOCK

It is a pleasure and honor to provide this dedication to the late
Charles Jarvis Meyers, who was my teacher, great friend, mentor and
casebook collaborator for some 25 years. When Charlie died in 1988,
there were several tributes to his long, varied and exceptionally distinguished career, but the Water Law Review's decision to honor his memory provides both an occasion to introduce Charlie to a new generation of water lawyers and professionals and to reflect on his intellectual
legacy with the benefit of the passage of time. Charlie's scholarship
and persona remain a vivid presence to those of us who came of age
professionally in the 1960s and 197 0s. A picture of him staring straight
ahead with his steely, penetrating gaze sits on the bookshelf next to my
computer desk and constantly reminds me to rethink and to revise
whatever I have just written.
Charlie was the leading water scholar of the generation that followed the late Dean Frank Trelease. His professional career included
prestigious academic appointments, extensive public service and private practice. He taught at the universities of Texas, Minnesota and
Columbia before coming to Stanford in 1962. He remained on the
faculty for twenty years becoming the Charles A. Beardsley Professor of
Law and ultimately the Dean and Richard E. Lang Professor. In 1981,
after a very successful deanship, he moved to Denver where he practiced natural resources law with Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher until his
death. When he died in July of 1988, just short of his sixty-third birthday, he was serving as the Special Master in Texas v. Mexico and hard at
work on the damages phase of the litigation after the Supreme Court
affirmed his finding that New Mexico had breached her compact obligations to Texas.'
This skeletal recitation of some of the highlights of his professional
life does not do justice to either his formidable intellect or the force of
his character. He was a true Texan; he wasn't larger than life itself but
an example of life lived to the fullest. He both challenged and
charmed almost everyone (except the late and equally formidable New
Mexico State Engineer Steve Reynolds) who had the privilege to know
and work with him. In Charlie, the Apollonian and Dionysian came
1. Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, A.B. 1962, LL.B.
1965, Stanford University.
2. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Tribute, 29 NATURAL REsoURcESJ. 328 (1989).
3. This chapter in Charlie's life is beautifully detailed in Chapter 7 of EM HALL,
HIGH AND DRY: THE TEXAS-NEw MEXICO STRUGGLE FOR THE PECOS RIVER (2002).

together, not in some kind of ideal balance, but in constant release of
energy that never ceased to dazzle and awe.4 One of Charlie's great
passions was opera, and he and his wife, Pamela, played a major role in
launching Opera Colorado. Mozart was his idol and his prose had a
Mozartian sparkle, clarity and depth.5 But, he could also direct the
cold fury of a Verdi baritone to those whose prose, and the ideas behind it, did not measure up to his high standards.
Charlie's enduring contribution to water law is his formulation and
promotion of two of the central ideas that continue to inform and influence western water law. On balance, one, state water allocation
primary, is somewhat fading in importance while the other, the need
to encourage the transferability of water rights, is increasing. His federalism views were formed in the epic Arizona v. California litigation.
Shortly after moving from the University of Minnesota to Columbia, he
became the law clerk to retired federal Judge Simon Rifkind who had
just been appointed the Special Master in Arizona v. California. The
Court agreed with the Master's Report on crucial issues such as the
existence of non-Indian federal reserved water fights, the then unprecedented power of Congress to apportion interstate rivers and the
use of the practical irrigable acreage standard to measure Winters
rights.' However, in his masterful analysis of the opinion,7 Charlie was
extremely critical of the Court's holding that state law did not control
the distribution of Boulder Canyon Project water within state lines, and
he remained a strong advocate of the principle that there should be a
strong, but not conclusive, presumption of state rather than the reflexive federal water allocation primacy then in vogue with the post-New
Deal Supreme Court.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist adopted Charlie's theory view of federalism
in 1982' in an opinion that reversed several decades of reflexive deference to federal authority. The western states cling to state allocation
primacy, but its importance is fading for reasons that Charlie could not
fully anticipate. First, the doctrine is not well suited for the implementation of environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act put in place in the 1970s. These statutes do
not contain explicit statutory deference to state allocation primacy and
have been interpreted to preempt state water rights. Second, the reclamation era has ended and the era of reallocation and restoration has
4. This attempt to capture Charlie's expansive personality is a slight modification
of part of the tribute that I was privileged to deliver at a memorial service in the Stanford Memorial Church on September 22, 1988. The partial text appears in STANFORD
LAWYER, Vol. 23, No. 1, Fall 1988 at 83.
5. I made some headway expanding his horizons to Wagner and late Richard

Strauss.
6. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
7.

CharlesJ. Meyers, The ColoradoRiver, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966).

8.

California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).

begun. As a result, the federal government's role in water allocation,
while still powerful in selected instances, is rapidly declining. Government no longer has the fiscal clout and thus power that it once enjoyed, and as water resource project funding has declined over the past
thirty years,9 the resource agencies lack a coherent vision to replace the
dream of an irrigated Eden in the West, which drove the Reclamation
Era.
Charlie's other major contribution remains vital and relevant to
today's water allocation issues. He was a crucial participant in the tectonic shift in western water policy from dam building to markets and
fish habitat protection. Until the 1960s, the idea that the federal government should construct large, subsidized regional water projects was
taken as a given, despite the grumblings of a few renegade economists
that the policy was of dubious efficiency and anti-dam conservationists
such as Bernard de Voto and Wallace Stegner. It was also assumed that
much of the inner-mountain West would remain a commodity production economy where water would be perpetually used at the place of
original application. The rise of the environmental movement and the
election of Richard Nixon in 1968 signaled the sunset of the Reclamation Era and the dawn of the era of reallocation and riverine restoration. The exponential population growth of in most of the western
states, except the harsh High Plains, has transformed the region into a
series of urban archipelagoes. In the process, the old assumption
about water development as the driver of regional growth has been
shattered and we have begun the era of reallocation and river restoration.
Charlie was an early and committed believer in the analytical power
of economics to promote rational water management. He cast his
cold, keenly analytical eye on the many inefficiencies in water allocation from subsidized federal water deliveries to the amount of water
consumed by low valued crops. He consistently argued that water
rights should be made as certain as possible to promote transfers. This
faith is the central premise of his most important legacy to water law
and resources management, the Final Report of the National Water
Commission, which endorsed the greater use of water transfers, increased environmental protection and tighter economic review of new
projects.
Congress created the Commission in 1968 in partial response to
fears that large transbasin diversions, especially from the Columbia,
might be authorized to supply California and the arid southwest. Ade9.

See WESTERN WATER POLIcY REvIEw ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST:

2-33- 2-38 (1998). This report contains the reasons
why the presumption of state supremacy no longer reflects reality but omitted the
recommendation of many consultants and witnesses that the presumption be abandoned.
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY

quately funded, staffed with the most knowledgeable water professionals and allowed to operate free from political interference, the Commission's comprehensive survey of all aspects of water management,
Water Policies for the Future, remains the standard against which all future studies must be measured. Unfortunately, the report's message
was a casualty of Watergate. Events such global warming and the ever
shrinking federal government have overtaken many of the Report's
specific recommendations, but many remain as relevant as they were in
1973 and no assessment of water policy since that time has been able
to.
Charlie served as an Assistant Legal Counsel, but his influence runs
through the report and it remains essential reading. The chapter on
water and the economy gently but firmly rejected the then prevailing
theory that water development was essential to regional growth. Instead, it concluded that "in the future, policies for water development
must be increasingly subordinated to other government policies, including land use, energy, environmental protection, and food and fiber production."' ° Charlie made major contributions to Chapter 7
which recommended the use of marginal rather than average cost pricing for municipal supplies and full cost rather than ability to pay pricing for irrigation water." The report had earlier rejected the case for
subsidized Bureau of Reclamation deliveries for new projects'2 and recommended greater use of water transfers. A classic Charlie sentence
provided a concise rationale for the termination of federal river basin
planning programs that occurred in the Reagan Administration: "Water planning sometimes appears to be an end in itself."' 3 He was able
to apply the need for greater certainty and more transfers when he was
appointed the Vice Chair of Government Jerry Brown's Governor's
Commission to Review California Water Rights Law in 1977." The Staff
Director, the distinguished California water rights scholar, Harrison
Dunning, recently described the Report in a way that shows Charlie's
influence. The Commission was assigned six topics, but "[t]he text of
that report departed from the six topic format ... in that the substantive material was organized under the four headings of 'greater certainty,' 'improving efficiency' (which included voluntary transfers),
'protection of instream uses,' and 'effective management of groundwater resources."1
10. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 39 (1973).
11.
Id. at 227-314.
12. Id. at 147.
13. Id. at 366.
14. An exhaustive analysis of the Commission's report and its impact on California
law can be found in Symposium on the 25r Anniversary of the Report of the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 1 (2005).
15. Harrison C. Dunning, The Governor's Commission: Success or Failure, 36
McGEORGE L. REv. 17, 20 (2005).

Charlie is most often associated with the view that economic rationality should control allocation decisions; however, he was keenly
aware of the need for environmental protection and need to pay attention to social equity issues that can arise in water use such as Indian
water rights. "' The second half of his career coincided with the rise of
the environmental movement, and he recognized that it would be an
integral part of modern water administration and management. In
1971, we completed the first edition of Water Resource Management. The
environmental movement emerged as we were preparing it, and the
book contained an extensive discussion of water pollution, the public
trust and the first wave of decisions reviewing agency approvals of water
resources projects. Charlie suggested that we cannabilize and expand
these chapters. The result was the first casebook on environmental
law. The title, Selected Legal and Economic and Aspects of Environmental
Protection, naturally reflected Charlie's view that economics had much
to say about the full range of emerging environmental issues." He
would be happy that his legacy at Stanford was carried on by his former
student, Barton Thompson, who has been a leader in the development
of market-based solutions to hard environmental problems.18
Some ideas, like modern music, soon become outdated. Others,
like the classic music, which he preferred, have an underlying integrity
that makes them to relevant even after the social and historical context
in which they were developed has changed. Charlie was always a forward thinking person, but the water world in which he formed his
ideas has changed radically, especially in the almost two decades since
his death. Still, his core ideas, the power of markets to reallocate water
to the full range of beneficial uses and the need to promote the efficient use of resources, regardless of the purpose to which are dedicated, remain as relevant today as when he articulated them, especially
as the government structures which supported the Reclamation Era
crumble with little prospect of replacement except by endless ad hoc
"consensus" processes.

16. Charles J. Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States,
13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377 (1978).
17. For the fullest exposition of his environmental views, see Charles J. Meyers, An
Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms, 50 IND. L. J. 426
(1975).
18. See, e.g. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Uncertainty and Water Markets in Water Resources, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 117 (2005). In my files, I have a draft outline, with Charlie's handwritten annotations, for a planned joint article on the public trust doctrine,
which was prepared the year before he died. We had agreed to argue that there was a
pressing need to reallocate water for both urban growth and instream flow protection,
but that the use of monitored markets was a more effective way than the doctrine announced in the now totemic but extreme case of National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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regulators. Having completed the article, the reader will likely conclude, as have the
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Do governmental regulatory, contractual, or proprietary actions
that interfere with private rights to use water, generically characterized
as "water rights," comprise an unconstitutional taking of those rights in
a manner that requires compensation under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments? Recent litigation has generated an increased interest in
the law of unconstitutional "takings" of property as it applies to water
rights.' Because of limited water availability in the West, in the face of
growing demands for water, interest in the topic has intensified.
Any analysis of whether the government has interfered with a legally defensible interest,' such as a water right, can be broken into four
1. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313
(2001) (holding that a "physical" taking requiring compensation occurred when staterecognized, contracted water rights were affected by actions of United States Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service securing water for endangered species protection in California's Tulare Lake Basin); Okanogan County v. Nat'l
Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CS-01-192-RHW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13625 (E.D. Wash.
Mar. 13, 2001), aff'd, 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that U.S. Forest Service
possessed authority to impose permit conditions that stopped the diversion of water for
farmland irrigation in order to benefit an endangered species of fish in the Methow
River); Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F.Supp. 2d 1222 (D. N.M. 2002), affd,
333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated, 355 F. 3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding, initially, that under the authority of the Endangered Species Act, the Bureau of Reclamation must release contracted reservoir water to increase flows on the middle Rio
Grande to protect the Rio Grande silvery minnow; the Tenth Circuit later vacated this
ruling due to mootness). Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504
(2005) (holding claims of Klamath Basin irrigators whose water deliveries were cut off
to preserve endangered species were not compensable takings). This article discusses
these cases in more depth in the text below.
2. This article uses the terms "legally defensible interest" and "private property"
interchangeably. The term "legally defensible interest" is intended to describe any
interest held by a non-governmental entity that the owner can protect against interference by another person through adjudication in federal or state courts. This phrase is
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basic questions. First, what particular legally defensible interest is involved? Second, what was the governmental action constituting interference with the legally defensible interest? Third, what takings analysis - physical or regulatory - should the government apply? Fourth,
how should the government measure compensation?
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments refer to "private property"
and "property" respectively.' In 1787, when the states adopted the
Constitution, the law of property was based primarily on the common
law of real and personal property.' At that time, riparian rights included the right to use water, a right inherent in real property adjacent
to surface water.' Private property "taken for public use" would likely
have included property expropriated for forts, arsenals, or public
roads, or personal property such as crops or residences commandeered for the support of armies. With abundant water resources in
flowing rivers and streams, it is unlikely the drafters of the Constitution
or Bill of Rights contemplated the appropriation of private rights to
use water as a necessary component of the public weal.
Although historical context may limit the term "property" as used
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the United States Supreme
Court has chosen to interpret "privately held interests" more broadly
than the drafters originally envisioned.7 Contemporary courts have
treated the right to use water as a legally defensible interest, holding
"[u]nder both the due process and the takings clause, property interests are not created by the Constitution itself, but are derived from
other sources 'such as state, federal, or common law.'"" As a result,

broad enough to include the panoply of rights typically called "water rights" or the
"right to use water" as well as interests created by contract, grant, use, prescription, or
by declaration (e.g., private intellectual property interests). See, e.g., FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993) (recognizing such things as satellite
transmitted signals as a type of private property even though these property interests
did not exist when the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were added to the Constitution).
3. See Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 573 (2002) ("As in every takings
claim, the court must decide: first, do plaintiffs own the property at issue; second, did
the government take the property; and if so, what is the 'just compensation' due the
plaintiffs.").
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
5. See 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2001)
(1991).
6. Id.
7. The Fifth Amendment was proposed in 1789, and ratified in 1791. U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, following the Civil
War, in the context of protecting all citizens from government encroachment on private interests. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. Concepts of private property have evolved significantly since the proposal and
enactment of these amendments.
8. Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 379, 394 (2004) (quoting
Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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there is little doubt that the right to use water, generally, is a legally
defensible interest that stands on equal footing with other traditional
property rights.
Appropriative water rights, however, pose unique problems for takings protection. As one scholar aptly noted:
[W]ater rights have less protection than most other property rights for
several reasons . . . (a) because their existence may intrude on a public common, they are subject to several original public prior claims,
such as the navigation servitude and the public trust, and to laws protecting commons, such as water pollution laws; (b) their original
definition, limited to beneficial and non-wasteful uses, imposes limits
beyond those that constrain most property rights; (c) insofar as water
rights (unlike most other property rights) are granted by permit, they
are subject to constraints articulated in the permits.9
Contractual water rights are difficult to characterize as a defensible
property interest because contractual contingencies may reduce the
certainty of the right.'" Here, as in other areas of takings jurisprudence, the case law is still evolving, and many uncertainties remain
regarding the scope and nature of defensible interests.
Water rights are also unique because they vary in both their origins
and attributes. Water rights may be created by the common law of
property or by state and federal statutes." This variety in origin may
explain the variety of apparently conflicting cases.
Because attributes of a water right originate from state law, federal
statutes, or contract law, examining whether governmental regulatory
actions constitute "takings" necessarily requires investigation into the
regulation's effects on attributes of a water right. Therefore, this article discusses cases involving regulatory takings of the following categories of water rights:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Riparian Property Interests
Appropriative Water Rights
The Right to Access a Water Right
Water Rights Created by Contract
Water Rights Created as an Incident of Congressional
Reservation

9. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Futureof Water Law, 61 U.
COLO. L. REv. 257, 260 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Stockton E. Water Dist., 69 Fed.Cl. at 383-85.
11. For example, the federal government can reserve water rights for Indian Tribes
or to serve the purposes of federally reserved land. See Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,145-47 (1976). State

legislatures can create water rights through statutes defining diversion and beneficial
use or through general stream adjudications, which may including federal interests
subject to state jurisdiction under the McCarran Act.
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This article does not address regulatory takings of interests in
groundwater because of the wide variety of state law pertaining to
ground water rights. Cases in states adopting the "English Rule""2 likely
have different outcomes than those in states who have adopted the
"American" or "Reasonable Use Rule." 3 In western states, where prior
appropriation is the law," this doctrine will likely produce different
legal outcomes. Additionally, the hydrologic connection between
ground water and surface water may produce different legal outcomes
in states whose courts acknowledge this principle. " Although analysis
of these groundwater cases is a worthy project, it is not the focus of this
article.
States typically infuse a water right with ultimate public ownership
even after a citizen establishes a valid right to use water." This article
considers issues related to governmental interference with the exercise
of water rights premised on the retained governmental interest. In
some states, the state legislature has codified these interests in such
concepts as the "public trust doctrine.""

12. The English Rule, first stated in Acton v. Blundel, provides that, absent malice
or willful waste, a landowner has the right to take all the groundwater he can capture
from under his land, and do with it as he pleases, and will not be liable to neighboring
landowners even if in doing so he deprives his neighbor of the use of the water. Acton
v. Blundel, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (1843). The English Rule is actually a rule of tort
law, rather than a rule of property law. The "English Rule" is used in a few American
jurisdictions including Washington D.C. See United States v. Alexander, 148 U.S. 186,
192 (1893). In Texas, the legal principle is refereed to as the "Rule of Capture." See
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999); Denis v. Kickapoo
Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); City of Sherman v. Public Utility
Comm'n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983); City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton,
276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1955); Houston & Tex. Central Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279,
280 (Tex. 1904).
13. Most eastern states have adopted the American Rule. The American rule provides that a "landowner, in dealing with surface water, is entitled to take only so such
steps as are reasonable in light of all the circumstances of relative advantage to the
actor and the disadvantage to the adjoining landowners, as well as social utility." Ridge
Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also Village of
Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1979) (a landowner may use his
.own property so as not to injure that of another"); Koch v. Wick, 87 So.2d 47 (Fla.
1956); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577 (1862).
14. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 111 (3rd ed.
2000) (1986).
15. See, e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River
System and Source, 9 P.3d 1069, 1083 (Ariz. 2000) (holding "subflow" can be regulated as surface water although it is not flowing at the surface and no unconstitutional
taking occurs from its regulation.)
16.
17.

4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 30.01.
1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 5, § 4.07.
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I. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
It is worthwhile, when considering cases pertaining to takings of interests in water, as Part II of this article does, to review the Supreme
Court's takings cases that have continually reshaped takings jurisprudence.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment provides "no person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall property be taken for public use, without just compensation."18 The Fifth Amendment requires the federal government to
compensate a landowner when the federal government takes property
for public use. The Fourteenth Amendment extends this requirement
to include actions of state and local governments." Thus, the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment is the basis for actions against the state,
local, or federal government in which plaintiffs allege the government
has taken their property. The Fifth Amendment raises three general
issue areas: whether the government action is a taking;' whether the
taking is for a "public use;"2' and whether the compensation isjust.'
A.
1.

Substantive Law of Takings Claims

"Per se," Physical and Regulatory Takings

The Supreme Court first recognized the significance of compensating landowners pursuant to the takings clause in 1833." The Supreme
Court elaborated on its support of the takings clause in 1872 while
construing a provision in the Wisconsin Constitution modeled after the
just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a
provision of constitutional law [such as the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment], always understood to have been adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual as against the govU.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
19. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897)
("[A] rbitrarily to take the property of one individual and give it to another individual,
would not be due process of law, as enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment, it must
be that the requirement of due process of law in that amendment is applicable to the
direct appropriation by the State to public use and without compensation of the private property of the citizen.").
20. Takings can occur through either the power of eminent domain or the police
power. This article explores takings solely in the context of the police power.
21. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2658 (2005).
22. Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003) ("the taking
must be for a 'public use' and 'just compensation' must be paid to the owner.").
23. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833) (recognizing the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on taking as a limit on federal authority).

18.
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emment.... [where] it shall be held that if the government refrains
from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public
it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent
injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that
word, it is not taken for the public use. Such a construction would
pervert the constitutional provisions into a restriction upon the rights
of the citizen, as those rights stood at the common law, instead of the
government, and make it an authority for invasion of private right
under the pretext of the public good ....
2'
Stated more simply, in 1897, the Supreme Court held"... without
such compensation the appropriation of private property to public
uses, no matter under what form of procedure
it is taken, would violate
"
the provisions of the Federal Constitution. 2
A taking through direct expropriation is straightforward, as the action clearly requires compensation under the Fifth Amendment.'
However, when a taking occurs through less direct governmental interference, such as governmental regulation, the case is more difficult.
The Supreme Court has developed judicial principles for analyzing
claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment primarily in the
context of growing municipal power to control the use of land through
zoning and permitting. Scholars trace regulatory taking jurisprudence
to the regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' and to the
landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., in which the Supreme Court upheld municipal zoning against the claim of an unconstitutional de facto taking of the landowner's property without just compensation.' In Euclid, the Supreme Court noted that the state may
exercise its delegated police power in situations where "the general
public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality
that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way."'
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance barring occupancy of homes by three or more unrelated people.' ° The Supreme Court noted "[t]he police power is... ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.""
However, the Supreme Court warned that, although government can,
through its police power, interfere with the use of legally defensible
24.
25.
26.
27.
it will
28.
29.
30.
31.

Pumpellyv. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1871).
Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
See Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 408 (1931).
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("if the regulation goes too far,
be recognized as a taking.").
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
I& at 390.
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
I& at9.
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interests without crossing the boundary beyond which compensation is
due, it can go too far in its regulation. 2
In a chain of cases following Village of Belle Terre, the Supreme
Court set forth a general proposition that it will uphold a governmental regulation against a taking claim unless the regulation deprives the
owner of all reasonable economic value." According to that approach,
a mere reduction in value, which is often the result of governmental
regulation, would not constitute a taking. 4 But interference with economic value is not the only test the Supreme Court has applied." In
United States v. Causby, where noise from overhead aircraft reduced the
value of property beneath the flight path, the Supreme Court determined that the airport proprietor had physically invaded, and, therefore, "taken" the land, even though the proprietor had not deprived
the landowner of all reasonable economic value.' Thus, successful
takings claims evolved into two main categories: deprivation of all reasonable economic value and physical invasion.
In the 1978 landmark decision of Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
New York City, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test to determine
whether a regulatory taking had occurred. 7 To determine the occurrence of a taking under the test, the Supreme Court first evaluated
whether the regulation served a "substantial public purpose"' and then
analyzed whether: (1) the regulation resulted in a denial of economically viable use of the property, 9 and (2) the property owner had distinct investment-backed expectations,' and (3) whether the interest in
the property owner's right to own and use the property without unwar-

32.

Id.at 4.

33. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see also Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260

(1980).
34. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001).
35. See Williamson County Reg'] Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 197-99 (1985); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Cent. Transp. Corp. v.
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Martino
v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F. 2d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983); Selby Realty Co.
v. City of San Buenaventura, 514 P.2d 111,117 (Cal. 1973).
36. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946); see also Portsmouth Harbor
Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 330 (1922) (holding that naval artil-

lery fire over private property was a compensable taking).
37.

Penn Cent. Transp. Corp., 438 U.S. at 123-25, 138.

38.
39.

Id. at 127-29.
Id. at 130-31.

40. Id. at 136. Probably the best method for a court to measure these expectations
is in the context of the law in place at the time the landowner invested in the allegedly

taken property.
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ranted governmental interference outweighed the public interest asserted by the government in support of the regulation."
Applying this test, the Supreme Court upheld New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law." The law imposed a duty on owners of
landmark-designated property to maintain the landmark's exterior
features in good repair and prohibited alteration or improvement of
structures on the property without the City's approval. 3 The Supreme
Court held that a taking of private property had not occurred because
there was no interference with the current use of the property and a
reasonable return on investment in the property was still possible."
The Court also analyzed whether New York terminated all of the
pre-existing use rights through regulation." The Court concluded that
the restrictions imposed were substantially related to the promotion of
the general welfare, permitted reasonable beneficial use of the property, and were, therefore, a constitutional exercise of the police power
and not a taking.'
After Penn Central, the Supreme Court continued to find takings
when regulations amounted to physical invasions of a property owner's
right. For example, in KaiserAetna v. United States, the Supreme Court
found a regulatory taking in conditions to a federal permit to dredge a
private lagoon.47 The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers had conditioned
the permit on the owner's providing public access once the owners
connected the lagoon to tidal waters." The Court held that because
the condition of the permit created an actual physical invasion of
property, the permit resulted in a taking even though the permit condition did not deprive the owner of all reasonable economic value. '9
Later in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, a New York
law required landlords to allow cable television equipment on their
property, the Supreme Court indicated that any degree of condemna-

41. Id. at 136-37. This factor, typically called the "character of governmental action" factor, logically includes the physical/regulatory interference distinction. Courts
differ whether the objective of the governmental action is relevant.
42. Id. at 138. The Penn Central multi-factor balancing approach permits a plaintiff to demonstrate a taking based on a possible combination of factors, without any
single factor being outcome determinative. Additionally, the Court did not specify
whether the balancing test was exclusively a three-part test, leaving open the possibility
that courts could analyze other factors when determining whether a taking has occurred. See Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (1997);John
D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History's Dustbin? 52 LAND
USE LAw & ZONING DIGEST 3, 4 (2000).
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 111-12.
44. Id. at 136.
45. Id. at 136-37.
46. Id. at 138.
47. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979).
48. Id.at 168.
49. Id. at 179-80.
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tion of property, even for something as small as a cable box constituted
a taking for which the government must pay compensation.' Physical
occupations constitute unconstitutional intrusions into property rights
because "[t] he power to exclude has traditionally been considered one
of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property
rights.""
The Supreme Court ruled similarly in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission." In Nollan the local government issued a building permit

with the condition that the property owner dedicate an easement to
permit the public to pass along the beach between the mean high tide
line, which defined the seaward edge of the property, and a seawall."
The Supreme Court found that the right to exclude others was an essential right in the ownership of private property. 4 Therefore, the
Court concluded that if the state wanted an easement, it would have to
use the power of eminent domain to obtain it."
In other cases, the Supreme Court continued to apply the Penn
Centralbalancing test to uphold regulations. In Agins v. City of Tiburon,
the Supreme Court upheld a municipal zoning ordinance, which
placed privately owned land in planned residential developments and
limited residential density zones.' The Court concluded that since the
zoning ordinance neither prevented the best use of the land, nor extinguished a fundamental attribute of ownership, no taking had occurred. 7 Then, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, the Supreme Court upheld regulations adopted pursuant to the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which regulated
the conditions under which mining could take place. 8 Since the regulations did not deprive the property owners of all economically viable
use of their property, the Court found no taking had occurred."
In 1992, the Supreme Court advanced the "economic viability"
component of the Penn Central balancing test in Lucas v. South Carolina

50.
51.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
Id. at 435.

52.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-2 (1987).

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 828.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 841-42.

56. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); see also Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2005) (dismissing the "substantially advances" test as

a means to identify an unconstitutional taking, because "[a] test that tells us nothing
about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that burden is allocated
cannot tell us when justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpayers

through payment of compensation.").
57.
58.
U.S.C.
59.

Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 254, 268, 296; 30
§§ 1201-1328 (2005).
Hode4 452 U.S. at 295-97.
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Coastal Council.' The Court found that when the economic impact of a
governmental regulatory action was so severe as to render property
without any value, a per se taking had occurred:
In 70-odd years of...
"regulatory takings" jurisprudence, we have
generally eschewed any "'set formula'" for determining how far is too
far, preferring to "engag[e] in ... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." We have, however, described at least two discrete categories of
regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into
the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a
physical "invasion" of his property. In general (at least with regard to
permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no
matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required
compensation... The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land. As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies
an owner economically viable use of his land."6
The regulation in Lucas was a building ban, imposed pursuant to
South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act. The regulation prevented a residential developer from constructing homes on his land."
The Supreme Court concluded the owner met the stricter economic
deprivation test since he could no longer build permanent structures
on his land under the Act.6" The Court noted that under the Penn
Central test, a court may include an inquiry into common law nuisance
principles in order to better understand the scope of a property
owner's vested interest, when balancing the private ownership interests
and the character of the government action. ' Lucas requires one to
consider the "background principles" of the interest allegedly taken, as
they existed in the owner's title prior to the application of the regulation.' On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded:
We have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties
regarding whether [the state] . . . possesses the ability under the
common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a habitable structure on his land. [The state] ...
has not persuaded us that any
common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas's desired use

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992).
Id. at 1015-16 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1015-19.
Id. at 1022-24.
Loveladies Harbor Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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of his land; nor has our research uncovered any such common law
principle."6
However, the Supreme Court seemed to refocus the regulatory takings inquiry in Dolan v. City of Tigard.67 In Dolan, a municipality required, as conditions in a redevelopment permit, a portion of property
lying within a 100-year floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage
system and dedication of an additional 15-foot strip of land as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.' The Supreme Court held that there must be
an "essential nexus" existing between the legitimate state interest and
the permit conditions.' Additionally, if a nexus exists, then conditions
imposed by the municipality must be roughly proportionate to the projected impact of the proposed development." In this case, the Court
concluded the conditions imposed by the municipality were not reasonably related to the impact of the proposed development. Therefore, the Court ruled that the permit conditions were an unconstitutional taking.71
Each case requires the Supreme Court to engage in an independent fact-based inquiry to determine the reasonableness of an owner's
investment-backed expectations.7" For example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, the plaintiff acquired property that was already subject to wetlands regulations." The property owner wished to fill eleven of his wetland acres. When the state denied the permit to fill the land, the
owner asserted a taking under Lucas.74 The Supreme Court ruled that
neither a regulation in place at the time the owner acquired the property nor his knowledge of such a regulation necessarily cut off a takings
claim.7' Additionally, the Supreme Court indicated that some remaining economic value would not defeat a takings claim.76 Thus, even
though a property still had some economic value and the property
owner had knowledge of existing regulations, the owner can assert a
takings claim.7
66. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
67. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U S. 374 (1994).
68. Id. at 379-80.
69. Id. at 386.
70. Id. at 391.
71. Id. at 394-95; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.SA. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2086-87
(2005) (referring to the Dolan case and the Nollan case as "exaction" cases, an exaction being imposed as a condition of permit approval).
72. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT.
REv. 1 (1987); John E. Fee, Unearthingthe Denominatorin Regulatory Takings Claims, 61
U. CHI. L. REv. 1535 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the EthicalFoundationsof "JustCompensation"Law,80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
73. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611 (2001).
74. Id. at 615-16.
75. Id. at 626-30.
76. Id. at 617.
77. Id. at 632.
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In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, the Supreme Court reiterated that a takings analysis demands a
full inquiry and that the outcome depends largely upon the particular
circumstances of the case.'m The Supreme Court emphasized its preference to examine "'a number of factors' rather than a simple 'mathematically precise' formula." ' In addition, in evaluating whether a taking has occurred,
the duration of the [regulatory] restriction is one of the important
factors that a court must consider in the appraisal of a regulatory takings claim, but with respect to that factor as with respect to other factors, the "temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted."*°

In addition to the distinction between per se and other takings
cases, which require balancing the property rights with the public interest, Supreme Court takings jurisprudence clearly distinguishes between physical" and regulatory" takings. A physical taking occurs when
government action amounts to a physical occupation or invasion of the
property, or simply the "practical ouster of [the owner's] possession. " '
Physical takings are invariably per se takings. "[N]o matter how minute
the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it,
we have required compensation. " '
Shortly after Lucas, the New Jersey Supreme Court restated the distinction between physical and regulatory takings:
As the United States Supreme Court has recently observed, "takings"
cases can generally be divided into two distinct categories: cases in
which the government takes title to or physically occupies property,
78. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321 (2002).
79. Id. at 326.
80. Id. at 342.
81. Physical takings cases derived from the Court's historical takings jurisprudence
include: Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
82. Regulatory takings cases derived from the Court's historical takings jurisprudence include: Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedicts, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
83. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 428; Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
84. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
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generally requiring that compensation be paid; and cases in which the
government regulates the permitted uses of property, which require
fact-specific determinations on whether compensation is mandated.
A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government..
. than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good ...
But where the government merely regulates the use of property,
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose
of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the
economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly
singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne
by the public as a whole. The first category of cases requires courts to
apply a clear rule; the second necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government ac-

tions.
The Supreme Court's most recent clarification between physical or
per se takings and regulatory takings is in Tahoe-SierraPreservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency. The Court acknowledged the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee is "designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. " ' However, the
Supreme Court has not simply been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when 'justice and fairness" require the government to compensate landowners for economic injuries caused by public action, rather than permitting the burden to remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
The question presented in Tahoe-Sierrawas "whether a moratorium
on development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constituted a per s' or physical taking of property.8 7
During the two moratoria at issue, "virtually all development on a substantial portion of the property... was prohibited for a period of 32
months. " ' The district court had concluded that the moratoria constituted a "categorical takings" under the Supreme Court's decision in
Lucas.' The Supreme Court distinguished Lucas as applying to the
rare case in which a regulation permanently denies all productive use

85. In re Plan for Orderly Withdrawal From NewJersey, 609 A.2d 1248, 1261 (N.J.
1992) (citations omitted).

86.

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,

336 (2002) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123
(1978)).
87. Id. at 306.

88.
89.

Id.
Id. at n.14.
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of an entire property right: "the Court of Appeals held that because
the regulations had only a temporary impact on petitioners' fee interest in the properties, no categorical taking had occurred."'
The Supreme Court went on to explain:
When the government physically takes possession of an interest in
property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is
taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof. Thus,
compensation is mandated when a leasehold is taken and the government occupies the property for its own purposes, even though that
use is temporary. Similarly, when the government appropriates part
of a rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants, or when its planes use private airspace to approach a government airport, it is required to pay for that share no matter how small.
But a government regulation that merely prohibits landlords from
evicting tenants unwilling to pay a higher rent; that bans certain private uses of a portion of an owner's property, or that forbids the private use of certain airspace, does not constitute a categorical taking.
"The first category of cases requires courts to apply a clear rule; the
second necessarily entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government actions."
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses,
on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical
takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
there has been a "regulatory taking," and vice versa. 9'
The Tahoe-Sierra Court concluded, "these cases make clear that the
categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the 'extraordinary case' in
which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the regulatory taking context, we require a
9
more fact specific inquiry. 2
Justice O'Connor commented in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. on
the current state of takings jurisprudence:
Our precedents stake out two categories of regulatory action that
generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes. First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property-however minor-it must provide just compensation. We held in Lucas that the government must
pay just compensation for such "total regulatory takings," except to
the extent that "background principles of nuisance and property law"
independently restrict the owner's intended use of the property.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 318.
Id. at 322-23 (citations omitted).
Id. at 332.
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Outside these two relatively narrow categories (and the special context of land-use exactions discussed below .. .)regulatory takings
challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City. The Court in Penn Centralacknowledged
that it had hitherto been "unable to develop any 'set formula'" for
evaluating regulatory takings claims, but identified "several factors
that have particular significance." Primary among those factors are
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations." In addition, the "character of
the governmental action"-for instance whether it amounts to a
physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through
"some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good"-may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred. The Penn Central factorsthough each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions-have
served as the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings
claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules.
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be characterized as unified, these three inquiries hare a common touchstone.
Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain....
...A test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on
property rights, or how that burden is allocated cannot tell us when
justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpayers
through the payment of compensation."
A compensable taking surely occurs where regulation "has very
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or
destroying it."94
2.

Partial Takings

Takings of interests in water may be considered as partial takings.
A riparian water right is a portion of a real property interest. If taken,
a part of the real property interest is taken. Appropriative and contractual water rights are quantified in volume and duration. If either volume or duration were limited by government action, a part of the interest may been taken. The success of many takings claims hinges on
the determination of whether to consider the entirety of the plaintiff's
property on which an alleged taking has occurred, or to consider only

93.

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2081-82, 84 (2005) (citations

omitted).
94. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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the portion upon which the government directed its action." The Supreme Court stated the general rule in Penn Central:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather
both on the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.96
A year later, the Supreme Court added: "where an owner possesses
a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be viewed in its en97
tirety.
In 1990, in Loveladies Harborv. United States, the United States Court
of Federal Claims found an unconstitutional taking where the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") denied a permit to fill a wetland.'
Attempting to develop 12.5 acres of a 250-acre tract, which included an
11.5-acre wetland, the landowner sought state permits to fill the wetland.' After years of negotiations, the state granted the permit on the
condition that the plaintiffs mitigate the destruction of the wetlands by
creating a corresponding amount of new wetlands." ° After obtaining
the state permit to fill the wetlands, the landowner sought a federal
permit from the Corps, and the Corps denied the permit."°' Despite
the Corps' argument that the entire 250-acre original tract should be
considered to determine if the property remained economically viable,
the court only considered the 12.5 remaining developable acres. The
developer had already developed and sold much of the original tract,
thus effectively reducing the size of the land where the developer could
build.'9 The developer's plan to dedicate the remaining undeveloped
wetlands to the state served as an indication that there was no development plan for those lands. Accordingly, the court, in determining
the amount of compensation for the taking, treated the wetlands
promised to the state differently than the developable acreage.' 6 The

95. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F. 3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
96. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
97. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
98. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 153-54 (1990).
99. Id. at 154.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 153.
104. Id. at 159.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed,'05 notwithstanding an intervening observation of Justice Scalia in Lucas regarding the "parcel of the whole."'"
The admittedly imprecise measurement of "all economically feasible use" can result in apparently conflicting outcomes. For example,
in Palazzolowhere the landowner lost the ability to develop over half of
his coastal wetland property, the Supreme Court ruled there was no
taking.' 7 Yet, in Loveladies Harbor,the property owner was able to recover for an unconstitutional taking when the Corp's denied him permission to develop 12.5 acres of his total 250 acre-tract.'"
The "parcel as a whole" problem is also present in cases where the
government exercises its power of eminent domain. There, courts address the problem by evaluation of "remainder damages," i.e., damages
to the property not taken. The Supreme Court has held, and subsequently Congress has enacted legislation indicating, that where the
government physically takes even a portion of property, whether affirmatively condemning the land or by other action, compensation is
due for the taken portion, as well as "for any injury to the part not
taken.""°

3.

Temporary Takings

In 1982, in Loretto, the Supreme Court explained that, where the
government intrusion on the use of private property is temporary, a
court should use a balancing test to determine if the invasion is of an
unusually serious nature, as to constitute a taking of private property. '
Later, in 1998, the Court of Federal Claims held that a temporary taking, which denies a landowner all use of his property for a period of
time, requires just compensation."'
105.
106.

Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1183 (Fed Cir. 1994).
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the "property interest" against which the

loss of value is to be measured. When, for example, a regulation
requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural
state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in
which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial

use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the
owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a
whole.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
107. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613-16 (2001).
108. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181-82.
109. 33 U.S.C. § 595 (2000); United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 185 (1911);
United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 338-39 (1910).
110. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982).
111. Allenfield Assocs. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 471, 488 (1998). Also, in 1879,

the Supreme Court held that Chicago's construction of a temporary dam on a river to
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The most recent Supreme Court decision involving temporary takings, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,
involved property near Lake Tahoe, Nevada."2 The temporary moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra raised the issue of whether a temporary interference can be so substantial as to comprise an unconstitutional taking."'
The plaintiff property owners relied on the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
in which the church sought relief from what it alleged was inverse condemnation under a county ordinance prohibiting the reconstruction
of its flood-damaged building in an interim flood protection area."' In
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Supreme Court held the
ordinance to be an unconstitutional taking and required the county to
compensate the property owners for their losses."5 The Court went on
to explain that "'temporary' takings which .... deny a landowner all use
of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for
which the Constitution clearly requires compensation."..6 In response
to the plaintiff's reliance on First English, the Court in Tahoe-Sierradistinguished between an intentionally temporary intrusion, and an in7
tended permanent intrusion that the government later removed.
The Court further rejected the landowners' claim that the thirty-two
month moratorium on developing their property could conceptually
be severed from a fee simple interest "because [the argument] ignores
Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on 'the parcel as a whole.""'"
Citing the Ninth Circuit's decision,
the Court said:
In [the Ninth Circuit's] view a "planning regulation that prevents the
development of a parcel for a temporary period of time is conceptually no different than a land-use restriction that permanently denies

enable the construction of a tunnel was not a taking, even though the dam prevented
landowners from accessing their property during construction. However, the access
involved was a public right of access, not a privately owned right of way. Thus, the
Court held that because the obstruction only temporarily impaired the use of the
landowner's property, and no portion thereof was physically taken, no taking had occurred. Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 636, 643 (1879).
112. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
113. Id. at 306.
114. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 306-08 (1987).
115. Id. at 322.
116. Id, at 318 (quotingJustice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v.
San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981), in which he opined "nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable."
117. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 320-21, 329, 333.
118. Id. at 331 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 13031 (1978)).
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all use on a discrete portion of property, or that permanently restricts
a type of use across all of the parcel."" 9
The Court affirmed that the temporary deprivation of an economically viable use of the property in Tahoe-Sierrawas not a taking because
the moratorium was temporary in nature, and not a serious intrusion
upon the landowners' rights."n However, "the better approach to
claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking 'requires2 carefil examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances." '
B.

Procedural Aspects of Takings Claims

Because takings claims are constitutionally based, either on a provision of a state constitution, the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment,
or the application of the Fifth Amendment to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs may bring takings claims in several different courts."n When plaintiffs premise claims on state constitutional
provisions, plaintiffs may file in state court; if plaintiffs premise taking
claims on the Fifth Amendment, plaintiffs may file either in a federal
district court or in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act,
depending upon the amount in controversy.'2
Litigants can also use
42 U.S.C § 1983 to bring Takings cases.' Because multiple venues are
possible, takings claims may involve preliminary issues of standing,' 5
ripeness, 6 abstention, 7 or issue preclusion."n
119. Id. at 318-19.
120. Id. at 340-43.
121. Id. at 335.
122. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Miller v. City
of Albuquerque, 554 P.2d 665 (N.M. 1976); Cent. Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike,
409 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).
123. Where diversity jurisdiction otherwise exists, a federal district court has original
jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of Federal Claims. See, e.g., Vulcan Materials Co.
v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2001); SK Finance SA v. La Plata
County, 126 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir 1997); But where the contract claim is in excess
of $10,000, the case must be resolved before the Court of Federal Claims. See Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2000); Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 559-60 n.10 (1983); Amerada Hess Corp. v.
Dept. of Interior, 170 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 1999); Stockton E. Water Dist. v.
United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 379, 384 (2004); Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 574
(2002); The Tucker Act has a six year statute of limitations, which is met when an action is filed either in district court or the Court of Federal Claims. Stockton E. Water
Dist., 62 Fed. Cl. at 388.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a right of action against individuals who, acting under
color of state law violate federal constitutional or statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000). Under section 1983, an action for damages may be brought against a state
official, acting in their individual capacity, or a local government for the taking of
property without just compensation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
125. In 1984, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District's ("TCID") claim that the Secretary of the Interior's termination of the contract to operate the project constituted a taking of property rights without due process
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The statutory jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims does not
extend to actions sounding in tort.'" Some governmental actions that
are arguably takings are in fact tortious, justifying damages in tort, but
not just compensation under the Takings Clause. Generally, a taking
involves a contemplated, direct, natural, or probable result of government action, while a tort is typically an incidental result of governmental action. When the injury and loss of property value appears to represent the predictable consequences of government action, courts have
found a taking rather than a tort. For example, in 1940, in Columbia
Basin Orchardv. United States, an orchard owner near the Grand Coulee
dam lost numerous fruit trees due to poor water quality resulting from
the government's discharge of excess groundwater water into nearby
Orchard Lake.' ° Record level precipitation caused overflow of the
lake's salty water onto the orchard lands.'"' When the orchard owner
sued, the Court of Federal Claims found no taking, but held that a
damage reward, if any, would be for tort damages.' 2
In 1982, in Berenholz v. United States, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers triggered floods by removing a large section of a dike.'33 Property
owners who lost their lands were able to recover under a takings claim,
because the flooding of the land was a natural and probable consequence of Corps' action."' Conversely, in 2002, in Drury v. United States,
a property owner brought a claim in federal district court seeking
of law. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Sec'y of Dept. of Interior, 742 F.2d 527
(1984). The court stated:
As a water district responsible for managing a reclamation project, TCID does
not directly own any water rights. Rather, the landowners within the service
area irrigated by the Newlands Project own water rights. ... Only those who
would have lost property, the owners of land with water rights, could claim a
deprivation of property without due process.
Id. at 530-31.
126. Washoe County v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Williamson
County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1996); Levald, Inc. v. City of
Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993); Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d
529 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989);
Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982);
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); United
States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2001); Bath Mem'l Hosp. v. Me. Health Care
Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1988).
128. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); Migra v.
Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980);
Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 379 (2004).
129. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (2000).
130. Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 707-09 (Cl. Ct. 1955).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 709.
133. Berenholz v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 620, 621 (1982).
134. Id. at 627.
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damages in tort for negligent or intentional trespass.' 5 The government persuaded the district court to remove the case to the Court of
Federal Claims on the basis that the property owner had actually alleged a taking." The claims court, however, transferred the case back
to the district court because the plaintiff had indeed stated a cause of
action in tort. 37' The claims court stated:
To determine whether defendant's alleged conduct constituted a tort
or a taking, the essential inquiry is whether the injury to the claimant's property is in the nature of a tortious invasion of his rights or
"rises to the magnitude" of an appropriation of some interest in his
property for the use of the government."
In 2003, in Ridge Line v. United States, the plaintiff filed a claim in
the Court of Federal Claims alleging a taking occurred when the U.S.
Postal Service permitted its stormwater to drain across plaintiffs land.'"9
The Claims Court found no taking had occurred and dismissed the
action."' On review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
found that the Claims Court must first consider and determine
whether to apply tort or takings law to the plaintiffs loss."' "The
tort-taking inquiry... requires consideration of whether the effects...
[experienced by the property interest holder] were the predictable
result of the government's action, and whether the government's actions were sufficiently substantial to justify a takings remedy.""" The
court went on to outline the two-part inquiry used to make this distinction:
First, a property loss compensable as a taking only results when the
government intends to invade a protected property interest or the asserted invasion is the "direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by
the action." Second, the nature and magnitude of the government
action must be considered. Even where the effects of the government
action are predictable, to constitute a taking, an invasion must appropriate a benefit to the government at the expense of the property
owner, or at least preempt the owner's right to enjoy his property for

135. Drury v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 402, 403 (2002).
136. Id. at 403.
137. Id. at 404.
138. Id. at 403-04 (quoting BMR Gold Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 277, 282
(1998)).
139. Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
140. Id. at 1351.
141.
Id. at 1356.
142.
M at 1355.
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an extended period of time, rather than merely inflict an injury that
reduces its value.
In 2004, in Moden v. United States, the government polluted
groundwater near Ellsworth Air Force Base with trichloroethylene
("TCE"), a chemical used to clean aircraft in the 1940s and 1950s.'"
Nearby property owners, claiming a taking, failed to prove the TCE
contamination was a direct, natural, or probable result of the Air
Force's use of TCE on the base rather than merely an incidental or
consequential injury.' The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the takings claim finding that the injury, if any, created a tort claim.'"
H. ANALYSIS OF THE LIKELY EFFECT OF GOVERNMENTAL
ACTIONS ON PARTICULAR INTERESTS IN WATER: WHEN IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING LIKELY TO OCCUR?
The following cases illustrate the significance of the first question
presented in the introduction - what particular legally defensible interests are involved? The applicable water right interests fall under the
following subheadings within this section: riparian property interests,
appropriative water rights, rights to access a water right, water rights
created by contract, and water rights created as an incident of congressional reservation. Although the law overlaps in part between these
different types of water interests, sorting the cases in this fashion helps
to examine the extent to which the governmental action regarding a
legally defensible interest is so substantial as to constitute a taking requiring compensation.
A.

Riparian Property Interests

Riparian rights are the rights of a landowner, who owns property
abutting a river, stream, or lake, to use a reasonable portion of the water in the water body.' 7 Riparian rights are appurtenant to that land
and within the "bundle of sticks" which composes the real property
right of riparian landowners." A riparian right is "an incorporeal he-

143. Id. at 1355-56 (citations omitted).
144. Moden v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 275, 276, 278 (2004).
145. Id. at 289.
146. Id.
147. In this paper, the term "riparian right" is used to include both riparian rights
and littoral rights even though technically speaking, littoral rights in common law
parlance refer to property interests in coastal waters, while riparian rights refer to
property interests in streams and rivers. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 952, 1332 (8th ed.
2004).
148. "Ripa" derives from the Latin for "bank" or edge of the water body and therefore does not connote the water in the water body itself. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 6.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2001).
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reditament rather than a corporeal right because the flow of water itself cannot be owned or possessed."'49 Therefore, one can only own a
right to use water as it passes over or lies upon one's land. Historically,
at common law, the downstream owner was entitled to the absolute
"natural flow" of water.'50 Now, however, most riparian jurisdictions
generally require only that downstream owners receive a reasonable
use of the waterway.'5 ' This entitles upstream riparian landowners to
use the water so long as their use does not deprive downstream landowners of their reasonable use.'52 Although riparian rights exist in
many states, each state's law measures the specifics of reasonable use
and acceptable riparian activity differently. ' A riparian water right is
also recognized in the sovereign interest of a riparian state. A continuing sovereign interest in the appropriate exercise of riparian rights is
incumbent in the attributes of privately held riparian property rights.'
In Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Lyman, an early case before the U.S.
Supreme Court involving riparian rights, riparian interests of the landowners included the right of fishery and the right to use stream water
for mill purposes. "' These rights were private property rights.' 56 The
state legislature granted a charter for a dam that would obstruct the
flow of the stream, but later amended that charter to enable fish to
swim freely in the stream.'57 The recipient of the legislative charter
protested that the amendment abridged his prior contractual interests. ' The court denied the claim on the basis that the parties' riparian rights were always encumbered by a public right to maintain a viable fishery in the river, which necessitates maintaining unobstructed
paths for fish.'59 Since the legislative mandate did not diminish the
riparian right, no impairment had occurred."n
In Olympia Light and Power Co. v. Harris, a power company condemned riparian property for use in producing power.'6 ' The land149. Id. § 7.02(a).
150. Id. § 7.02(c).
151. Id. § 7.02(d).
152. Id. § 7.02(d) (2).
153. See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. United States 282 U.S. 399, 404-05 (1931).
154. See Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 67 (2003) ("[D]ominion over navigable
waters, and property in the soil under them, are so identified with the exercise of the
sovereign powers of government that a presumption against their separation from
sovereignty must be indulged." (quoting Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 89
(1926))).
155. Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. 500, 506 (1872).
156. See id. at 507.
157. Id. at 508-10.
158. Id. at 511.
159. Id. at 517.
160. See id. at 521-22.
161. Olympia Light & Power Co. v. Harris, 108 P. 940, 940-41 (Wash. 1910). Riparian interests can be condemned as separable property interests. See Spokane Valley
Land Co. v.Jones & Co. 101 P. 515, 520 (Wash. 1909).
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owner sought compensation for loss of rights to fish, hunt, water stock,
boat, and take water for domestic use. ' The court held that these
were riparian rights, and the government must compensate the landowners if there was a taking.'6" However, the court found that the value
of these rights could be affected or nullified if the power company enabled the landowner to continue his riparian use by permitting him to
cross intervening public property.TM
As western states began adopting permitting systems, which require
users to obtain permits for appropriative rights, the question arose
whether the establishment of permitting systems was an unconstitutional taking of prior existing undocumented riparian rights. When
Nevada's water code was adopted in 1903, and made comprehensive in
1913, riparian property owners challenged the Nevada Legislature's
action on the basis that it took property without compensation." The
Nevada Supreme Court dismissed these claims because the distribution
of the waters of the state was within the state's police power." Similarly, in a decision that the Supreme Court subsequently adopted in
PacificLive Stock Company v. Lewis, the Oregon Supreme Court, in 1914,
67
held that enacting permitting systems was within a state's power. Justice Van Devanter quoted the Oregon Supreme Court saying:
Water rights, like all other rights, are subject to such reasonable regulations as are essential to the general welfare, peace and good order
of the citizens of the state, to the end that the use of water by one,
however absolute and unqualified his right thereto, shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others entitled to the equal privilege
of using water from the same source, nor injurious to the rights of the
public."'8
A state legislature's or judiciary's action amending prior state
property law pertaining to water rights may, however, have the effect of
taking the property without compensation where those rights were
162. Olympia Light & Power, 108 P. at 941.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803, 805-06 (Nev. 1914); see Pitt v. Scrugham,
195 P. 1101, 1102 (Nev. 1921).
166. Ormsby County, 142 P. at 806; Pitt,195 P. at 1103.
167. In reWillow Creek, 144 P. 505, 514 (Or. 1914); Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241
U.S. 450 (1916).
168. Pac. Live Stock, 241 U.S. at 449. Compare this statement of water rights regulations to Justice Sutherland's description of land use regulations:
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must
find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the
public welfare, ... and the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted... for
the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of the
[regulation's] power.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-8 (1926).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

firmly vested through reliance on the prior state law and the subsequent legislative or judicial action places "a sufficient cloud upon the
tire of the plaintiffs so as to interfere substantially with the financing of
improvements or any potential sale of their lands."' 9 In Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Hawaii Supreme Court, which held that earlier territorial decisions upholding
the use of "normal surplus" water flowing into the Hanapepe River, for
use outside that river's drainage, were void.'7 ° The Hawaii court overruled all territorial cases and adopted the common law doctrine of riparian rights, relying on the sovereign powers of the State to control
the waters of the Hanapepe.'7 ' Recognizing the investment in improvements in reliance on the territorial decisions, the Ninth Circuit
found that "any reasonable interpretation of the word 'vested"' included the plaintiff's use.7
The court noted, "[n]ew law, however,
cannot divest rights that were vested before the court announced the
73
new law."
On the other hand, where water is put to use so that the use is
deemed "vested," subsequent changes in the law injurious to this use
may represent a compensable taking.
In InternationalPaper Co. v. United States, the Secretary of War took a
riparian interest in water flow, which plaintiffs previously used to produce hydropower and operate mill works, to produce power for the
war effort during World War

1.

'

The U.S. Supreme Court found that a

direct expropriation of a property interest had occurred.
In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., the Supreme Court upheld
a Court of Federal Claims decision to compensate riparian water right
holders "for the loss of actual beneficial use," noting that compensation for the taking of a water right does not extend to any unreasonable use of water.'76 In Gerlach, the property owner held riparian prop77
erty downstream from a dam constructed by the federal government.1
The property owner's riparian interest was diminished by a prior appropriate right and an easement imposed on the property by a grantor
reserving a riparian interest in a quantified amount greater than the
normal flow of the river. This interest was transferred to another ripar-

169. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded
to determine ripeness, 477 U.S. 902 (1986), dismissed as not ripefor review, 887 F.2d 215 (9th
Cir. 1989).

170.
171.

Id. at 1474-75.
Id.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 404-05 (1931).
Id. at 406-08.
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752 (1950).
Id. at 727-28.
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ian property owner, which would be served by diversions created by the
upstream dam.'"
The United States claimed authority to operate the project under
its commerce power to control navigation, which indicates that the
federal government would not have to compensate the riparian landowners for the intrusion on their riparian rights." The Supreme Court
concluded that Congress, in an exercise of its constitutional power to
tax and spend for the general welfare, had elected to proceed under
the reclamation laws and therefore had to pay for any vested rights
taken by the Government. "[W] hether required to do so or not, Congress elected to recognize any state-created rights and to take them
under its power of eminent domain.""
In Gerlach, the Court of Federal Claims granted the riparian owners' takings claims." ' The Supreme Court determined that the Court
of Federal Claims had properly understood state law and affirmed the
awards.' 2 The Supreme Court held that the government had proceeded under the Reclamation Act of 1902 rather than its authority to
regulate navigable waterways.'
The Supreme Court then ruled that
California law, rather than federal law, would determine the landowners' property rights."
Interpreting the California Constitution, the
Supreme Court held that the water rights at issue were limited in quantity to such water as beneficial use reasonably required.' 5 The Supreme Court also held that the lower court properly awarded compensation only for the loss of actual beneficial use, stating that the public
welfare, which requires claimants to sacrifice their individual benefits
for public ones, did not require that their loss be uncompensated."
In Dugan v. Rank, the court found that when the federal government impaired "almost three fourths of the natural flow" of the San
Joaquin River, by storing and diverting water at Friant Dam, the action
constituted a partial taking of riparian rights. 7
In a 1973 case, Belle Fourche IrrigationDistrict v. Smiley, the South Dakota Supreme Court rejected a claim by a riparian who asserted that he
had a vested right to use or divert water from the Belle Fourche River
for domestic and irrigation purposes.'" The riparian claimed that this
right became "an inseparable incident of his land when it was settled;
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 752.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 743, 751-52.
Id. at 752.
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620-23 (1963).
Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105, 107 (S.D. 1973).
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use did not create it and disuse cannot destroy it; and to deny such

right deprives him of property without due process of law and without
just compensation."" Rejecting this argument, the South Dakota Supreme Court determined that the legislature had the authority to create a vested right in water that was already being utilized for beneficial
purposes prior to passage of the state water law system. The court also
held that the South Dakota Legislature could limit the rights of riparian owners to domestic use or to those uses granted under their statutory prior appropriation scheme."
In 1985, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that the legislature
could extinguish or limit unexercised riparian rights by statute. The

court held that "the 1917 water code established prior appropriation as
the dominant water law in Washington. " " ' The court concluded that
the denial of a water right claim based on riparian status did not constitute an unconstitutional taking because the state had the authority
under its police powers to deny claims. The court added:
In other states, it is well established that riparian rights may be extinguished or limited by statute. That a state has the power to either
modify or reject the doctrine of riparian rights because [it is] unsuited to the conditions in the state and to put into effect the doctrine
of prior appropriation has long been settled.'92
Texas, through exercise of its police power, allows the state to terminate riparian rights because of nonuse."' Appropriation acts in Kansas and Oregon, which give state government the authority to extinguish riparian rights, have also withstood takings challenges.'94

However, in Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, the Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated that a riparian
water user enjoys the protections of the takings clause even after the
state adopts a prior appropriation system. 5 Franco-American addressed
the issue of how much water riparian owners had the right to use. The
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 107-08.

191. Dept. of Ecology v. Abbott (In re Deadman Creek Drainage Basin), 694 P.2d
1071, 1072 (Wash. 1985).
192. Id. at 1077 (citation omitted).
193. In re Adjudication of Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the
Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982).
194. See, e.g., Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F.Supp. 617, 624-25 (D. Kan. 1956), aftd, 352
U.S. 863 (1956); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan. 1962); F. Arthur
Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1173 (Kan. 1981) (holding that mandatory

permit procedures for appropriation of water and imposition of criminal penalty for
violation of those procedures does not constitute a taking of property rights because it
is a reasonable exercise of police power); In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1084 (Or.

1924).
195. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd. 855 P.2d 568, 577
(Okla. 1990).
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court found that limiting the riparians water use to domestic use constituted an unconstitutional taking of the remainder of the riparian
water right. 96' The Oklahoma Water Resources Board contended that
riparian water right holders were able to preserve their rights under
1963 legislation, which provided a mechanism to protect common law
riparian water rights that existed prior to the Oklahoma's adoption of
the prior appropriation doctrine in 1897. The court ruled that the
legislative mechanism, which would have allowed a riparian to maintain only a certain quantity of water as a vested right, did not protect
the riparians' common law right, which is not limited in quantity but
only by its reasonableness.'97 Thus, the court held the 1963 legislation
unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution and ordered the
trial court to reconsider the reasonableness of the riparian's water
uses.198

Operating under a unique system managing both riparian rights
and appropriative rights, the California Supreme Court, in In re Waters
of Long Valley Creek Stream System, ruled in favor of preserving future
riparian rights.' As part of a stream adjudication, the trial court upheld the California Water Resources Control Board ("CWRCB") determination that a riparian's water right only extended to the eightynine acres that he and his predecessors had been irrigating over the
previous sixty years, thereby extinguishing any future water right for
his remaining 2,884 acres.'
The riparian property owner appealed,
claiming the water board could not extinguish his riparian right to
greater water use in the future. The California Supreme Court held
that such an extinguishment of future rights would constitute a taking.
The court explained:
[A]lthough the Board has broad authority to define and otherwise
limit future riparian rights, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to authorize the complete extinction of any future riparian
rights in circumstances in which the Board has failed to establish that
the most reasonable and beneficial use of waters subject to the adjudication proceeding could not be promoted as effectively by placing
other less severe restrictions on such rights.20'
However, the court noted that while it would be unreasonable to
extinguish an unexercised riparian water right, the CWRCB could limit
a future riparian use, so long as those limitations deal with the scope,
196. Id. at 676-78.
197. Id. at 577.
198. Id, at 571,577.
199. Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d
656, 660 (Cal. 1979).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 659.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

nature, and priority of that use, and such limitations do not constitute
an outright extinguishment of the right.
Thus, the Board is authorized to decide that an unexercised riparian
claim loses its priority with respect to all rights currently being exercised.... [Wlhile we interpret the Water Code as not authorizing the
Board to extinguish altogether a future riparian right, the Board may
make determinations as to the scope, nature and priority of the right
that it deems reasonably necessary to the promotion of the state's interest in fostering the most reasonable and beneficial use of its scarce
water resources. 202
Riparian water users must not unreasonably interfere with the
rights of other riparian owners. For example, in the case of drought,
all riparian owners would presumably bear equally the impact of the
reduced amount of water, as the measure of reasonableness changed.
The question remains, however, whether a government imposed regulation in the name of drought protection, which reduces the reasonable use of all riparians, would constitute a taking? In California, such
a reduction would likely not be a taking because the water board has
broad authority to reduce a riparian water right according to what
constitutes reasonable use. Unfortunately, current case law does not
squarely respond to this question.
In a case arising in the Sixth Circuit, Stupak-Thrall v. United States,
the government imposed a regulation in 1991 prohibiting houseboats
and sail boats within the Sylvania Wilderness Area in Michigan's upper
peninsula, thereby reducing the scope of reasonable use of water under a state-based riparian right to fish, boat, sail, and swim." 3 The federal district court found that no taking had occurred because, under
Michigan state law, riparian rights are subject to reasonable regulation
under the state's police power. "Riparian rights are not, however, absolute rights. They may be regulated under the police power of governmental units. In addition, when the uses of riparian owners are in
conflict, riparian rights may be limited by the reasonable use doctrine."' The Sixth Circuit affirmed."5
In 1995, the Forest Service passed a second regulation prohibiting
use of non-electric motorboats in the same Sylvania Wilderness Area.2
When the riparian owners challenged the second regulation, the court,
after looking at the effect of the regulations on the livelihood of the
plaintiffs and the value of their riparian property, found a taking had
202.
203.
204.
205.
evenly
206.

Id. at 668-69.
Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 843 F.Supp. 327, 328 (W.D. Mich. N. Div. 1994).
Id. at 331.
Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 70 F.3d 881 (6th Cir. 1995), affd en banc by an
divided court, 89 F.3d 1269 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519. U.S. 1090 (1997).
Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F.Supp. 1055, 1058 (W.D. Mich. N. Div. 1997).
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occurred. "The motorboat restrictions in Amendment No. 5 directly
and significantly affect fundamental attributes of Plaintiffs' ownership
and enjoyment of their property ....

There can be no real question

that Amendment No. 5 will result in a significant diminution of value
to the riparian land.""'7
In many instances, riparian water rights are subject to the principles of public trust. This article addresses the implications of the public trust doctrine on riparian and other water rights below.f8

B.

Appropriative Water Rights

The prior appropriation doctrine protects the rights of the prior
users of water against the rights of subsequent users. The geographic
position of land in relation to the water is irrelevant. Rights protected
by the prior appropriation doctrine arise from state law. Water rights
based on prior appropriation may or may not require a permit . In
some states, a permit or certificate can constitute primafacie proof of a
perfected water right, whereas the development of diversion structures
and beneficial use of a certain amount of water, by itself, may not. Two
experienced Utah water lawyers expressed their view on the continuing
governmental interest in appropriative water rights:
While private rights can be acquired to use water, and while these
rights are property interests which are entitled to protection and cannot be taken without due process and payment of just compensation,
it is fundamental that the state has an interest in the use of the water
resource which justifies regulation to govern the manner in which the
resource shall be used. The concept that the state has a dominant interest in use of the water resource by private individuals has been a
part of the law of the West from the very beginning. Water rights
could be lost through nonuse. The very nature of a water right implied a reasonably efficient use, so as to prevent waste, and the courts
have not been hesitant to prevent excessive uses or wasteful practices.
Early statutes in the various states expressly declared the public nature
of the water resources and the public interest in its use. State constitutions frequently expressed the same public interest.
The public concern and public interest in water use became more
acute as the water use began to exhaust available supplies. So long as
there were surplus waters, or a supply fully adequate to meet the demands placed upon the stream, there was no urgency in preventing
wasteful practices or to carefully supervise and regulate water use. As
the available supplies diminished, and as the demand for water use
threatened to exceed the available supply, the public interest re-

207.
208.

Id. at 1065.
See infra text accompanying notes 385 - 408.
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quired that more stringent efforts be made to conserve, utilize and
regulate the use of water....
So it can be seen that there is a vital public interest in water. It is a
limited natural resource upon which the very function and survival of
society depends. While the water supply is renewable in the sense
that nature provides a new supply each year, the total volume of water
that will be renewed each year is limited, even though the annual
supply will fluctuate as a result of variations in the precipitation pattern. In short, the vital public concern in a wise and judicious
use of
m
the water resource justifies and requires state regulation.2
An appropriative water right is a right to use water. It is "usufructuary, " ' meaning that it is a right to use211 the thing and enjoy its fruits
and profits, rather than a right to own the thing. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, the principle of "beneficial use" limits the quantity and manner of the water right. Limiting an appropriative water
right to its beneficial use is generally not a taking. Beneficial use is the
basis, measure, and limit of water rights in most western states.1 Inasmuch as beneficial use is the limit of a water right, a use that is not
beneficial under the state's definition would not be part of the bundle
of property rights comprising an appropriative right. In Lucas v. South
CarolinaCostal Council, the Supreme Court explained:
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only
if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with. This accords, we think, with our "takings" jurisprudence,
which has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citi-

209.

EDwARD W. CLYDE & DALLIN W. JENSEN, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION LEGAL

STUDY 3: ADMINISTRATIVE ALLOCATION OF WATER 31-33 (1971).
210. Derived from the Latin usufructus. Generally refers to a right to use without
diminishment or damage to the property or other users. BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY 1580
(8th ed. 2004).
211. The distinction between the right to use and the right to own is often misunderstood. The right to "use" water includes the right to "consume" it, hence the term
"consumptive use." Perhaps a better distinction is between a right to the exclusive use
of water and the right to the shared use of water. Water retains a servitude of public or
common interest notwithstanding recognition of the right as being within the control
of any particular person.
212. See, e.g., Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Wash. 1993). See
also Sax, supra note 9, at 267 ("While owners of most property have a right to make
inefficient uses is they so choose, this is not true of owners of water rights."). For example, a Utah statute provides that "[b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state." UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3
(2005). Similar statutes include: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (B) (2005); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 533.035 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-8

(2005).
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zens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they obtain title to property. It
seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his
property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers;
"[a]s long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power."213

Because non-beneficial uses are not part of a water right owner's
bundle of rights, limiting a water right to its beneficial use does not
take any rights away from the owner of the appropriative right. Therefore, the greater the extent of limitations and conditions a state places
upon a water right at issuance, the smaller the scope of a water right
holder's constitutionally protected uses will be.
Similarly, if the use of the water was such that it would constitute a
nuisance under state law, a regulation stopping its use would not take
any aspect of the water right. However, in order for the government's
regulation to succeed, it cannot simply proffer a legislative declaration
that the property owner's intended uses are inconsistent with the public interest, rather the government must identify the background principles of state nuisance and property law that prohibit the intended
14
uses."
Thus, in a water right case, if either the doctrine of beneficial
use or state nuisance law prohibits the purpose for which the water
right owner seeks to use his water, then government action may diminish the use, and even extinguish it without incurring any constitutional
liability. Such government action does not actual take anything, because a water right does not include the right to put the water to a nonbeneficial use or to use the water in a way that state nuisance law would
otherwise bar.
One attribute of a prior appropriation right is seniority in the priority system based on the time the right vested. The common phrase
"first in time, first in right," refers to the seniority element of an appropriative water right. This phrase indicates that a senior appropriator is entitled to satisfy his water right even if by doing so he leaves a
junior appropriator without water. '
Just as continuing state regulation of the manner of use will not
generally constitute a taking, the state may take subsequent actions to
limit the amount of water subject to the right, without constituting a
taking. In 1938, the Supreme Court ruled in Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cheny Creek Ditch Co. that no taking occurred when the State of
213. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (quoting
in part Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).

214.

I& at 1031.

215. See, e.g., Clough v. Wing, 17 P. 453, 456 (Ariz. 1888); Wishon v. Globe Light &
Power Co., 110 P. 290, 292 (Cal. 1910); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5
P.3d 1206, 1218 (Utah 2000) (citing UTAH CODEANN. § 73-3-1).
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Colorado formed an interstate compact with New Mexico in a manner
that interfered with pre-existing appropriative water rights."' "[T]he
apportionment [by compact] is binding upon the citizens of each State
and all water claimants, even where the State had granted the water
rights before it entered into the compact."" 7 In an 1898 water proceeding, Colorado had adjudicated the water rights involved in the
dispute."' Accordingly, the i7olorado Supreme Court decided that the
later, 1923 interstate compact took a portion of the pre-existing 1898
rights.2 1 9 The Supreme Court overruled the Colorado Supreme Court,
reasoning that because Colorado controlled only an equitable share of
the La Plata River, the pre-existing right holders' interests could only
be as large as the state's equitable interest.' Therefore, adoption of
the interstate compact did not effect a taking, because, in terms later
used by the Lucas Court, the attributes of the right purportedly taken
were "not part of [the property] to begin with.""
Government regulations limiting the usage rights of junior appropriators in favor of senior appropriators do not, by their very nature,
take any portion of junior appropriator's water rights. In Central Colorado Water Conservancy District v. Simpson, a water conservancy district
and others claimed that application of a 1989 state law, granting augmentation exemptions for certain gravel pit owners, represented an
unconstitutional taking of a portion of existing junior water rights.'
Colorado's Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
19 69 3 regulated the evaporative loss of tributary groundwater exposed
by the excavation of open pit sand and gravel mines. The Act mandated augmentation water to compensate for evaporative loss from the
pits. " The Act provided augmentation exemptions for certain sand
and gravel pits excavated prior to 1981 or meeting specific criteria.'
The conservation districts alleged that the new law "create[d] a new
class of water rights not subject to the appropriation system" because
qualifying operations were not required to replace the evaporative loss
of tributary groundwater.' The districts claimed that in dry years, reduced flows would injure junior water right holders because a call on
216.

Hinderlinder v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 99, 106

(1938).
217.

Id. at 106.

218.
219.

Id. at 98.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 25 P.2d 187, 187-88

(Colo.
220.
221.
222.
1994).

1933).
Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 102.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 339-40 (Colo.

223.

COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2005).

224.
225.
226.

Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 877 P.2d at 339.
§ 37-92-502(b); see also Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 877 P.2d at 339.
Cent. Colo. Water Cdnservancy Dist., 877 P.2d at 344.
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the river would not enable the state engineer to force exempted mining operations to reduce evaporative losses.f 7 The Colorado Supreme
Court held:
Although the water court found that implementation of [the Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969] will "somewhat
...
decrease" the amount of water in the river available for use, this
fact alone does not establish "substantial" damage to any particular
water right owner. Owners of water rights have no title to the water in
the river, whatever its volume might be at any particular time. While
owners of senior water rights are entitled to protection from injurious
depletions by owners of junior water rights, the [conservation districts'] effort to equate potential injuries with actual damages for
purposes of takings analysis is not persuasive. m
Importantly, the court added that the Act would not prohibit the
holder of a water right senior to the water right of a qualifying sand or
gravel pit operation from seeking a remedy in court based on specific
evidence that the gravel pit operation directly caused an injury to the
senior water right holder.
Because state officials retain the discretion to grant or deny a permit in a prior appropriation system, the question arises whether an
unpermitted (or uncertified) water right is sufficiently perfected to
justify a takings claim. For example, under Utah water law, a certified
right is prima facie evidence of a constitutionally protected property
interest:
Upon it being made to appear to the satisfaction of the state engineer
that an appropriation ... has been perfected in accordance with the
application therefor, and that the water appropriated . . . has been
put to a beneficial use . . . he shall issue a certificate .... The certificate so issued and filed shall be prima facie evidence of the owner's
right to the use of the water in the quantity, for the purpose, at the
place, and during the time specified therein, subject to prior rights.2 '
While a certificate can aid a water right holder in protecting his inUtah case law indicates that,
terest, an uncertified right is inchoate.
if an application lapses for failure to submit timely proof of appropriation, a taking does not result from the consequent reduction in priority.
it.232

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 347.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 343.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-17 (2005).
Mosby Irrigation Co. v. Criddle, 354 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1960).
Id.
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While case law dealing with uncertified water rights differs from
state to state, the Supreme Court's decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
is informative."' In Palazzolo, the Supreme Court ruled that while a
takings claim is not necessarily unavailable because the party bringing
the claim acquired property after adoption of a regulation diminishing
the property's value, a factual inquiry is required in each case to discover whether the property owner's investment-backed expectations
were reasonable under the circumstances.234 If the investment-backed
expectations were not reasonable in light of the circumstances, a taking did not occur.' However, if an unperfected water right is involved,
a takings claim based on sufficient investment-backed expectations may
not succeed. The very failure to perfect the right indicates insufficient
investment-backed expectations,"
C.

The Right to Access a Water Right

As many water rights in the West are not put to use on riparian
land, the water right holder may need additional property rights in
order to gain physical access to water. If the government through
regulation prohibits access to the water source, the water right is impaired. Cases vary regarding whether such an impairment is an unconstitutional taking requiring compensation.
In Okanogan County v. National Marine Fisheries, the United States
Forest Service ("Forest Service"), the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, and the National Marine Fisheries Service negotiated for over
two years about the amount of in-stream water required to accommodate the bull and steelhead trout species, both listed as endangered
under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
Pursuant to the negotiations, the Forest Service adopted minimum in-stream flow rates within
irrigation canals." Because the canals crossed federal land, a Forest
233. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
234. Id. at 630. The Court held that takings claims are not barred because title after
the effective date of a regulation:
A final decision by the responsible state agency informs the constitutional determination whether a regulation has deprived a landowner of "all economically beneficial use" of the property, or defeated the reasonable investmentbacked expectations of the landowner to the extent that a taking occurred.
These matters cannot be resolved in definitive terms until a court knows "the
extent of permitted development" on the land in question.
Id. at 618 (citations omitted).
235. Id. at 618.
236. Id. at 618-21 (holding that regulatory agencies must have the opportunity to
.exercise their full discretion" in granting property rights before a takings claim is
ripe).
237. Okanogan County v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CS-01-192-RHW, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13625, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 13, 2002), aff'd, 347 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir.
2003), and cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1029 (2004).
238. Okanogan County, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13625, at *3.
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Service special use permit was required to access the water."' When
the Forest Service imposed a condition on the special use permits that
required users to maintain minimum in-stream flows for endangered
fish, the irrigators claimed that the condition effectively denied water
right owners access to the water they were entitled to by right."'
The irrigators alleged that the Forest Service's decision to place
conditions on water use for the benefit of ESA-listed fish was arbitrary
and capricious. " ' The irrigators relied on United States v. New Mexico,
in which the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to reserve water rights for wildlife preservation purposes when they enacted
the Organic Administration Act and the Multiple Use Sustained Yield
Act establishing national forests. 4 '
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that the Forest Service did not effectuate a taking by
conditioning the permits and did not relinquish its power to impose
such conditions through the special use permits. 42 Rather, the Forest
Service had the authority to place conditions on special use permits in
accordance with the ESA, 24 4 and courts may review such conditions for
arbitrariness and capriciousness. ' The court concluded that the Forest Service did not act arbitrarily by imposing conditions for the benefit
of ESA-listed fish in the Methow River. 6
Okanogan suggests that a water right holder's water right and real
property access rights are separable and distinct.2' Federal agencies
possess the ability to obtain in-stream flows simply by limiting the terms
of special permits."* From the perspective of the Supreme Court's decision in Lucas, access across federal land is not part of an irrigators'
right to water. Although the district court did not address the issue in
19
these terms, its ruling is consistent with Lucas.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision.2u While acknowledging that the ESA does not grant federal
agencies power that they do not otherwise possess,' the National Forest Management Act, 22 Organic Administration Act,2 Federal Land
239. Id. at *2.
240. Id. at *3-5.
241. Id. at *27-29.
242. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707-08, 713-15 (1978).
243. Okanogan County, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13625, at *10-11, *18-19.
244. Id. at *18.
245. Id. at *27.
246. Id.
247. See id. at *10-11, *18-19.
248. Id. at*12-13.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
250. County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081, 1081 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1029 (2004).
251. Id. at 1085.
252.
16 U.S.C. § 160 4 (g)(3)(A)-(B) (2000).
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Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), ' and the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield Act provided the Forest Service authority to "maintain
certain levels of flow in the rivers and streams within the boundaries of
the Okanogan National Forest to protect endangered fish species. " '
"The permits [issued pursuant to those statutes], from their inception,
provided the government with unqualified discretion to restrict or
terminate the rights-of-way." 7 The Court of Appeals also found that
FLPMA's savings clause' was not pertinent as the case involved the
right of way, not the water right itself.'O The court distinguished United
States v. New Mexico because New Mexico
...did

not address the power of the Forest Service to restrict the use

of rights-of-way over federal land ....

FLPMA specifically authorizes

the Forest Service to restrict such rights-of-way to protect fish and
wildlife and maintain water quality standards under federal law, without any requirement that the Forest Service defer to state water law.2
However, the Court of Appeals suggested that if the irrigators had
alleged that their state water rights had vested prior to Congressional
enactment of the Forest Service's permitting authority, then they
would implicate the FLPMA savings clause, and a takings claim could
have been cognizable."l
A similar result occurred in Bradshaw v. United States where cattle
ranchers, after refusing to pay associated grazing fees, sought continued access to water via the Humboldt National Forest.12 The Court of
Federal Claims, while not ruling on the ranchers' takings claim with

253.

16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000).

254.

43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).

255. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000).
256. County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1029 (2004).
257.

Id.

258.

"Nothing in this Act... shall be construed as terminating any valid lease, per-

mit, patent, right-of-way, or other land use right or authorization existing on the date
of approval of this Act." Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-579, § 701 (a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2786 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)). It adds,
"[a]ll actions by the Secretary concerned under this Act shall be subject to valid existing rights." Id. § 701(h).
259. County of Okanogan, 347 F.3d at 1086.

260.
261.

Id.
Id. at 1085 (noting that "[aippellants did not establish that they had vested

rights to use the ditches to supply their water needs prior to the enactment of the
FLPMA in 1976"); see also Washoe County v. United States (Honey Lake), 319 F.3d 1320,
1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding a 2001 Court of Federal Claims decision denying an right-of-way application across federal land, stating that "[t ] he government did
not effect a physical taking...because it neither physically appropriated nor denied
meaningful access to Appellants' water rights.").
262. Bradshaw v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 549, 551 (2000).
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respect to water rights," held that the imposition of grazing fees was a
reasonable condition on the ranchers' continued use of federal land.'
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit upheld a decision finding no taking where
cattle ranchers in New Mexico refused to pay for grazing permits, and
the state subsequently denied the ranchers access to water. In Diamond
Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, the court explained:
In entering summary judgment for the United States, the district
court held plaintiffs obtained no legal right of possession or use
merely because their predecessors historically grazed cattle on the
land. Nor did the court find it material that plaintiffs' water rights
may have long been vested under New Mexico law, stating:
"[W]hether Plaintiffs own certain water rights . .. does not change

the fact that such rights do not deprive the Forest Service of its statutory authority and responsibility to regulate the use and occupancy of
National Forest System lands for livestock grazing through the issuance of grazing permits." The court enjoined plaintiffs from grazing

livestock in the Gila and Apache National Forests until they obtained
authorization from the Forest Service.2
In Hage v. United States, another cattle rancher obtained a different
result when the Court of Federal Claims agreed with a water right
holder seeking continued access to a water right.' Hage alleged that a
taking occurred when the Forest Service revoked his grazing permits
and denied his use of rights-of-way after he removed several trees adjacent to irrigation ditches in order to provide his cattle access to the
water. 7 Hage claimed that he possessed a right to continue to cross
federal land to exercise a water right for his cattle even after the Forest
Service revoked his grazing permits.' Although agencies who issue
rights-of-way for ditches can place conditions on their use, the Court of
Federal Claims ruled that Hage owned the right, and the associated
rights-of-way, to access water by crossing federal land.'
The Forest Service argued that Hage exceeded his right of reasonable maintenance as described in the Forest Service Manual when he
cleared the vegetation.'o The court ruled that the Ditch Rights-of-Way
Act of 1866 generally allowed, and the legislative intent of the Act supported, a 50 foot right-of-way of on either side of a ditch to provide
ample access; thus the court rejected the Forest Service's contention
263.
264.
265.
ted).
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 552.
See id. at 553.
Diamond Bar Cattle Co. v. United States, 168 F.3d 1209, 1211 (citations omitHage v. United States, 51 Fed.Cl. 570, 584 (2002).
Id. at 573, 581 n.14.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 585.
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that the Forest Service Manual controlled."' Judge Smith cited the
repeated use of that specific measurement in 19th century House and
Senate floor debates over the bill: "[T] he Forest Service Manual does
not have the force of law. It can not [sic] alter a statutory right....
The Manual was created to guide Forest Service personnel, not to govern private citizens in the exercise of their rights." 7 '
The court found that Hage obtained various water rights with a
priority date that predated the 1907 creation of the Toiyabe National
Forest Reserve. 73 Thus, Hage had a vested right to continue to access

those waters.

4

The court admonished,

IT] he government cannot deny citizens access to their vested water
rights without providing a way for them to divert that water to another
beneficial purpose if one exists. The government cannot cancel a
grazing permit and then prohibit the plaintiffs from accessing the water to redirect it to another place of valid beneficial use. The plaintiffs have a right to go onto the land and divert the water.275
The court relied on Elko County Board of Supervisors v. Glickman, a
1995 decision of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, holding that a vested right-of-way that runs across Forest Service
lands is subject to reasonable Forest Service regulation so long as the
regulation
does not amount to a prohibition against exercising that
7
right. 1

In Washoe County v. United States, also known as the Honey Lake case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a
2001 Court of Federal Claims ruling that the Bureau of Land Management's ("BLM") denial of an application for a right-of-way to transfer water across federal land did not constitute a taking of a state water
right because the water right had not been perfected.
Nevada's
Washoe County entered into a contract under which it obtained appropriated water rights previously held by the Fish Springs Ranch in
the Honey Lake Valley of northwest Nevada. 8 The Ranch was located
between an Army depot in Lassen County, California on the west and
the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation on the east.' In 1989, despite
objections from the Army and the Pyramid Lake Tribe of Indians
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
1995).
277.
2003).
278.
279.

Id. at 586.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 584.
Id.
Elko County Bd. of Supervisors v. Glickman, 909 F.Supp. 759, 764 (D. Nev.
Washoe County v. United States (Honey Lake), 319 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
Id. at 1322.
Id.
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("Tribe"), Nevada's state engineer granted a change in the place of
use, as well as a change in the manner of its use, from agricultural to
municipal and industrial use.2 80

In order to use the water in its newly authorized place of use, the
county sought a right-of-way from BLM in order to transport the water
via pipeline south to the Reno-Sparks metropolitan area. " ' The Army
and Tribe objected to the draft Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") BLM distributed for comment.82 The decision "as to whether
to proceed further with the development of a final EIS was elevated to
the Secretary of the Interior."8 ' The Secretary issued an order directing the BLM to suspend work on the final EIS until the county resolved
objections from the Army, the Tribe, and the United States Geological
Survey. 8 ' Because the objections were not resolved, the BLM effectively denied Washoe County's right-of-way permit application.8
The county argued that by denying the right-of-way application,
BLM denied the county meaningful access to its state-recognized water
right, thereby effectuating a physical taking requiring compensation. 6
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the ight to
cross federal land was not part of the water right owner's title to begin
with:
In the instant case, the government has neither physically diverted or
appropriated any water nor physically reduced the quantity of water
that is available to the Appellants from the water source on the
Ranch ....

[T]he government has not affected Appellants' water

rights except by denying permission to use the government's own
land to exploit those rights ....

Because the government neither

physically diverted or reduced the amount of water accessible by Appellants nor denied all meaningful access to their water rights, it did
not effect a physical taking. .

.

. Washoe County applied for a

right-of-way to build a pipeline on federal land. Washoe County and
the other Appellants28 7had no right to build on federal land and thus
no interest in the land.
The scope of the right of access to a water ight depends greatly on
the attributes of the water right owner's title at the outset. Okanogan
held that government action may interfere with state-issued water

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1322-33.
1323.

1325.
1327 (emphasis added).
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rights so long as there is statutory support for the action.'
Okanogan
also established that, as long as the government's permitting authority
predated the vesting of water rights, conditions destroying the exercise
of the right are justified. " Further, Honey Lake held that the right to
access a water right may depend on whether the holder of right perfected the right prior to the agency obtaining the power to condition
access across the government's land.' Where the title enjoyed by the
water right owner does not include a vested right of access across the
land in question, which was established prior to the agency's ability to
regulate such land, reasonable restrictions, including restrictions that
may virtually cut off access, have been upheld.
On the other hand, Hage provides an example of access to a water
right vested in a cattle rancher prior to the creation of the Toiyabe
National Forest, which allowed the rancher to cross part of the forest to
access his right."l While the government may reasonably regulate such
a right and charge reasonable fees for the use of the land crossed, the
government cannot unilaterally deny access the land to a valid, perfected water right."2 To do so would require compensation under the
Fifth Amendment."
Where the water right owner has reasonable access to water, such
as in Honey Lake, the government is not obligated to grant the water
right owner additional license to construct on or cross federal land.
Denying additional means of access does not take any rights away from
the right holder because those features were not an attribute of the
original water right.
D. Water Rights Created by Contract
A contract with the United States may give rise to a right to use water. Delivery of water pursuant to a contract with a governmental entity, such as an irrigation district or the United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau"), enables the exercise of state-based water rights. 4
288. County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 347 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1029 (2004).
289. Id. at 1085-86.
290. Washoe County v. United States (Honey Lake), 319 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
291. Hage v. United States, 51 Fed.Cl. 570, 573-74, 583 (2002).

292.

Id. at 584.

293.

Id. at 573, 592.

294.

Bureau project water may be obtained from: (1) state-based rights held prior to

the project's congressional authorization; (2) state-based rights obtained from state

officers by the Bureau under state permitting systems; (3) federal control of the waterway, as in the case of Lower Colorado River projects authorized by the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (2000); or (4) contracts to transport non-project water
under the Warren Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-525 (2000). Courts construing federal contract rights have assiduously maintained the distinction between state-based water
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In Ickes v. Fox, reclamation project water users alleged that the government took their vested state-based water rights.' In 1906, pursuant
to authority granted under the Reclamation Act of 190 2 ,' the Secretary of the Interior approved the Sunnyside Unit of the Yakima Reclamation Project. 7 In the 1930's, the Bureau of Reclamation levied additional fees on the water district, which had utilized the project pursuant to contract, to cover the costs of constructing another dam in the
area.'s The Supreme Court held that, because the water users complied with their contractual obligations and put their water to beneficial use, their right to use project water vested under Washington state
law.tm The Supreme Court enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from
taking action to change the vested water rights.' The Supreme Court
noted:
Appropriation [of water] was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the landowners;
and by the terms of the law and of the contract.. . the water rights
became the property of the landowners, wholly distinct from the
property right of the government in the irrigation works."'
The Court added that state law determines whether water users acquire property rights in the water provided by Reclamation projects.'
Ickes illustrates an attempt by the Bureau to change the quantity of
water and the price thereof, although the terms of water delivery contract explicitly protected both quantity and price. The Court's holding
indicates that the government cannot reduce water availability or price
under an existing contract unless the contract provisions allow such
changes. If the government acts outside of the contract provisions, a
compensable taking occurs. Ickes also illustrates that if irrigators in a
water delivery contract comply with their obligations by paying their
fees in full, their right to a fixed quantity of water, at the agreed conrights and federal contract rights. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 629
(1945); United States v. Tilley, 124 F.2d 850, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1941); Verde River Irrigation & Power Dist. v. Work, 24 F.2d 886, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1928); New York Trust Co. v.
Farmers Irrigation Dist., 280 F. 785, 795 (8th Cir. 1922); Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United
States, 269 F. 80, 88 (8th Cir. 1920); New York Canal Co. v. Bond, 265 F. 228, 233 (9th
Cir. 1920); Tulelake Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 342 F.2d 447, 452 (Ct. Cl. 1965);
Bean v. United States, 163 F.Supp. 838, 844 (Ct. Cl. 1958); El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of El Paso, 133 F.Supp. 894, 921 (W.D. Tex. 1955).
295. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 92-93 (1937).
296. Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 371
(2000)).
297. Ickes, 300 U.S. at 88.
298. Id. at 92.
299. Id. at 94.
300. Id. at 96-97.
301. Id. at 95.
302. Id. at 95-96.
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tract price, is a vested right, and such rights enjoy the same protections
as any other state-issued water right.
In Nevada v. United States, the federal government tried to reallocate some of its water rights from the Newlands Project to the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Indian Tribe in Nevada."3 The Orr Ditch decree of 1944
enumerated the water rights for the project, the Tribe, and Truckee
River water users.: 4 Pertinent contract language between the federal
government and the irrigation district stated: "[A]pplication is hereby
made to the [Truckee-Carson Irrigation District] ... for a permanent

water right for the irrigation of and to be appurtenant to all of the irrigable area now or hereafter developed under the above-named project[.]"" 5 The Supreme Court ruled that land owners relying on Project waters held vested rights to that water, and that those rights could
not be taken without appropriate compensation. The Court said:
Once these lands were acquired by settlers in the Project, the Government's "ownership" of the water rights was at most nominal; the
beneficial interest in the rights confirmed to the Government resided
in the owners of the land within the Project to which these water
rights became appurtenant upon the application of Project water to
the land"

6

The Court precluded the United States from modifying the irrigators' water rights as outlined in the Orr Ditch Decree.' 7
The terms of a contract define the attributes of a contractual water
right. Those terms may preclude a takings claim. In Peterson v. United
States, the Ninth Circuit rejected claims brought by water agencies that
the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 ("RRA") had taken their water
rights, and held that the Central Valley Project contracts gave the government the authority to regulate the quantity of subsidized water provided to the contracting water users."
In Peterson, water districts challenged the constitutionality of RRA §
203(b),' a so-called "hammer clause," which gave the water districts
the options of either amending pre-existing contracts to conform to
the RRA's new provisions, or continuing to receive water at the original
contract price for delivery to land not exceeding an acreage limit, but
then paying full cost for any water delivered to leased land exceeding
the limit.10 The plaintiff water districts declined to amend their con303. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 113 (1983).
304. Id at 145.
305. Id. at 126-7 n.9 (emphasis omitted).
306. Id. at 126.
307. Id. at 145.
308. Peterson v. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 806-08, 811 (9th Cir. 1990).
309. Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, tit. II, sec. 203(b), 96 Stat. 1264, 1265 (1982)
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(a),(b) (2000)).
310. Peterson, 899 F.2d at 806-07.
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tracts and brought an action in federal court claiming that the "hammer clause" violated the Fifth Amendment's due process and taking
clauses."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's denial of the takings claim, stating that by passing the RRA:
Congress increased the size of farms that could receive reclamation
water to 960 acres.., and raised the price of reclamation water to reflect more accurately its true cost to the government. Section 203(b)
authorized the Water Districts to amend their contracts to take advantage of the 960-acre limitation, albeit at a potentially higher, but still
subsidized, rate than that provided in their contracts. The Water Districts were not required to amend their contracts because any water
district that wanted to maintain the 160-acre limitation and lower contract price was left free to do so. Section 203(b), the so-called hammer clause, simply provided that those who elected to continue under
the original contracts could no longer continue to deliver subsidized
water to leased tracts of any size. Section 203(b) requires the Water
Districts to choose between continuing under previous federal water
policy, but without the "leasing loophole" tolerated by the Department of the 12Interior, or conforming with the new 960-acre limitation
of the RRA.
The Water Districts contend that because they were not expressly
prohibited by the Department in their contracts from providing water
to leased land, they have a contractual right to do so which must be
considered "vested" or immune from later regulations or statutory
amendments....
[T] he implied right asserted here clearly violates
the spirit, if not the letter, of the reclamation laws which authorized
such contracts. The reclamation projects were funded by the federal
government with the express intent that the subsidized water be used
to promote the development of family-owned farms. ...
Congress
had always required that land receiving reclamation water be owned
in no larger than 160-acre parcels and that the owners of the land occupy it or reside in the neighborhood. The fact that the Department
of the Interior ignored the residency requirement and turned a blind
eye to the practice of large-scale leasing does not lessen the importance of these restrictions in the congressional scheme....
The contracts contain no language that can be construed as a "surrender[] in unmistakable terms" of the sovereign's ability to regulate
the quantity of subsidized water that may be provided to leased farm
lands3 t s

311.
312.
313.

Id. at807.
Id. at 813-14.
Id. at 810-12.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

In O'Neill v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
a water user's contractual enforcement proceeding based on a fifty
percent reduction in water delivery from the San Luis Unit of California's Central Valley Project ("CVP").

34

The contract between the Bu-

reau of Reclamation ("BOR") and the water users contained a provision limiting the government's liability for water shortages caused by
"errors in operation, drought, or other causes. .315 The contract, executed in 1963, provided for Westlands Water District's receipt of
900,000 acre-feet of water annually."' For several years, the BOR delivered the 900,000 acre-feet each year pursuant to the contract."7 Disputes over the contract arose in 1978 when the government claimed
the contract was invalid. 8 For the next eight years, the BOR and the
district entered into short-term delivery contracts, and then in 1986 the
parties agreed to operate under the 1963 contract. 9' However, a substantial challenge ensued after federal agencies listed the Sacramento
River winter-run chinook salmon and the delta smelt as a threatened
species in 1990 and 1993 respectively.' 2 In 1993, the BOR announced
that, pursuant to efforts to comply with both the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA") and the purposes of the CVP, they would reduce water
delivery to the Wesdiands District by half."' Water users and the district
sued, but due to the contract limitation, the BOR refused to release
more water."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the contract language in favor of the government. Article 11(a) of the contract
"limit[ed] the government's liability for water shortages caused by errors in operation, drought, or any other causes."" 3 The court held
that, "[o] n its face, Article 1 1(a) unambiguously disclaims any liability
for damages in the event the United States is unable to supply water in
times of shortage. "3 4 This included artificial shortages, such as legislatively created storage to provide water for endangered species."5 Due
to the contract terms that allowed the federal government to reduce
the water quantity to comply with a statutory mandate, the water rights
held by the landowners were not absolute, and, therefore, the landowners could not enforce delivery of a specific quantity of water.
314.

O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 681, 689 (9th Cir. 1995).

315.
316.

Id. at 680.
Id.

317.
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Similarly, in Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, hydrologists predicted that the San Acacia stretch of the Middle Rio Grande in New
Mexico would dry up due to extreme drought adversely affecting the
endangered silvery minnow."' As part of the San Juan-Chama Project,
imported water was stored in the Heron Reservoir and was under contract for delivery to farmers and municipalities.3 "7 The court concluded
that the BOR's obligations under the ESA authorized it to release water
from federal projects and to restrict and prorate the established water
contracts for deliveries from the San Juan-Chama Project and the Middle Rio Grande Project as needed."'
Although the district court referenced contractual language that
appeared to negate a takings claim against the United States, the court
nevertheless directed compensation if water was withheld."
In granting the preliminary injunction forcing the release of water from federal projects, the district court stated: "[i]f BOR and FWS conclude
that 2003 water deliveries to contractors must be reduced in order to
avoid jeopardy to the silvery minnow, under the Court's Order, the
contractors must be compensated for the amount of contracted water
not delivered to them."30
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision, but noted that compensation to the adversely affected state
water right holders may be required.3 ' Although the compensation
portion of the district court's order was moot because the contracts
were not abrogated, the court indicated that "the issue of compensation will likely resurface with reallocations that may eventuate from
BOR's exercise of discretion."3 3
326. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, No. CV 99-1320 JP/RLP-ACE, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9246, at *27 (D. N.M. Apr. 19, 2002), preliminary injunction granted by 356
F.Supp. 2d 1222 (D. N.M. 2002), affd, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), and vacated and
appeal dismissed, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
327. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9246, at *61-62.
328. Id. at *53.
329. Id. at *67.
330. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F.Supp. 2d 1222, 1235 (D. N.M. 2002)
(granting preliminary injunction and providing findings of fact and conclusions of
law), affd, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), and vacated and appeal dismissed, 355 F.3d
1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
331. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1138, vacated and appeal dismissed, 355
F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
332. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 333 F.3d at 1138. Six months later, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals found moot, and vacated its June 2003 panel opinion affirming the
injunction granted by the district court giving BOR broad authority to abrogate water
contracts to meet the needs of the silvery minnow. The court reasoned,
The climatological circumstances that occurred during the appeal and the
passage of time have rendered the injunction superfluous. No water has been
diverted, and the order requiring diversion expired.... Thus, the injunctive
order from which this appeal was taken no longer provides the court with a
live controversy to review. Therefore, this appeal is moot.
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In Tulare Lake, the Court of Federal Claims determined that the
BOR's water pumping restrictions, imposed in order to provide water
for endangered fish, constituted a physical taking of water from irrigation districts using water delivered through a federal project.33 The
irrigators received their water from the coordinated pumping system of
the Central Valley Project and the California State Water Project,
thereby, utilizing both federal and state infrastructure and contracts.'
The Court of Federal Claims observed:
In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use-the hallmark of a regulatory action-completely eviscerates the right itself
since plaintiffs' sole entitlement is to the use of the water. Unlike
other species of property where use restrictions may limit some, but

not all of the incidents of ownership, the denial of a right to the use
of water accomplishes a complete extinction of all value. Thus, by
limiting the plaintiffs' ability to use an amount of water to which they
would otherwise be entitled, the government has essentially substituted itself as the beneficiary of the contract rights with regard to that
water and totally displaced the contract holder. That complete occupation of property-an exclusive possession of plaintiffs' water-use
rights for preservation of the fish-mirrors the invasion present in
[United States v.] Causby [328 U.S. 256 (1946)]. To the extent, then,
that the federal government, by preventing plaintiffs from using the
water to which they would otherwise have been entitled, have rendered the usufructuary right to that water valueless, they have thus effected a physical taking.335
However, the same court came to a different result under similar
circumstances in Kandra v. United States, where the BOR shut off water
to farmers in the Klamath River Basin in Southern Oregon and Northern California in April 2001 in order to prevent harm to endangered
fish in Klamath Reservoir." Irrigators and the Klamath Water Users
Association sued to enjoin the agency's action.3 7 The court held the
irrigators' contractual water rights were subservient to ESA and tribal
trust requirements stating, "the ESA explicitly prohibits the relief [the
irrigators] seek."" The irrigators subsequently filed a lawsuit in the
United States Court of Federal Claims seeking compensation for a taking and for the impairment of water rights under the Klamath Basin

Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 355 F. 3d 1215, 1219-20 (10th Cir. 2004).
333. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.C1. 313, 314-15,
318-19 (2001).
334. Id. at 314.
335. Id. at 319.
336. Kandra v. United States, 145 F.Supp. 2d 1192, 1195-96 (D. Or. 2001).
337. Id. at 1195.
338. Id. at 1211.
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Compact.' Although the situation was factually similar to the situation
in Tulare Lake, the Court of Federal Claims denied Klamath Basin irrigators' allegations under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.'
The court criticized its earlier Tulare Lake decision, finding that it was
"wrong on some counts, incomplete in others and, [sic] distinguish3'
able, at all events. ' 1
The court determined that it "must give practical meaning to the
term 'property"' as used in the constitutional context. 42 The plaintiffs
claimed property interests from a number of sources, including federal
reclamation law, general state water law, and water delivery contracts.13
As to reclamation law, the court noted that in 1922 Congress granted
the BOR authority to not only contract for water deliveries with individual users, but also with water districts. 44 In 1926, Congress enacted
further legislation specifying that only state-recognized districts may
enter into federal contracts."5 Thereafter, the BOR contracted exclusively with irrigation districts to deliver water. 6 The contracts for
Klamath Basin water with the districts superseded provisions of certain
BOR contracts with individual users.347
The court determined that the BOR was obligated to assure that its
operation of the Klamath Project did not result in jeopardy to any endangered species.3 4" At the time of the Klamath suit, the BOR was in
the process of establishing an operating plan for the project to balance
"competing purposes and obligations."3 9 The court noted that, if the
BOR determined its proposed action would result in jeopardy to endangered species, then the BOR must modify the proposal.3 Indeed,
previous biological opinions indicated that the project would in fact
351
threaten three fish species.
Thirteen of the fourteen contracts between water districts and the
BOR contained provisions "holding the United States harmless for 'any
damage, direct or indirect,' resulting 'on account of drought or other
causes' of 'a shortage in the quantity of water available' from Project
sources." 3
339.
256, at
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The court noted that, to prevail on a takings claim, the plaintiffs
must establish a private property interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution." Because water belongs to the public, state water rights are usufructuary in nature."4 Section eight of the
Reclamation Act required the BOR to comply with state law in acquiring project water."5 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that takings claims were supported by Ickes v. Fox," Nebraska v. Wyoming,"' or
Nevada v. United States,' concluding that "Congress, in passing the reclamation laws, [did not] intend[] to create usufructuary rights independent of state law.""' Therefore, the court considered whether, under state law, the plaintiffs had property rights in the Klamath Basin.'
The court found that the United States obtained rights to all unappropriated waters in the basin as of 1905 and acquired pre-1905 rights
by contract." l The court concluded that the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment protected post-1905 contractual rights, but "cautioned
against commingling takings compensation and contract damages. " "
The court cited Hughes Communications Galaxy v. United States, in which
the court noted, "[t]akings claims rarely arise under government contracts because the Government acts in its commercial or proprietary
capacity in entering contracts, rather than in its sovereign capacity.""
The court then applied the Hughes rationale: "the United States
may be viewed as acting in its proprietary capacity in entering into the
water contracts in question, and it appears that the affected plaintiffs
[as third party beneficiaries] retain the full range of remedies with
which to vindicate their contract rights."' The court noted that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in O'Neill v. United States, concluded
that water shortage provisions in BOR water contracts do not obligate
the BOR to deliver the full contractual amount of water if such delivery
is inconsistent with the ESA. "'
The court also concluded that even for those contracts that did not
contain such shortage provisions, the reductions ordered did not result
in a breach under the sovereign acts doctrine." "An act of govern353.
354.
355.

Id. at *32.
Id. at *55.
Id. at *5-6.

356.

Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937).

357.
358.
359.

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
Klamath IrrigationDist., 2005 U.S. Claims LEXIS 256, at *55.

360.

Id. at *61.

361.

Id. at *65, 74-75.

362.

Id. at *90-91.

363.

Id.; Hughes Commc'ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed.

Cir. 2001).
364. Klamath IrrigationDist., 2005 U.S. Claims LEXIS 256, at *95.
365.

Id. at *109 (citing O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 682-4 (9th Cir. 1995)).

366.

Id. at*112.
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ment will be considered to be sovereign so long as its impact on a contract is 'merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective. '
Further, the court stated, "[s]everal courts
have concluded that the enactment and subsequent enforcement of
,, 368
the ESA should be viewed as sovereign acts ....
The court also addressed the holding in the Tulare Lake case, which
upheld the plaintiffs' claims to damages because the reduction
amounted to a physical taking of property3' The court found the Tulare Lake decision flawed because it "failed to consider whether the contract rights at issue were limited so as not to preclude enforcement of
the ESA," and it treated the contract rights of the districts as absolute
without adequately considering whether they were limited in the case
of water shortage "either by prior contracts, prior appropriations or
some other state law principle," and the court never reached the
analysis of whether the claim should be treated as a contract breach
rather than a takings claim. 7 °
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' patent deed and state
water permit claims.3 7' The court noted both the deeds and the permits, which were acquired after 1905, were, thus, subservient to prior
rights, and "could not have been taken... by the failure of the [BOR]
1'372
[as senior water right holder] to deliver water....
E.

Water Rights Created by Implied Congressional Reservation

Implied congressional reservation may also create water rights.
Whether the federal government sets aside land for a national forest,
an Indian reservation, a national park, or military purposes, an implied
right to water on such land is reserved for federal use. The amount is
limited to the water needed to serve the primary purposes for which
the land was set aside. Numerous decisions by the high court have refined the definition and scope of such reserved water rights.3 73 Because

367.

Id. at'*112-13.

368. Id. at *114.
369. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.Cl. 313, 318-19
(2001).
370. Klamath IrrigationDist., 2005 U.S. Claims LEXIS 256, at *116-18.
371. Id.at'119-20.
372. Id. at*121.
373. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978) (holding that "Congress intended that water [for National Forests] would be reserved only where necessary to preserve the timber or to secure favorable water flows for private and public
uses under state law."); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (holding
that "the United States acquires a reserved water right in unappropriated water [for
National Monuments] which vests on the date of the reservation [."); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) (holding that tribal reservations had right to federal
reserved water rights to "irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations" for both the present and the future).
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the federal government cannot initiate a takings claim against itself,
reserved rights are rarely associated with a takings claim.
Although the government cannot sue itself for taking a reserved
right to water, it is conceivable that others who enjoy a property interest created by an implied reservation of water could assert a claim if
that property interest were taken. In 1998, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled on the extent to which incidental beneficiaries of reserved water rights held property interests in excess water. 7 1 In Marcopa-Stanfield Irrigation & DrainageDistrict v. United States, several water
districts in Arizona alleged that, by passing the San Carlos Apache
Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act ("SCAT Act"), the government took
their right to use excess water resulting from the Ak-Chin Indian Water
Rights Settlement Act. 75 Pursuant to the Ak-Chin allocation, the AkChin Tribe was to receive 75,000 acre-feet per year, or 85,000 acre-feet
in years where sufficient water was available. 7 ' Because the two sources
for tribal water, the Central Arizona Project ("CAP") and the Ak-Chin
allocation, "together produced 23,300 to 33,300 [acre-feet] more water
than the Ak-Chin Tribe was entitled to under the terms of the settlement, Congress stated that the Secretary 'shall allocate' this excess
3 77
Ak-Chin water 'on an interim basis to the Central Arizona Project.'
In the years preceding the final SCAT Act allocations, the secretary
adopted a system to make the excess water available:
The Secretary decided that the Indian tribes, which include the
Ak-Chin and the San Carlos Apache Tribes, could contract for up to
309,000 [acre-feet] of water from the CAP. Municipal and industrial
users were entitled to contract for as much as 640,000 [acre-feet] of
CAP water. The non-Indian agricultural pool was allotted the right to
contract for whatever CAP supply remains after the tribal, municipal,
and industrial users purchased the water allotted to them in 1983.378
The excess water remained in the CAP for eight years." In 1992,
Congress approved a settlement agreement that provided that the Secretary would allocate excess water to the San Carlos Apache Tribe.'m
Two years later, the water districts sued for damages asserting a takings
claim."' The claimant water districts alleged a right to water from the
374. Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 158 F.3d 428,
434 (9th Cir. 1998).
375. Id. at 432-33.
376. Id. at 432.
377. Id. (citing Act of Oct. 19, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-530, § 2(k), 98 Stat. 2698, 2701
(1984)).
378. Id. at 431 n.3 (citations omitted).
379. Id. at 432.
380. See San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, tit. 37, § 3704(c)-(d), 106 Stat. 4740, 4742-43 (1992).
381.
Maricopa-Stanfield,158 F.3d at 432-33.
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non-Indian agricultural pool pursuant to subcontracts with the Central
longer available afArizona Water Conservancy District, which was no
2
Act.8
Settlement
Ak-Chin
the
ratified
ter Congress
The "Ak-Chin Settlement Act direct[ed] the Secretary to 'allocate'
the excess Ak-Chin water 'on an interim basis to the Central Arizona
Project' without naming a specific allottee or class of allottees.3 8 ' The
court held "Congress's failure to designate a specific user or user class
[for the excess water] convinces us that, even if the excess Ak-Chin
water generally was available to the districts before 1992, the Ak-Chin
Settlement
Act conferred upon them no protectable property inter, 4

est.

38

Thus, while Congress can impliedly reserve protectable water rights
to serve the purposes for which federal land is reserved, only by explicit
statutory language will such reservations also preserve a right for incidental third party beneficiaries directly affected by the reservation of
water rights. When a statute expressly protects such third party beneficiary rights, adverse impact to those rights may require just compensation.
F.

The Public Interest and the Public Trust Doctrine

In prior appropriation water rights systems, water is publicly
owned. 5 Riparian rights, which are appurtenant to private landowner
rights, may also be subject to a continuing public interest. Even after a
usufructuary right is established or recognized, the government, as
protector of the public's interest, remains involved. State courts in the
West have relied on this public interest to justify limiting private water
Various courts
rights without compensating the water right owner.'
have emphasized the role of state constitutions and statutory provisions
stating that water is the property of the public. 7 The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas, in a decision finding Kansas's
permitting system constitutional, reasoned, "[a] dequate water supply is
a necessity. In the arid and semi-arid regions of the West it is imperative that all available water be utilized beneficially and without waste. " '
382. Id.
383. Id. at 435.
384. Id. at 436.
385. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supranote 5, § 30.04.
386. See Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan. 1956), aff'd per curiam,
352 U.S. 863 (1956); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968) (upholding
state law limiting water right to beneficial use); In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1092-93
(Or. 1924) (limiting the extent of the right of a riparian water user).
387.
See Baumann, 145 F. Supp. at 623; Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d
1164, 1172-73 (Kan. 1981); Pratt v. Dep't of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn.
1981).
388. Baumann, 145 F. Supp. at 625 (holding the Kansas Water Appropriation Act of
1945 constitutional).
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Further illustrating the substantial public interest in water resources, in

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,Justice Holmes proclaimed:
[Flew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to
maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public
welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect
use. This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State, and
grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and we
are of opinion that ... private property . . . cannot be supposed to
have deeper roots ....
The private right to appropriate is subject not
only to the rights of lower owners but to the initial limitation that it
may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public
welfare and health."'
ProfessorJoseph Sax commented on Holmes' statement, writing:
Uustice Holmes] intuited what is indeed a radical idea, that basic resources must be seen not only as ordinary property subject to the
rules and assumptions of the private property system, but also as elements of the community's capital stock, the use and protection of
which could affect the fate of the whole community.'

In EsplanadeProperties,LLC v. City of Seattle, a landowner proposed
constructing homes on pilings above navigable tidelands." The city's
denials of the proposal did not constitute a taking of the landowner's
property, as the tidelands, used by the public for recreation, were imbued with a public trust and, therefore, the property owner's interest
was not diminished by denial of the construction proposal. 9 ' Similarly,
in R.W. Docks & Slips v. Wisconsin, a permitting agency declined to
grant a fill permit at the last phase of the development of a lakeside
marina."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the action on the
basis that the public trust doctrine limited the scope of the property
interest such that the government action did not constitute a taking.'9
The public trust doctrine can also limit the exercise of water rights.
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that
state lands under the navigable waters of Lake Michigan were held in
trust for the people, could not be sold or conveyed, and the retaking of
389. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
390. Sax, supra note 9, at 276.
391. Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003).
392. Esplanade, 307 F.3d at 984, 987. See also McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580
S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003); Coastal Petroleum v. Chiles, 701 So.2d 619, 625 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997).
393. R.W. Docks & Slips v. Dep't of Natural Res., 628 N.W.2d 781, 791 (Wis. 2001).

394.

Id.
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such lands following their grant was an appropriate exercise of sovereign authority that did not constitute a taking."'
However, states cannot use the public trust doctrine as a rationale
to establish new rights to use water. In Wisconsin v. Illinois, Wisconsin
and other states sought to enjoin a diversion from Lake Michigan
where the water diluted and carried away sewage from Chicago into
the Mississippi River drainage.' Wisconsin argued that it held proprietary interests in the lanes of barge traffic on the Great Lakes and that
the diversion itself was a taking of property 97 The diverters argued
that their diversion of water through Chicago, and ultimately into the
Mississippi River, augmented navigation and that the public trust doctrine protected this use for the benefit of the Mississippi River states
and the nation as a whole.' The court rejected both public trust arguments.'
In the Mono Lake case, the California Supreme Court ruled that the
public trust doctrine applied to water rights, and used the doctrine to
limit appropriative water rights and promote flow into the lake.' The
court unanimously held that the public trust doctrine always limited
appropriations affecting navigable waterways, stating:
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the.., use of the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current knowledge
or inconsistent with current needs.
The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allocation decisions
even though those decisions were made after due consideration of
their effect on the public trust.401
State-issued water rights in California are thus subject to continual
exercise of the public trust.")2 Where the public trust limits a water
right, there is no taking of private property where the governmental
interference imposes no greater limitation than does the public trust."

395.
396.
397.
398.

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1929).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 401.

399.

Id. at 420-21.

400.

Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 723-24 (Cal.

1983).
401. Id at 728.
402.

Id. at 727.

403.

Id. at 723.
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This is consistent with the background principles announced in LuCaS.404

In Idaho Conservation League v. Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court
ruled that while "all water rights, are impressed with the public trust[,]
... the public trust doctrine is not an element of a water right used to
determine the priority of that right in relation to the competing claims
of other water right claimants. " " Subsequently, the Idaho State Legislature clarified that the public trust doctrine does not apply to water

rights. °6
In TulareLake Basin v. United States, the United States Court of Federal Claims rejected the argument that the public trust doctrine should
be considered within the "background principles" of the right arguably
taken.47 The court dismissed this argument because the state agency
responsible for defining the rights involved had not addressed the application of the public trust to these rights.
There is... no dispute that [the California Department of Water Resources] permits, and in turn plaintiffs' contract rights, are subject to
the doctrines of reasonable use and public trust....
Nor is there serious challenge to the premise that the [State Water Resources Control Board], under its reserved jurisdiction, could at any time modify
the terms of those permits to reflect the changing need of the various
water users. The crucial point, however, is that it had not ....
Nor can we, as defendant urges, make that determination ourselves.
It is the Board that must provide the necessary weighing of interest to
determine the appropriate balance under California law between the
cost and benefit of species preservation. 8

III. VALUATION IN JUST COMPENSATION
Courts use the principles developed in other inverse condemnation
cases or cases involving affirmative condemnation pursuant to the
power of eminent domain to determine the value of interests in water
taken without just compensation. To the extent those cases involve
real property, valuing the property taken is arguably easier than the
case of valuing interests in water. In water cases, valuation theory dif-

404. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
405. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995).
406. Idaho Code Ann. § 58-1203(2) (2002), amended &yH.B. 794, ch. 342 (Idaho
1996). The amending act stated, in relevant part: "Specifically, but without limitation,
the public trust doctrine shall not apply to: . . .The appropriation or use of water, or
the granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights..."
407. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed.Cl. 313, 320-21
(2001).

408.

Id. at 324.
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fers, for example, based on the origin of the water right (e.g., riparian,
appropriative, contractual) and its attributes.'
When the government takes property, "[n]ormally, the proper
measure of just compensation . . . is 'the fair market value of [the]
property at the time of the taking.'"" The property owner whose interest is taken must "be put in the same position monetarily as he
would have occupied if his interest had not been taken."... When analyzing the just compensation for a water taking, courts consider
whether the government action took the water right, or whether the
water itself is merely a portion of a perpetual right. For example, California law distinguishes between water and water rights.4 As a typical
water right is a perpetual right to divert water at a given point in a waterway, taking this specific amount of water is like a temporary taking
of the water right itself.
In Dugan v. Rank, a case stemming from the construction of the
Friant Dam as part of the Central Valley Reclamation Project, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to hold that "the absence of specificity
as to the amount of water to be taken prevents the assessment of damages... "",'In Dugan, property owners sought an injunction to prevent
the storage of water at the dam because it would impair appropriated
rights and reduce riparian flows.'
Even though the Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the United States and remanded the case, in addressing the specificity of the claim itself, the
Court said:
While it is true.., that the Government did not announce that it was
taking water rights to a specified number of "gallons" or, for that
matter, "inches" of water, we do not think this quantitative uncertainty precludes ascertainment of the value of the taking.... We find
no uncertainty in the taking."5
Addressing the manner in which to assess damages in such a case,
the court said:
In an appropriate proceeding there would be a determination of not
only the extent of such a servitude but the value thereof based upon

409. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752 (1950) (stating that the limiting concepts of beneficial use and waste may, for example, be relevant
to some questions of valuation).
410. Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
411. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 47374 (1973).
412. Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 61-62 (Cal. 1939) (distinguishing
between water itself and a water right).
413. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 610, 623 (1963).
414. Id. at 614-15.
415. Id. at 623, 626 (citations omitted).
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the difference between the value of respondents' property before and
project,
after the taking. Rather than a stoppage of the 1government
6
this is the avenue of redress open to respondents.
In the past, Courts have used several approaches to establish fair
market value. The easiest, and the one courts typically use in cases
involving the taking of real estate, is comparison of the property taken
against other sales or transactions of like property under like conditions where willing sellers and willing buyers establish value through
arm's length transactions." 7 Alternative approaches include replacement value, diminution in value, and rental value (in temporary takings cases). Choosing the appropriate valuation approach depends
upon the origin of the water right and its attributes. Typically, the
same court that has determined that an unconstitutional taking has
occurred determines the value of the interests in water.
A.

Valuation in Riparian Water Rights Cases: Diminution in Value

A riparian water right is an attribute of a real property right.
Therefore, valuation of a riparian water right requires determining the
amount by which the government diminished the real property's value
taking its riparian component. The diminution in value method requires a comparison of the value of the interest before and after the
government action constituting the taking. Cases involving takings of
riparian interests generally fall into two categories: those in which a
new use of water reduces or eliminates water for the riparian use," 8 and
those involving inundation by flooding thereby diminishing either the
riparian or non-riparian use of the land. 9
In Sharp v. United States, a 1903 eminent domain case, the Supreme
Court held that a riparian landowner could receive compensation for
the actual land taken by the government, but not for the diminution of
value in his adjacent tracts of land." In United States v. Grizzard, the
government raised the water level on Tates Creek, a tributary to the
Kentucky River, to improve navigation. A local farmer lost a portion of
his land, as well as the use of a public road, which provided access to
416. Id. at 626.
417. Id. 624-26.
418. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752 (1950); Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. 500, 507 (1872); Olympia Light & Power Co. v. Harris, 108
P. 940, 941 (1910).
419.
See, e.g., United States v. Dickenson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947); United States v.
Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266 (1939) (holding no taking occurs where the inundation is possible within an historic floodway, but prospective and uncertain); United
States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 182, 185-86 (1911) (holding that plaintiff is entitled to

remainder damages for inundation of property by water controlled by U.S, but a taking
did not occur).
420. Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341, 354 (1903).
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his remaining land. ' The trial court held that the government must
compensate the farmer for the loss of the flooded land and for the
easement, but not for the reduced value of the remaining property."
Reversing that decision, the Supreme Court extended the damage
award to include the loss in value of the farmer's adjacent land on
which the flooding occurred.
Whenever there has been an actual physical taking of a part of a distinct tract of land, the compensation to be awarded includes not only
the market value of that part of the tract appropriated, but the damage to the remainder resulting from that taking, embracing, of
course, injury due to the use to which the part appropriated is to be
devoted .... The determining factor was that the value of that part
of the Grizzard farm not taken was fifteen hundred dollars, when the
value of the entire place before the taking was three thousand dollars.
A judgment for a less sum will not be that "just compensation" to
which the defendants are entitled.423
The Supreme Court also affirmed an award that included compensation for the diminished value of the remaining land.4 4 A few years
later, Congress passed the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1918, mandating compensation for taken lands and property interests,
425
including" any injury to the part not taken."
In United States v. Dickinson, compensation for a taking included the
flooded riparian lands, and other portions of the parcel affected by the
government's actions.4
The Supreme Court reasoned that "[w]hen
the part not taken is left in such shape or condition as to be in itself of
less value than before, the owner is entitled to additional damages on
that account. " "
In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., a newly constructed dam
eliminated the river's seasonal flood flow previously used by downstream landowners." The court turned to the diminution in value approach, looking to the difference in the value of the riparian property
before and after the floodwater's interference." Prior to the construction of the dam, seasonal floods enhanced the richness of the soil,
benefiting agricultural uses, and thus increasing the property's value.

421. Grizzard, 219 U.S. at 181-82.
422. Id. at 182-84.
423. Id at 183, 185.
424. Id. at 182, 186.
425. Act of July 18, 1918, ch. 155, § 6,40 Stat. 911 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 595
(2000)).
426. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750 (1947).
427. Id. at 750-51 (quoting Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897).
428. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 730 (1950).
429. Id. at 752.
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The court established value of the land by looking at the diminution in
value of other similarly situated riparian properties."'
In Dugan v. Rank, the Supreme Court found that just compensation
for taking of riparian water rights is "measured by the difference in
market value of the ... land before and after the interference or partial taking" of water." '
In Loveladies Harborv. United States, the court used the difference in
fair market value before and after the Corps of Engineers denied a
permit application to fill wetlands to determine the value of the prop-

erty interest taken. ' Although the property interest taken was not a
riparian water right, the court arguably characterized the interest as
the right to use the riparian asset of the wetland." The court found
that the significant economic impact of the governmental action, as
measured by the value of the property before and after the action,
could demonstrate that a taking had occurred. ' Comparable sales
analysis, using a property's highest and best use less development costs,
determined the value of the property before and after the taking:
[T] he value of the property virtually has been eradicated as a result of
government action. The value of the property before the taking was
$2,658,000; the value of the property after the permit denial was
$12,500, resulting in a diminution in value of over 99%. The significance of this impact is heightened when it is recalled that the $ 1,000
per acre figure represents a reasonable estimate of what a government entity could be expected to pay for the property, and is not the
product of negotiations between a willing buyer and seller under no
duress. As a result of government action, there is no market; the only
potential buyer is a governmental unit, and the only remaining value
is a nominal one. 35
B.

Valuation in Appropriative Water Rights Cases: Comparable Sales
Transactions

An appropriative water right is a creature of state law. It is subject
to the effects of the use of prior, or more senior, water users. An appropriative right which is "out of priority" in most years is hypothetically of little value if taken because its late-priority status means that
most of the time, senior rights may be exercised to the detriment of
the out-of-priority right holder.

430. Gerlach Livestock Co. v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 87, 98 (1948) (permitting
additional evidence to establish the diminution value of the property).
431. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 624-25 (1962).
432. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 C1.Ct. 153, 153, 156 (1990).
433. Id. at 159.
434. Id. at 157, 160.
435. Id. at 160.
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In the extreme case, the legislature may make unlawful behavior
that it previously condoned on private property." The legislature may
prohibit uses of public property previously authorized by itself or its
agent. From that perspective, a state legislature or a state engineer
may generally prohibit a use previously regarded as beneficial without
requiring just compensation.
Continuing regulation by a state officer of vested appropriative
rights is similar to a state legislature refining the authority conferred by
a previously issued legislative charter. The Supreme Court, applying
Pennsylvania state law, considered this issue in Rundle v. Delaware &
Raritan Canal Co. 7 The Supreme Court opined that Pennsylvania had
adopted the civil law, rather than the English common law, of riparian
property interests, and that civil law reserved the ownership of the water in the river to the public to permit navigational and other public
uses. 4' The Pennsylvania legislature granted a license to a private party
to operate a hydropower facility in the Delaware River, and when the
state legislature later attempted to amend that authority to promote
public uses, the licensee objected."9 The Court responded:
It is true that the State would have had a right to [preserve the waters

of these rivers for public uses] for the public benefit, even if the rivers
had been private property; but then, compensation must have been
made to the owners, the amount of which might have been so enormous as to have frustrated, or at least checked these noble undertakings ....
[H]e who accepts a license from the legislature, knowing that he is
dealing with an agent bound by duty not to impair public rights, does
so at his risk; and a voluntary expenditure on the foot of it gives him
no claim to compensation.

0

In Fox v. Cincinatti, the Supreme Court found a hydropower right
subservient to the state's navigation right in a public canal. 4 1 Even
though the canal company held a water right in the canal, the right
derived from the state's permission to use a public resource."' The
state could, therefore, terminate its navigability interest, dry up the
canal, and transfer the canal right of way to a municipality for development of the road, without affecting the private water right." The
436.

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (stating that the state may signifi-

candy limit the use of property without compensation).
437.

Rundle v. Del. & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. 80, 89 (1852).

438.
439.
440.

Id. at 85-86.
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 91-93.

441.

Foxv. Cincinnati, 104 U.S. 783, 783 (1881).

442.
443.

Id.
Id. at 783-85.
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private water right existed as a subordinate right to the state's continuing interest, and therefore, the state did not take a private property
interest and no compensation was due. "
Government action that clearly takes a ripened, certified, senior
appropriative water right directly poses the question of value. In one
early California case, Collier v. Merced Irrigation District,which involved
riparian rights, the court's dicta indicated that a comparable sales approach would be appropriate to determine just compensation in an
appropriative rights case. " The court analyzed whether "special benefits" accruing to the property owner only, and not to the public generally, by virtue of the governmental project effectuating the taking,
should have reduced the value of a riparian right. "6 The court distinguished the before and after analysis, which applies in a riparian rights
case, from the comparable sales approach, which applies in an appropriative rights case, holding that "special benefits" did not apply in a
riparian rights case because such benefits were integrated into the before and after valuation analysis, and, thus, were not valued and
awarded independently."
C.

Valuation in Contractually-Conferred Water Rights Cases:
Replacement Value

Where the water right taken is a contractually conferred water
right, courts have used the cost of replacing the property taken as a
measure of just compensation. Courts can more easily apply the replacement cost approach when the owner of the interest has acted to
replace the taken interest. In a water takings case, where the plaintiff
has not sought replacement water, a court must determine which approach will put them in a position as if the taking did not occur.
A decision by the United States Court of Federal Claims illustrates
the process of determining fair market value for a contractually conferred water right. In Tulare Lake, the plaintiff irrigators sought an estimated $66 million plus interest for federal actions resulting in a taking of their contractually conferred water in California's San Joaquin
Valley."8 The court used a per acre-foot valuation based on actual replacement water purchases from the California Drought Water Bank,
but adopted a lower value per acre-foot for interruptible water based
on comparable sales of State Water Project water. 9

444. Id. at 786.
445. Collier v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 2 P.2d 790, 794 (Cal. 1931).
446. Id. at 796.
447. Id. at 797.
448. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed.Cl. 246, 250
(2003).
449. Id. at 263-64.
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The court's approach in Tulare Lake is best characterized as a
commodity approach because the court simply places value on the
taken water as a commodity in the market. Under valuation theory
above, undelivered water is personalty" of the party holding the contractual water right. However, the commodity approach distinguishes
between the taking of a water right and the taking of water itself as a
commodity. The distinction is not simple. Because a typical water
right is a perpetual right to divert water at a given point from a particular waterway, taking a specific amount of water is like a temporary taking of the water right itself."'
D.

Valuation in Temporary Takings Cases: Diminution in Value

Courts determine compensation for governmental takings by the
loss incurred by the owner of the property interest, rather than by
measuring the benefit received by the government through taking the
property. Even though the government may ultimately benefit from
action which temporarily takes a property interest, "[i]t is the owner's
loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the
property taken." '
Courts treat the valuation of just compensation in a temporary taking similar to permanent takings, except that the objective is to measure the value of an interest for a limited period of time. 52 Where the
temporarily taken property is interest in real property, as with the riparian interests discussed above, the diminution in value approach is
appropriate, but the period of time for valuation is limited to the period of interference with the property owner's use.' Where the temporarily taken property is a contractually conferred interest, the property it considered a commodity and valued as individual units, whose
time components can be incorporated into the commodity value."
In United States v. General Motors, where the United States affirmatively condemned a partial interest in a leasehold, the court based
valuation on the cost of leasing alternative space within similar lease-

450. Valuation theory differs when the property taken is water held as personalty, as
opposed to the right to obtain water pursuant to a water right. See, e.g., Collier v.
Merced Irrigation Dist., 2 P.2d 790, 796 (Cal. 1931) (distinguishing between the right
to remove water and water already removed from stream, the latter of which is personalty which can be taken without compensation.).
451. Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal. 1939) (distinguishing
between the water itself and a water right).
452. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
453. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987).
454. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 381-84 (1945).
455. Id. at 380.
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holds.4" Thus, for any time in which the government takes a private
property interest, whether permanently or temporarily, the court calculates compensation representing the fair market value denied to the
property owner."7 For permanent takings, the value of the parcel of
land, or the value of the water right in its entirety, must be determined.4" For temporary takings of real property, the value of the use
of the property during the pendency of the taking, perhaps determined by the rental value of the property, may determine the fair market value."
In FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
the Supreme Court established that compensation is due from the time
the government action "takes" the property interest until it ceases to
do so.'

"'Temporary' takings which . . .deny a landowner all use of

his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for
which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.""1 Similarly, in
Allenfield Associates v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims held that
a "temporary taking which denies a landowner all use of his property
for a finite period of time, requires just compensation in the form of
the fair market rental value of the property.""
One issue in the valuation of temporarily taken property is whether
the government should incorporate the "going-concern value" or good
will value the government takes, into the value of the taken property.
In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court included
"going-concern value," as measured by lost profits during the period of
taking, in the compensatory sum.' The Court relied on a water rights
456. Id. at 374-75, 382. The Court also permitted inclusion of the cost to General
Motors in making the partial leasehold available to the United States, as that likely
would have been incorporated in any comparable leasehold situation. Id. at 383-84.
Lessees' interests may also be compensable, but only to the extent of their rights of
occupancy under their respective leases. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S.
372, 378-81 (1946).
457. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. at 381.

458. Id. at 378.
459. Yuba Natural Res., Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
460. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 319-21 (1987). The Court explicitly rejected the argument that removing a law,
which previously took a property interest, thereby returning the entire interest to its
owner, constitutes a sufficient remedy for the taking:
Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this period of
time, though converting the taking into a "temporary" one, is not a sufficient
remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause.... [W] here
the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective.
Id. at 319, 321.
461. Id. at 318.
462.
463.

Allenfield Assocs. v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 471, 487 (1998).
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1949).
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case, City and County of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., where the Supreme Court determined that going-concern value should be included
in the rate base of a water utility for purposes of determining the
amount against which they could apply a reasonable rate of return.
In one aberrant case, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
the Supreme Court used a loss of profits approach to determine
value."n The plaintiff owned a lock and dam system which the government affirmatively condemned." Because the government conferred
the system upon the private corporation, and the system operator had
a franchise to charge tolls for use of the system, the Court held that the
compensation due to the company "[was] not determined by the mere
cost of construction, but more by what the completed structure brings
in the way of earnings by its owner."

E.

7

Reimbursement for Ancillary Costs

Ancillary costs may or may not be included in value depending on
the circumstances. For example, in Tulare Lake, where the court used a
commodity valuation approach, the court rejected the water district's
request for reimbursement of delivery costs for the replacement water
it had purchased. The court noted that the district would have paid
for the delivery costs of its contracted water regardless of whether the
government had taken the water.'
F.

Date of Valuation

The fair market value of a property interest is determined at the
time of the property taking. ' The effective date of a taking depends
upon the facts of the case, varying from the date of first actions to accomplish the public purpose to the date when the full impact of the
governmental action on the property occurred. 70 But "whenever the
defendant's intent to take has been definitely asserted and it begins to
carry out that intent," a taking occurs."' A takings claim accrues "when
464.

City of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 191-92 (1918). But see

1 LEwIS ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 647-48 (2d ed. 1953).

465. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 344-45 (1893).
466. Id. at 324.
467. Id. at 328.
468. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed.Cl. 246, 265-66
(2003).
469. Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Att'y Gen., 124 U.S. 581, 595 (1888).
470. See, e.g., United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 265 (1939) (holding the
government is not liable for takings that would result regardless of the government's
actions); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1932) (holding that taking occurs at
first action indicating that taking is intended); Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co.
v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1922) (holding that intent to take alone does
not establish the remedy ofjust compensation).
471. Gerlach Livestock Co. v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 87, 97 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
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all events have occurred that fix the alleged liability
of the Government
472
and entitle the plaintiff to institute an action.,

The Supreme Court indicated takings occur as soon as the government encroaches upon a private property interest, thereby acquiring a servitude."
However, the Supreme Court has held that in cases
where takings occur over time, as a matter of fairness, a plaintiff need
not initiate a cause of action until the situation surrounding the taking
has stabilized.
A court can make a timing determination for purposes of calculating fair market value for taken water using average
values for the time when the government took the water. As used in
Tulare Lake, this is a "weighted time factor, 4

75

which considers quantity

and the date of water taken over a period of time.
In some circumstances, the taking itself is gradual, making it difficult for a court to determine when the taking began. Addressing one
such circumstance, in United States v. Dickinson, where the government
took riparian property by flooding when it raised the Kanawha River in
West Virginia, the Supreme Court suggested:
Property is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made
upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private parties,
a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course of
time. The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not
a technical rule of procedure enshrining old or new niceties regarding "causes of action"-when they are born, whether they proliferate,
and when they die ....The source of the entire claim-the overflow
due to rises in the level of the river-is not a single event; it is continuous. And as there is nothing in reason, so there is nothing in legal doctrine, to preclude the law from meeting such
a process by
76
postponing suit until the situation becomes stabilized.
In Tulare Lake, the court measured the water impact as beginning
with the mandatory implementation of the biological opinion issued by
the National Marine Fisheries Service, which resulted in reduced water
deliveries, even though earlier voluntary state actions reduced deliveries. The court noted that any reduction in flows prior to the federal
biological opinion would not be attributable to the federal government, and only upon the issuance of the federal biological opinion did
the federal government force reduced deliveries to the district."
472.

Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

473.
474.
475.

Peabody v. United States, 231 U.S. 530, 538 (1913).
See Creppel 41 F.3d at 632-33.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed.Cl. 246, 265 n.31

(2003).
476. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1947).
477. TulareLake, 59 Fed.Cl. 246, 254-55.
478. Id. Because the court selected the Drought Water Bank sales as the appropriate
measure for fair market value of the taken water, it did not need to consider the timing
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Interest on Just Compensation

Once a landowner or water right holder establishes a taking and
determines the fair market value, the government may owe interest on
just compensation as well. The right to interest, or the rate of it, differs
depending on the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff brings a takings
claim. In most actions against the United States, interest on judgments
is only available where Congress has specifically authorized it." But, in
a case based on the constitutional right to just compensation, judgment interest is mandatory, as it is considered a part of just compensation. '
Because time is money, interest is logically included in the
value of the right taken.
In a case dealing with government action that flooded privately
owned land, the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument
that interest should not apply:
The amount recoverable was just compensation, not inadequate
compensation. The concept of just compensation is comprehensive
and includes all elements, "and no specific command to include interest is necessary when interest or its equivalent is a part of such
compensation." The owner is not limited to the value of the property
at the time of the taking; "he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with
the taking."8'
In United States Court of Federal Claims cases, interest begins accruing on the date that the claim ripens, " which in takings cases is the
date the taking begins. In Tulare Lake, the plaintiffs argued for the
prime rate plus 1.5% as the rate for farm operating loans at the time,
but the government referred the court to a rate set forth by Congress
in 40 U.S.C. § 258e-1 based on U.S. Treasury bill rates as related to inverse condemnation cases."3 The court adopted the interest rate, noting that the "strong judicial policy in just compensation cases.., favors
uniform interest rates in order to avoid discrimination among litigants. ' '4

for valuation purposes since "the Drought Water Bank prices were uniform throughout
both 1992 and 1994." Id. at 265.
479. SeeLibrary of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 311 (1986).
480. Id. at 320.
481. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16-17 (1933).
482. 40 U.S.C. § 258e-1 (2000).
483. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed.Cl. 246, 266
(2003).
484. Id.
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IV. REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects property owners against the uncompensated taking of private property. While government by its very nature can limit
private property owner interests to some extent, where government
action includes a physical occupation of private property, the government commits a categorical or per se taking. Where there is no physical
invasion of property, but the government's action nonetheless impair
the use of the property, courts use a balancing test to weigh the gravity
of the intrusion to determine if the regulation exceeded constitutional
limits. In making this determination, a court must find that the regulation serves a "substantial public purpose." To assess whether the owner
of private property is unfairly bearing the burden of the taking, courts
generally consider a number of factors, including the effect of the
regulation on economically viable private property rights, the property
holder's investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government's action. Where the effect of the taking results in total loss of
economic value, the government commits a per se regulatory taking.
There are no "bright lines" with which to evaluate takings claims.
However, where the government imposes regulations on private property interests, transferring public burdens to private individuals, governmental impositions "take" constitutionally protected private property. Additionally, the Supreme Court has made clear that in each takings analysis, courts must determine which property rights were initially included in the owner's title. Where government action appears
to infringe on a private property interest, state law serves as a guide to
determine the extent the government action diminishes a property
owner's interests.
Determining whether to apply a physical or a regulatory takings
analysis depends on the facts surrounding each takings claim. For
most real property interests, simply observing whether the government
has physically invaded the property is often the determinative factor.
This process is more difficult for water rights. An appropriative or contractual water right is different in nature from other property interests
because such rights are typically usufructuary and subject to a number
of limitations, such as beneficial use or priority. The United States
Court of Federal Claims held in one instance that any measurable reduction in water quantity was a physical and, therefore, categorical or
per se taking, but case law indicates that regulatory restrictions on riparian water uses are better understood as regulatory takings using a
multi-factored balancing test.
State law, contracts, and federal statutes define the attributes of individual's water rights. The extent to which governmental regulatory
action constitutes a taking necessarily requires investigation into the
respective state law, contract, or federal statutes to ascertain the effects
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of the regulation in question on those attributes. However, when
courts treat water as a commodity, and the government is deemed to
have taken that commodity, the private property owner may successfully claim a physical taking.
Pursuant to common law riparianism, riparian property owners
hold a right to a portion of the continued natural flow of a river.
Western states have to one extent or another adopted the doctrine of
prior appropriation, but conflicts have arisen regarding the continued
exercise of the riparian water rights that existed at the time the state
embraced the prior appropriation doctrine. Courts in South Dakota,
Nevada, Washington, Texas, Oregon, and Kansas have upheld legislation extinguishing unused riparian water rights. Oklahoma's Supreme
Court found that even though the state adopted the prior appropriation doctrine, the state must afford unexercised common law riparian
water the same constitutional protections as appropriative rights. California allows riparian rights to be limited, but not fully extinguished, if
the riparian put the water to use at any time.
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, where a water user perfects a state-issued water right by putting the water to beneficial use,
the government retains significant authority to affect the right via its
police power. However, the state cannot unilaterally reduce the
amount of the water right, except pursuant to a priority call or according to other terms or characteristics of the water right itself. Applying
a regulatory takings analysis, only the particular attributes established
by state law and the appropriation doctrine are constitutionally protected against governmental taking.
A perfected water right can indicate considerable investmentbacked expectations, and can serve as prima facie evidence of a vested
water right that enjoys the protection of the Takings Clause. Water
rights typically include a right to reasonable access, which poses difficulties because of the vast federal ownership of land in the West. The
scope of the right to access water to fulfill a usufructuary right depends
greatly on the specific aspects of the specific water right prior to application of a later regulation. Government action may incidentally interfere with state-issued water rights, so long as there is statutory support
for the action. As long as the government's permitting authority predates the vesting of the water rights, right of access conditions that virtually destroy the right can be justified.
Contracts can also create water rights. The constitutional protection of the Takings Clause endows vested water right owners with the
power to obtain compensation for the taking of their contractually created water rights. Contractual provisions may limit the power to seek
compensation under the Takings Clause if they diminish the right or
subject it to continuing governmental action.
Analyses of takings claims involving contractually created water
rights inevitably consider the nature and scope of the actual water
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right. Case law indicates a possible diverging approach as to whether
compensation is due to a water user if the government exercises a contractual condition that reduces deliveries. The Ninth Circuit has held
that if the terms of the contract support such a reduction, the reduction would not constitute a taking for which compensation is due. On
the other hand, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that compensation
may be due under the same circumstances.
Despite the manner of their creation, state-issued water rights have
always been, and continue to be, subject to beneficial use restrictions
and potential public interest limitations. Although federal and state
governments have implemented many beneficial use or public trust
restrictions on water rights without triggering the mandate to compensate under the takings clause, the permissible extent of such limitations
remains unclear.
Takings cases indicate that the appropriate value of a property interest is the fair market value at the time of the property taking. The
Supreme Court has ruled that as soon as the government encroaches
upon a private property interest, thereby acquiring a servitude, there is
a compensable taking. However, for gradual takings, the Supreme
Court has held, as a matter of fairness, that a plaintiff does not need to
initiate a taking cause of action until the situation surrounding the
taking has stabilized. Courts use various methods to determine timing
for purposes of calculating fair market value for taken water. The
method depends upon the circumstances of the case.
Where the government takes a riparian right by either taking a portion or all of the water, or by flooding the riparian property, courts
determine just compensation by a valuation of the diminution of value
to the property because of the taking. Courts typically use a fair market value appraisal for a property interest both before and after a governmental taking to determine the reduction in value of the property.
Where the government takes an appropriative water right, a comparable sale is an appropriate measure of the value of the property interest
taken. Where the government takes contractually conferred water
rights, courts have used the replacement value of the water to determine just compensation. The replacement value calculation is easier if
the property owner replaced the water that the government took.
When the property owner does not seek replacement water, a court
must determine what approach would best compensate the property
owner to put the owner in a position as if the government had not
taken the property. Further, where the water right owner does not
replace the water, a court may also consider the income generated by
the water right owner's intended use and the aggrieved water right
holder's loss of good will.
Courts treat compensation for a temporary taking similar to a permanent taking. For permanent takings, the court determines the value
of the parcel of land or water right in its entirety. For temporary tak-
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ings, courts measure compensation by the rental value of the property
or the fair market value of the property for a period during which the
government has taken the property.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Society's dependence upon electricity has grown tremendously in
recent years. As energy prices rise, so does the number of conflicts
over existing sources of electricity. Increased societal demands for recreation, fish, and wildlife uses are creating conflicts with traditional
production of hydroelectricity from existing water storage facilities.
Within the last few years, conflicts over the operations of federal facilities have called into question the very purposes of the federal water
projects. These conflicting uses include water storage versus compact
compliance, producing hydroelectricity versus downstream angling,
t

The author is an attorney at Hale Friesen, LLP. His practice focuses on endan-

gered species, water, and federal and state permitting. The author currently represents the Colorado River Energy Distributors Association in the Environmental Impact
Statement Process for the Aspinall Unit operations on the Gunnison River.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

maintaining aesthetics versus allowing sediment transport, and protecting endangered species versus sustaining irrigation and agriculture. In
one recent example, debate centered on whether the purposes for
which Congress authorized Colorado River Storage Project reservoirs
included operations for fish, wildlife, or recreation. The U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation has undertaken an environmental impact statement
("EIS") process assessing potential effects of operational changes on
Endangered Species Act ("ESA") compliance on the Aspinall Unit reservoirs in Western Colorado. The EIS process has cast a spotlight on
the use of federal water facilities.
Operating federal facilities for fish, wildlife, or recreation could result in a myriad of effects on western watercourses. In general, rafters
and kayakers crave high flows over long periods. Downstream anglers
appreciate the clear, steady tailwater flows that produce gold-medal
trout. Wildlife management agencies are wary of seasonal changes in
river flow rates because rainbow trout spawn in the spring and brown
trout spawn in the fall. Environmentalists call for hydrographs mimicking natural seasonal flow rates - high spring peak flows and low summer and winter flows. Downstream federal land managers covet high
flows that transport sediment and remove trees and other vegetation
from the river channel. Upstream anglers often wish to keep stored
water in reservoirs benefiting flat-water fishery or kokanee salmon
spawning.
The Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft EIS for the Aspinall Unit
provides that "[t]he purpose of Reclamation's proposed action is to
operate the Aspinall Unit to avoid jeopardy to endangered species
while maintaining the congressionally authorized Unit purposes."' For
an effective EIS process, the cooperating agencies and stakeholders
must have a clear understanding of what it means to "avoid jeopardy"
while maintaining the purposes authorized by Congress. In the end,
careful management may help balance these competing interests.
H. ENDANGERED SPECIES
Four listed fish species inhabit the Colorado River and the Gunnison River downstream of the Aspinall Unit reservoirs: the Colorado
pikeminnow (formerly known as the Colorado squawfish), the razorback sucker, the humpback chub, and the bonytail chub.' The U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") has identified some of the major
threats to the listed fish. Five of these threats include: (1) changes in
river flows and dams that prevent fish from reaching their historic
1. Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Announcement of Public Scoping Meetings, 69 Fed. Reg. 2943, 2944 (Jan. 21, 2004).
2. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,374 (Mar. 21,
1994).
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range, (2) competition with and predation by nonnative fish, (3) hybridization, (4) pesticides and pollutants, and (5) parasitism. The
FWS designated 1,980 miles of the Colorado River as "critical habitat"
for the listed fish in March 1994.' This designation included approximately 35 miles of the Gunnison River from Grand Junction downstream to Delta.
Interested parties have created recovery programs in the Upper
Colorado River Basins with the goal of eliminating threats to the species while allowing existing and future water development to continue.
For example, water and power providers are working with public agencies to provide habitat and create fish passages.5 Through federal and
state hatchery programs, native fish stocking has become a key factor
in recovery. Nonnative fish management efforts are also underway,
including the construction of fish screens in reservoirs, which control
the distribution of nonnative species.'
The Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Implementation Program began in 1988 through a cooperative agreement between the governors of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, the Secretary of
the Interior, and the Administrator of the Western Area Power Administration. The San Juan Recovery Implementation Program is a
similar effort involving Colorado and New Mexico, as well as the Bureau of Reclamation, FWS, Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Native American tribes, and water development interest
groups "To date, over $20 million has been spent for capital projects
to recover the endangered fish in the Upper Basin. But the participants in these recovery programs estimate the need for up to $100 million in capital construction funds through fiscal year 2007."'

3.

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Upper Colorado River Basin and Endangered

Fish Recovery Program Homepage, http://www.r6.fws.gov/coloradoriver/

(follow

"Why some native fish in the upper Colorado River basin are endangered" hyperlinks)
(last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
4. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. at 13,374.

5. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR
ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 7 (rev. April 2003)
[hereinafter BLUEBOOK].
6. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Upper Colorado River Basin and Endangered
Fish Recovery Program Homepage, http://www.r6.fws.gov/coloradoriver/ (follow
"Managing non-native fish" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).

7.

COOPERATIVE

ENDANGERED

AGREEMENT FOR RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION
PROGRAM FOR
SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1988), available at

http://www.r6.fws.gov/crrip/doc/coop.pdf.
8. ProgramHighlights 2003-2004, ANN. PUBLICATION (Upper Colorado River Endangered Fish Recovery Program and San Juan Basin Recovery Implementation Program,
Denver, Colo. and Albuquerque, N.M.), 2003-2004, at 7.
9. To Authorize the Bureau of Reclamation to Provide Cost Sharingfor the EndangeredFish
Recovery ImplementationProgramsfor the Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basins: Hearing
on S. 2239 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, water and power providers, and environmental interest groups are active participants in these recovery
programs.' ° The fundamental goal of these programs is to aid recovery
of endangered fish and ultimately delist the endangered fish species
while allowing water development in the Upper Basin and San Juan
Basin in accordance with a complex array of state and federal laws,
treaties, interstate compacts, Supreme Court decrees, and the Secretary of Interior's trust responsibilities, collectively referred to as the
"Law of the River." These recovery programs have given a greater
voice to the states, water and power providers, and environmental interest groups, and have shifted the focus from a regulatory approach to
solution-based approach. Both Recovery Implementation Programs
have made significant progress toward the recovery of the endangered
fish.
With support from the state of Colorado, the FWS finalized recovery goals in August 2002 for the listed fish in the Colorado River Basin." The FWS developed these goals as supplements to existing recovery plans. The existing recovery plans detail population numbers and
habitat conditions required for the recovery of the Colorado pikeminnow, razorback sucker, humpback chub, and bonytail chub. The recovery goals are comprehensive and contain attainable criteria for
down-listing and delisting of each species.
Populations of the Colorado pikeminnow are increasing, and de2 The humpback
listing, or at least down-listing, is a distinct possibility."
chub has made similar progress. Razorback suckers are also beginning
to show signs of improvement, but programs may need additional focus for the bonytail chub.
Habitat protection for the listed fish includes floodplain easements
and backwater habitat, as well as providing adequate stream flows. The
September 29, 1987 [there is only one Blue Book] of the Recovery
Implementation Program for Endangered Fish Species in the Upper
Colorado River Basin ("RIP Blue Book") provides that the acquisition
of flows will be accomplished by "working with the State agencies that
are responsible for instream flow protection[,]" and that "[u]nder this
program, water rights will be appropriated, acquired, and administered

Resources, 106th Cong. 13 (2000) (statement of Greg Walcher, Executive Director,
Colorado Department of Natural Resources).
10. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Upper Colorado River Basin and Endangered
Fish Recovery Program Homepage, http://www.r6.fws.gov/coloradoriver/ (follow
"Recovery Program overview" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
11. Notice of Availability of Recovery Goals for Four Endangered Fishes of the
Colorado River Basin, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,270 (Aug. 28, 2002).
12. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Upper Colorado River Basin and Endangered
Fish Recovery Program Homepage, http://www.r6.fws.gov/coloradoriver/ (follow
"Colorado pikeminnow" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
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pursuant to State law."" In addition, the Bureau of Reclamation is to
"assist in meeting instream flow requirements for the rare fish through
the refined operations of Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa [Aspinall], and
Ruedi Reservoirs in a manner consistent with all applicable laws.""4
Therefore, the Bureau must be mindful not only of the ESA but of "all
applicable laws," including its own statutory authority.
As part of the ESA Section 7 consultation, the FWS completed a
Programmatic Biological Opinion for the "15 Mile Reach" of the Colorado River near Grand Junction on December 20, 1999.'" This put
more than one million acre-feet of existing water and 120,000 acre-feet
of future water depletions on the main stem of the Colorado River in
compliance with the ESA. The FWS recently completed a similar biological opinion on the Yampa River, and they will likely complete another concurrently with the Aspinall EIS process on the Gunnison
River.
Section 7 of the ESA requires that those actions for which an
agency is authorized must "not likely... jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species." 1" All federal agencies and private
parties must consult with the FWS when any activity permitted, funded,
or conducted by that agency may affect a listed species or designated
critical habitat, or is likely to jeopardize proposed species or adversely
modify proposed critical habitat. 7
13. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR
ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 1-7 (1987) [hereinafter
BLUEBOOK 1987], available at http://www.r6.fws.gov/crrip/doc/bluebookfinal.pdf; See
also U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Upper Colorado River Basin and Endangered Fish
Recovery Program Homepage, http://www.r6.fws.gov/coloradoriver/ (follow "Protecting stream flows" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2005) (listing some accomplishments
of the recovery program as: management of the release of 30,000 acre-feet of water
from Green Mountain Reservoir and coordinated releases from Ruedi and Wolford
Mountain Reservoirs; agreement to release up to 3,300 acre-feet of water annually from
Steamboat Lake for endangered fish in the Yampa River; agreements to coordinate
water releases from several Colorado reservoirs to benefit endangered fishes; construction of structures in the Government Highline Canal near Grand Junction, Colorado
to improve efficiency and reduce diversions; synthesis reports and flow recommendations for endangered fish habitats to be used in preparing new biological opinions for
future dam operations) (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
14. BLUEBOOK 1987, supra note 13, at 1-7.
15. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR
BUREAU OF RECLAMIATION'S OPERATIONS AND DEPLETIONS, OTHER DEPLETIONS, AND
FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOVERY PROGRAM ACTIONS IN THE UPPER COLORADO
RIVER ABOVE THE CONFLUENCE WITH THE GUNNISON RIVER (1999),
available at

www.r6.fws.gov/crrip/15mile/Final%20PBO.pdf.
16. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000). Section 1536 of the
ESA is also known by its Congressional Act section designation, section 7. Section
7(a) (2) is triggered by federal agency action, but 7(a) (1) allows federal agencies to
take voluntary measures, such as participation in recovery program activities to benefit
listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1)-(2).
17. 16 U.S.C § 1536(a) (2).
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The ESA does not grant independent power to federal agencies,
and a federal agency is limited to its existing authority in carrying out
its obligations pursuant to the ESA.'8 "Moreover, the ESA does not alter or override existing laws... nor does the ESA expand the scope of
a federal agency's authority and allow the imposition of restrictions or
requirements because they are considered by agency employees to be
beneficial to listed species.""
Consultation under the ESA must be considered in light of the Bureau of Reclamation's statutory authority. The RIP Blue Book proscribes that implementation of the program is to be "compatible with
all Federal and State laws and all private development projects."'
Moreover, the authorizing legislation for RIP funding specifies that
"with regard to the acreage limitation provisions of Federal reclamation law," no action taken pursuant to, or in furtherance of, the RIP
shall affect Reclamation Law."
HI. THE CONGRESSIONALLY-AUTHORIZED PURPOSES OF
CRSP UNITS
A.

1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act ("CRSP")

Following World War II and the enactment of the 1948 Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact, the states helped initiate legislation for
the comprehensive development of the river system through water
storage. The goal was to ensure that the Upper Basin states could develop their proportion of water and meet downstream delivery obligations.' The result was the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act
("CRSP"). The CRSP authorized initial units including Glen Canyon,
Aspinall, Flaming Gorge, and Navajo for specific purposes:
In order to initiate the comprehensive development of the water re-

sources of the Upper Colorado River Basin, for the purposes, among
others, of regulating the flow of the Colorado River, storing water for
beneficial consumptive use, making it possible for the States of the
18. .d.§ 1536(a) (1).
19. Norm James, The Endangered Species Act and Current Problems Concerning
the Administration of Livestock Grazing on National Forests in the Southwest 22 (Oct.
26, 2001) (unpublished submission to the Forest Service and the Department of the

Interior, on file with the author) (citing American Forest and Paper Ass'n v. U.S. EPA,
137 F.3d 291, 298-299 (5th Cir. 1998) (EPA cannot invoke the ESA as a means of im-

posing requirements that are not authorized under the Clean Water Act) and Platte
River Whooping Crane Trust v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 962 F.2d 27, 33-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (the ESA "does not expand the powers conferred on an agency by its ena-

bling act")).
20. BLUEBOOK 1987, supra note 13, at 1-8.
21. Act of Oct. 30, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-392, § 4, 114 Stat. 1602, 1606.
22. James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California'sClaims to Water From
the Colorado River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 290, 312 (2001).
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Upper Basin to utilize, consistently with the provisions of the Colorado River Compact, the apportionments made to and among them
in the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact, respectively, providing for the reclamation of arid and
semiarid land, for the control of floods, and for the generation of hydroelectric power, as an incident of the foregoing purposes .... 23
Analysis of statutes must include the social conditions and societal
ideals at the time of the statute's enactment.24 After World War II, the
arid West demanded reliable water supplies, protection from flooding,
and electricity. Congress aimed to deliver. Congress enacted the
CRSP decades before the United States adopted some of the most
powerful environmental laws in the world, namely the ESA and the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). The rationale behind
enacting the CRSP was to supply water and power to the West. 2 Today,
great controversy surrounds any proposed water and power development because of potential effects on the environment. Even the operation of existing water storage facilities, such as the Aspinall Unit
reservoirs, attracts significant environmental opposition.
Congress excluded fish, wildlife, and recreation from CRSP purposes. "While every word of a statute must be presumed to have been
used for a purpose, it is also the case that every word excluded from a
statute must be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose."' The
introductory phrase in Section 620, "among others," does not expand
the express purposes.21 "[W]here the legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be
implied where excluded."' The CRSP addressed recreational facilities
and fish hatcheries in another provision.'
Therefore, the drafters
could have included boating, angling, or instream flows as listed purposes of the CRSP, but chose not to do so.
Noscitur a sociis provides that unclear words within a list have their
meaning colored by the other words in the list.' Courts often apply
noscitur a sociis to avoid giving "unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress."" In Section 620 of the CRSP, Congress describes the "comprehensive development" of the Upper Basin, the "control of floods," that
water would be stored "for beneficial consumptive use," that the Upper
Basin States would be able to "utilize" their compact-apportioned wa-

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.

Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2000).
MICHAEL SINCLAIR, A GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 140 (2000).
Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2000).
NORmANJ. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 192 (6th ed. 2000).
43 U.S.C. § 620.
SINGER, supra note 26, at 194.

29.

43 U.S.C. § 6 20(g).

30.

SINGER, supra note 26, at 265.
SINCLAIR, supranote 24, at 152.

31.
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ter, and that the "generation of hydroelectric power" is "an incident of
the foregoing purposes. " " Under noscitur a sociis, the expression of
these uses requires the exclusion of other uses such as navigation, aesthetics, rafting, fishing, or channel maintenance.
The principle jusdem generis limits a listed general phrase in meaning to the same category or classification as other specific items in the
list.3 In the CRSP, the list of purposes exhibits a common a comprehensive scheme for development of the Colorado River for the economic and societal benefit of the Upper Basin States. Storing and releasing water for aesthetics, rafting, angling, sediment transport, etc.,
would be inconsistent with the comprehensive scheme of the authorized purposes. Therefore, if the Bureau of Reclamation operates the
CRSP facilities for aesthetics, rafting, angling, or sediment transport,
then the Bureau is allowing inconsistent uses to dictate the operation
of facilities built for a specific comprehensive development scheme.
Operating the CRSP facilities in this way is allowing the tail to wag the
dog.
B.

Legislative History of the CRSP

"[T] he two most basic rules of statutory interpretation are: Read
[sic] the statute, and give the words their ordinary meanings."' Under
this "plain meaning rule," where the meaning of statutory language is
unambiguous, it is not appropriate to examine legislative history."
Because some contend that CRSP purposes are broader than providing
water and power, a review of the legislative history of the CRSP helps
clarify these issues. The House Committee stated:
The Colorado River is an erratic stream. The periods of high flow do
not coincide with the periods of greatest demand on its waters. Large
holdover reservoirs, like Lake Mead behind Hoover Dam which stores
and regulates water for use in the lower basin, are needed in the upper basin for storing water during years of high flow for use during
subsequent years of low stream discharges, as well as to serve on a seasonal basis. Using these large storage reservoirs, the Bureau of Reclamation can equalize the flow of the river from year to year and
maximize water utilization on a long-term basis.'
President Eisenhower understood the need for the CRSP to prevent flooding and to supply water and power to the West for economic
growth:
32.

43 U.S.C. § 620.

33.
34.
35.
36.

SINGER, supra note 26, at 272-74.
SINCLAIR, supra note 24, at 135.
SINGER, supra note 26, at 123.

H.R. REP. No. 84-1087, at6 (1956), reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2349.
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I also recommend enactment of legislation authorizing the Bureau of
Reclamation to undertake construction of two comprehensive riverbasin improvements which are beyond the capacity of local initiative,
public or private, but which are needed for irrigation, power, flood
control and municipal and industrial water supply. These are the upper Colorado River Basin development in the States of Colorado,
Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, and New Mexico, and the FryingpanArkansas development in Colorado. The Colorado River development will enable the upper basin States to conserve floodwaters and
to assure the availability of water and power necessary for the economic growth of the region. * * * Sale of power generated at these
developments will repay the power investment within 50 years and will
make a contribution toward repayment of other investments. 7
Congress recognized and addressed the increasing demand for
municipal and industrial water supply 38 and the possibility of catastrophic consequences for the Upper Basin States in the event of a compact call from the Lower Basin. The foresight in the CRSP included
planning "sufficient holdover capacity.., in the upper basin to enable
it to meet its commitment to the lower basin required by the Colorado
River compact of 1922 and at the same time permit the upper basin
States to make full use of their apportioned share of the water." 3 9 The
CRSP directed the Secretary to "have regard for the achievement
within each of said States of the fullest practicable use of the waters of
the Upper Colorado River system, consistent with the apportionment
thereof among such States. 4 °
C.

Hydroelectric Power

Hydroelectric power is the nation's leading renewable energy resource.4 1 Of all renewable power sources, hydroelectric power is "the
most reliable, efficient and economical." 42 It also provides one of the
few means to store energy because dam operators can release water
stored in a reservoir to generate power when needed.
Preceding the enactment of the CRSP, there is little doubt that the
Congress recognized the value of hydroelectricity. In 1941, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt asked his countrymen to build an arsenal of ships,
boats, and planes capable of defending the United States and the
world from the evils embodied in Hitler's advancing forces. The con-

37. Id. at 20, reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2364 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 8416at M65 (1954)).
38. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2351.
39. Id. at 7, reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2350.
40. CRSP, 43 U.S.C. § 620(1) (2000).
41. Western Area Power Administration, Products,
http://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/factsproducts.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
42. Id.
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struction of the nation's defenses in World War II required huge quantities of aluminum, the production of which required staggering
amounts of electrical power. The nation achieved Roosevelt's goalthanks in large part to nearly unlimited hydroelectric power production in the Northwest.
Today, the Bureau of Reclamation's power program is the caretaker for some of the nation's most important electrical resources. The
policies set by the Bureau of Reclamation regulate the flow of water,
which generates power from dams, on a monthly and yearly basis under the CRSP Act and the Law of the River. Another federal agency,
the Western Area Power Administration ("WAPA"), substantially controls the generation of power on a daily and hourly basis from CRSP
facilities from which WAPA sells power.
WAPA markets and distributes hydroelectric power to millions of
consumers in fifteen western states including Arizona, California,
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming.43 In
2004, WAPA sold more than 39.6 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of energy 4 -enough to serve roughly 11 million homes for a year. WAPA's
customers include rural electric cooperatives, municipal utilities, irrigation districts, and Native American tribes."5 CRSP facilities supply
energy to several tribes including the Navajo, Shoshone, Ute, and
Apache tribes.'
Congress labeled hydroelectric power an "incident" of the authorized purposes enumerated in Section 620 of the CRSP.4 ' Black's Law
Dictionary defines "incident" as "[a] dependent, subordinate, or consequential part (of something else)."'

The CRSP inexorably linked

hydroelectric power to the development of water resources for economic development in the arid West. As long as hydropower operations do not "affect or interfere with" the compacts or contracts,49 the
CRSP Act mandates that the projects be operated "so as to produce the

43. WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT 2004 6 (2005) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], availableat
http://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/pdf/annrep04.pdf.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 2.
46. Western Area Power Administration, Native American power customers,
http://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/factsnative.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
47. CRSP, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2000).48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 777 (8th ed. 2004).
49. H.R. REP. No. 84-1950, at 9 (1956) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2422, 2423 ("This language has been adopted to make clear the intent that all of the
instruments constituting the law of the Colorado River shall be read together by the

Secretary of the Interior in the operation of the power facilities authorized to be constructed, operated, and maintained by this legislation.").
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greatest practicable amount of power and energy that can be sold at
),50
firm power and energy rates ....
Section 620 of the CRSP prompted an agreement among the
upper Colorado River Basin states (the "Santa Fe Accord") as to
how to credit power revenues to the Upper Basin states.5 '
The Aspinall Unit reservoirs are capable of producing around 287
MW of renewable power. 2 Hydroelectric power from the Aspinall Unit
also meets up to 50% of the peak power needs of all CRSP power customers. The Reservoir Operation section of Water Supply Appendix of
the 1959 Economic Justification Report on Curecanti ("Aspinall") provides that "[t] he reservoirs of the Curecanti unit have as their primary
5
purpose the production of as much power and energy as is possible."
The legislative history also illustrates the importance Congress attributed to hydroelectric power. "The three downstream reservoirs would
be primarily for the development of power head with only nominal
active storage capacities.""4 Congress, in discussing the plan of development in the CRSP, recognized that "[a] great new source of hydroelectric power would be provided to meet the need of the expanding
economy of the area.""
However, the conference committee made clear, that the "impounding and use of water for the generation of power and energy at
the plants of the Colorado River storage project.., shall be subservient

50.

43 U.S.C.

§ 620(f). See also Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 647 (D. Utah

1977) (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 11 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1171, 1171-1172 (1974), and reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974)).
51.
Friends of the Earth, 485 F.2d at 4-5 (explaining how section 620(1) also created the Upper Colorado River Basin Fund and directed that proceeds from the sale of
power were to be applied towards maintenance, operating and replacement costs of
the CRSP and participating projects; the Basin Fund is also used to repay power and
municipal costs incurred by the Government including interest. Any surplus is allocated to the Upper Basin states for repayment of project costs.); see also H.R. REI'. No.
84-1087, at 13 (1956), reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2408.
52. WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION, SYSTEM, PROJECT & FINANCE DATA TO THE
2004
ANNUAL
REPORT
19
(2005),
available
at
http://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/sa04/sa04.htm.
53. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, CURECANTI UNIT OF THE
COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT: ECONOMICJUSTIFICATION REPORT 27 (1959).
54. H.R. REP. No.84-1087, at9 (1956), reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2352; see
also id. at 12 reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2356 (estimating that "[i]n a 50-year
period following the last power installation, net power revenues from the power facilities herein authorized are estimated at $1,075 million .... After the project has been
completely repaid, the net power revenues . . .for the units herein authorized will
continue to flow into the Treasury.").
55. Id. at 8, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2351; see also id. at 4, reprinted in
1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2347 ("After all project costs have been returned, many millions of dollars of net annual project revenues will continue to flow into the Treasury.").
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to the appropriation of water for domestic or agricultural purposes." 6
Congress could have chosen to subordinate hydroelectric power generation to other uses, such as aesthetics, boating, fishing, camping, instream flows, or channel maintenance. It did not.
Should the tail wag the dog and Congress allow use of the Colorado River for unauthorized purposes, there could be significant consequences stemming from the reduction of hydroelectric power production at the Aspinall Unit reservoirs. Possible consequences include
increased reliance on non-renewable energy sources, inability to meet
peak power demands, and rolling brownouts. Power customers
throughout the rural West face substantial cost increases when WAPA
must purchase power on the markets (likely from coal-fired sources) to
meet existing power contracts. Purchase power costs have increased
significantly in recent years. For example, purchase power cost approximately $380 million in 2003 and $385 million in 2004."7
Commenting on economic indicators; Federal Reserve
Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed the "chronic concern" that rising
energy prices could threaten the nation's economic recovery.' Should
demand for electricity continue to rise as projected, by 2020 the
United States will require more than one new power plant per week.59
To meet Colorado's power demands, power providers will require
1,600 megawatts of new generation by 2012.'
D.

Do Fish, Wildlife or Recreation Constitute CRSP Purposes?

The CRSP facilities provide habitat for the listed species, and downstream from the Aspinall Unit reservoirs are gold-medal trout fishing
and the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park." At over 2,500
feet deep, the Black Canyon of the Gunnison is one of the deepest and
narrowest canyons in North America. 2 In 2004, over 175,000 people
visited the National Park." Blue Mesa Reservoir, the largest of the
56. H.R. REP. No. 84-1950, at 9 (1956) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2422, 2424.
57. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 30.
58. Monetary Policy and the State of the Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 64 (2004) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman Board of

Governors of the Fed. Reserve System).
59.

NATIONAL ENERGY

PoLicY

DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLIcY

5-10

(2001).
60. Steve Raabe, Utility eyes two new coalplants,THE DENVER POsT, Feb. 6, 2004, at IC.
61. Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park and Gunnison Gorge National
Conservation Area Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-76, § 2(3), 113 Stat. 1126, 1126-1127

(transforming a national monument created in 1933 into a National Park and Conservation Area).
62. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison - Canyon Dimensions,
http://www.nps.gov/blca/webvc/dimensions.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005)..
63. National Park Service, Park Visitation Report, Black Canyon of the Gunnison,
http://www.nps.gov (search with terms "Black Canyon 2004 visitation;" then follow
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three Aspinall Unit reregulating reservoirs, is a popular flat-water recreation destination and attracts about 960,000 visitors per year. '
Congress considered the maintenance of national parks an important issue and incorporated certain protections for them into the
CRSP.' Environmentalists ["Representatives" could be confused with
Members of Congress] wrote Chairman Wayne N. Aspinall and voiced
support for the legislation conditioned on: (1) the administration's
agreement to drop the Echo Park proposal from the bill, (2)
adequate protection for Rainbow Bridge National Monument,
and (3) Congress' expressed intention not to construct a dam or
reservoir within any national park or monument.' With such
provisions included in the CRSP, the environmentalists'7
endorsed the legislation.
There are distinctions between the purposes of the CRSP units and
the benefits derived from them. Congress enacted the CRSP to provide long-term water supplies and hydroelectric power for the benefit
of the West and its economic development.'
There are, however,
many subordinate benefits to the reservoirs, such as recreation. The
legislature recognized that construction of water storage facilities
would have important incidental benefits. In addition to new water
storage and hydroelectric power, Congress acknowledged that "the
plan would create new recreational facilities and substantial benefits to
fish and wildlife."' 70The Tenth Circuit held similarly in JicarillaApache
Tribe v. United States.

"NPS Visitation Database - Park Report" hyperlink; then select "Black Canyon, 2004,
all months" pull-down menus; then follow "View Report" hyperlink) (last visited Oct.
21, 2005).
64. The Colorado Directory, Blue Mesa Reservoir/Curecanti National Recreation
Area, http://www.coloradodirectory.com/nationalparks/bluemesa.html
(last visited
Oct. 21, 2005).
65. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620(b) (2000).
66. H.R. REP. No. 84-1087, at 11 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2407.
67. In particular, Horace M. Albright signed for the Trustees for Conservation, Ira
N. Gabrielson signed for the Citizens' Committee on Natural Resources, and Howard
Zahniser signed for the Council of Conservationists. Id. Similar letters to the committee were sent by: "American Nature Association, the American Forestry Association,
National Wildlife Federation, the Wilderness Society, National Parks Association, Izaak
Walton League of America, Inc., Sierra Club, Wildlife Management Institute, General
Federation of Women's Clubs, Conservation Education Association, and National
Audubon Society." Id.
68. See 43 U.S.C. § 620.
69. H.R. REP. No. 84-1087, at8 (1956), reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2351.
70. 657 F.2d 1126, 1139 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding that recreation was not a primary purpose of the CRSP).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

1. Section 620(g) Facilities
a. Facilities for Recreation
Section 6 20(g) authorized facilities for recreation." Congress recognized that the creation of water storage would provide recreational
areas and therefore authorized facilities such as boat ramps, picnic
tables, and campgrounds through Section 6 2 0 (g). In fact, ten years
later, the National Park Service began constructing a boat-launching
ramp, camping and picnic sites, and a boat dock at Blue Mesa.73 The
April 1962 Economic Justification Report on the Curecanti Unit projected costs from recreational facilities and fish and wildlife facilities to
be $5,181,000 and $3,235,000, respectively.' This report defines recreational facilities specifically to include a "boat-launching ramp, boat
dock, sanitary facilities, and refuse containers," as well as concession
facilities.7"
As to fish and wildlife, the Department of the Interior demonstrated its regard related primarily to the ability to fish and access to
fishing. 6 The FWS described the Crystal Reservoir as providing a minor addition to fishing use at Curecanti, and as having "an insignificant
effect upon wildlife since the reservoir pool will be largely retained
within the Gunnison River Canyon." Section 6 20(g) authorized "public recreational facilities" on the lands withdrawn for construction of
the four initial units: Glen Canyon, Aspinall, Flaming Gorge, and Navajo, as well as the public use and enjoyment of such facilities and the
water areas created so long as they were "consistent with the primary purposes of saidprojects."'
b. Facilities for the Propagation of Fish and Wildlife
Section 6 20(g) of the CRSP also authorized "facilities to mitigate
losses of, and improve conditions for, the propagation of fish and wildlife."7' Congress was likely referring to fish hatcheries. There are two
71.
72.
73.

43 U.S.C. §
Id.

6 20

(g).

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE
COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT AND PARTICIPATING PROJECTs, S. Doc. No. 90-7, at 5

(1967).
74.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, CURECANTI UNIT OF THE
COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT: ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION REPORT APRIL 1962, A
SUPPLEMENT To THE ECONOMICJUSTIFICATION REPORT OF FEBRUARY 1959 3 (1962).

75. Id. at 28.
76. Id. at 29 (stating that public use facilities would be constructed "in the event
good stream fishing develops below Crystal Dam").
77. Id. at 27.
78. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 6 20(g) (2000) (emphasis
added).
79. Id.
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federal fish hatcheries in Colorado: one in Hotchkiss and one in Leadville. In fact, ten years after the passage of the CRSP, the Department
of the Interior reported to Congress that, working with state fish and
game departments, it stocked 3.9 million rainbow fingerlings in CRSP
reservoirs, completed engineering for the Jones Hole National Fish
Hatchery in Utah, and developed the Delta National Fish Hatchery to
serve the Aspinall reservoirs and other nearby participating projects.'
Congress noted that these recreational facilities and fish hatcheries
were nonreimbursable expenses under the CRSP:8 '
Only about $8.2 million, or less than 1 percent, of the total cost is
nonreimburseable for flood control, fish and wildlife, and recreation.
The remainder of over 99 percent is allocated to irrigation, power,
and municipal water supply as follows: $331.6 million to irrigation,
$510.9
million to power, and $45.5 million to municipal water sup82
ply.

In contrast, enumerated CRSP purposes were reimbursable. 83
E.

1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act ("CRBPA")

Following the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Arizona v. California,' legislators introduced bills in Congress to authorize the Central
Arizona Project, and complex negotiations followed amongst all of the
Colorado River Basin States.'
The origin of the CRBPA was a November 1962 letter from Chairman Aspinall to Secretary Udall that requested a comprehensive plan
for meeting the water and power needs of the Southwest. This Pacific
Southwest Water Plan evolved to encompass the Central Arizona Project Act and eventually came to be known as the CRBPA. 6 The CRBPA

80.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE
COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT AND PARTICIPATING PROJECTS, S. Doc. No. 90-7, at 12

(1967).
81. 43 U.S.C. §

620

(g).

Further, the legislative history provides that "[a]ll

costs incurred for recreational and fish and wildlife purposes would be nonreimbursable under the provisions of this section." H.R. REP. No. 84-1087, at 18
(1956), reprintedin 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2362-63.
82.

H.R. REp. No. 84-1087, at 11-12 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346,

2355.
83.

43 U.S.C. § 620(c); see also 43 U.S.C. § 620(a-1).

84.

373 U.S. 546 (1963).

85.

COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, COLORADO RIVER BASIN PROJECT,

H.R. REP. No. 90-1312 at 30-31 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666, 3680.
86. Id. at 183, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666, 3773. The name change reflected the conference committee's intent that the bill "give to the Secretary of the

Interior the authority and the responsibility for planning the best possible use of this
Nation's water resources west of the Continental Divide and for meeting the future
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authorized the construction of the Central Arizona Project s' but gave
first priority in the Lower Basin to California.88
The CRBPA also directed the Secretary to proceed with construction of participating projects authorized under the CRSP.89 The government is currently building Animas-La Plata, but did not build the
West Divide, Fruitland Mesa, Savory Pothook, and San Miguel Projects.'
1. What Was the Intent of Congress in Passing the CRBPA?
The primary theme in the CRBPA was water storage for beneficial
use. The House Committee outlined its findings after exhaustive consideration and debate and concluded that water shortages in the West
were quickly leading the area into an economic crisis. Additional storage would allow for conservation in times of abundance and sustenance throughout the seasons and the years. The Committee concluded:

(1) One of America's fastest growing regions-the Colorado River Basin-is in danger of economic stagnation unless its presently available
water supplies can be augmented. Colorado River water, which is the
very life blood of this area, is fast being exhausted.... The answer to
the Colorado River controversy is not to try to divide shortages but to
provide additional water. (2) In addition ... [i]t seems to the Committee that this presently thriving, prosperous area of our Nation is
clearly on a collision course with economic disaster unless this water
gap can be closed by augmentation of the Colorado River basin water
supplies....
(9) This bill constitutes another important step in the broad national
program devised by Congress to develop and utilize wisely the resources with which the Nation is endowed ....
This particular water
development program has added urgency because of the desperate
water supply situation existent throughout the Colorado River Basin. 9'
Water storage had the added benefit of curtailing the destructive
forces of flooding."
The House Committee deliberated upon the
CRBPA for many days. Recognizing the problems of scarcity and
overly optimistic projections of flows in the Colorado River, the Comwater needs of our 11 Western States." Id. at 19-20, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666,
3774.
87. Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §1501 (2000).
88. Lochhead, supra note 22, at 313.
89. 43 U.S.C. § 1501(b).
90. Lochhead, supra note 22, at 313 n.102.
91. H.R. REP. No. 90-1312 at 20-22 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666,
3669-71.
92. Id. at 24, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666, 3673.
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mittee considered the availability of water the single most important
issue at hand."
2.

How Does the CRBPA Amend the CRSP?

Only Title V of the CRBPA amended the CRSP. 94 It added: (1) participating projects and planning reports in Section 620, and 620(a) of
the CRSP; (2) a provision that construction of projects be concurrent
with construction of the Central Arizona Project in Section 620(a-1);
(3) a provision for the establishment of nonexcess irrigable acreage for
CRSP participating projects in Section 620(a-2); (4) a provision regarding priority of appropriation for projects within, and for the benefit of,
only the State of Colorado in Section 620(c-1); (5) a provision regarding the reimbursements for deficiencies in generation at Hoover dam
in Section 620(d-1); and (6) Section 620(k) regarding authorization
for additional appropriations. 95
The amendments to Section 620 and Section 620(c-1) are most
relevant to the issues discussed here. The purpose of the CRBPA
amendment to the CRSP is expressly stated as a note at the end of Section 620:'
Section 501 (a) of Pub. L. 90-537 provided that the amendment of this
section and section 620a of this title by such section 501 (a) were
made in order to provide for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Animas-La Plata Federal reclamation project, Colorado-New Mexico; the Dolores, Dallas Creek, West Divide, and San

Miguel Federal reclamation projects, Colorado; and the Central Utah
project (Uintah Unit), Utah, as participating projects under the Colorado River Storage Project Act, and to provide
for the completion of
97
planning reports on participating projects.

Tide V of the CRBPA amended section 620(c-1) of the CRSP by
adding language regarding the priority of appropriations:

93. Id. at 33, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666, 3682. The legislative history of
the CRBPA reinforced that "[t]he Upper Basin projects are needed in the areas they
will serve to provide dependable water supplies to meet the ever-growing needs for
agricultural, municipal, and industrial uses." Id. at 55, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3666, 3703.
94. Id. at 27-28, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666, 3677. "In 1956 the Congress
enacted the Colorado River Storage Project Act (70 Stat. 105). This Act authorized the

construction of a comprehensive, multiple-purpose, basinwide, water resource development plan known as the Colorado River Storage Project and Participating Projects.

It is amended by Title V of H.R. 3300." Id.
95. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2000); see also 43 U.S.C. §
620c-1, § 620d-1.

96.
97.

43 U.S.C. § 620.
Id.
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In the diversion and storage of water for any project or any parts
thereof constructed under the authority of the Colorado River Basin
Project Act [43 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.] or the Colorado River Storage
Project Act [43 U.S.C. 620 et seq.] within and for the benefit of the State
of Colorado only, the Secretary is directed to comply with the constitution and statutes of the State of Colorado relating to priority of appropriation; with State and Federal court decrees entered pursuant
thereto; and with operating principles, if any, adopted by the Secretary and approved by the State of Colorado."
The Aspinall Unit is located within the State of Colorado, but Congress authorized Aspinall, and the other CRSP units, for the benefit of
the entire Upper Colorado River Basin-not solely for the state of
Colorado. Similarly, Congress did not intend Flaming Gorge to be
solely for Utah, or Glen Canyon to be solely for Arizona.
Even if Section 620(c-1) applied to the Aspinall Unit, the legislative
history of the CRBPA indicates that Congress intended the units to
operate in priority with state water law. Congress did not intend to
disrupt the congressionally authorized purposes of the units:
The Committee understands this requirement to mean that diversion
and storage rights for these projects will be junior to existing rights
recognized under Colorado law. This is merely a reaffirmation of the
rule of law that would apply in any event.... The Committee does not
intend this language to interfere with the executive discretion of the
Secretary in contracting for the sale and distribution of water.9
Congress stated CRBPA's purposes differently than it stated CRSP's
purposes. The CRBPA's purposes, among others, include:
regulating the flow of the Colorado River; controlling floods; improving navigation; providing for the storage and delivery of the waters of
the Colorado River for reclamation of lands, including supplemental
water supplies, and for municipal, industrial, and other beneficial
purposes; improving water quality; providing for basic public outdoor
recreation facilities; improving conditions for fish and wildlife, and
the generation and sale of electrical power as an incident of the foregoing purposes.'00
The language "improving conditions for fish and wildlife" could be
construed to mean CRBPA reservoirs can store and release water expressly for fish and wildlife. However, the CRBPA did not contradict,
amend, or alter the purposes of projects authorized in the CRSP. In
fact, the CRBPA specifically provides:
98.
99.
100.

43 U.S.C. § 620(c-1) (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. No. 90-1312 at 81, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3666, 3723.
Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000).
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Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter, amend, repeal,
modify, or be in conflict with the provisions of the Colorado River
Compact (45 Stat. 107), the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
(63 Stat. 31), the Water Treaty of 1944 with the United Mexican
States (Treaty Series 994; 59 Stat. 1219), the decree entered by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Arizona against California and
others (376 U.S. 340), or, except as otherwise provided herein, the
Boulder Canyon Project Act .... the Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment Act,... or the ColoradoRiver Storage ProjectAct.'0 '
In 1968, Congress amended Section 620 of the CRSP by adding
participating projects.'2 Although Congress added participating projects in Section 620, Congress chose not to amend the authorized purposes within Section 620. It is a standard rule of statutory interpretation "that the legislature did not intend to effect a greater change than
is clearly apparent either by express declaration or by necessary implication.' 03
Simply because Congress enacted the CRBPA on a later date does
not make it controlling. Most often, later and more specific statutes
control earlier and more general ones.' This is not the case here because the CRSP is not less specific than the CRBPA. More importantly,
as discussed above, the CRBPA did not amend the project purposes
enumerated in the CRSP.
Further, the government completed Blue Mesa, the primary reservoir in the Aspinall Unit, in 1967 before Congress enacted the CRBPA,
and courts consider construction of a water project prior to changes in
laws a factor in rejecting limits on the use of stored water.'0
IV. STATE DECREES AND CASE LAW
Congress did not intend that state decrees would interfere with the
federal purposes of CRSP units. State court decrees cannot override
congressionally authorized purposes.
The Colorado River Water Conservation District ("River District")
obtained Colorado water court decrees to the Aspinall Unit beginning
in 1960 for domestic, municipal, industrial, power, flood control, piscatorial, wildlife protection and preservation, recreation, irrigation, and

101.

Id. § 1551(a) (emphasis added).

102. SeeAct of Sept. 30, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-537, § 501 (a), 82 Stat. 885, 896-97.
103. Heflin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 247, 251 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(quoting C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 254 S.E.2d

426, 428 (1979)) (stating that such a presumption is a standard rule of statutory construction).
104. See SINCLAIR, supra note 24, at 138.
105. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 5-8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974), and reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974).
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stock watering purposes.'" The River District obtained the decrees
because the United States was unwilling to subject itself to state court
adjudication.' 7
In the 1960 decree, the court stated,
while these uses [piscatorial, wildlife protection and preservation, and
recreational purposes] are not necessarily essential to the industrial
and agricultural development of the Basin, they are recignized [sic]
beneficial uses of water for which decree [sic] may be entered, and
add greatly to the attraction and welfare of the area, and there is apparent reason to consider it will serve these purposes.108
However, "state water law does not control in the distribution of
reclamation water ifinconsistent with other congressional directives to
the Secretary.""' Here, Congress expressly defined the purposes of the
CRSP units and in so doing, preempted inconsistent state law.
The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the development of
compact water, hydropower, and compact deliveries as CRSP project
purposes."' The court also recognized that the Aspinall decrees permit
power generation, and that power generation provided most of the
Aspinall Unit's economic justification. "Congress considered power
revenues to be the most important aspect of CRSP. .

.

.Without the

revenues from power sales, Congress might not have approved the
Aspinall Unit."'
However, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the Colorado water
court's finding that the Bureau of Reclamation "stored and released
water from the Aspinall Unit not only for hydropower, but for other
beneficial purposes, including flood control, fish and wildlife, recreation, irrigation, and domestic uses, under the appropriative rights" of
the unit."' The court interpreted the 1968 CRBPA as amending the

106. Final hearing and decree, In re Matter of the Adjudication of Priorities for Water Rights, No. 6981, at 247.48 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Montrose County, Water Dist. No. 62,
Mar. 30, 1960); see also Final hearing and adjudication, In re Matter of the Supplemental Adjudication of Priorities of Right to the Use of Water for All Beneficial Purposes,
No. 5590 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Gunnison County, Water Dist. No. 59, Oct. 28, 1961); Final
hearing and Adjudication, In re Matter of the Adjudication of Priorities, No. 5782
(Colo. Dist. Ct., Gunnison County, Water Dist. No. 59,Jan. 27, 1965).
107. Final hearing and decree, In re Matter of the Adjudication of Priorities for Water Rights, No. 6981, at 246-47 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Montrose County, Water Dist. No. 62,
Mar. 30, 1960).
108. Id. at 249.
109. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 668 (1978).
110. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners Ass'n (Union Park
Case), 14 P.3d 325, 333 (Colo. 2000).
111. Id. at 337 (quoting Arizona Power Auth. v. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th
Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at336.
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project purposes of the CRSP units to include fish, wildlife, and recreation as "bona fide purposes of the Aspinall Unit.''..
V.

FEDERAL PROJECT PURPOSES PREEMPT STATE CASE LAW
AND DECREES

Courts have grappled with inconsistencies between state court decrees and federal project purposes before. The Commerce,"4 Property," ' and Supremacy Clauses. 6 of the U.S. Constitution provide Congress with the authority to preempt state law. Generally, courts hold
that specific congressional directives or authorizations override inconsistent state law."7 In the case of the CRSP, Congress has clearly exercised its power in describing the authorized purposes of the CRSP
units.
Neither the reference to fish, wildlife, and recreation benefits in
the Colorado water court decrees for the Aspinall Unit nor the Colorado Supreme Court's holding that such uses are [use of the terms
"primary" or "secondary" may lead one erroneously to believe there are
separate classes of purposes] project purposes in the Union Parkcase is
consistent with the clear Congressional intent in authorizing the CRSP
units. Rather, Congress intended fish, wildlife, and recreation as benefits to reservoir operations when consistent with the primary purposes
of the project."'
Unlike the CRSP, the authorizing statute of the San Juan-Chama
legislation specified that water may be used "for the purposes of furnishing water supplies [for irrigation] and for municipal, domestic,
and industrial uses, providing recreation and fish and wildlife benefits."" 9 The ficarillacourt rejected the legality of storing water solely for
fish and wildlife, particularly in the arid Rio Grande Basin. Even
though the statute referenced these uses as purposes of the project, the
court held that fish, wildlife, and recreation were "incidental byproducts" and "secondary" to other uses."n
In response to this decision, the city of Albuquerque sought and
obtained a limited Congressional change in the authorized purposes of
the San Juan-Chama Project to allow the project to store water in cer113.
114.
115.

Id. at 339.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

116.
117. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 668 n.21 (1978).
118. Jicarilla.Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1136-37 (1981) (holding
that, even if recreation was recognized as a beneficial use under New Mexico law, the
authorizing statutes of the San Juan-Chama project, Act ofJune 13, 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-483, § 8, 76 Stat. 96, 97-98, repealed ly 43 U.S.C. § 615pp (2000), did not allow water
to be stored for those purposes).
119. Act ofJune 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96, 97-98.
120. Jicarilla, 657 F.2d at 1145.
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tain reservoirs for flat-water boating and other recreation and fishery
uses.'"' Only with subsequent and specific Congressional authorization
did such uses become legitimate purposes of the San Juan-Chama Project. Congress has not enacted similar legislation allowing CRSP units,
such as Aspinall, to operate for aesthetics, kayaking or downstream
angling.
Similarly, in ONeill v. United States,'22 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a water service contract where the congressional authorization required the project to use a portion of the water for fish,
wildlife, and habitat restoration.2 In that case, legislation specifically
amended the project's authorizing legislation to make fish and wildlife
mitigation, protection, and restoration purposes equal in priority to24
the original purposes of the project - irrigation and domestic use.'
There is no comparable provision in the Aspinall Unit's authorizing
legislation. Therefore, only Congress has the authority to add fish,
wildlife, and recreation to the authorized purposes of the CRSP units.
VI. DO OTHER LAWS AMEND CRSP PURPOSES?
Congress enacted the Federal Water Project Recreation Act
("FWPRA") in 1965 to promote a more uniform policy on recreational
opportunities.
The FWPRA did not amend the CRSP, nor did it
change the purposes of any project authorized under the CRSP. It
simply applied to investigating and planning water resource projects
and urged the Secretary of the Interior to consider recreation, fish,
and wildlife enhancement where consistent with project purposes."n In
fact, the FWRPA expressly stated, "[n]othing in this part shall be construed to change, modify, or expand the authorized purposes of any
Reclamation project."1 7 In Jicarilla,the court held that the FWRPA did

not authorize storage for recreation, fish or wildlife." Moreover, the
FWRPA did not apply to projects commenced before its effective
date."n
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act ("FWCA") authorizes the
Secretary of Interior, in conjunction with the development of federal
water projects, to provide assistance and cooperation for the development, protection, rearing, and stocking of wildlife by controlling losses
121.

Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-140, § 5, 95 Stat. 1717, 1717-18.

122.

50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 1028 (1995).

123. Id. at 681.
124. Act of Oct. 30, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3406(a), 106 Stat. 4714, 4714.
125. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-12 (2000).
126. See id.
127. Id. § 4601-34(a).
128. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1143 (1981).
129.

Uithoven v. Stone, 906 F. Supp. 369, 373-74 (N.D. Miss. 1995), affd, 96 F.3d

1445 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997).
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from disease, minimizing damages from overabundant species, and
providing public shooting and fishing areas.'" In this regard, the
FWCA provides that such wildlife conservation "shall receive equal
consideration and be coordinated with other features of water-resource
development programs through
.
131
nance, and coordination."'

.

. planning, development, mainte-

The FWCA applies only to the authorization or construction of new
projects."' Moreover, the FWCA simply requires the Secretary of the
Interior to provide adequate provisions for wildlife resources "consistent
with the primary purposes" of the federal water project.'33 There is no requirement that the project proponent follow agency advice in regards
to the FWCA.Ml Even if the FWCA applied to Aspinall, compliance with
NEPA generally results in compliance with the FWCA.'35
VII. CONCLUSION
Debate over the congressionally authorized purposes of the CRSP
units, including the Aspinall Unit, could have long-standing policy implications. The operation of federal water projects affect water storage,
compact compliance, energy supplies, and prices, as well as endangered species and ecosystems.
Enacted prior to environmental laws such as the ESA and NEPA,
Congress implemented the CRSP for the express purposes of solving
long-term water supply problems and generating hydroelectric power
in the arid West. Congress had the opportunity to add purposes to the
CRSP in 1968. As discussed herein, Congress amended the very section of the CRSP listing its purposes. The only change Congress made
to that section was the addition of participating projects.
Additionally, Congress expressly provided that nothing in the
CRBPA, except the additions of participating projects and other slight
modifications, altered or amended the CRSP. The CRSP is in concert,
rather than conflict, with the Law of the River."
130.
131.
132.

16 U.S.C. § 661 (2000).
Id.
Id. § 662(a) (stating that "whenever the waters of any stream or other body of

water are proposed or authorized to be impounded, diverted... [or] otherwise controlled or modified... [consultation with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
must occur] ... with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources," implying that such
consultation pertains only to new projects).
133.

Id. § 663(a) (emphasis added).

134.

Lake Erie Alliance for the Prot. of the Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engrs., 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1081 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affid, 707 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
135. Bergen County v. Dole, 620 F. Supp. 1009, 1064 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d
1130 (3d Cir. 1986).
136. H.R. REP. No. 84-1087, at 18 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 236263 (providing that "nothing in the Act shall be construed to alter, amend, repeal, in-
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In the CRSP, Congress recognized that recreational and other
benefits would arise from the construction of CRSP units. Furthermore, a separate section of the CRSP authorized facilities for recreation where consistent with the primary purposes of the CRSP. The
legislature authorized boat ramps, picnic tables, and camping areas so
long as they did not interfere with water storage or power production.
Similarly, CRSP authorized facilities for the propagation of fish and
wildlife, such as fish hatcheries, to improve fishing for non-native
brown and rainbow trout.
Legislation subsequent to the CRSP did not alter the purposes for
which the reservoirs were constructed. The legislation that created the
National Parks expressly avoided any conflict with federal or state water
rights, and the recent boundary adjustment did not alter the authority
of the Commissioner of Reclamation. Similarly, the recovery programs
for endangered fish comply with federal and state laws. These programs do not alter, amend, or supplement Reclamation law. Neither
the ESA nor NEPA alter an agency's statutory authority. To the extent
state case law or state decrees are inconsistent with the authorized purposes of the Aspinall Unit, federal law preempts them under the authority of the Commerce, Property and Supremacy Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.
Absent express congressional authorization, the United States must
continue to operate the Aspinall Unit pursuant to its authorized purposes under the CRSP. If the government operates the facilities in this
manner, then the tail is not wagging the dog. Such operation, however, can be consistent with important benefits to plant and animal
species and the environment. Careful management of the Aspinall
Unit reservoirs accounting for hydrologic conditions can accomplish
environmental benefits without compromising the congressionally authorized purposes or the state priority system. The alternative, continued conflict over dwindling water and power supplies, will result in few
benefits to the people of the West or its rare species.

terpret, modify, or be in conflict with any provisions of the compacts and acts which
comprise the so-called law of the river.").
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the parts of the country where water is rarely in short supply, interstate water disputes are uncommon. This includes the southeastern
portion of the United States, with its abundance of lakes, rivers, and
streams. Whereas the West has routinely been the site of interstate
water struggles, the Southeast has traditionally had enough water to
please everyone. However, there have been exceptions. Two such exceptions are the ongoing clash among the states of Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
River system and the dispute between Alabama and Georgia over the
waters of the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River system.
Because these states have repeatedly been unable to reach an
agreement regarding allocation of the waters, and because Congressional apportionment of the waters is a politically non-viable option,
these two "water wars" are likely to find their way to the United States
Supreme Court for an equitable apportionment. Until that time, the
disputes are certain to continue, and the downstream states of Alabama
and Florida will continue to claim harm from the upstream uses of
Georgia, particularly the uses of the ever growing city of Atlanta, with
its seemingly unquenchable thirst.
H. THE RIVER BASINS
A.

The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin

The basins of the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint ("ACF")
Rivers extend 385 miles and have a total drainage area of approximately 19,800 square miles.2 Roughly 70 percent of Atlanta's water
supply comes from the Chattahoochee.' The Chattahoochee also supplies drinking water to multiple municipalities in both Georgia and
Alabama and provides water for flood control, navigation, and hydropower.4 One of the main uses of the Flint River is irrigation by farmers
in the Southwestern portion of Georgia.' The Apalachicola River flows
into Apalachicola Bay the fresh water needed to support a commercial
2.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., WATER ALLOCATION FOR THE
APALACHICOLA-CHATrAHOOCHEE-FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN: ALABAMA, FLORIDA, AND

GEORGIA MAIN REPORT 4-10 (1998) [hereinafter ACF RIVER BASIN], available at
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/pd/actacfeis/acfMain.pdf
(the drainage of the re-

spective areas are as follows: Apalachicola River 2,680 square miles, Chattahoochee
River 8,770 square miles, Flint River 8,460 square miles). Id. at 4-37.
3. William L. Andreen, State Surveys: Alabama, in 6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 20,
28 (Robert E. Beck ed., Supp. 2004).
4. Id.
5. See Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division, Georgia Flint River Basin Plan, http://www.gadnr.org/frbp/index.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2005).
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fishing industry, which generates over $100 million per year, making it
the "most productive estuary in Florida."6 Apalachicola Bay, which has
an area of 210 square miles, "yields 90 percent of Florida's (and 10
percent of the country's) commercial oyster harvest .... [It] provides
important nursery habitat for shrimp, red snapper, speckled sea trout,
and blue crabs."7
B.

The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa Basin

The basins of the Alabama, Coosa, and Tallapoosa ("ACT") Rivers
extend about 320 miles, and the total drainage area of the ACT Basin
to the mouth of the Alabama River is approximately 22,820 square
miles.' The main rivers of the ACT Basin are the Coosa, Tallapoosa,
Cahaba, and Alabama with basin areas of 10,200, 4,680, 1,825, and
22,800 square miles respectively. 9 "The Coosa watershed . . . ranks

third in the United States in terms of freshwater fish diversity."'" Also,
"[t]he Nature Conservancy has classified 18 fish and mussel species
from the Tallapoosa as species at risk and has deemed the conservation
of the Tallapoosa watershed as critical to the conservation of fish and
mussel biodiversity in the United States."" American Rivers, an environmental organization, named the ACF and ACT Basins "among the
of "water
most endangered river systems in the United States" because
2
withdrawals, dams, urban sprawl, and non-point pollution.,'
HI. THE ROAD TO CONFLICT
A.

Atlanta's Population Growth

Over eighty percent of the population of the ACF Basin lives in
Georgia, primarily in the Atlanta area. Since 1950, Atlanta's metropolitan population has increased from less than 500,000 to over four
million.'3 Atlanta's population surge shows no signs of slowing down.
"To put such dramatic population growth in perspective, consider that

6. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 185-86 (2002).

7.

Id. at 184-85.

8.

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., WATER ALLOCATION FOR THE ALABAMA(ACT) RIVER BASIN: ALABAMA AND GEORGIA MAIN REPORT 4-11, 4-12
RIVER
BASIN],
available
at
(1998)
[hereinafter
ACT

COOSA-TALLAPOOSA

http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/pd/actacfeis/actmain.pdf.
9. Id. at 4-40, 4-42 to -43.
10. Andreen, supra note 3, at 29.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 30. (discussing sixteen dams within the ACF system, and seventeen dams
within the ACT system). Id. at 28-29.
13. GLENNON, supranote 6, at 187-88.
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metropolitan Atlanta grows by the total population of the town of Apalachicola every month."'4
Due to the rapid population growth of the Atlanta metropolitan
area during the latter part of the twentieth century,'" the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") proposed reallocation from hydropower to water supply of two of Georgia's lakes in 1989: Lake Sidney Lanier in the ACF system and Lake Allatoona in the ACT system.'"
According to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division, "[t]he
two river basins make up 38 percent of Georgia's total land area,
provide drinking water to more than 60 percent of the state's
population and supply water for more than 35 percent of Georgia's
irrigated agriculture."' 7
B.

Groundwater Pumping by Georgia Farmers

Partially due to the severe summer droughts in Georgia in the
1980s, "[t]he only farmers who stayed in business were irrigators." 8
The number of acres irrigated by Georgia farmers from the early 1970s
to the early 1990s increased fivefold to over one million." The number
of irrigated acres further increased to about 1.5 million in 2000.' ACF
Basin groundwater withdrawals grew by 240 percent between 1970 and
1990.2' Florida took exception to the increased withdrawals, claiming
the pumping by Georgia farmers from the Florida Aquifer was reducing the Flint River flow reaching Florida.' The Corps prepared an environmental impact statement ("EIS';) in 1998 and found that "the effect of pumping I gallon of groundwater from the Upper Floridan Aquifer would be about a 0.6-gallon reduction in the groundwater contribution to stream flow" in the Flint River. J.B. Ruhl, a law professor at
Florida State University, believes groundwater pumping by South
Georgia farmers is probably as much of a problem as are the withdrawals from Lake Lanier.24

14.

Id. at 188.

15.

Id. at 187-88.

16.

Andreen, supra note 3, at 30-31.

17.

ENVrL. PROT. Div.,

GA. DEP'T. OF NATURAL

REs., GEORGIA'S ENVIRONMENT 10

(2003), available at
http://www.gaepd.org/Files-PDF/gaenviron/annualreport/gaenvO2-03.pdf.
18. GLENNON, supranote 6, at 188.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 189.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 190.
24. Interview with J.B. Ruhl, Assoc. Dean for Academic Affairs and the Matthews &
Hawkins Professor of Prop., Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Apr. 18,

2005).
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C.

Dredging of the Apalachicola River

In order to allow a small number of barges to make deliveries to
small ports in Georgia and Alabama, the Corps has conducted
"extensive dredging" of the Apalchicola River, resulting in large sand
piles along its banks that have eliminated twenty-five miles of
floodplain. 5
This dredging harms the Apalachicola Bay's fishing
industry. Dredging tends to reduce the "amount of nutrients that
floodwaters remove from the floodplain and transport down the river
to the [Apalachicola Bay] estuary." 6 As a result, American Rivers has
placed the Apalachicola River on its 2002 list of America's Most
Endangered Rivers. 7
D. The Comprehensive Study and the Southeastern Water Compacts
In the early 1990s, the Corps conducted studies (collectively
"Comprehensive Study") of the ACT and ACF Basins. 8 According to
the Corps' Mobile (Alabama) District, the purposes of the Comprehensive Study were to:
0 Determine the capabilities of and demands on the water resources
of the basins.
" Develop technical information, strategies, and plans.
" Provide basin-specific tools to evaluate water management alternatives.
" Evaluate alternatives that affect the water resource uses.
* Recommend a formal mechanism to coordinate long-term basinwide management and use of water resources to meet the environmental, public health, and economic needs of the basins.u
The studies required the consensus of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama
on every element of the results.'
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama negotiated, primarily between 1992
and 1997, to form the ACT and ACF Compacts," collectively known as
25.
26.
27.

GLENNON,

supra note 6, at 190.

Id.
Id.

28. U.S. ARMY CoRPs OF ENG'RS, MOBILE DIST., SHARING THE WATER IN ALABAMA,
FLORIDA, AND GEORGIA 2 (1997), available at
http://www.sam.usace.army.mil/pd/actacfeis/files/ 1097.pdf.
29. Id.
30. ACT RIVER BASIN, supra note 8, at 1-5.
31. ACF RIVER BASIN, supra note 2, at 1-5, 1-10; ACT RIVER BASIN, supra note 8, at 14, 1-9 (explaining that the compacts were ratified by the legislatures of each of the
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the Southeastern Water Compacts."' The compacts were the three
states' attempts to come up with a coordination mechanism, the last of
the five purposes of the Comprehensive Study. The compacts contained no allocation formula, which is noteworthy "since most water
compacts allocate water."" They "essentially froze present uses on both
river systems in place while the three states and the Corps ... stud [ied]
how to resolve the controversy ....

The two compacts [were] merely

agreements to agree[.]"" Georgia, Florida, and Alabama "concluded
that they would prefer to take their chances in court-ultimately, in equitable apportionment litigation-rather than control their own destinies through compromise. Only the future will demonstrate their wisdom or the lack thereof. " 5
The compacts included language "specifically protecting water
quality and endangered species, as provided under federal law. " ' Any
allocation resulting from the implementation of the compacts by the
United States must be "to the maximum extent practicable, in a manner consistent with the formula so long as it does not conflict with federal law." 7 Furthermore, none of the states should have their rights to
control the waters within their respective borders disturbed by the
compacts, as long as "the state does not act inconsistently with the allocation formula. " '
Each compact created a commission composed of the governor of
each of the states and a representative from the federal government.
Each state governor received one vote (decisions were to be unanimous), and the federal representative received no vote 9 but could only
object to any proposed formula if such formula violated federal law.

three states, signed by their respective governors, approved by Congress, and signed by

President Clinton, thus making them federal law for the duration of the compacts).
32. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.06(c) (3), 9-210 (Robert E. Beck ed., Supp.
2001).
33.

Interview with Nolton Johnson, Ga. Envtl. Prot. Dep't, Water Res. Div. (Apr. 19,

2005).
34. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supranote 32, at 9-210 to -211.
35. Charles T. DuMars & David Seeley, The Failureof the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeHint River Basin and Alabama-Coosa-TallapoosaRiver Basin Compacts and a Guide to the
Successful Establishment of Interstate Water Compacts, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 384 (2004).
36. ANDREEN, supra note 10, at 32.
37. Id. at 34.

38.

Id.

39. Josh Clemons, Water-Sharing Compact Dissolves, 23 WATER LOG 1, 11 (2003),
available
at
http://www.olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/MS-

AL/Water%20Log%20PDF/23.3.pdf (stating that the voting mechanism was "a structural flaw that effectively ensured its demise.").
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1.

The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Compact 0

The ACT Compact, between Alabama and Georgia, controls allocation of the surface waters of the ACT Basin,' which is comprised of
"the Alabama River, the Coosa River, the Tallapoosa River, all their
associated tributaries, as well as the Cahaba River.""
An agreement on the ACT Compact was not expressly contingent
upon an agreement on the ACF Compact. At one point, however,
Georgia, unlike Alabama, linked the ACT Compact with the ACF
Compact. As a prerequisite to an agreement with Alabama on the
ACT, Georgia wanted assurance that the ACF would meet its needs.
Georgia believed Alabama should help on the ACF and did not believe
Alabama had any "substantial disagreement" on the ACF. In return,
Georgia felt it could help Alabama on the ACT.4
In the months leading up to the ACT's July 2004 expiration date,
Trey Glenn, former director of Alabama's Office of Water Resources,
remained "optimistic" that a resolution would be reached with Georgia
regarding the ACT Basin." Likewise, Charles T. DuMars, an attorney
representing Georgia, felt something was "possible on the ACT ...
there's communication." ' Despite their high hopes, the ACT Compact
expired on July 31, 2004.
Because there was no express linkage between the ACT and ACF
Compacts, the ACT Compact's failure was not directly due to the ACF
Compact's failure. Professor William Andreen of the University of
Alabama School of Law believes the ACT Compact failed because Alabama was not happy with the amount of water Georgia wanted to withdraw from Lake Allatoona for use in Cobb County. The later discharge
of that water includes waste water in the Chattahoochee system. '

40.

Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111 Stat.

2233 (1997).
41. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.03, at 46-9 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2004) (stat-

ing ACF and ACT "make some references to groundwater, but the provision in each
compact calling for the development of a formula to allocate water among the signatory states refers only to surface water."). Id. at 46-9 to -10.
42. ALA. DEP'T. OF ECON. & CMTY. AFFAIRS OFFICE OF WATER RES., ALABAmA - COOSA TALLAPOOSA (ACT) RIVER BASIN COMPACT 1, http://www.actcompact.alabama.gov/ (last
visited Dec. 15, 2005).
43. Telephone Interview with Bruce Brown, McKinna Long & Aldridge, L.L.P. in
Atlanta, Ga. (Apr. 27, 2005).
44. Telephone Interview with Onis "Trey" Glenn III, Dir. of the Ala. Dep't. of Envtl.
Mgmt. (Oct. 17, 2005).

45.

Telephone Interview with Charles T. DuMars, Professor of Law, Univ. of N. M.

Sch. of Law (Oct. 14, 2005).

46. E-mail from William Andreen, Edgar L. Clarkson Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala.
Sch. of Law (May 2, 2005) (on file with author).
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The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Compact47

The ACF Compact controls surface water allocation of the ACF Basin.' The compact gave the ACF Basin Commission the authority "to
develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface
waters" of the basin among Georgia, Alabama and Florida. 9 However,
"[t]he apportionment only of surface water is curious indeed, for it
exempts pumping by Flint River farmers from control by the commission."' The Compact also contains a one-state-one vote mechanism
requiring unanimity, which practically allows "Georgia cities and farms
to divert and pump with impunity. "
The ACF Compact was to terminate if the ACF Basin Commission
did not reach an agreement by December 31, 1998.
Negotiations
deadlocked and, following a series of deadline extensions,53 the ACF
compact officially expired on August 31, 2003." In December 2003,
Georgia and Alabama agreed on management of the ACT system, but
this agreement was contingent on Georgia reaching an agreement with
Florida regarding the ACF system; since there was no ACF agreement
before the final deadline, the ACT agreement between Georgia and
Alabama was void. However, because the available waters cannot meet
the water needs of the three states, an allocation agreement is still necessary. The dispute did not end with the termination of the Southeastern Water Compact, though there are "some noise about getting the
three states back together."5 Professor Andreen claims, "[i] t will take a
long time." 6 Donna Christie, a law professor at Florida State University
College of Law, agrees, "[i] t looks like we're in for a long fight." 7
47. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104,
111 Stat. 2219 (1997).
48. ALA. DEP'T. OF ECON. & CMTY. AFFAIRS OFFICE OF WATER REs., APALACHICOLA CHATTAHOOCHEE - FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN COMPACT 1, www.acfcompact.alabama.gov/
(last visited Dec. 15, 2005).

49. 111 Stat. at 2222-23. According to Art. XIII of the Compact, "only equitable
relief, and not money damages, shall be available in a proceeding to enforce the compact water allocation formula." 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.05(d), 46-29 n.175
(Robert E. Beck ed., 2004).
50. GLENNON, supra note 6, at 191.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53, Id.
54. ALA. DEPT. OF ECON. & CMTY.AFFAIRs OFFICE OF WATER REs., APAIACHICOLA CHATTAHOOCHEE - FLINT (ACF) RIVER BASIN COMPACT 1, www.acfcompact.alabama.gov/
(last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
55. Interview with William S. Cox III, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., N. Birmingham, Ala. (May 5, 2005).
56. Interview with William Andreen, Edgar L. Clarkson Professor of Law, Univ. of
Ala. Sch. of Law, in Tuscaloosa, Ala. (May 2, 2005).
57. E-mail from Donna Christie, Elizabeth C. and Clyde W. Atkinson Professor and
Assoc. Dean for Int'l Programs, Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law (Apr. 19, 2005) (on file
with author).
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IV. CURRENT LTIGATION
There are currently three active suits in the "water wars" litigation.
William "Buddy" Cox, a lawyer at Lightfoot, Franklin and White in
North Birmingham, Alabama, classifies the situation as "a federal civil
procedure exam nightmare." 8 A summary of the three suits follows.
A.

State of Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 9

Alabama, concerned that the reallocation proposed by the Corps in
1989 would "raise hydropower costs, harm water quality, and prevent
further economic development,"' filed suit against the Corps on June
28, 1990, in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama ("N.D. Ala. Court")." According to Cox, the biggest problem for Alabama is "resource management, particularly during low
flow conditions."6 2 Alabama has been steadfast throughout the dispute,
wanting to protect the state's uses of water for supply, irrigation, navigation," hydropower, and recreation.'
The suit, which is currently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, alleged the Corps' 1989 reallocation of Lake Lanier violated Alabama's water rights.' In September 1990, Florida intervened
to protect Apalachicola Bay's oyster and fishing industry, and Georgia
intervened to protect its sovereign power over water within its borders.' Alabama and Florida were concerned about both the quantity
and the quality of the water reaching them from the upstream Atlanta
metropolitan area. "The inadequacy of sewage treatment presents
quality problems, especially in the City of Atlanta where a unitary sewage system spills raw sewage with heavy storm runoff." 7
B.

SoutheasternFederalPower Customers, Inc. v. Caldera"

In December 2000, Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc.
("SFPC")' brought suit against the Corps in the United States District

58. Interview with William S. Cox III, supranote 55.
59. 382 F.Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Ala. 2005), vacated and remanded, 424 F.3d 1117
(11th Cir. 2005).
60.
Clemons, supra note 39, at 1.
61.
Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 382 F.Supp. 2d at 1304.
62.
Interview with William S. Cox III, supra note 55.
63. JOSEPH L. SAX, ETAL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 71 (3d ed. 2000).
64. Telephone Interview with Onis "Trey" Glenn III, supranote 44.
65. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,382 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.

66.

Id.

67. James L. Bross, Georgia, in6 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 301, 310 (Robert E. Beck
ed., 1994).
68. 301 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004).
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Court for the District of Columbia ("D.D.C. Court"), challenging the
Corps' allocation of additional water from Lake Lanier for municipal
uses.' Georgia moved to intervene, and SFPC and the Corps agreed to
allow Georgia to participate in mediation beginning in March 2001.'
In January 2003, the parties reached an agreement ("D.C. Agreement"
The agreement gave Georgia municior "Settlement Agreement").
palities the right to contract with the Corps for additional water out of
Lake Lanier for municipal and industrial water supplies.73 The agreement was to last for ten years, with the option to extend to twenty years,
and would give the Atlanta area enough water to meet its current and
some future needs. Furthermore,
[Tihe Settlement Agreement makes no disposition of the water in
Lake Lanier itself. Rather, the Settlement Agreement deals solely
with the subject of water storage. While Alabama and Florida may be
apprehensive that Georgia will allow the Water Supply Providers to
take their fill up to their storage quota, the actual extraction of water
stored in Lake Lanier for water supply purposes is entirely governed
by the permitting process administered by the State of Georgia. The
Corps itself has no authority to control water withdrawals. Under the
WSA, it can only reserve the storage from which those withdrawals
may be made. Even if the Settlement Agreement were to authorize all
of Lake Lanier as water storage for municipal and industrial water
supply, the actual withdrawal of that water would be up to the state
permitting authorities. 74
Florida and Alabama moved to intervene in the D.C. litigation and
also sought relief in the Northern District of Alabama.' In an October
15, 2003 order, the N.D. Ala. Court stated the singular question before
it was whether the D.C. Agreement violated the Northern District's
September 19, 1990 stay order.' The stay order was "governed in part
by a precedent Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings," the relevant language of which "forbid the Corps from execut[ing] any contracts or
agreements which [were] the subject of the complaint in [the]77 action
unless expressly agreed to, in writing, by Alabama and Florida."
69. SFPC "is a non-profit corporate consortium of rural electric cooperatives and
municipal electric systems supplying electric power to their customers in the southeastern United States." Id. at 30.
70. Id.
71. Id. (explaining that by the time Georgia reached a settlement with the Corps,
the granting of its motion to intervene had yet to occur).
72. Id.
73.
74.

Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 32.

75.

Id. at 30.

76.

Alabama v. Florida, No. CV 90-BE-1331-E (N.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2003) (order

granting preliminary injunction).
77. Id.
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Georgia and the Corps argued that a 1992 Northern District order
superceded the 1990 stay order.'8 The N.D. Ala. Court disagreed, holding the 1990 stay order and the precedentJoint Motion were the governing documents at the time when Georgia and the Corps entered
into the D.C. Agreement.' The court stated, "[n]o clear path lies before the Corps that it can take to satisfy all of the parties .... Water is a
limited resource, and Alabama, Georgia and Florida all have seemingly
unlimited [sic] uses for it. " '°
The district court found the D.C. Agreement in violation of the
1990 stay order, holding the D.C. Agreement implicated "the subject of
the complaint: the duty of the Corps to allocate water from the Buford
Dam/Lake Lanier Project in a lawful manner."" The court conceded
the possible physical injury the D.C. Agreement posed to Alabama and
Florida "may be gradual" but held "[t]he injury to the status quo
placed on the Corps' decisionmaking ability in this area, however, will
be instant. '"" Though the court acknowledged the D.C. Agreement
appeared purely intrastate (i.e. appeared to be an agreement between
only Georgia parties), it stated "its effects will resonate in every state
that shares the ACF river basin.""3
The district court granted Alabama's and Florida's motion for preliminary injunction against enforcement of the D.C. Agreement.' The
injunction enjoined Georgia and the Corps from filing the D.C.
Agreement, implementing any part of the D.C. Agreement, and "entering into any other new storage or withdrawal contracts affecting the
ACF Basin without approval of N.D. Ala." "5 The Corps and Georgia
appealed, and Gwinnett County, Georgia intervened.
After Georgia and the Corps appealed, the D.D.C. Court rejected
Alabama's and Florida's attacks on the Settlement Agreement, approving the settlement on February 10, 2004.' However, the court held
"the Settlement Agreement may not be executed or implemented until
the injunction entered by N.D. Ala. has been dissolved.""7
[T]his Court concludes that the Settlement Agreement is fair and
reasonable, and neither illegal nor contrary to public policy. Execution of the Settlement Agreement, and any implementation thereof, is
however, subject to Judge Bowdre's injunction, and to that end, be78.
79.

Id.
Id.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

84.

S. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Caldera, 301 F.Supp.2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2004).

85.

Id.

86. Id. at 35; Interview with William S. Cox III, supra note 55 (stating that in Caldera,
Georgia "got what it wanted").
87. Caldera, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31.
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fore they may act under the Settlement Agreement, the parties to it
must first obtain dissolution of the injunction in N.D. Ala.88
On April 8, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit stayed the appeal of the
Northern District of Alabama's October 15, 2003 preliminary injunction, remanding for the limited purpose of allowing the N.D. Ala.
Court to consider dissolving its injunction on the basis of the D.D.C.
Court's order.' On February 18, 2005, the N.D. Ala. Court issued an
order refusing to dissolve the injunction, and held there has been no
change in circumstances "that would justify lifting the injunction. " '
The N.D. Ala. Court held the D.D.C. Court's February 10, 2004 order
approving the D.C. Agreement did "not affect the findings upon which
this court based its preliminary injunction."" Finally, the N.D. Ala.
Court held the injunction was to stay in place "until the case is resolved
on the merits, and may be lifted earlier 'for just cause.'"9"
C.

Georgiav. U.S. Army Corps of Engineer

In May 2000, Georgia petitioned the Corps for more water from
Lake Lanier. The Corps resisted because it believed it did not have
authorization divert water from hydroelectric uses. Georgia responded
by suing the Corps in the Northern District of Georgia ("N.D. Georgia
Court") over the denial of its Water Supply Request. ' The N.D. Georgia Court has since issued an order abating and administratively closing this case, pending final judgment in the N.D. Ala. Court litigation."
According to Bruce Brown,' an attorney for Georgia, the critical issue in the Northern District of Georgia litigation was "may, must, or
must not the Corps operate Lake Lanier in accordance with the directive of the State of Georgia to operate the lake for the purpose of water
supply."97 Brown believes Georgia's position is that the Corps must follow its lead as the home state, unless such lead is contrary to clear congressional intent.' Brown points to Calfornia v. United Stater in support of his position:
88. Id. at 35.
89. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 357 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1316 (N.D. Ala.
2005).
90. Id. at 1317.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1318.
93. 223 F.R.D. 691 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
94. Id. at 693. The last paragraph of the section entitled "Georgia's Position" discusses this issue.
95. Id. at 699.
96. Mr. Brown's views do not necessarily reflect the position of Georgia.
97. E-mail from Bruce Brown, McKinna Long & Aldridge, L.L.P. in Atlanta, Ga.
(Apr. 27, 2005) (on file with author).
98. Id.
99. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
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Since it is clear that the States have the control of water within their
boundaries, it is essential that each and every owner along a given water course, including the United States, must be amenable to the law
of the State, if there is to be a proper administration of the water law
as it has developed over the years.'l°
Brown says, "[s] ince Congress intended Lake Lanier to be used for
water supply for the growing North Georgia region, then the Corps
must follow the state's directive."'01
An issue arising from this suit is to what extent the Corps should
consider Georgia's obligations to downstream Florida and Alabama.
Brown believes forcing the Corps to allocate all or part of the waters of
Lake Lanier for municipal use "does not have anything to do with
Georgia's obligation . . . to deliver to Florida and Alabama their fair
share of water at the state line."' '° Brown continues,
If, on the other hand, you allow the Corps to take into account the interests of downstream states in determining how to operate a particular reservoir, as Alabama and Florida contend, then the Corps will be
making the decisions that the U.S. Supreme Court is supposed to
make, and the state (Georgia) will be deprived of its ability to make
necessary intrastate water allocation decisions.'0 3
Georgia's position is that the Corps does not have the statutory or
constitutional authority to allocate water among the states and therefore cannot take into account the interests of downstream states.
However, if a downstream state obtains, from either the Supreme
Court or interstate compact, an allocation from the ACF, then Georgia
must provide the amount of water allocated to such user(s), regardless
of the amount of water pumped out of Lake Lanier for intrastate water
supply. In such case, the Corps would have to operate its reservoirs in
accordance with the allocation.
V. GEORGIA VERSUS FLORIDA. THE MAIN EVENT
A.

Georgia's Position

Because of the tremendous need for water brought about by the
vast increase in the population of the Atlanta metropolitan area, Georgia asserts that it has a right to divert a large amount of water and that
its uses of the water are reasonable. "Intrastate water allocation decisions are made by the state itself," says Brown.' ° To defend its position
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 678-79 (citing S. REP. No. 755, at 6 (1951)).
E-mail from Bruce Brown, supra note 97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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that there should be no limits on its ability to pump groundwater
within its borders, Georgia asserts state sovereignty."5 "Georgia advocates keeping the reservoirs, most of which are located in Georgia,
filled as though a drought were imminent; the continuing diversions
necessary to accomplish this would effectively lower river flows and
would provide Georgia with water for future growth."'"
With regard to the ACF system, DuMars, another attorney representing Georgia, avers Alabama's use is miniscule and that rates of flow
out of Lake Lanier do not significantly affect Alabama.' 7 Professor
Ruhl, who feels the genuine fight is between Florida and Georgia, the
"two principal disputants," reinforces this belief.'" The fundamental
difference between the ACT and ACF systems is that Florida asserts
that it should be able to compel a release of ACF water for environmental purposes."n However, there has never been such a case, and
DuMars finds it "hard to understand why the Supreme Court would get
ahead of Congress in this regard." 0. He does not think the Supreme
Court will equitably apportion a greater amount than Congress requires, since in no case has the Supreme Court undertaken to preempt
or contradict a congressional determination."'
To combat Florida's claims for more water, DuMars feels it is important to differentiate between the water stored in Lake Lanier and
the entire ACF system: "Compacts do not allocate water from reservoirs; they allocate water from river systems.""' He claims the vast majority of the water in the ACF system enters the system below Atlanta
and, thus, below Lake Lanier."' Therefore, Atlanta's consumptive use
of Lanier's water "is extraordinarily small compared to the entire ACF
basin."" DuMars notes "much more than half" of Atlanta's diversions
return to the Chattahoochee." ' DuMars continues,
Florida attempts to focus on Atlanta and ignore all of the other water
that flows across their border. Below Atlanta there is no physical way
to stop [Florida] from getting the water except by consumption, since
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there are no
deep reservoir sites... there are no reservoirs at all on
6
the Flint."
According to DuMars, roughly 95 percent of the waters from the
Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers in Georgia currently reach Florida and
Alabama."7 DuMars feels the fact that these states receive almost all of
the usable water from the ACF system makes their case for more water
more difficult."8
Legally, downstream states must show present injury."9 Brown believes Supreme Court adjudication is "way away" because neither Alabama nor Florida is able to show injury from Georgia's "reasonable
use."" Brown notes only Georgia and the Atlanta Regional Commission ("ARC") have offered evidence regarding the impact of Georgia's
use of its waters upon Florida. 2 ' Two separate affidavits from qualified
experts, based upon results using the computer model used by all
three states in the interstate compact negotiations, established that the
marginal impact of the D.C. Agreement upon Florida was barely even
detectable. Significantly, neither Florida nor Alabama, who have access
to the same computer model, has submitted affidavits rebutting the
evidence submitted by Georgia and ARC. Brown says,
Florida has not attempted to make the kind of factual showing necessary for a Supreme Court equitable apportionment case. Florida has
asserted that it has substantial ecological interests inthe Apalachicola
River and Bay, but has not explained or documented how Georgia's
reasonable
use of the water has affected or is likely to affect those in122
terests.
Even if Florida established direct impact, it must still show Georgia's uses are unreasonable relative to other uses. Given the large and
growing population of Atlanta, and given that residential use is generally the highest priority use of water, proving Georgia's residential uses
are unreasonable will prove to be a near impossible task.
Brown notes another problem with Florida's position is that Florida
diverts the water, using it for paper mills, for example.'2" Thus, Florida's concerns over the potential damage to the Apalachicola Bay are
weak, given that it routinely diverts water for various other uses. From
Georgia's perspective, if its diversions are harming Apalachicola Bay, so
are Florida's. Professor Ruhl acknowledges Florida diverts water, but
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.

119.

Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 539, 548 n.13 (1982).
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says Florida's diversions are "miniscule" compared to Georgia's." Almost all the land along the Apalachicola River is publicly owned,
"meaning [Florida] will never divert more water than [Georgia]
do[es]."'5 Furthermore, since paper mills, which Georgia cites as part

of the reasons
for past diversions, are closing, Florida "will be reducing
'
diversions. ""

Florida maintains the Apalachicola basin is a precarious and rich
area of biodiversity and a habitat to numerous creatures. Brown, however, says Florida has not documented the impact of Georgia's use of
the ACF waters on these environmental interests and has not compared such impact to impacts caused by Florida's own industry and
development along the river." In addition, according to Brown, Florida has all the protection it needs from the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), "compliance with which would 'trump' any other subservient
use of the water. '"" Since the ESA trumps other law, Florida's protection is sufficient. Brown analogizes it to a bundle of property rights.'"
With respect to interstate water, there are a number of sticks in the
bundle, including water quality, which federal law governs under the
Clean Water Act and the ESA. So no matter what, Georgia is obligated
to provide: clean water to downstream users, navigational opportunities (also a federal servitude), intrastate allocation of the water itself, as
well as providing for interstate rights. This protects Florida, as do numerous other federal laws. Thus, according to Brown, the state has all
the protection it needs.'"
Professor Ruhl says Florida will raise federal law claims if it needs
to."' In fact, the state issued a 60-day notice of intent to sue the Corps
for ESA violations, but has yet to file suit. Ruhl suspects Florida's strategy "is to put the ESA in play before seeking Supreme Court adjudication of water rights."' Ruhl adds, "[w] ith the three other federal suits
in stalemate, it also seems in Florida's interests to sit on the status quo
13 3
and wait for Georgia to get aggressive and look greedy."

Georgia avers its uses of the water are presumptively reasonable
and believes the courts will agree. Georgia also claims it is not wasting
the water. Atlanta has strict waste use restrictions and insists it is a
124.
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good steward of the water. This, the state hopes, will ensure that Florida will not have legal recourse. In support of the view that Georgia
has not made unreasonable use of the water, Brown says,
If Alabama or Florida had been or were threatened with the kind and
degree of injury that is necessary to trigger a Supreme Court equitable apportionment case, then one of them would have filed suit already rather than laboring for years now in the district courts in cases
that will not establish their entitlement to a certain amount of water
vis-A-vis Georgia.134

One problem concerns the physical regulation of these basins by
dams. The Corps controls the reservoirs which in turn govern the flow
of the rivers. The Corps, therefore, can determine how recipients use
the water. If the Corps uses Lake Lanier's water for hydropower, Florida benefits because a much larger amount of water will bypass Atlanta
and head downstream. An issue that arises is what role the Corps is to
play in the interstate allocation of water when there is no governing
compact. How is the Corps supposed to conduct itself in order to respect the relative rights of all the users? Brown's answer is that the
Corps must listen to the home state.'3 5 Therefore, Georgia owns the
water while it is within its borders. Georgia's position is that the Corps
must cede to its interests, given that there is not yet a congressional
mandate to trump its instructions as the home state."
Therefore,
7
Brown believes the Corps must follow Georgia's lead.'
B.

Florida's Position

Florida's argument is that "releases from the reservoirs should
mimic historic (predam) flows."'" Florida wants to protect the flow of
natural fresh water into Apalachicola Bay in order to maintain the
proper salinity levels needed to support the Bay's fishing industry.
Both Georgia's and Florida's modifications of the hydrologic models
support their own positions with regard to the proper allocation of
surface waters. In this sense, according to the Nature Conservancy,
Georgia and Florida "have slipped into a battle of the [hydrologic]
models.""
Both the ACF and the ACT Compacts provided that their principle
objective in equitably apportioning surface waters was "to be carried
134. E-mail from Bruce Brown, supranote 97.
135. Id.
136. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 223 F.R.D. 691, 695 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Email from Bruce Brown, supra note 97.
137. E-mail from Bruce Brown, supranote 97.
138. GLENNON, supra note 6, at 192.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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out 'while protecting the water quality, ecology and biodiversity' of the
stream system in question..' .4 "Florida's interest is in maintaining eco-

logical quality downstream of water-hungry Georgia and into Apalachicola Bay."'42 Professor Christie says, "[w]ater allocation litigation
among states doesn't have much of a history of protecting or even considering instream and ecosystem uses, so Florida will have an uphill
battle in convincing the Supreme Court to recognize this (or not).""'
The Supreme Court has held "a State seeking to prevent or enjoin
a diversion by another State bears the burden of proving that the diversion will cause it 'real or substantial injury or damage."""4 Traditionally, the Supreme Court looks mainly to economic injury to determine
the extent of the damage. "[U]nder the Supreme Court's conventional approaches to interstate water allocation, Florida loses.'

4

5

To

compensate, Florida must urge the Supreme Court to take into account the injury to the Apalachicola's ecological system." Given the
broad range of issues and considerations the Supreme Court takes into
account in equitable apportionment litigation, there is no genuine
basis for the Supreme Court to refuse to consider environmental
harm.'47 The question will be what weight the Supreme Court will give
these concerns relative to other concerns. 8
"Ecological injury in fact is economic injury, because healthy functioning ecosystems provide immensely valuable services to human
populations."' 9 Ecosystem services "are only services because they provide something of value to humans."" Professor Ruhl stated, "[i] f one
could show a loss attributable to diminished ecosystem services, then
one also ought to be able to express the loss in economic terms for
purposes of standing, so the issue of non-economic injury is avoided."'5 '
As a possible indication of the value of Florida's ecosystem, Florida

141.
5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 52. 0 6(c)(1), 188 n.317 (Robert E. Beck ed.,
Supp. 1998) (citing Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L.
No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2219, 2222-23 (1997); Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin
Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111 Stat. 2233, 2237 (1997)).
142.
Ruhl, supra note 108, at 48.
143. E-mail from Donna Christie, supranote 57.
144. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187 n.13 (citing Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 672 (1931)).
145. Ruhl, supra note 108, at 57.
146. Id.
147.
See id. at 55.
148. See id. at 54.
149. Id. at 53.
150. E-mail from J.B. Ruhl, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & the Matthews &
Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University College of Law (Mar. 22, 2005)
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State University graduate student Greg Garrett estimated the value of
the Apalachicola ecosystem to exceed $5 billion per year.'52
Ruhl proffers the idea that the Supreme Court should account for
ecological injury, as it is the "logical, incremental extension(s)" of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Idaho v. Oregon, in which the Court apportioned salmon runs between two states. ' Ruhl equates the salmon
runs with the ecosystem services of the Apalachicola because both "are
economically valuable resources that flow within" their respective water
systems."4
There is also a question of whether Florida can show actual, present injury as a downstream state. This is why Ruhl emphasizes ecosystem service losses as a possible alternate category of injury. Regardless,
Ruhl does not believe the Supreme Court would toss out the case for
failure to show sufficient standing, partly because "there has not been
an apportionment case like this since the dawn of the environmental
age."' All Florida wants is "flow, no more diversions."' 6 Proving harm
to Florida, Ruhl acknowledges, "is indeed a hard question," but he argues "the Court has to revisit what counts as harm."' 7 Because environmental harm, for example to oyster beds might be irreparable,
Ruhl believes the Supreme Court ought to look differently at the harm
requirement when the environment is involved."M However, if the
Court does decide to take environmental harm into account when assessing present injury, the result could lead to suits by virtually all
downstream users against upstream diverters. In order to avoid this
slippery slope, the Court may choose to continue to disregard environmental damage in its analysis of present injury.
VI. AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES
The termination of the ACF and ACT Compacts do not spell the
end of the story. "The waters available are not sufficient to meet full
demand in the three states so one means or another will have to be
found to resolve their dispute.""
Under the current regime, there are three avenues for allocating
interstate waters among the states where the waters are located. First,
the states can negotiate a solution. The states have tried this to no
avail. Secondly, Congress can craft a remedy, such as an apportionment via statutory determination, under its interstate commerce
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Ruhl, supranote 108, at 53.
Id. at 53-54; Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983);
Ruhl, supranote 108, at 54.
E-mail fromJ.B. Ruhl, supranote 150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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power.'" For political reasons, this option is highly unlikely. Finally,
the Supreme Court can exercise its original jurisdiction over interstate
suits and formulate an equitable allocation of the waters.'61 In Nebraska
v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court held "mutual accommodation and
agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of
invocation of our adjudicatory power." ' However, as in Nebraska, the
states in the conflict are not able to settle their disputes through interstate compacts. Thus, "[t]he states' likely next step is litigation before
the U.S. Supreme Court for an equitable allocation of the disputed
waters." 63
The Supreme Court has the authority to equitably apportion inter-

state waters. In Hinderliderv. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., the
Supreme Court held "whether the water of an interstate stream must
be apportioned between . . .States is a question of 'federal common
"The decision implies that no State can undermine the
law.""'
federal interest in equitably apportioned interstate waters.""
Equitable allocation does not mean "there must be an equal division of the waters of an interstate stream among the States through
which it flows."'" As the Supreme Court has stated,
It means that the principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard to the "equal level or plane on which all the States stand,
in point of power and right, under our constitutional system" and
that, upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending
States and all other relevant facts, this Court will determine what is an
equitable apportionment of the use of such waters.
The Supreme Court has traditionally considered a multitude of factors when ruling on an equitable apportionment, such as reasonableness of use, gravity of harm or injury, and conservation measures. In
Nebraska, the Court held,
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a
consideration of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding
principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use
of water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate of
return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability of storage
160.
161.
162.
163.

U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945).
Clemons, supra note 39, at 1.

164. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938). See also Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-71 (1931); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907).
165. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).
166. Connecticut v. Massachusetts,282 U.S. at 670.
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water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream
areas if a limitation is imposed on the former - these are all relevant
factors. l6
No single factor is controlling. Rather, the Court usually considers
the totality of the circumstances. "Our aim is always to secure a just
" 1'
and equitable apportionment 'without quibbling over formulas. 'w
The Court in Colorado continued,
The laws of the contending States concerning intrastate water disputes are an important consideration governing equitable apportionment.... But state law is not controlling. Rather, the just apportionment of interstate waters is a question of federal law that depends
"upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending States
''
and all other relevantfacts. 17
Therefore, though the Court would consider all riparian rights of
the individual states, the Court would not be bound by the laws of any
of the states. The Court would look to the totality of the circumstances
to arrive at the most equitable division of the waters. If the Supreme
Court equitably apportions the waters among the three states, this
"probably means that no state will get all that it wants, but each state
will get at least some of what it wants.''.
According to DuMars, if the Supreme Court took the case, it would
appoint a Special Master to determine how much water is actually
reaching Florida and Florida would have the burden of proof.n Florida must show injury just to have standing. 13 The current studies of the
Apalachicola Bay show no such damage. 14 Florida claims there will be
future damage, but since it cannot prove this, DuMars believes the

168. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945). See also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982);
Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1036 (1983).
169. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 183 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283
U.S. 336, 343 (1931)).
170. Id. at 183-84 (quoting Connecticut v. Massachusetts,282 U.S. at 670-71).
171. Clemons, supranote 39, at 11.
172. Telephone Interview with Charles T. DuMars, supra note 45.
173. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 48-49 (1907) (explaining that Kansas had
not shown the amount of injury that would warrant the Court's intervention); See also
Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Learning to Get Along: Alabama, Georgia, Florida and the
ChattahoocheeRiver Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV. 993, 1001 (1998) (stating that "[t]he result
in Kansas was the [Supreme] Court's adoption of the principle of equitable apportionment."); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 672 (explaining that Connecticut
failed in its attempt to enjoin the city of Boston's diversions of the Connecticut River
because there was no sufficient injury to Connecticut to justify intervention by the
Court).
174. Telephone Interview with Charles T. DuMars, supra note 45.
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Special Master should throw out the case.'7" There will not be equitable apportionment for events that have not occurred because the Supreme Court does not speculate. Actual, present injury is necessary. If
Florida could show enough injury to gain standing, the Supreme Court
would perform a balancing test. DuMars feels the big issue is, if the
matter comes before the Supreme Court, whether the Court will craft a
federal common law concerning interstate water quality." There is
currently no such law, so this could turn out to be the most salient and
most important issue of the dispute.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is no clear answer for any of the questions or dilemmas
posed by the Alabama-Georgia or the Alabama-Florida-Georgia water
allocation disputes. What is clear is that a resolution is not in the near
future due to the complexity of the issues and litigation. In the meantime, Atlanta will continue to grow and require larger amounts of water from Lake Lanier to meet its municipal needs. Until the unreasonableness of such uses are shown, Atlanta will face no repercussions for
its substantial withdrawals. Furthermore, without a court order, South
Georgia farmers will continue to pump groundwater freely.
Alabama's best bet appears to be to cooperate with Georgia. Because Alabama does not appear to be able to show serious, present injury in the ACF dispute, its willingness to work with Georgia on ACF
matters should only help it get what it wants with regard to the ACT.
If Florida's economic injury increases to the point where the courts
would traditionally intervene, Florida should get the equitable relief it
seeks. However, without showing present economic injury, Florida will
continue to fight an uphill battle. Therefore, Florida should push forward with its ecosystem services injury argument. If Georgia moves for
dismissal of all claims against Florida for failure to show present injury,
Florida's alternative ecosystem services theory could give Florida a way
to continue in the absence of the traditional requirement of serious
economic injury. This would afford the Supreme Court the chance to
rule definitively on the issue of environmental injury.
If Florida is able to show Georgia's diversions or uses are damaging
the quality of downstream flows, it might be able to seek an equitable
remedy. However, there is no interstate or federal common law right
to water quality.'77 The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Water
Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 preempt the federal common
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law of nuisance.'78 However, if downstream users can show poor or inadequate quality of the flows they receive, then federal lawsuits under
the CWA or ESA are cognizable. This might be Florida's best option,
considering its inability to show present economic injury resulting
from Georgia's uses of the ACF waters and considering the uncertainty
of the viability of Professor Ruhl's ecosystem services argument.
Florida should also press its claims of damage from groundwater
pumping by south Georgia farmers. Because the compacts exempted
groundwater pumping, Georgia farmers have, to this poin.t, pumped
freely. Because the farmer's pumping has a direct effect on the surface
waters of the Flint River, and thus an effect on the amount of water
that eventually reaches the Apalachicola River and Bay, Florida would
be wise to seek to curtail the amount of pumping available to Georgia
farmers. To do this, Florida must prove the adverse effects of such
pumping on downstream flows. If Florida demonstrates the relationship between groundwater pumping and the amount of flows it receives, there is a good chance the Supreme Court will limit the Georgia
farmers' ability to pump."'
One of the most interesting aspects of these two interstate water
struggles is the possibility that, in resolving the dispute, the courts "may
create new law."" The issues and claims involved will give the federal
judiciary the opportunity to address, among other things, the idea of
an interstate common law right to water quality and the novel position
to consider environmental damage when assessing present injury of
downstream users. However, until the courts rule on issues of water
quality or environmental injury, or until a ruling regarding the reasonableness of Atlanta's uses of Lake Lanier's water occurs, the only likely
recourse for downstream users is to attempt to prevail on federal law
claims. Save a federal law remedy or Supreme Court intervention, the
downstream states of Florida and Alabama are up the creek.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

East of the Continental Divide, Colorado's Rocky Mountains whittle away into rolling foothills before succumbing to sprawling cities and
the endless range. Both people and industry have relocated en mass to
Colorado's Eastern Slope, which is framed by the jagged silhouette of
121
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the mountains and basks in the sin of near perpetual sun. Beneath this
picturesque setting, however, looms a water supply crisis. Below the
surface of dry grasses, hills, and highways lay the Denver Basin aquifers.
Within these aquifers are hundreds of millions of acre-feet of water
that have fueled agriculture and recent urban development, particularly in the southern Denver metro area. However, these aquifers are
finite and cannot support the current rate of groundwater withdrawal
indefinitely. Furthermore, atop this hydrological reality lay the strata
of Colorado groundwater law. Because Colorado groundwater law
rarely parallels hydrology, it serves to complicate management of Colorado's groundwater.
This article analyzes the sustainability of the Denver Basin aquifers
considering current conditions and possible future modifications. Accordingly, Section II examines the hydrology of the Denver Basin aquifers and discusses the problems associated with their development.
Section III reviews Colorado groundwater law as it applies to the Denver Basin aquifers. Section IV compares the hydrology and the legal
regime of the Denver Basin aquifers, discussing problems and suggesting possible solutions. Lastly, section V offers some closing comments.
H.

HYDROLOGY OF THE DENVER BASIN AQUIFERS

The Denver Basin aquifer system consists of four aquifers located
just east of the Front Range.' The Denver Basin aquifers are located in
the Denver Basin, a geological structure that is in the Great Plains
physiographic province.2 The aquifers underlie a 6,700 square mile
area from Weld County in the north to El Paso County in the south,
and stretch from Jefferson County in the west to the eastern portions
of Adams, Arapahoe, and Elbert Counties.' The four aquifers lay one
atop another.' Hydrologists estimate that the Denver Basin aquifers
store 470 million acre-feet of water.' However, the theoretical amount
of recoverable water is significantly smaller. Engineers have calculated
that 292 million acre-feet are potentially recoverable, although recent
data suggests the realistically recoverable amount may be only 206 million acre-feet.' Furthermore, the quantity of economically recoverable
1. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND WATER ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES, DENVER
BASIN AQUIFER SYSTEM fig. 80 (1995), availableat

http://capp.water.usgs.gov/gwa/ch-c/peg/C80.jpeg (last visited November 6, 2005)
[hereinafter U.S. GROUND WATER ATLAS].
2.
RALF TOPPER ET AL., GROUND WATER ATLAS OF COLORADO 85 (2003) [hereinafter
COLORADO ATLAS].

3. Id.
4.

Id.

5.

Id. at 93.

See also S.G. ROBSON, BEDROCK AQUIFERS OF THE DENVER BASIN: A

QUANTITATIVE WATER RESOURCES APPRAISAL, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROF. PAPER

66 (1987).
6. COLORADo ATLAS, supranote 2, at 93.
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ground water from the Denver Basin aquifers may be significantly
smaller than these estimates. This section discusses the physical characteristics of the Denver Basin aquifers and then examines their use
and development.
Ftgure 80. Th ber
tofluaraqufers that ariderie
tt kIf~s fleFoxo the
eisL of1is Rok Mwia

I

A. Hydrogeologic Units of the Denver Basin
The Denver Basin aquifer system consists of four aquifers that lay
one atop another, centered below the Castle Rock conglomerate formation.9 In descending order, the aquifers are the Dawson, the Denver, the Arapahoe, and the Laramie-Fox Hills. The Denver Basin aquifers are generally under confined conditions, except for the Dawson
aquifer and the outcrop areas of the other aquifers."

7. See id.
8. U.S. GROUND WATERATLAS, supra note 1, fig. 80.
9. U.S. GROUND WATER ATLAS, supra note 1, fig. 81. The Castle Rock conglomerate
formation is comprised of conglomerate, sandstone, and tuff. S.G. ROBSON ET AL.,
STRUCTURE, OUTCROP, AND SUBCROP OF THE BEDROCK AQUIFERS ALONG THE WESTERN
available at
tbl. 1 (1998),
BASIN,
COLORADO
OF THE
DENVER
MARGIN

http://rockyweb.cr.usgs.gov/frontrange/water/bedaqmapping/robsonfig.l ,2.pdf (last
visited November 5, 2005) [hereinafter MAP 1]. The geohydrologic unit is comprised
of unsaturated tertiary rocks that reach a thickness of 100 feet. Id.
MAP 1, supra note 9, tbl. 1. See also COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at 92 (show10.
ing the extent of confined and unconfined aquifer conditions as of 1978).
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The Dawson aquifer is the smallest and closest to the surface, underlying an area of 1,400 square miles, extending north of Aurora, east
of Kiowa, and south of Monument." Unlike the other Denver Basin
aquifers, the Dawson aquifer is fully unconfined." Although the Dawson formation varies from a few feet to 1,200 feet in thickness, the saturated portion may only be 400 feet thick. In the northern portion of
the basin, a 50-foot thick layer of shale divides the aquifer into upper
and lower units. Typical well yields vary from 50 to 150 gallons per
minute ("gpm")," although wells in areas of good permeability may
yield up to 200 gpm.1' A twenty-five to fifty foot thick layer of relatively
impermeable shale separates the Dawson and Denver aquifers.' "
The Denver aquifer is larger and deeper than the Dawson aquifer.
It underlies an area of 3,500 square miles, extending north to the city
of Brighton, east to the plains, and south to Colorado Springs." The
thickness of the Denver geological formation ranges from 800 to 1,000
feet." The saturated portion, or aquifer, ranges from 100 to 350 feet,

11.

U.S. GROUND WATERATLAS, supra note 1, fig. 81.

12.
13.

COLORADo ATLAS, supra note 2, at 87.
Id. at 92.
COLORADo ATLAS, supra note 2, at 87.

14.
15.

Id. at 87-8.

16. Chris Sanchez, Bishop-Brogden Associates, Inc., American Water Resources
Association - Colorado Section Presentation: Recent Water Level Changes in the Denver
Aquifer
Basin
Bedrock Aquifers
(March
29,
2003),
available at
http://www.awra.org/state/colorado/DENVERBASIN4-29-2003.pdf (Last visited No-

vember 5, 2005).
17. MAP 1, supra note 9, tbl. 1.
18.
19.
20.

COLORADO ATLAS, supra note

Id. at 87-8.
Id. at 88.

2, at 88.
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although it may be as deep as 500 feet." Well yields from wells drilled
into the Denver aquifer are low because of the predominant shale and
claystone deposits.' Typical yields vary from 20 to 50 gpm, 2 upwards to
150 to 200 gpm, but 300 gpm is achievable if the well is completely
within a sandstone layer.2 4 A fifty-foot layer of shale underlies the Denver aquifer, separating it from the Arapahoe aquifer.
The Arapahoe aquifer is somewhat larger than the Denver aquifer,
underlying 4,700 square miles, extending north to Fort Lupton and
slightly farther east and south.' The Arapahoe geological formation is
generally 400 to 700 feet thick, but at its center, the formation reaches
a thickness of up to 2,200 feet.26 The saturated thickness of the aquifer
ranges from zero feet near the perimeter to a maximum of 400 feet in
the center.27 In the northern areas, a layer of shale, between 50 and
100 feet thick divides the sandstone and siltstone layers into upper and
lower hydrologic units.' Well yields in the Arapahoe aquifer are high
and the water is generally under artesian pressure.' Well yields of over
300 gpm are typical, although yields of 700 gpm are possible.' The
Upper Laramie Formation, which is up to 400 feet thick and consists of
shale, interbedded siltstone, very fine-grained sandstone, and seams of
subbituminous coal, underlies the Arapahoe aquifer.'
The Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer is the largest in area and deepest of
the Denver Basin aquifers. This aquifer underlies 6,700 square miles of
the basin, marking the "extent of commercially economic groundwater [sic] ...for the Denver Basin." " The Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer
lies three thousand feet beneath Parker, Colorado.' Although the aquifer is 350 feet thick, the saturated layer of the aquifer rarely exceeds
200 feet in thickness.' Typical well yields range from 100 to 150 gpm,
although 300 gpm is possible.' Underneath the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer, a layer of Cretaceous Pierre shale up to 8,000 feet thick forms the
lower terminus of the Denver Basin aquifer system.'

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
27.
28.

Id; MAP 1, supranote 9, tbl. 1.
COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at 88.
Id
MAP 1, supra note 9, tbl.1.
COLORADO ATLAS, supranote 2, at 87-8.
COLORADO ATLAS, supranote 2, at 88.
Id
Id

29.

Id

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id
MA 1, supra note 9, tbl. 1.
COLORADO ATLAS, supranote 2, at 88.
Id.
Id,
Id.
MAP 1,supra note 9, tbl. 1.

26.
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B. Recharge and Discharge of Aquifers
Recharge of the Denver aquifers occurs through three mechanisms: precipitation, irrigation return flows, and inter-aquifer movement. 7 Overall recharge is limited by the semi-arid climate of the
Denver Basin, which only receives fifteen to sixteen inches of precipitation per year, totaling about five million acre-feet.' However, only
40,000 acre-feet of precipitation recharge the Denver Basin aquifers
because ninety-nine percent is lost to evapotranspiration and surface
runoff.9 Precipitation recharge in the Denver Basin aquifers is greatest
in the highland outcrop areas along the western side of the basin and
high altitude areas in the southern part of the basin.' Recharge into
the unconfined Dawson aquifer is especially high due to its more permeable, coarse materials. 4' Additionally, lawn irrigation in the Denver
metro area recharges the Dawson and Denver aquifers." While some
of this lawn irrigation recharge is recycled Denver Basin groundwater,
some or it originated outside the basin, such as from Denver's upper
basin or transmountain diversions, and may therefore be foreign water.4 Although relatively impermeable layers separate the four aquifers,
some water moves between them. The most significant movement is
drainage from the Denver aquifer down into the Arapahoe aquifer.'
The Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer receives very little recharge from the
Arapahoe due to the relatively impermeable shale confining layer.'
Both natural and artificial discharges occur in the Denver Basin
aquifers, although artificial withdrawals are the primary means of discharge. 7 Pumping water from the Denver Basin aquifers began in the
late 1800s and has increased significantly ever since.' As a result of the
pumping, artesian pressure and natural discharge has decreased '9 and
"[i] n some areas lower water levels have reduced or eliminated natural
discharge to streams or alluvial aquifers."'

37.

COLORADO ATLAS, supra note

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.

2, at 88-9.

43. See, e.g., City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 62-63 (Colo. 1996)
(discussing foreign water); City and County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co.,
506 P.2d 144, 147-48 (Colo. 1972).
44. COLORADo ATLAs, supra note 2, at 88-9.

45.
46.

Id at 89.
Id.

47.

See id.

48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Water Levels, Flow, and Water Quality
The Denver Basin aquifers are generally under confined conditions
in the center and unconfined conditions near the edges." The exception is the Dawson aquifer, which is fully unconfined.53 The aquifers
flow outward from the high topographical and potentiometric point
located south of Castle Rock. ' Increased withdrawals have lowered the
potentiometric surface throughout the Denver Basin aquifer system.
The declining water levels are "beginning to convert more of the aquifer system from confined to unconfined conditions."' The declining
water levels have a significant impact on the economics of ground water development because a reduction in the thickness of the saturated
hydrologic layer requires more wells to yield the same amount of water. 7 Lower water levels can also lead to elastic compaction of the aquifers and land-surface subsidence, although there have been no reports of this phenomenon in the Denver Basin.'
The effects of ground water development on potentiometric levels
have varied across the Denver Basin aquifers. Measurements in the
Dawson aquifer between 1995 and 2000 show both rise and decline in
the water level.' Lawn irrigation from housing developments has become a significant recharge source for the Dawson aquifer.' Lawn
51.

U.S.

52.

GROUND WATER ATLAS, supra note 1, fig. 85.
COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at 89.

53.

Id. at 92.

54. Id. at 89. Transmissivity, the product of hydraulic conductivity and hydrologic
layer thickness, varies greatly across the Denver Basin aquifer. Id. at 91.
55. Id. at 90.
56. Id. at 89.
57. Id, at 89, 93.
58. Id at 90-91.
59. Id. at 89.
60.
d.
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irrigation also recharges the Denver aquifer, but it is limited to areas
where the aquifer lies at or near the surface.' Water levels in the
Arapahoe aquifer are declining rapidly, about thirty feet per year, resulting in overall declines of 100 to 300 feet since pumping began. 2
The water level declines are the result of increased groundwater use
fueled by extensive development in southern Denver and along Interstate 25.' Water levels in the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer have declined
over the past ten years, although not as dramatically as in the Arapahoe
aquifer.' The water level in the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer has declined
more than 125 feet since pumping began for municipal water use in
southeast Denver.' Due to the complex structure of the Laramie-Fox
Hills aquifer and extensive faulting in eastern Boulder County, water
declines are not uniform throughout the aquifer.'
Water quality is good in the Denver Basin aquifer system, and the
water typically meets state and federal drinking water standards.'
When Denver Basin water fails to meet these standards, it is usually due
to color, smell, or taste.' However, in some areas farmers cannot use
water from parts of the Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer for irrigation due to
a high sodium absorption rate.'
D. Development Concerns of the Denver Basin Aquifers
In recent years, the rapid development of the Denver Basin aquifers has resulted in lower water levels. In turn, the lower water levels
have increased concern for the future of groundwater withdrawals
from the Denver Basin aquifers. The Denver Basin is Colorado's major
commercial and industrial center, although the "pre-dominant land
uses are agricultural and residential."" In 2000, the Denver metro area
61.

Id. at90.

62. Id. See Robert G. Raynolds, Stratigraphy of the Arapahoe Aquifer in the Denver Basin:
The Rocks Rule the Water, Geological Society of America, Paper No. 36-2, 2004 Denver
Annual Meeting (Nov. 7-10, 2004).
63. COLORADO ATLAS, supranote 2, at 90.
64. Id.See asoJohn Ezra Moore, GroundwaterMining of Bedrock Aquifers in the Denver

Basin, Geological Society of America, Paper No. 36-1, 2004 Denver Annual Meeting
(Nov. 7-10, 2004).
65. COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at 90.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 93.
68. I. at 93.
69. Id,at 88. The sodium absorption rate "isa calculated value that indicates the
relative concentration of sodium to calcium and magnesium in the water. It reflects
that the presence of calcium and magnesium counteracts high levels of sodium." J.R.
Kessler, Jr., Water Quality Management for Greenhouse Production, ALA. COOPERATIVE
EXTENSION
Svs.,
January
2005,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.aces.edu/pubs/docs/A/ANR-1 158/. A high sodium absorption rate "can
result in root uptake of toxic levels of sodium." Id.
70. COLORADO ATLAS, supranote 2, at 85.
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was home to over 2.4 million people.7' Recently population growth has
slowed, but from 1990 through 2002, "Colorado consistently was
among the five fastest growing states in the country",72 with much of
that growth occurring in the Denver Basin. The population surge
placed increased demands on the Denver Basin aquifers, especially in
Douglas and El Paso counties where there are few surface water
sources. 73

Increased usage of groundwater from the Denver Basin aquifers
raises issues about the long-term effect of these groundwater withdrawals. Possible issues include land subsidence, impacts on surface appropriators, high costs of continued withdrawals, and the long-term
sustainability of the aquifers as a water source. While there are currently no reports of land subsidence in the Denver Basin, 4 subsidence
becomes more likely as withdrawals increase.
Groundwater withdrawals from the Denver Basin aquifers may also
harm surface water appropriators on the adjacent South Platte River.
In the absence of pumping, the Denver Basin aquifers discharge into
the South Platte.' Groundwater withdrawals prevent the Denver Basin
aquifers from discharging to drainages in the South Platte River Basin.76 Accordingly, the South Platte is changing from a gaining to a
losing river.77 Estimates suggest that in 2040 appropriators will experience the full impact of the loss of natural discharge.'
Another major concern is the increasing costs of withdrawals as water levels decline.' Although the theoretical withdrawal from the Den71. Id
See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COLORADO QUICK LINKS (2005),
http://www.census.gov/popest/ counties/tables/CO-EST2004-01-08.xls (last visited
November 6, 2005).
72. Burt Hubbard, Colo.'s Growth Faltering:State is Not Among Top 10 in RankingFrom
Census Bureau, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 22, 2004, at 4A.
73. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND-WATER AVAILABLrry ANALYSIS OF THE DENVER
(last
GROUND-WATER BASIN, http://co.water.usgs.gov/projects/BCFOO/index.html

visited November 6, 2005). This project began in 2004 and is scheduled for completion in 2007.
74. COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at 90-1.
75. See Park County Sportsmen's Ranch LLP v. Bargas, 986 P.2d 262, 271 (Colo.
1999). This article discusses the effect of pumping on Denver Basin aquifers at length
later.
76. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, SENATE BILL 96-74 DENVER BASIN
available at http://cwcb.state.co.us/SecB/SB96GROUNDWATER STUDY § 9.4,
74StudyTOC.htm (last visited November 6, 2005) [hereinafter DENVER BASIN
GROUNDWATER STUDY].

77. A gaining river is one that groundwater contributes to the surface flow. A losing river is one that loses surface water to groundwater. See COLORADO ATLAS, supra
note 2, at 205, 207.
78.
DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY, supra note 76, § 9.4 ("[T] he only question
It is estimated depletions will exceed the net disis when will the full effect occur ....
charge to the South Platte River Basin drainages around the year 2040.").
79. COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at 89. Groundwater withdrawals become more
difficult, and more costly as water levels decline due to loss of hydrostatic or piezomet-
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ver Basin aquifers is 292 million acre-feet, the amount of water that is
economical feasible to withdraw may be significantly lower. "° Depending on the location and number of future wells, estimates of the longterm operation costs range from $500 to $1,000 per acre-foot in the
highly productive Arapahoe aquifer, to over $2,000 per acre-foot in the
Denver aquifer south of the Palmer Divide." The cost of pumping the
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer is particularly relevant because numerous
augmentation plans rely on this aquifer to replace post-pumping depletions."2 The reasonableness of these costs depends on the availability of alternative water supplies. "
Finally, the long-term sustainability of the Denver Basin aquifers as
a groundwater source is a major concern for water users on the Front
Range. Because groundwater users currently withdraw groundwater at
a rate exceeding the rate of aquifer recharge, they are mining the
Denver Basin aquifers, and they will eventually exhaust the resource."
Apart from obvious environmental concerns, this raises a critical issue
of whether it is preferable, or even possible to indefinitely prolong the
life of the Denver Basin aquifers.
Although current withdrawals remain small compared to theoretically recoverable reserves, the full impact of high groundwater withdrawal remain unclear." The unknown impacts of groundwater mining add uncertainty to the issues of land subsidence, economics of
groundwater withdrawal, impacts on surface appropriators, and longterm sustainability. Despite the unknowns, lawmakers have begun to
address these issues. The following section discusses the perplexing
law governing the Denver Basin aquifers.

ric head. For example, in an unconfined aquifer, as water levels decline, the water
table may drop below an appropriator's well, forcing the appropriator to deepen the
well to continue appropriations. In a confined aquifer, withdrawals lower the piezometric pressure, therefore, there is less pressure forcing the water up towards the sur-

face. As a result, an appropriator will have to expend more energy to continue withdrawals. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW
AND PUBLIC PoLICY 558 (5th ed. 2002).
80.

COLORADO ATLAS, supranote 2, at 93.

81. DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY, supra note 76, § 14.2.
82. Interview with Kevin Kinnear, Attorney, Porzak, Browning & Bushong in Boulder, Colo. (Sept. 20, 2005). Kinnear notes, "[a]s the replacement obligation is reduced over time to a few acre feet per year, it may not be viable to pay the high costs of
pumping for such a small amount of water." Id.
83. DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY, supra note 76, §14.2.
84.
85.

See COLORADO
See id. at 93.

ATLAS,

supra note 2, at 90.
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III. COLORADO GROUNDWATER LAW AND THE DENVER
BASIN AQUIFERS
Colorado groundwater law divides the Denver Basin aquifers into
four classifications based primarily on "legal-political boundaries, and
not necessarily coincident with hydrologic boundaries."86 The Denver
Basin aquifers "are essentially non-tributary although in fact, underground water contributes about 50,000 acre-feet of water per year to
the South Platte River."87 Because of that contribution, Colorado lawmakers could consider Denver Basin aquifer groundwater tributary to
surface water, subjecting it to existing vested surface rights under the
prior appropriation system.' However, the Colorado General Assembly ("General Assembly") created special rules for the Denver Basin
aquifers because they consider the discharge into surface streams de
minimus' compared to both the potential annual withdrawals and the
total storage capacity.' The General Assembly noted "the great economic importance of the ground water in those aquifers."9' Further, "it
is both feasible and required that wells in the tributary portions of the
Denver Basin [aquifers] fully augment the loss they cause to surface

86. Veronica A. Sperling & David M. Brown, Outline of Colorado Ground Water Law, 1
U. DENV. WATER L. REV.275, 278 (1998) (discussing designated ground water districts).
87. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 79, at 590. The natural discharge of the Denver
Basin aquifers is not certain, but engineers have estimated it to be about 40,000 acrefeet annually. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch LLP v. Bargas, 986 P.2d at 271-272
(Colo. 1999); see also DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY, supranote 76, § 9.1 (discussing the "Robson Report's" finding of natural discharge of 54.7 cubic feet per second
and an annual discharge of 39,600 acre-feet); see also COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at
88 (discussing the mechanisms of Denver Basin recharge and discharge).
88. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 986 P.2d at 267; see also Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951) (presuming all ground water to be tributary).
Not all Denver Basin aquifer water would necessarily be tributary. However, it is likely
that a significant portion of the Denver Basin aquifers would be tributary.
89. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (2004).
90. The 40,000 acre-feet annual discharge is small relative to the 292 million acrefeet of recoverable water in the Denver Basin aquifers. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch,
986 P.2d at 271; COLORADO ATLAS, supra note 2, at 93. Singrud Jaunarajs & Eileen
Poeter, A Modeling Approachfor Assessing the Feasibility of Ground-WaterWithdrawalfrom the
Denver Basin DuringPeriodsof Drought, COLO. WATER RESOURCES RES. INST. April 1991, at
1.
91. § 37-90-103(10.5); Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62, 73 n.19 (Colo. 2004) (discussing the "de minimus" language
of section 37-90-103(10.5)). In a rapidly growing region such as the Front Range, a
40,000 to 50,000 acre-feet annual discharge into an over-appropriated river such as the
South Platte may not be "de minimus." Nonetheless, this term is somewhat justified in
comparison to the capacity of the Denver Basin aquifers. Further, it is perhaps best to
view the "de minimud' language of section 37-90-103(10.5) not as a hydrological fact,
but rather as a value judgment. The General Assembly seemed to view the potential
development of the significant amounts of water in the Denver Basin aquifers as outweighing the marginal injury to senior surface appropriators.
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streams."92 Consequently, numerous and occasionally overlapping legal rules govern the Denver Basin aquifers.
The four legal classifications of Colorado groundwater are designated groundwater, tributary groundwater, nontributary nondesignated groundwater, and not nontributary groundwater." The
initial distinction is between designated groundwater, found in designated groundwater basins, and non-designated groundwater, which is
all other groundwater."
There are three classifications of nondesignated groundwater: tributary groundwater, nontributary nonThe
designated groundwater, and not nontributary groundwater."
General Assembly created the not nontributary classification specifically for the Denver Basin and it has been the major focus of discussion
and development.' However, the Denver Basin contains all four classifications of groundwater.
A. Designated Groundwater
The rural eastern forty-seven percent of the Denver Basin aquifers
is in designated groundwater basins.97 The General Assembly enacted
the 1965 Colorado Ground Water Management Act' ("1965 Act") to
address the increasing conflict between ground and surface water users.' The 1965 Act focuses almost entirely on designated groundwater
and created the Colorado Ground Water Commission ("Ground Water
Commission"), which regulates and administers designated groundwater."° The 1965 Act distinguishes between small and large capacity
wells. ' Small capacity wells do not exceed fifty gallons per minute and
five acre-feet per year."°2 Although the aggregate effect of thousands of
small capacity wells in a single designated basin surely have some impact, this article will focus on the unquestionable impact of large ca-

92. N. Kiowa-Bijou, 77 P.3d at 73 n.19 (citing § 37-90-103(10.5)).
93. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 79, at 586. Many sources refer to "nontributary nondesignated" simply as nontributary ground water. However, for purposes of clarity,
despite its verbosity, this article will use the longer term.
94. § 37-90-103 (6), (7).
95. Sperling & Brown, supa note 86, at 285-87.
96. § 37-90-103(10.7) (defining not nontributary ground water).
97. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 278. This percentage is not certain. See,
e.g., Park County Sportsmen's Ranch LLP v. Bargas, 986 P.2d 262, 266 n.11 (using an
estimate of forty-nine percent).
98. Colorado Ground Water Management Act, ch. 319, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246
(codified as COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-101 to -143 (2004)).
99. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50, 59 (Colo. 2003).

100. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 276 (noting that the 1965 Act "still contains
only a few subsections that are applicable to both designated and non-designated
ground water within Colorado.").
101. § 37-90-105; seeSperling & Brown, supranote 86, at 280.
102.

§ 37-90-105(1), (3)(b).
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pacity wells. Finally, the 1965 Act created special rules that apply to
designated groundwater found within the Denver Basin.'
Designated groundwater is water within designated groundwater
basins ("designated basins"). By statute, the General Assembly noted
that the Ground Water Commission should designate groundwater
basins' 4 if groundwater in a basin meets either of two definitions. The
first definition of designated groundwater is "ground water which in
its natural course would not be available to and required for the
fulfillment of decreed surface rights[.]"'' ° The second definition
is "ground water in areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing
natural stream wherein ground water withdrawals have constituted the principal water usage for at least fifteen years preceding the date of the first hearing on the proposed designation of
the basin."'" However, as of May 23, 1983, the Ground Water
Commission may no longer designate groundwater found within
the Denver Basin.' 7 Although numerous definitional problems
exist,' 0 the most pertinent problem is that some groundwater
contributes to the flow of surface streams. For non-designated
basins, Colorado would normally administer this groundwater
conjunctively with surface rights, and it would not be subject to
the Ground Water Commission."
"There are currently eight designated groundwater basins, all
of which are in eastern Colorado.."0 Four of these basins comprise the eastern forty-seven percent of the Denver Basin aquifers."' They are the Lost Creek, Kiowa Bijou, Upper Big Sandy, and
2
Upper Black Squirrel Creek Designated Ground Water Basins.

103. See, e.g., § 37-90-103(10.5).
104. § 37-90-106.
105. § 37-90-103(6) (a).
106. Id.
107. § 37-90-106(4) (a). There is one minor exception to the moratorium on the
Commission's ability to designate ground water in the Denver Basin. The Commission
may designate "any ground water in the Crow Creek drainage area in Weld
county, upstream from the confluence of Crow Creek and Little Crow Creek,
within the Laramie-Fox Hills formation when the Laramie-Fox Hills formation
is not overlaid by the Dawson-Arkose, Denver, or Arapahoe formations." § 3790-106(4) (b). However, the exception only deals with a "specific" and "remote" section of the Denver Basin aquifers, leaving the rule all but intact. Sperling & Brown,
supranote 86, at 278 n.6.
108. Sperling & Brown, supranote 86, at 277.
109. Id. at 279 (discussing the jurisdiction of the Ground Water Commission for
designated groundwater).
110. Id. at 276.
111. Id.at278.
112. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, R. 5.3.1.1 (2005).
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The Ground Water Commission supervises and controls the exercise and administration of water rights in designated groundwater.'
The Ground Water Commission is a twelve-member board that meets
at least quarterly."4 The governor appoints nine members for confirmation by the Colorado State Senate."' Voting members of the commission include the nine appointed members, and the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources."' The state engineer and
the director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board are the additional two non-voting members."7 Ground water commissioners hold
unpaid positions for four-year terms."8 Membership of the Ground
Water Commission favors agricultural interests."9 The state engineer
performs the majority of the Ground Water Commission's daily work."'
In addition to the Ground Water Commission, groundwater management districts ("management districts") also regulate designated
groundwater.'
Local taxpaying residents form management districts
by petitioning the Ground Water Commission to hold an election for
the creation of a management district.' The management district area
may be smaller than the designated groundwater basin, although current management districts cover most of the existing eight basins. 3
Management districts possess regulation and taxation powers.' 4 They
113. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111 (2004).
114. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 279.
115. § 37-90-104(1).
116. § 37-90-104(4).
117. Id.; see also § 37-90-117 (discussing the duties of the Colorado Water Conservation Board).
118. § 37-90-104(3) (a), (5). Although the board members are not paid, the state
reimburses them for expenses incurred in performance of their duties. § 37-90-104(5).
119. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 279.

Appointments made afterJuly 1, 1971, as terms expire or are vacated,
shall be made so that the commission includes six members who are
resident agriculturists of designated ground water basins, with no

more than two resident agriculturists from the same ground water basin to be members of the commission at the same time; one member
who shall be a resident agriculturist and who shall be appointed from
water division 3; and two residents of the state who shall represent
municipal or industrial water users of the state, one of whom shall be
appointed from the area west of the continental divide.
§ 37-90-104(3) (b).
120. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 279; see generally § 37-90-110 (discussing the
powers of the state engineer).
121. Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d 1177,
1185-90 (Colo. 2000). Generally, the Ground Water Commission issues permits and
approves changes to permits. Meanwhile, management districts administer existing
permits and enforce priorities. If there is no management district in an area, the
Ground Water Commission administers permits and enforces priorities. Id.
122. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 279; § 37-90-119 to -124.
123. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 279.
124. Id
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also possess "rather vague, untested powers" to enable the district to
administer designated ground water aquifers by means other than
strict priority." Management districts have the power to tax, "including the authority to impose limited ad valorem and well capacity levies."" They may also conduct research and regulate groundwater
withdrawals, but the "authority to prohibit the exportation of designated ground water" outside the management district is doubtful."
Despite these potentially broad powers, management districts have
limited themselves to enforcing the Ground Water Commission's policies and orders."
District courts, rather than the water court, hear legal disputes pertaining to designated groundwater." If a designated groundwater appropriator seeks administrative or adjudicative relief, the appropriator
must first receive a determination that the conflict arises out of the use
of designated groundwater." ° After the Ground Water Commission
makes its decision, the courts hear appeals.' The Colorado Supreme
Court names "a designated ground water judge" in each judicial district "within which some part of the designated ground water basin
The designated groundwater judge hears all disputes over
lies." "'
groundwater except for those arising out of the adoption of rules regulating groundwater, over which the district court has jurisdiction."'
The right to withdraw designated groundwater within the Denver
Basin is different from the right to withdraw other designated groundwater. The courts use a modified appropriation system to allocate designated ground water outside of the Denver Basin."M Under the modified appropriation system, senior appropriators are entitled to maintenance of reasonable ground water levels, but do not have a right to the
maintenance of historic water levels." 5 This modification is necessary
125. Id.
126. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-132 (2004).
127. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 279.
128. Id.As a result of this self-limitation, management districts have not attempted
to promulgate regulations curtailing pumping, in large part, due to local unpopularity.
Id
129. § 37-90-115(1)(a).
130. Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Water Div. 1, 03CV1335, July 22,
2005, at 6-7.
131. § 37-90-115(1)(a).
132. § 37-90-115(1) (b) (V).
133. §37-90-115(1)(a), (2).
134. § 37-90-102(1).
135. Id. Despite the fact that senior appropriators have no right to mainte-

nance of historic water table levels, several designated basins are already over
appropriated. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, R. 4.2.20 (2005) (defining an
'overappropriated aquifer" as "an aquifer for which the net average annual
depletion rate of ground water is considered to be in excess of the allowable
net average annual depletion rate for that aquifer set by the [Ground Water]
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because of groundwater mining in designated groundwater basins.
Without this modification, the withdrawal by any subsequent junior
appropriator would injure the senior, resulting in a legal monopoly of
the aquifer."
In contrast, ownership of overlying land determines allocation of
designated groundwater within the Denver Basin. 37 However, the rules
for allocating designated groundwater within the Denver basin are
"substantively the same as the rules adopted by the state engineer for
allocation of Denver Basin groundwater outside designated basins[.]"'
In limited circumstances, where a "municipal or quasi-municipal water
supplier is obligated either by law or by contract ... to be the principal
provider of public water service to landowners" within its boundaries,
the landowners may be "deemed to have consented to the withdrawal.
. . of all such ground water[".]' ' The Ground Water Commission allocates Denver Basin aquifers based on a 100-year life.'" To achieve the
goal of 100 years, the commission requires replacement water. The
Ground Water Commission limits consumption of Denver Basin
groundwater, which the state engineer deems nontributary,'4 ' to ninety-

Commission."). New appropriations in these aquifers, such as the Upper
Black Squirrel Creek designated basin, require a replacement plan. See id. R.
5.6.1 (explaining the requirements of a replacement plan); id. R. 4.2.23 (defining "replacement plan" as "a detailed program to increase the supply of
water available for beneficial use in a designated basin or portion thereof by
the development of new or alternate means or points of diversion, by a pooling of water resources, by water exchange projects, by providing substitute
supplies of water, by the development of new sources of water, or any other
appropriate means. 'Replacement Plan' does not include the salvage of designated waters by the eradication of phreatophytes, nor does it include the use
of precipitation water collected from land surfaces which have been made
impermeable, thereby increasing the runoff but not adding to the existing
supply of water."). Where the aquifers are not over-appropriated, the Commission
will grant a permit if there is no "unreasonable impairment" to senior appropriators.
Id. R. 5.1.1.
136. Such a monopoly conflicts with principles of Colorado water law, most notably,
maximum utilization. See Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d
914, 932-33 (Colo. 1983) (discussing the doctrine of maximum utilization).
137. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-107(7) (a), -111(5) (2004); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. §
410-1, R. 5.3.2.2 (2005).
138. Sperling & Brown, supra, note 86, at 282.
139. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, R. 5.3.10 (2005).
140. Id, at R. 5.3.2.1.
141. "Whether Denver Basin aquifer water underlying a particular parcel of land is
nontributary or not nontributary is determined by the state engineer when reviewing a
well permit application or by the water court in ruling on a water court decree application." Chatfield E. Well Co. v. Chatfield E. Prop. Owners Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260, 12711272 (Colo. 1998).
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eight percent.' The two percent for replacement may be in the form
of return flow.''
For Denver Basin not nontributary groundwater, the amount of replacement depends on the distance of the well from the "contact with
the alluvium," or stream.' 4 For Dawson aquifer not nontributary
ground water, the Ground Water Commission requires full replacement.'5 The Ground Water Commission requires full replacement for
Denver, Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox Hills groundwater that the state
engineer deems not nontributary'46 and is within one mile of a natural
stream.' 7 For wells in these three aquifers further than one mile from
a stream, an appropriator must replace four percent of the water they
148
pump.14
The Ground Water Commission requires groundwater appropriators within designated basins to obtain a permit to appropriate
groundwater. The anti-speculation doctrine applies to the Denver Basin aquifers within designated basins.'
Permitting procedures vary
slightly for Denver Basin appropriators, depending on the timing of
the appropriation.' l5 The Ground Water Commission grants all permits in the Denver Basin based on a 100-year aquifer life."' Before
withdrawing designated groundwater, appropriators must apply to the
Ground Water Commission for a permit, detailing the beneficial use
and other specifics of the proposed withdrawals. '" As long as "the
142.
143.
144.
145.

§ 410-1, R. 5.3.6.2(A).

Id. at R. 5.3.6.5.
Id. at R. 5.3.6.2(B)-(C).
"[T] he amount of such replacement water shall provide for the depletion of alluvial water for the first 100 years due to all previous pumping and if pumping continues beyond 100 years, shall replace actual
impact until pumping ceases, assuming water table conditions in the
bedrock aquifer. The applicant shall be required to develop terms
and conditions necessary to prevent injury to prior designated ground
water fights."
Id. at R. 5.3.6.2(C).
146. Chatfield,956 P.2d at 1271-1272.
147. § 410-1 R. 5.3.6.2(C).
148. Id. at R. 5.3.6.2(B). The four percent replacement value evolved from the
"Robson Report." DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY, supra, note 76, § 9.1.
149. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 80 (Colo. 2003).
150. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-107 (2004).
151.
Id. § 37-90-111(5).
152.
The applicant shall specify the particular designated ground water
basin or subdivision thereof from which water is proposed to be appropriated, the beneficial use to which it is proposed to apply such water, the location of the proposed well, the name of the owner of the
land on which such well will be located, the estimated average annual
amount of water applied for in acre-feet, the estimated maximum
pumping rate in gallons per minute, and, if the proposed use is irrigation, the description of the land to be irrigated and the name of the
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proposed appropriation will not unreasonably impair existing water
rights from the same source and will not create unreasonable waste,"
and other appropriators do not object to the proposed use, the state
engineer will grant a conditional permit.153 However, if other appropriators object, as is frequently the situation, the Ground Water Commission holds a hearing in the designated basin or management district. 54 The Ground Water Commission will not issue a conditional
permit if "it appears that there are no unappropriated waters in the
designated source or that the proposed appropriation would unreasonably impair existing water rights from such source or would create
unreasonable waste." 55
Denver Basin appropriators who acquired their conditional permit
before July 1, 1991, must obtain a final permit. 56 The holder of a conditional permit has one year to complete the proposed well and three
years to demonstrate that he or she has put the designated groundwater to a beneficial use. 57 An affidavit of the conditional permit holder
is prima facie evidence for a final permit, although the Ground Water
Commission may investigate further claims of injury. 58 The Ground
Water Commission issues the final permit "[t]o the extent that the
commission finds that water has been put to a beneficial use." 159 In
contrast, Denver Basin appropriators who acquired their conditional
permit on or after July 1, 1991, do not have to obtain a final permit
because a conditional permit "shall be considered a final determination of a well's water right if the well is in compliance with all other
applicable requirements."' 6° These permitting rules are essentially the
same as those for non-designated nontributary water in the Denver
Basin.
The rights of designated groundwater appropriators, against both
surface water appropriators and other groundwater appropriators, are
unclear.' 6' As previously mentioned, some groundwater within designated basins contributes to streams. It is unclear whether the state can
owner thereof, together with such other reasonable information as
the commission may designate on the form prescribed. The amount
of water applied for shall only be utilized on the land designated on
the application.
Id. § 37-90-107(1).
153. Id. § 37-90-107(3).

154.
155.

Id. § 37-90-107(4).
Id.

156.

Id. § 37-90-108(3) (a) (II).

157.

Id. § 37-90-108(1)(a), (2)(a).

158.

Id. § 37-90-108(2)(b).

159. Id. § 37-90-108(3) (a) (I).
160. Id. § 37-90-108(3) (a) (II).
161. See Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, No. 03CV1335 (Colo. Water Div.
1, July 22, 2005) (discussing the rights of surface water appropriators in designated
groundwater basins as against designated groundwater appropriators).
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limit withdrawals of designated groundwater to satisfy surface appropriators, and whether the Ground Water Commission or the State Engineer would have the authority to do so.162 Within the Denver Basin,
the Ground Water Commission addressed this problem by requiring
complete replacement of not nontributary groundwater within one
mile of a stream and four percent replacement for appropriations farther than one mile from a stream. 163 The relative rights between
groundwater appropriators are even less clear. The 1965 Act provides4
for enforcement mechanisms among designated basin appropriators.
However, the Ground Water Commission has yet to regulate permitted
junior wells beyond labeling certain designated basins overappropriated "regardless of their depletive effect upon each other or
upon supplies available to senior wells."' 65
The Ground Water Commission will only allow a change of rights
to withdraw designated groundwater if the change "will not cause material injury to the vested rights of other appropriators."' In the Denver Basin, the transferable amount of groundwater depends on when
the Ground Water Commission issued the permit. Permit holders with
rights granted before July 1, 1991, may transfer the maximum amount
of designated groundwater put to a beneficial use. 67 However, permit
holders with rights granted on or after July 1, 1991, may transfer the
entire permitted amount.68
Although the designated groundwater rules apply only to the rural
eastern half of the Denver aquifers, the rules are particularly significant
because of excessive withdrawal problems. First, the two halves of the
Denver Basin aquifers are hydrologically connected. There is no hydrological reason for the distinction between designated and nondesignated groundwater. Accordingly, withdrawals from one area of
the Denver Basin aquifers will eventually affect other areas. Second,
although the majority of the specific rules governing the Denver Basin
aquifers are substantively the same inside and outside of designated
basins, conflicts over jurisdiction persist. The Ground Water Commission administers and regulates the designated portions of the Denver
162. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 283. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected an invitation to place tributary ground water within designated basins under the
authority of the water courts, despite seeing merit in the arguments. Pioneer Irrigation Dists. of Yuma County, Colo. and Dundy County, Neb. v. Danielson, 658 P.2d 842,
846 (Colo. 1983). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the water
court that it "lacked original subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases involving the
taking of ground water in a designated ground water basin[.l" Id at 843.

163.
164.

2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, R. 5.3.6.2 (B) (C) (2005).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-109 to -111.5 (2004).

165.

Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 284.

166.

COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, R. 7.1.1 (2005).

167.

Id. R. 7.1.3.

168.

Id.
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Basin aquifers, while the water courts administer and regulate the nondesignated portions."
B.

Non-Designated Groundwater

The urbanized western fifty-three percent of the Denver Basin aquifers is non-designated groundwater, located outside of designated
basins."
Although the rules for designated groundwater within the
Denver Basin are "substantively the same" as the rules for nondesignated groundwater, 7 the distinction is significant because the
Ground Water Commission has jurisdiction over designated groundwater while the water courts have jurisdiction over non-designated
groundwater. 72' The three classifications of non-designated groundwater in the Denver Basin are tributary, nontributary non-designated, and
not nontributary.
1.

Tributary Groundwater

Tributary groundwater is of minimal significance in the Denver Basin because the not nontributary classification exempts the Denver Basin aquifers from the tributary classification. Nevertheless, tributary
groundwater is worthy of discussion for comparison to nontributary
non-designated and not nontributary groundwater. Because tributary
ground water and surface water are hydrologically connected, the water courts conjunctively manage both types of water under the Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act").'
The withdrawal of tributary groundwater will eventually "deplete water
that would otherwise be available for withdrawal directly from the surface.,1

74

Further, all groundwater is presumed to be tributary, absent a

clear and convincing proof to the contrary.'75
The definitions of tributary groundwater within and outside of the
Denver Basin are different. Outside of the Denver Basin, tributary
76
groundwater is all groundwater that fails the nontributary test.'
169. Sperling & Brown, supranote 86, at 278-79, 285-86.
170. Id. at 278.
171. Id. at 282.
172. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 70 (Colo. 2003).
173. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 299; see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101, 103(11) (2004) ("'Underground water', [sic] as applied in this article for the purpose
of defining the waters of a natural stream, means that water in the unconsolidated
alluvial aquifer of sand, gravel, and other sedimentary materials and all other waters
hydraulically connected thereto which can influence the rate or direction of movement of the water in that alluvial aquifer or natural stream.").
174. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50,59 n.7 (Colo. 2003).
175. Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951).
176. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (2004) (defining nontributary ground water).
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Therefore, groundwater is tributary if its withdrawal will deplete the
flow of a natural stream to an extent greater than 0.1% of the annual
rate of withdrawal within 100 years.177 However, for groundwater to be
tributary within the Denver Basin, it must fail both the nontributary
test and the not nontributary test.178 Ground water is not nontributary
is if it is within the Denver Basin and fails the nontributary test. ' Logically, this should mean that all groundwater that contributes to surface
flow within the Denver Basin is not nontributary. However, there are
two factual exceptions. The first is tributary groundwater that fails
both the nontributary and not nontributary test due to location, such
as "Denver Basin groundwater located near the contacts of these aquifers with Monument Creek or its alluvium." 8 ° The second exception is
water that is just below the surface, immediately under or next to a
stream. Arguably, one can infer this exception from the statutory definition of non-tributary ground water. 8' In either case, the amount of
tributary groundwater within the Denver Basin is insignificant.
The water courts administer tributary groundwater conjunctively
182
with surface water according to the prior appropriation system.
Colorado has seven water divisions based on surface watersheds.'8 3 The
legislature split the Denver Basin between Division 1 in the north,"
and Division 2 in the south. 81 5 Each division appoints a districtjudge to
serve as the water judge, who, along with the water referee and water
clerk, adjudicates water rights.8 6 Similarly, the statute divides the state
engineer's office into seven divisions, and a division engineer is responsible for each division.'8 7 The state engineer administers the water
177.
178.

Id.
See Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 286.

179.

See§ 37-90-103(10.7).

180. See Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 286.
181. This second exception of tributary ground water within the Denver Basin is
implied by certain language in section 37-90-103(10.5), which mentions "the feasibility
and requirement of full augmentation by wells located in the tributary portions of [the
Denver Basin] aquifers." (emphasis added). However, it is unclear whether the legislature intended the word "tributary" to create a category of legally tributary groundwater
within the Denver Basin or simply to refer to that groundwater that is hydrologically
tributary, without creating a legal distinction. § 37-90-103(10.5).
182. See Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 299.
183. § 37-92-201 (defining the seven water districts).
184. § 37-92-201(1) (a) ("Division 1 consists of all lands in the state of Colorado in
the drainage basins of the South Platte river, the Big Laramie river, the Arikaree river,
the north and south forks of the Republican river, the Smokey Hill river, Sandy and
Frenchman creeks, and streams tributary to said rivers and creeks.").
185. § 37-92-201 (1) (b) ("Division 2 consists of all lands in the state of Colorado in
the drainage basins of the Arkansas river and the Dry Cimarron river, and streams
tributary to said rivers.").
186. § 37-92-203 to - 204, -301 (discussing water judges, water referees, water clerks,
and administration and distribution of water).
187. § 37-92-202.
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courts' rulings." The Colorado Supreme Court hears appeals directly
from the water courts.8
Tributary groundwater appropriators must acquire a permit from
the state engineer." The state engineer allocates the rights to withdraw tributary groundwater according to the priority system and subject to senior surface rights.'"' Consequently, tributary groundwater
taken out of priority requires replacement water so senior appropriators are not injured."n Finally, a change in rights is subject to prior
appropriation principles so as not to harm junior appropriators. 9 '
However, in several areas of Colorado, special rules and regulations
apply in an attempt to balance the use of tributary groundwater and
surface water.'"
Although there is minimal tributary groundwater in the Denver Basin, the previous discussion is significant for two reasons. First, as with
tributary groundwater, the water courts administer all non-designated
groundwater. ' Second, this discussion illustrates how significant portions of non-designated groundwater might be administered and regulated if the General Assembly did not create the not nontributary classification. For example, tributary Denver Basin groundwater would
have been subject to the seniority of surface appropriators and full replacement requirements.
2. Nontributary Non-Designated Groundwater
Unlike tributary groundwater in the Denver Basin, nontributary
non-designated groundwater is of major significance. The legal rules
188. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n. v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 70 (Colo. 2003).
189. Idat69n.6;§ 13-4-102(1)(d).
190. § 37-90-137(1). Before the 1969 Act, the water courts often did not adjudicate
tributary wells, nor was the water in the wells considered to be part of the priority system. For a discussion of the impacts of the 1969 Act, see Sperling & Brown, supra note
86, at 296.
191. See Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 299; see e.g. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation
Co., 69 P.3d 50, 72 (Colo. 2003) (holding inter alia that State Engineer can not authorize out-of-priority diversion of ground water in the absence of any provision requiring
that an application for an augmentation plan be filed with the water court.").
192. § 37-92-103(9); Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674
P.2d 914, 945 (Colo. 1983); see also Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 297 (noting
that the court exempts wells flowing fifteen gallon per minute or less from stricter
permitting requirements.)
193. See § 37-92-305(3) (2004).
194. See Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 299-302. See also Kuiper v. Well Owners
Conservation Ass'n, 490 P.2d 268, 280 (Colo. 1971) (rejecting the claim that shutting
down tributary ground water wells results in a futile call, stating "[w]e can see no logical distinctions between the result of an intervening storm in the case of a call on surface right and the case of a call on a well"), overruled on other grounds,
Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983).
195. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 285-86.
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governing nontributary non-designated groundwater within the Denver Basin differ substantially from those outside the Denver Basin.'"
However, the legal rules governing nontributary non-designated
groundwater within the Denver Basin are substantively the same as
those for designated groundwater within the Denver Basin.'97
Nontributary non-designated groundwater is groundwater within
the Denver Basin that meets the nontributary test and is outside of a
designated basin. Groundwater outside of designated basins is nontributary if its withdrawal will deplete the flow of a natural stream
greater than 0.1% of the annual rate of withdrawal within 100 years.'
Further, within the Denver Basin, the statute assumes unconfined water table conditions exist, even if the Denver Basin aquifers are under
artesian pressure.'" This assumption ensures that Denver Basin nontributary non-designated groundwater "will not be considered to overflow into the surface waters," arguably making it tributary.' Significant
portions of the Denver Basin aquifers are nontributary nondesignated,"° in that the groundwater is "an appreciable distance from
the discharge areas of these formations. '
The water courts and state engineer adjudicate and administer
nontributary non-designated groundwater.s The procedures are similar to those previously discussed for tributary groundwater. Notably,
the legislature split the Denver Basin aquifers between Water Division 1
and 2.'
However, in contrast to tributary groundwater, water courts
and the state engineer do not administer nontributary non-designated
groundwater in conjunction with surface waters because legally they
are not hydrologically connected.
Nontributary non-designated groundwater appropriators must acquire a permit from the state engineer."m A vested right to use non196. As discussed below, the main difference is that nontributary non-designated
groundwater consumption within the Denver Basin is limited to ninety-eight percent.
Compare2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-6, R. 8 (1987) (limiting withdrawals to 98% of water
consumed), with 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-7, R. 8 (1986) (establishing relaxed limitations on consumption of nontributary non-designated groundwater).
197. Sperling & Brown, supranote 86, at 282.
198. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) (2004).
199. Id.
200. Colorado Groundwater Comm'n v. N. Kiowa Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist.,
77 P.3d 62, 73 n.21 (Colo. 2003) ("Since ground water must be hydraulically connected to surface waters to be considered tributary in nature, the legislature has essentially mandated that Denver Basin ground water is nontributary when, without such an
assumption, the water might be classified as tributary.").

201. The state engineer determines whether Denver Basin aquifer water underlying
a particular parcel of land is nontributary or not nontributary. Chatfield E. Well Co. v.
Chatfield E. Prop. Owners Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260, 1271-1272 (Colo. 1998).
202. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 287.

203.

M at 294.

204.
205.

See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-201(1) (a)-(b) (2004).
Id. § 37-90-137(1).
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tributary non-designated groundwater is acquired in either of two ways:
one, an overlying landowner may construct a well according to a permit from the state engineer; or two, the overlying landowner may receive an adjudication from the water court.' In either case, a permit
from the state engineer is required before withdrawals actually begin.
The anti-speculation doctrine does not apply to Denver Basin groundwater outside of designated basins.n7 The state engineer allocates
permits based on a 100-year life of the aquifer " and ownership of the
overlying land.' However, municipal or quasi-municipal water suppliers that are obligated by law or by contract to be the principal water
supplier within their boundaries may acquire the implied consent of
landowners through a public ordinance.' Further, within the Denver
Basin, statutes limit consumption to ninety-eight percent of annual
withdrawals." ' These rules are substantively the same as the rules for
nontributary groundwater in designated basins within the Denver Basin.
Surface appropriators face difficulties attempting to demonstrate
injury caused by nontributary non-designated groundwater withdrawals
because Colorado does not administer such withdrawals under the
prior appropriation system." For example, surface appropriators cannot demonstrate injury from withdrawals of nontributary nondesignated ground water in the Denver Basin because Colorado considers the hydrological connection so attenuated."
The two percent
return flow requirement within the Denver Basin seems to imply that
the withdrawal of some nontributary non-designated groundwater impacts surface rights. However, the General Assembly, through the state
engineer, imposed these limitations to prevent waste, promote beneficial use, and require reasonable conservation of groundwater, rather
than to lessen the impact on surface appropriators. 4 Other nontributary non-designated groundwater appropriators in the Denver Basin
also face difficulties demonstrating injuries caused by withdrawals because statutorily "[t] he reduction and eventual elimination of artesian
pressure and the lowering of pumping levels thereafter do not per se
206. E. Cherry Creek Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109 P.3d
154, 157 (Colo. 2005).

207.

See id.

208. Id. § 37-90-137(4) (b) (I); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-7, R. 8A (1986).
209. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n. v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 71 (Colo. 2003).
210. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(8) (2004).
211. Compare 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-6, R. 8 (1987) (limiting withdrawals to 98%
of water consumed), with 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-7, R. 8A (1986) (establishing re-

laxed limitations on consumption of nontributary non-designated groundwater).
212. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(11) (2004).
213. See § 37-90-103(10.5) (discussing test for nontributary non-designated ground
water).
214. § 37-92-305(11).
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constitute material injury." 15 This rule is substantively similar to the
rule in designated basins that does not protect appropriators from declines in the historic water levels. 16
The law governing changing the rights to withdraw nontributary
non-designated groundwater is undeveloped because "[flew such
transfers have been requested to date, and those that have been requested have been handled on an ad hoc basis by the State Engineer's
office and the Water Courts.""7 These changes, however, are lawful so
long as the point of diversion is within the boundaries of the subject
property."8
The striking feature of the rules governing nontributary nondesignated groundwater in the Denver Basin is their substantive similarity to those governing the designated portions of the Denver Basin.
Aside from the fact that the anti-speculation doctrine doe not apply to
the Denver Basin aquifers outside of designated basins, the major difference between the rules is that the Ground Water Commission adjudicates and administers the non-designated portions of the Denver
Basin aquifers.
3.

Not Nontributary Groundwater

The General Assembly created the not nontributary classification
thus preventing classification of the Denver Basin aquifers as tributary
groundwater. 1 ' The not nontributary classification permits the state
engineer and water courts to treat otherwise tributary groundwater in
the Denver Basin like nontributary non-designated ground water,
though with slightly higher recharge rates.
The General Assembly classified much of the Denver Basin aquifers
as not nontributary 20 because a tributary classification would hamper
development. For example, surface appropriators who benefited from
the Denver Basin aquifers' natural discharge into the South Platte
River could call the river, limiting the withdrawals of the junior
groundwater appropriators."
Groundwater appropriators could take
215. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 291.
216. § 37-90-102(1).
217. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 304.
218. Interview with Kevin Kinnear, Attorney, Porzak, Browning & Bushong in Boulder, Colo. (Sept. 20, 2005). Because of the widespread reliance on nontributary nondesignated groundwater for augmentation plans of Denver Basin aquifer pumping,
such transfers may become commonplace. Id.
219. § 37-90-103(10.5), (10.7).
220. The State Engineer, when reviewing a permit application, or the water court,
when ruling on a decree, determines whether ground water is not nontributary. Chatfield E. Well Co. v. Chatfield E. Property Owners Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260, 1271-1272
(Colo. 1998).
221.
DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY, supTa note 76, § 9.4 ("The model indicates
that the vested water rights to the flow of the South Platte River Basin drainages may be
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water out of priority if they had an augmentation plan to replace the
natural discharge.2" However, due to hydrological uncertainty and the
high number of groundwater appropriators, it is difficult to determine
the amount of replacement surface water required for augmentation
plans."' Therefore, to protect senior surface appropriators on the
South Platte River, the General Assembly created the not nontributary
classification and limited consumptive use to ninety-six percent within
the Denver Basin. 4 In this way, the not nontributary classification
promotes utilization of the large amounts of Denver Basin aquifer
groundwater while minimizing, or perhaps ignoring, impacts on surface users.
Not nontributary groundwater is water located within the Denver
Basin aquifers but outside designated basins, the withdrawal of which
will deplete the flow of a natural stream to an extent greater than 0.1%
of the annual rate of withdrawal within 100 years. 5 Not nontributary
groundwater fails the nontributary non-designated test because its impact on surface water is too great. As not nontributary groundwater is
withdrawn, the aquifers lose artesian pressure. The loss of artesian
pressure significantly affects the flow of surface waters.
The water courts and state engineer adjudicate and administer not
nontributary groundwater." The procedures are the same as those
previously discussed for tributary and nontributary non-designated
groundwater, requiring an adjudication in water court and an augmentation plan. 7 Similar to nontributary non-designated groundwater,
the water courts and state engineer do not administer not nontributary
groundwater in conjunction with surface waters because legally they
are considered to be only minimally hydrologically connected.

materially injured due to ground water withdrawal from wells legally developed in the
Denver Basin."). Ground water appropriators are typically junior to surface users be-

cause well technology is a recent development compared to surface water diversions,
which have existed since the first appropriations.
222. See§37-92-103(9) (2004).
223. From a hydrological standpoint, it is difficult to understand the effect each well
has on the flow rate and direction of flow of the ground water in the Denver Basin
aquifers. The high number of wells, the lack of uniformity in well distribution, and the
different withdrawal rates makes it yet more difficult for hydrologists to determine the

effect of each individual well.
224. § 37-90-137(9) (c) (I). Judicially approved augmentation plans are required for
not nontributary ground water. Id. However, the General Assembly has essentially
dictated the terms of the augmentation plans by specifying required return flow values.
See id. A recent study found that "the average replacement [of not nontributary
ground water] required to protect vested surface water rights ranges from 14.6% to

20.7%."

DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY,

supra note 76, § 9.4.

225. § 37-92-103(10.7).
226. Chatfield E. Well Co. v. Chatfield E. Property Owners Ass'n, 956 P.2d 1260,
1271-72 (Colo. 1998).
227. § 37-90-137(9)(c).
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Not nontributary groundwater appropriators must acquire a permit
from the state engineer.' The anti-speculation doctrine does not apply to Denver Basin groundwater outside of designated basins." 9 The
state grants permits based on a 100-year life of the aquifer.2" Colorado
bases not nontributary groundwater allocation on ownership of the
overlying land." ' However, municipal or quasi-municipal water suppliers obligated by law or by contract to be the principal water supplier
within their boundaries may acquire the implied consent of landowners through a public ordinance. 32 Colorado law limits consumption by
requiring appropriators to replace at least some of the withdrawn water. Appropriators using wells in the Dawson aquifer must fully replace
water to "prevent any injurious effect."2 33 Similarly, appropriators using
wells within one mile of a natural stream in the Denver, Arapahoe and
Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers must fully replace withdrawn water.2 3 Appropriators using wells in these aquifers farther than one mile from a
natural stream must replace four percent of the water they withdraw.
To protect surface appropriators, court decrees may require continued
replacement of water after withdrawals cease.236
Similar to surface users in nontributary non-designated groundwater areas, surface users in not nontributary groundwater areas face difficulties demonstrating injury caused by not nontributary withdrawals
because such not nontributary groundwater is not governed by the
prior appropriation system.2 37 Further, statutorily mandated augmenta-

tion plans governing not nontributary withdrawals make it difficult for
surface appropriators arguing anything other than non-compliance.
Additionally, groundwater appropriators face difficulties demonstrating injury because "[t]he reduction and eventual elimination of artesian pressure and the lowering of pumping levels thereafter do not per
228. § 37-90-137(1) (2004).
229. See E. Cherry Creek Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109
P.3d 154 (Colo. 2005).
230. § 37-90-137(4) (b) (I); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-7, R. 8A (1986).
231. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch LLP v. Bargas, 986 P.2d 262, 267 (Colo. 1999).
232. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(8) (2004).
233. § 37-90-137(9) (c) (I) (stating Dawson wells "shall provide for the replacement
of actual stream depletion to the extent necessary to prevent any injurious effect, based
upon actual aquifer conditions in existence at the time of such decree"). Proposals to
withdraw not nontributary ground water from a Dawson aquifer or not nontributary
ground water from the Denver, Arapahoe, or Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer require the
applicant "to develop terms and conditions necessary to prevent injury to prior designated ground water rights." 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, R. 5.3.6.2(C) (2005).
234. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(9) (c) (I) (2004).
235. Id.
236. Id.; see also Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106, 1114 (Colo. 1990)
(holding the water court may retain jurisdiction on the issue of injury if it is unclear
whether continued replacement is required after pumping ends).
237. § 37-92-305(11); Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 302.
238. See§ 37-90-137(9)(c)(I).
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Basin wells and other non tribuse constitute material injury to Denver
2 39
tary and not nontributary wells."

Changing the rights to the withdrawal of not nontributary groundwater is lawful so long as the changed point of diversion is within the
boundaries of the subject property. Similar to non-designated nontributary groundwater, "[f]ew such transfers have been requested to
date, and those that have been requested have been handled on an ad
hoc basis by the State Engineer's office and the Water Courts. 2

40

How-

ever, such transfers may become fairly common due to the development of the Denver Basin aquifers.
The rules governing not nontributary groundwater are substantially
similar to those governing groundwater within designated basins.
Again, other than the application of the anti-speculation doctrine, the
salient difference is that the Ground Water Commission adjudicates
and administers groundwater within designated basins, while the water
courts adjudicate all other groundwater.
IV. DISCONNECT: THE MISMATCH OF LAW AND HYDROLOGY
A homogeneous set of substantive rules governs all groundwater in
the Denver Basin aquifers."' Briefly, the rules for designated and nondesignated groundwater in the Denver Basin are: the right to withdraw
groundwater is based on the ownership of the overlying land, although
municipal or quasi-municipal water suppliers may obtain implied consent to withdraw water; permits are required for all withdrawals and are
based on a 100-year aquifer life; consumption of water deemed nontributary is limited to ninety-eight percent; and consumption of not
nontributary water is limited to ninety-six percent, unless it is withdrawn from the Dawson aquifer or from any aquifer within one mile of
a natural stream. However, there are significant procedural differences for appropriating designated and non-designated water. The
Ground Water Commission and the district courts control designated
ground water rights, while the water courts and state engineer control
non-designated groundwater rights. Further, the anti-speculation doctrine only applies within the designated basins. Concealed in the
above brief summary of Colorado groundwater law are numerous
problems facing Colorado in the future management of the Denver
Basin aquifers. The remainder of this article discusses some of the key
problems and examines possible solutions.

239.
240.
241.

Sperling& Brown, supra note 86, at 291; See § 37-90-102(1).
Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 304.
See infra text accompanying notes 282-85.
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A.

Current Problems Facing the Denver Basin Aquifers

This article discusses only some of the numerous problems facing
the Denver Basin aquifers; it does not address ground water quality.
Although "a contaminated aquifer is tantamount to a depleted aquifer,""4 ' Colorado's current concerns are the problems caused by consumption rather than contamination. The next section discusses some
legal problems in regulation of the Denver Basin aquifers, and the following section discusses the physical problems resulting from the current regulatory scheme.
1.

Legal Problems

There are two types of legal problems associated with the Denver
Basin aquifers: the ability to change water rights and jurisdiction. The
problem with changing water rights stems from the ambiguity and gaps
in the law. In designated basins, established rules govern the ability to
change well locatign, type, place, and time of use. ' However, the legislature did not clearly establish rules for transferring surface diversions within designated basins to wells. " Moreover, outside the designated basins, the state engineer and water courts have handled very
few water rights transfers and those that they have handled have been
"on an ad hoc basis." ' The lack of clearly established rules may adversely affect surface appropriators if groundwater withdrawals in designated basins start to injure the surface appropriators. Further, this
ambiguity could become significant when appropriators need to
change well locations to accommodate the depleted conditions of the
Denver Basin.
The other legal problem in the Denver Basin aquifers is jurisdictional. As discussed previously, with regard to the Denver Basin aquifers, two entities manage the same resource. The Ground Water
Commission governs the eastern half of the Denver Basin aquifers,
while the water courts govern the western half. Furthermore, although
the substantive rules in the designated and non-designated sections of
the aquifers are nearly identical, appropriators in designated basins
face significantly different procedures than those outside designated
242. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 79, at 536.
243. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS.§ 410-1, R. 7 (2005); Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at
284-85.
244. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 285 (noting "[c] hanges from surface diversions to wells are not addressed in the Designated Basin Rules."). The problem arises

when ground water withdrawals cause a decline in surface flows. Id. It is unclear
whether these surface appropriators must file for a permit like any other new appro-

priator, or whether they are in a unique position because they are merely protecting
their vested rights. Id. This is especially problematic when the commission would deny
new permits because the designated basin is over-appropriated. Id
245. Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 304.
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basins. "All other things being equal, the more organizations that are
involved ...

the higher the transaction costs attending their coordina-

tion." "

Appropriators pay these high transaction costs since they must
deal with several agencies or expend time determining which agency
handles a specific issue."7
The jurisdictional split in management of Denver Basin aquifers
also affects management agencies. When considering the management of a unified resource, a management agency cannot respond as
effectively when its policies govern only half of a resource. Additionally, coordinating policy with other agencies is both difficult and costly.
Finally, there are ambiguous areas of authority where both management agencies claim jurisdiction. For example, until the Colorado
Supreme Court ruled in 1983, " the law was unclear as to which agency
had jurisdiction over groundwater that is essentially tributary within
designated basins. 9 In 1985, to achieve uniformity across designated
and non-designated groundwater basins, the legislature decreed that
the nontributary test would apply to all future designated basins.'m Yet,
management agencies did not apply the same nontributary test to all
designated basins until 1992." Problems remain because the Ground
Water Commission is primarily concerned with groundwater rights to
the exclusion of other water rights. Lastly, management agencies govern surface appropriations within designated basins differently than
surface appropriations outside designated basins.
A second jurisdictional problem entails the timeframe for augmentation in the Dawson aquifer. If "injurious depletions to vested [surface] water rights" continue to occur after withdrawals of not nontribu246. William Blomquist et al., Institutions and Conjunctive Water Management among
Three Western States, 41 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 653, 659 (2001) (discussing conjunctive management projects).
247. See, e.g., Colorado Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater
Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62, 66-67 (Colo. 2003) (holding the Ground Water Commission

has authority to determine the applicant's use right and the Ground Water Management District's authority did not begin until after the Commission issued the permit).
248. Pioneer Irrigation Dists. of Yuma County v. Danielson, 658 P.2d 842, 847 (Colo.
1983) (holding "[t ] he Colorado Ground Water Commission ...has initial jurisdiction

to make a determination of whether a ground water matter involves designated ground
water.").
249. An example of groundwater that is essentially tributary within designated basins
is the natural discharge of the Ogallala aquifer into running streams in northeastern
Colorado, such as North Fork of the Republican River. Sperling & Brown, supra note
86, at 277. On a related point, the meaning of the term "adjacent" remains unclear

under the second definition of designated ground water. See COLO. REV.STAT. § 37-90103(6) (a) (2004). Particularly, it is unclear whether "'adjacent' mean [s] something
less inclusive than 'hydraulically connected'[]" Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at
278. Similarly, the term "principle water usage" is ambiguous. Id.
250. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-10.5 (2004); Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 277.
The Upper Crow Creek basin is the only post-1984 basin. Id.
251. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, R. 4.2.19; Sperling & Brown, supra note 86, at 277.
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tary groundwater cease, Colorado law "mandates that a plan for augmentation replace such depletions.", 52 However, "[i]f. . . the water
court is unable to make a determination as to whether the depletions
will be injurious, it shall retain jurisdiction on the issue" for an appropriate period of time.2 5 However, injuries to surface appropriators may
linger for up to two centuries after withdrawals cease. 54 Augmentation
plans for not nontributary groundwater may not be sufficient because
augmentation plans are often based on return flows, wastewater, and
direct discharge, which results from pumping.255 For exaii.ple, if the
augmentation source is return flows, it is far from certain whether the
appropriator will still be around in the ensuing decades to pay for the
groundwater withdrawals, especially if there is little usable water left in
the aquifers. Consequenly, judges face the choice of either approving
a plan for augmentation that may be inadequate, or retaining jurisdiction until withdrawals end, following the statutory 100-year aquifer life.
2.

Physical Problems

Significant physical problems face Colorado in management of the
Denver Basin aquifers. The first major problem is the possible injury
to surface appropriators along the South Platte and in other Denver
Basins. Groundwater models 6 demonstrate that "vested water rights to
the flow of the South Platte River Basin drainages may be materially
injured due to groundwater withdrawal from wells legally developed in
the Denver Basin[.]"" 7 Excluding the Dawson aquifer and depending
on future ground water withdrawals, the average replacement required
to protect vested surface water rights ranges from 14.6% to 20.7% for
not nontributary groundwater outside designated basins."n "For the
nontributary non-designated areas, the average replacement required
ranges from 2.2% to 2.9%. " ' These replacement values are larger
252. Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106, 1113-14 (Colo. 1990); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(9) (c) (I) (2004).
253. Castle Meadows, 791 P.2d at 1114 (addressing whether the Denver Basin aquifers
were connected to West Plum Creek in order to determine whether withdrawals of not
nontributary ground water would injure surface appropriators).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1109.
256. The State Engineer's Office developed the ground water model of the Denver
Basin aquifers based on the United States Geological Survey MODFLOW code.
DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY, supra note 76, § 9.2.
257. Id. § 9.4.
258. Id
259. Id.
In reality, the average replacement requirements may be somewhat less than
the range of values derived from the model results. This is because a portion
of the discharge to drainages may be to springs and seeps along the drainage
at points above the stream and alluvium and a portion may be lost to
evapotranspiration without actually entering the stream. In order to deter-
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than the current statutorily required replacement amounts. Accordingly, "the groundwater contribution to the South Platte River Basin
drainages is already as good as gone from the surface drainages, the
only question is when will the full effect occur, which could be forty
years into the future. " ' °
The second physical problem facing Colorado in management of
the Denver Basin aquifers is future depletion. Because withdrawal exceeds recharge, groundwater levels within the aquifers are declining.
These decreased water levels will eventually exhaust the aquifers. First,
withdrawals will become more costly with lower water levels, making
the use of Denver Basin groundwater less economical. Water users will
have to drill deeper wells, especially near the edges of the aquifers. 6
Additionally, more energy will be required to withdraw the same
amount of water. Depending on the location and number of future
wells, estimates for the long-term operation cost range from $500 to
$1,000 per acre-foot in the highly productive Arapahoe aquifer, to over
$2,000 per acre-foot in the Denver aquifer south of the Palmer Divide.26 Although currently this may be less expensive than purchasing
surface water rights in the South Platte Basin, the relative costs will
no doubt change over time. Further questions arise as to what water
users will do when the aquifers become physically or economically exhausted. Accordingly, with such high rates of groundwater withdrawal
from the Denver Basin aquifers, the valuable underground resource is
not sustainable either physically or economically. Ultimately, the cities
that rely upon the Denver Basin aquifers will not be able to subsist
without substitute water sources.
B.

Addressing the Problems Facing the Denver Basin Aquifers

While the Denver Basin aquifers may ultimately be a finite resource, efficient management can extend their use. This section

mine the magnitude and extent of these occurrences, extensive field studies
would be required.
Id.
260.
261.

Id.
See ld. § 14.2.
Denver and Arapahoe aquifer well sites in the central portion of the basin
may be able to operate for a long period at high pumping rates without requiring additional wells to meet projected demands. The analyses show that
at these locations additional wells are not required in the Arapahoe aquifer
before 2085 and that additional wells are not required in the Denver aquifer
until 2075.

Id.
262. Id.
263. See generally Water Colorado, http://www.watercolorado.com (last visited on
Dec. 28, 2005) (classified advertisement listings to buy and sell water rights).

SUSTAINING THE UNSUSTAINABLE

Issue I

briefly examines proposed current solutions and explores some new
solutions.
1. What Is Being Done Now
Currently some water districts are taking several steps to address
the problems regarding the Denver Basin aquifers, including artificial
recharge and the creation of new political entities. Two water districts
M
The Centennial Water and
currently engage in artificial recharge."
Sanitation District takes water from McLellan reservoir to the Centennial waste treatment plant and then injects that water into the ArapaIn 1996, Centennial Water and Sanitation District inhoe aquifer.'
jected 654 acre-feet into the Arapahoe aquifer.' The Willows Water
District, in conjunction with the Denver Basin Aquifer Recharge and
Demonstration Project267 concluded, "[a] full-scale injection, storage
and recovery project in the Denver Basin is technically, economically
and institutionally feasible."' Based on 1997 prices, consultants calculated that the cost of delivering water to the well, injecting it into the
Arapahoe aquifer, storing, and recovering it would be about $800 per
acre-foot." Further, the specific rules governing the withdrawal of artificially recharged Denver Basin groundwater outside of designated
basins do not apply within designated basins. 270 Accordingly, artificially
recharged groundwater outside the boundaries of the designated basins is fully consumable or reusable." Further, "[a] rtificially recharged
water may be retained in the aquifer indefinitely by the person who"
injected it, although the right of others to continue withdrawals are not
affected."2 Although artificial recharge may prolong the life of the
aquifer and offers low-evaporation storage, of course, the question remains where the recharge water will come from.
264. TOPPER ET AL., ARTIFICIAL RECHARGE OF GROUND WATER IN COLORADO - A
STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT ii (2003), availableat
http://geosurvey.state.co.us/portals/0/ARExecSum%20for%20web.pdf (last visited

November 11, 2005). Artificial recharge is "any engineered system designed to introduce water to, and store water in, underlying aquifers." Id. at i. There are several types
of artificial recharge technologies, including direct injection, which recharges water
directly into the saturated zone of the aquifer. Id. at ii.

265.
266.
267.

DENVER BASIN GROUNDWATER STUDY,

supra note 76, § 7.1.

Id.

JOHN C. HALEPASKA & Assocs., CASE HISTORY OF AQUIFER STORAGE AND RECOVERY
IN THE DENVER BASIN AQUIFER, 1-2 (2005),

http://www.hydrologyconsultants.com/AEGpaper.pdf (last visited November 11,
2005). This project was part of the High Plains States Groundwater Project of the
United States Bureau of Reclamation conducted from 1990 to 1997.
268. Id. at 14.
269. Id. at 13.
270. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-11, R. 3.1 (1995).
271. Id. at R. 5.1.
272. Id. at R. 7.4.
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Consultants have examined five alternatives for meeting the southern Denver's future water needs. " Each proposed alternative would
significantly reduce withdrawals from the Denver Basin aquifers. 74
However, the initial capital construction costs range from approximately $1.1 to $2.3 billion, and total costs range from $2.3 to $4.0 billion.27 Even for a conservation district in an affluent area, which has
the ability to tax and marshal funds for these projects, these costs are
no doubt high. Although no entity has acted on these proposals, as
water supplies dwindle action will become more likely."
2. What Could Be Done
While possible solutions are endless, this article surveys several options, none of which is mutually exclusive. The first option is to consolidate the management of the Denver Basin aquifers. The state
could be overlooking this solution because the current rules for allocating water inside and outside of designated basins are substantively
the same and consolidation would not directly address the ultimate
depletion of the Denver Basin aquifers. However, consolidation could
clarify jurisdictional confusion, reduce transaction costs for management agencies and the public, and facilitate future policy coordination.
Consolidation of management agencies would facilitate policy coordination and decisions associated with water rights transfers, augmentation plans, dwindling groundwater contribution to the South Platte
Basin, and the ultimate life span of the Denver Basin aquifers.
The state could consolidate authority by either extending the
Ground Water Commission's authority over the western half of the
Denver Basin aquifers or extending the water courts' and the state engineer's authority over the eastern half of the Denver Basin. However,
extending the authority of the Ground Water Commission may be
problematic because the Commission does note deal with tributary
groundwater. Conversely, extending the jurisdiction of the water
courts and state engineer at the cost of the Ground Water Commission
would eliminate the local control created by the 1965 Act and create
additional work for the water courts. However, under either scenario,
the institutional interests of the Ground Water Commission and the
water courts would likely resist any reduction of their authority.
An alternate solution is for the state to create a management
agency to oversee and coordinate policy across the Denver Basin.
273. BLACK & VEATCH ET AL., SOUTH METRO WATER SUPPLY STUDY 4-7 (2003), available
at http://www.crwcd.gov/news/reports/SouthMetroWaterSupplyStudyll-03.pdf (last
visited November 11, 2005) [hereinafter SOUTH METRO WATER SUPPLY STUDY].
274. Id.
275. Id. at 12.
276. See e.g. H.R. 1298, 65th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005); S. 83, 65th
Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005).
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However, while a management agency responsible for coordinating
policy across the Denver Basin would intrude less on the institutional
interests of the Ground Water Commission, water courts, and the state
engineer, it would create an additional level of bureaucracy.
A second possible option for extending the aquifer life is to address
the current and future injury to surface appropriators by imposing
higher recharge requirements. Considering that current recharge
rates for not nontributary groundwater are four percent, and that fifteen to twenty percent is required to avoid injury, this option would be
unpopular among groundwater appropriators. Existing augmentation
plans further confound the issue. Implementing this option is troublesome, because the current four percent recharge rate is statutory, "'
and the General Assembly would have to legislate any change in the
recharge requirements.
A third option is to address the current and future injury to Denver
Basin surface appropriators and the long-term sustainability of the
Denver Basin aquifers is to limit growth. In addition to local growth
ordinances, the state engineer could slow growth by reducing the
number of permits issued. However, currently the state engineer does
not have the authority to limit permits in this way. If the law was
changed to give the state engineer this authority, the unelected state
engineer would have immense discretion over both water and nonwater issues. Admittedly, any decision of the state engineer has impacts beyond water. However, if Colorado were to give the state engineer discretion to consider non-water issues when allotting permits, it
would be a unique and unprecedented act. Any such measure would
face significant opposition, especially given the high growth rate of the
area.
A fourth option is mandatory conservation. Unlike surface water
conservation measures, which are inefficient because water can flow
away, water conserved in aquifers remains relatively stable. However,
appropriators have no incentive to conserve because they do not receive credit for groundwater that they do not withdraw. Thus, conserved groundwater is available for other users to appropriate."
To implement conservation of groundwater, the state engineer
could impose stricter requirements on permits and permitted uses.
However, this creates equity problems between earlier and later appropriators, as well as possible permit transfer problems. Alternatively,
appropriators could receive credit for the entire amount of their permit, regardless of the amount of actual withdrawal. Under this option,
appropriators may seek inflated permits, but it would create an incen277.
278.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(9) (c) (I) (2004).

In contrast, "[a]rtificially recharged water may be retained in the aquifer in2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 40211, R. 7.4.
definitely by the person who has injected the water[.]"
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tive for appropriators to withdraw less groundwater, and it may increase efficiency if appropriators could transfer the water they do not
use.
A fifth option is supplemental water. However, this solution begs
the question of where such supplemental water would come from in an
already over-appropriated state. To find new water sources, the courts
and state engineer would have to realign existing water rights. The
South Metro Water Supply Study suggested purchasing water rights on
the South Platte River on the Eastern Slope and the Blue River on the
Western Slope." Although this supplemental water would certainly be
helpful, it is important to keep the limitations and scale of the South
Metro Water Supply Study in perspective. The study "assumes a 15%
percent reduction in outdoor water use, along with expanded reuse
wherever practicable." ° Additionally, "[i]n every [proposed] alternative, the artesian pressure will be depleted or reduced over the next 20
years, '81 and the South Metro Water Supply Study only projects future
needs to the year 2050. Considering the life of the Denver Basin aquifers, the South Metro Water Supply Study fails to consider the future
water needs and costs. Because the South Metro Water Supply Study is
limited to the more perceivable future, it tends to ignore larger questions of sustainability.
A final option is to accept the complete mining of the Denver Basin aquifers by a certain year and begin planning in earnest for alternative sources. The current legal and regulatory structure already implicitly assumes the mining of the Denver Basin aquifers by providing for
their withdrawals while acknowledging the lack of adequate recharge.
The real challenge lies in planning for the future, when the Denver
Basin aquifers are no longer a seemingly endless supply of water.
Planning will, of course, need to address how a region whose growth
was spurred by the massive supply of groundwater can transition to a
future without the Denver Basin aquifers. The answer would logically
seem to be early preparation, that is, conservation, growth limitation,
and alternative supplies. Although this future may be all but certain,
and just around the corner on a geological timescale, politically, the
exhaustion of the Denver basin aquifers is far off indeed. The political
will to plan, and stick to it, are an undeniable weak point.
V. CONCLUSION
The Denver Basin aquifers face both short and long-term sustainability problems. In the short-term, groundwater withdrawals will become more costly and withdrawals continue to injure surface appro279.

SOUTH METRO WATER SUPPLY STUDY,

280.

Id. at 4.

281.

Id. at 16.

supra note 273, at 5.
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priators. In the long-term, withdrawals will eventually exhaust the
Denver Basin aquifers, forcing residents and industry to find new
sources of water. Although one can use reason and analysis to outline
various courses of action, the solution and legislative response may
ultimately be a political question for the citizens of Colorado.
VI. APPENDIX: COLORADO GROUNDWATER LAW TABLE
This table is a reference for general principles of Colorado
groundwater law in the Denver Basin. Please consult the text for specific questions of law.
Designated
82
Groundwater'

Designated
Groundwater in
22
Denver Basin

NonDesignated
Groundwater
in Denver
4

NonDesignated
Groundwater"'

BasinW
Administration
Adjudication
Allocation of
Permits
Implied Consent
of Landowners
Life of Aquifer
Tributary
Groundwater

Ground Water Commission
District ground water judge
Modified prior
appropriation
Not applicable
N

State Engineer
Water Courts
Overlying land
Yes

No

100 ears

Nontributary
Groundwater

Minimal tributary groundwater in fact
All is legally
nontributary

Not nontributary
Groundwater
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I.

INTRODUCTION

For thousands of years the Colorado River ran unimpeded for fifteen hundred miles from its headwaters in the Rocky Mountains to the
Sea of Cortez.' It formed and flowed through the Grand Canyon, then
opened up into the Gulf of California. Before its termination in the
Gulf, it created the Colorado River Delta, one of the world's largest
desert oases. The Colorado River Delta consists of three thousand
square miles of "vast riparian, freshwater, brackish, and tidal wetlands"
in the middle of the Sonoran Desert.! Water from tributaries and
sediment picked up along the river's journey through the southwest
1. Theo Stein, Flood of legal tests may await complex 'law of the river, 'DENVER POST,
April 4, 2004, at Al0.

2. Daniel F. Luecke et al., A Delta Once More: Restoring Riparian & Wetland
Habitat in the Colorado River Delta 1 (1999).
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United States and Mexico feed the Delta.' During a canoe trip down
the lower Colorado River in 1922, Aldo Leopold described the Delta as
"a hundred green lagoons ... a verdant wall of mesquite and willow
separat[ing] the channel from the thorny desert beyond."4
Over 400 species of plants and numerous animal species, including
desert pupfish, coyotes, and jaguars made their home in the Delta.
Native Americans also lived along the Delta, taking refuge from the dry
Sonoran desert that surrounded them.6 Natural flow patterns of the
Colorado River maintained the delta habitats that supported both
animals and humans.' Spring floods are a natural and necessary part
of those flow patterns. Historically, the floods brought water out of the
"main channel to wash salt from the banks, germinate tree seeds, and
create seasonal wetlands."8 Without these floods, salt water tidal flows
would have made the land surrounding the Delta sterile and barren.9
The days of ample water and regular flooding are gone. Today,
jaguars no longer live in the Delta,'" and many species of animals, once
plentiful, no longer reside there. Upstream development in the
southwestern United States and Mexico throughout the twentieth century used, diverted, and polluted the water that once fed this fertile
ground." Decreased and sometimes nonexistent flows have reduced
the Delta to 150,000 acres.'2 The water that does reach the Delta is
"murky brown, salty, and contains pesticides," '" creating a "fissured
moonscape of baked mud
and desert weeds." " The river is now a
5
"mere ditch in the sand.'1

The world's most endangered mammal, the vaquita porpoise (Phocoena sinus) still makes its home in the Delta.'6 However, by some accounts only a few hundred remain." The giant totoaba fish (Totoaba

3.

Id.

4. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTWALMANAc 142 (4th prtg. 1975).
5. Joby Warrick, A River Once Ran Through It, NAT'L WILDLIFE, Feb.-Mar. 2002, at
32, 32.

6. A Resource for the Colorado River Delta: A Brief History,
http://www.ag.arizona.edu/coloradoriverdelta/delta/intro.html (last visited Dec.
28, 2005) [hereinafter A Brief History].
7. Id.

8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Warrick, supra note 5, at 36.

11.

LUECKE, supra note 2, at 1.

12.

Paul E. D'Amours, The Colorado River Delta, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L ENVrL. L. &

POL'YY.B. 2000, at 183, 184 (2001).
13. A Brief History, supra note 6.

14.
15.

Warrick, supra note 5, at 32.
Id.

16. A Brief History, supranote 6.
17. Frank S. Wilson, A Fish out of Water: A Proposalfor International Instream Flow
Rights in the Lower ColoradoRiver, 5 COLO.J. INT'L ENVrL. L. &POL'Y 249, 255 (1994).
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macdonaldi) has also suffered as a result of habitat decimation." The
fish once grew as long as seven feet and weighed over three hundred
pounds." It bred at the mouth of the river and the tides sent the
totoaba's eggs into the Delta, which acted as a nursery for its young."
The destruction of the Delta reduced the size of the totaba's nursery,
and consequently, the totoaba began to die out, significantly affecting
the delicate delta ecosystem.
The Delta still provides habitat for other dwindling populations of
species including the southwest willow flycatcher (Empidonax traillii
extimus) and the yuma clapper rail (Rallus longirostrisyumanensis), both
listed as endangered species under the Endangered Species Act.' At
least six other species of birds that Mexico lists as threatened or endangered make their home in what remains of the Delta.' Today,
much of the Delta ecosystem remains only because of wastewater releases from water users in Mexico.
A solution to the Delta's problems is not out of reach. The Colorado River, the Delta's source of life, is an international watercourse
flowing through, shared, and used by both the United States and Mexico. Both countries have an interest in and the ability to affect the flow
of the Colorado's water. Thus, protecting and restoring the Colorado
River Delta ecosystem requires an international solution. Currently,
the 1944 treaty with Mexico controls the flow in the Colorado River,"
but it makes no mention of ecosystem protection. The creation and
signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses and the creation of
the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program" now
form a framework within which the two countries can amend the 1944
treaty to reflect modem international customary law and provide protection for the Delta ecosystem.
Involvement of non-governmental organizations can also play a
role on both sides of the border. Non-governmental organizations
18. A Brief History, supra note 6.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2004); D'Amours, supranote 12, at 184.
22. A Brief History, supra note 6 (listing the brown pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis),
peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus anatum), yellow-footed gull (Lants livens), Heermann's gull (Larus heermanni), elegant tern (Sterna elegans), reddish egret (Egrettarufescens)).

23.

Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting utilization

of waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3,
1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Treaty].

24.

Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-

courses, GA. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (Jul. 8,
1997) [hereinafter UN Convention]; United States Department of the Interior, Bureau

of Reclamation,

Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation

Program,

http://www.usbr.gov/lc/lcrmscp (last visited Dec. 28, 2005) [hereinafter MSCP].
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could help provide funding for the improvement of Mexican irrigation
systems, which would conserve water to support the Delta. They could
also purchase water rights thereby assuring that water will be available
to restore and protect the Delta.
This article explores the history of the Colorado River Delta and
the formation of law surrounding the use of the water of the Colorado
River. The paper concludes by urging a renegotiation of the agreements between the United States and Mexico to insure that the Delta
will receive enough water to protect its ecosystem.
H.

HISTORY

The Colorado River, the Delta's lifeblood, is now "the most legislated, litigated, and debated river in the world." ' Its freshwater flows
have been reduced by 75 percent during the twentieth century." Both
the United States and Mexico use nearly every drop that flows down
the Colorado for purposes ranging from irrigation to municipal uses to
power production. Internal agreements in the United States and the
treaty between the United States and Mexico govern these uses and
allocate more water than has ever flowed in the river.'
The 1922 Colorado River Compact and the 1944 Treaty between
the United States and Mexico ("1944 Treaty") divided the river. The
1944 Treaty allowed 15 million acre-feet of water to remain in the
United States and provided for 1.5 million acre-feet to Mexico.' Between the 1930s and 1980s, the United States government constructed
ten major dams and dozens of irrigation diversions along the river.'
Courts in Colorado River states allocated water to farmers, power producers and thirsty municipalities.'
Mexico uses nearly all of its water
allocation to irrigate 500,000 acres of farmland in the Mexicali and San
Luis Colorado River Valleys." Growing municipalities use whatever
water remains.32 In all, the river now provides water for twenty five million users in seven states and two countries." However, the law of the
river has not allocated water for any uses south of Mexico's Morelos
Dam where the Delta ecosystem exists.'
25.

A Brief History, supra note 6.

26. Rudy E. Verner, Short Term Solutions, Interim Surplus Guidelines, and the Future of
the Colorado River Delta, 14 COLO.J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 241, 244 (2003).
27. Warrick, supra note 5, at 34.
28. Felix L. Sparks, Synopsis of Major Documents and Events Relating to the Colorado
River, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 339, 343 (2000).

29.
30.
31.

Warrick, supra note 5, at 34.
Verner, supra note 26, at 244.
Id.

32.
33.

LEuCKE, supra note 2, at 12; Verner, supra note 26, at 244.
Jerd Smith, Still navigatinglaw of the river,ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Nov. 12, 2005,

at 23A.
34.

Warrick, supra note 5, at 35.
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The Delta has declined steadily in size and health through the last
half of the twentieth century." However, El Nino weather patterns and
heavy snowpack in the Rocky Mountains during the 1980s and 1990s
brought some of the lost Delta back to life. "' Reservoirs swelled and
dams released surplus flows in the United States, allowing the Delta to
regain some of its former acreage when surplus water passed over the
border and through Mexico. 7 Several years of drought have now put
the Delta in the same precarious position it was in prior to 1980.
During the Delta's rebirth, political interest in the Delta increased.
In 1993, Mexico declared two million acres of the Upper Gulf of California and Colorado River Delta a "Biosphere Reserve."' The "Biosphere Reserve" designation protects unique ecosystems in Mexico and
promotes sustainable economic activity around those ecosystems. 9 In
December of 2000, former Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt acknowledged that protecting what remained of the Delta "may be the
single most important piece of unfinished business on the Colorado
River."' In 2000, the Department of Interior of the United States and
the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries of the
United Mexican States signed a joint declaration to improve cooperation in the Colorado River Delta.' Despite this growing recognition,
neither country has developed any binding legislation or agreement to
protect the Delta.
During the last half of the twentieth century, a new vision and ethic
regarding ecosystems and waterways has created a new customary international law. 2 The emphasis on unilateral consumption by upstream users switched to equitable use by all riparian countries." Nations have also become more interested in protecting river ecosystems,
recognizing that long-term uses of the river as a commodity required
protection of the lands through which it ran. This new ethic, though
not fully recognized in all nations, helped spur the passage of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
35. Id. at 34-35.
36. Id. at 36.
37. See id.
38. Verner, supranote 26, at 242.
39. Id.
40. D'Amours, supra note 12, at 183 (citing Ken Ellingwood & Tony Perry, Delta a
Snag in Babbitt's Planfor Colorado River, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at A3, availablein 2000
WL 25930507).
41. Joint Declaration Between the Department of the Interior (DOI) of the United
States of America and the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries
(SEMARNAP) of the United Mexican States to Enhance Cooperation in the Colorado
River
Delta,
U.S.-Mex.,
May
18,
2000,
available
at
http://www.cerc.usgs.gov/fcc/jointdecICO.htm.
42. A. Dan Tarlock, Safeguarding InternationalRiver Ecosystems in Times of Scarcity, 3
U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 231, 233 (2000).
43. Id. at 240.
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Watercourses ("U.N. Convention"). The U.N. Convention creates an
opportunity to restructure how governments manage the Colorado
River so that survival of the Delta becomes not just a topic of legal papers, but a reality of international cooperation.
A.

Law Governing The Colorado

The dominant vision of water use worldwide throughout the twentieth century was that of "optimum" development." States looked at
rivers as a natural resource and commodity meant for development.45
Mexico and the United States use the Colorado River for irrigation,
municipal development, and power production, along with other economically beneficial uses." Both countries give environmental protection, a non-consumptive, non-economic use, the lowest priority.47
The Law of the Colorado River, comprised of interstate compacts,
statutes, court decisions, and the 1944 Treaty, now governs the Colorado River.4 8 The Law of the Colorado River reflects the twentieth century vision of international waterways, but the U.N. Convention is a
sign that a new twenty-first century vision has evolved.
B.

U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
International Watercourses

Of the 264 largest watercourses in the world, all cross the borders
of more than one nation. Throughout the twentieth century, the focus of most nations was "optimum" development where the flows of
large rivers were seen as commodities for nations to develop."0 Customary international law focuses on the benefits of multiple purpose
development. Most nations now recognize that the consumptive uses
implemented during the twentieth century are often an "inefficient
allocation of resources, cause environmental degradation, and are often socially inequitable."5' The United Nations recognized this as well
and took up the matter of codifying the modern customary law of international rivers in an effort to do away with the some of the problems
concerning the use and consumption of international waterways.
The need for the convention came about from two conflicting
schools of thought: absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute terri-

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 234.
Id.
Verner, supra note 26, at 244.
Id. at 245.
Sparks, supra note 28, at 339 (citing Introduction byjames Lochhead).
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreward: bringing the customary internationallaw of transboundary waters into the era of ecology, 1 INT.J. GLOBAL EVNTL. ISSUES 3/4 243, 244 (2001).
50. Tarlock, supra note 42, at 234.
51. Id. at 235.
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torial integrity.52 Absolute territorial sovereignty allows a state to control and develop those resources inside its borders in a way it deems fit,
without regard to the consequences in other states. In the case of an
international watercourse, this theory allows a nation to consume and
use a river system without regard to adverse effects on downstream users in other nations.
Absolute territorial integrity, on the other hand, gives states the
right to resources, unaffected by any other states. In the case of international rivers and watercourses, it gives states the right to an uninterrupted flow of water undiminished in either quantity or quality."
In disputes over international watercourses, the downstream states
most often argue territorial integrity while upstream states argue territorial sovereignty.55 As the world continued to develop through the
twentieth century, customary international law adopted limited territorial sovereignty - a balance between the two schools of thought.'
In recognition of this principle, after twenty years of study and
drafting by the International Law Commission, the United Nations
opened and approved for signature the U.N. Convention on May 21,
1997. 7 Both Mexico and the United States signed the agreement. The
philosophy at the convention reflected established or emerging customary international law, and therefore the U.N. Convention adopted
the principle of limited territorial sovereignty through "equitable utilization. " ' The U.N. Convention also represented a change from consumptive and non-consumptive economic uses to an emphasis on cooperative ecosystem management. 9
However, the convention itself does not immediately affect any
river system apportioned by prior agreements. Article 3 of the convention states, "[i] n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing
in the present Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a
watercourse State arising from agreements in force for it on the date
on which it became a party to the present Convention. " '° Article 3 also
expresses a hope that nations will harmonize the convention with existing agreements." To facilitate a gradual harmonization, Article 3 al-

52. Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, Customary InternationalLaw, and the Interests of Developing Upper Riparians,33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 257, 276 (1998).

53.
54.

Id.
Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id..
UN Convention, supranote 24.
Tarlock, supra note 42, at 237.
See id. at 234.
UN Convention, supra note 24, at art. 3 § 1.
Id.§2.
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lows nations to make specific agreements regarding a particular portion of the river or a particular project.'2
Article 10 of the convention addresses how each state may use a
river, stating no use enjoys inherent priority over another.' It makes
no reference to the hierarchy of 'uses previously present along the
Colorado and many of the world's other rivers, nor does it place any
emphasis on beneficial uses. The emphasis in Article 10 is on reasonable
use of the river.' The choice of language in Article 10 opens the door
for environmental uses and gives states the right to protect both their
territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity.
At the convention, a great deal of debate took place as to how
much emphasis would be placed upon environmental protection.'
Article 20 is the culmination of those debates and it states quite simply,
"[w]atercourse States shall; individually and, where appropriate,
jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses."' Drafters used the term "ecosystem" deliberately. An earlier
International Law Commission report used the word "environment,"
which many deemed too broad and open to interpretation.67 The Chinese delegation proposed substituting the term "ecological balance."'
In the end, drafters relied on "ecosystem" to serve the interest of protecting "those land areas whose use may affect a watercourse, more or
less directly."'
The simple wording of Article 20 creates an obligation on nations
to protect international watercourse ecosystems without considering
economic interests.70 It allows states to play a preventive role and "requires that preventive and precautionary measures be adopted where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damages to a river ecosystem, even if full scientific certainty about their verification is not attained."71 However, whether Article 20 also creates an obligation to
repair those parts of the riparian ecosystem that are already degraded
is unclear.
62.
63.
64.

Id. § 3.
Id. art. 10§ 1.
Id. art. 10 § 1-2 (citing id. art. 5 § 1; Id. art. 7 § 1).

65.

ATTILA TANzI & MAuRIzIo ARcARi, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERcOURsES 229-30 (Patricia Wouters & Serguei Vinogradov
eds., 2001).

66.
67.

UN Convention, supranote 24, art. 20.
TANzi, supranote 65, at 238-39.

68. Id. at 241.
69. Id.
70. Id.at 243.
71. Id.
72. Ved P. Nanda, The Law of The Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses:
Draft Articles on Protection and Preservation of Ecosystems, Harmful Conditions and Emergency
Situations, and Protection of Water Installations, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175,
183-84 (1992).
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The United States and Mexico agreed to the uses of the Colorado
River in the 1944 Treaty. The convention creates no legal obligation
on either the United States or Mexico to manage the river any differently. All fights and obligations are static and continue to operate under the ethic of the twentieth century and the 1944 Treaty. The U.N.
Convention creates only a framework under which the United States
and Mexico could manage the Colorado differently.
To understand the evolution of river management, one must know
how the modem ethic of management differs from historical river
management. That history began with settlers of the western United
States.
C.

The Colorado River Compact

Settling the arid western United States in the late 1800s required
access to fresh water. As more and more Americans arrived, conflicts
developed, and the need became apparent for a clear vision of how the
Colorado and other rivers would be apportioned between states and
between users.
Between 1905 and 1907, a series of floods beset the Lower Basin
states of California, Nevada and Arizona along the banks of the Colorado."3 Out of fear of more flooding and a desire to develop the river
basin, a vision for controlling the river evolved and gained momentum;
most notably in California which was experiencing rapid population
growth.74 California began pressing Congress for the right to create
various storage projects along the river to feed its development. 5
At that time, the rule of prior appropriation governed the use of
the Colorado River.76 The Upper Basin states of Colorado, Wyoming,
Utah and New Mexico feared they would lose their rights to any water
should California be successful in its efforts to hold and use the
amount of water it was requesting. 77 The states made various attempts
to come to an agreement on the apportionment of waters, but were
unsuccessful.m
Congress eventually stepped in and created the Colorado River
Compact Commission.' Congress and the states agreed to group the
states into the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin.' Ultimately, the
compact apportioned 7.5 million acre-feet of water from the Colorado
to the Upper Basin states, 7.5 million to the Lower Basin states, and left
73.
74.
75.

Sparks, supranote 2828, at 342.
Id.
Id

76.

Id.

77.

I&

78.
79.

Id at 343.
Id. at 342-43.

80.

Id. at 343.
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1.5 million for Mexico."' Respective commissioners of the Colorado
River Basin States signed the compact on November 24, 1922.82 The
compact, which is still the basis for dividing water in the Colorado, reflects the dominant vision of water use of the twentieth century - it
dedicates water to consumptive and economic uses."
D.

Mexican Treaty and Protocol of 1944

Despite the existence of the Colorado River Compact, Mexico and
the United States operated for the first half of the twentieth century
without a formal agreement assuring water in the Colorado would
reach the Mexican border. Both countries were developing other
shared rivers without agreement as well. At the beginning of the century, governments on both sides of the border were concerned about
apportionment of waters in the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, as well as
the Rio Grande.84 In the late 1920s, Mexico and the United States,
through the International Water Commission (IWC), began formal
negotiations with the goal of coming to a permanent agreement as to
the division of the various watercourses." In regard to the Colorado
River, Mexico asked for a guaranteed delivery of 4.5 million acre-feet
per year.' The United States offered 750,000 ace-feet per year.8 7 Many
interests inside the United States opposed compromise with the Mexican government.' California vigorously opposed a compromise fearing any such compromise would impair the allotment of water guaranteed to the state in the Boulder Canyon Act - legislation that gave California the right to construct and hold water in Lake Mead.' Both sides
of the border also disagreed over the proper division of water in the
Rio Grande.' As a result, the two countries did not quickly come to a
solution to the water concerns.
The attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States' entry into
World War II served as the final push for the execution of a treaty with

81.

Id. Although the compact appears to deliver water on a equal basis to the Up-

per and Lower Basin, article III(b) gives the Lower Basin the right to increase its consumptive use of water by one million acre-feet annually, allowing a total of 8.5 million

acre-feet.
82. Id. at 344.
83. Tarlock, supra note 42, at 234.
84. Damien M. Schiff, Rollin' Rollin' Rollin' on the River: A Story of Drought, Treaty
Interpretation,and other Rio Grande Problems, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 117, 119, 122-

23 (2003).
85. Id. at
86. Id. at
87. Id. at
88. Id. at

123.
123-24.
124.
124-26.

89.

Id. at 126-27.

90.

Id at 124.
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Mexico.9 ' Leadership in the United States feared that Japan would attempt an invasion of the west coast and contemplated that they could
easily defend California, Oregon, and Washington, but Mexico could
not itself offer any serious resistance to an invasion that started on its
shores." As a result, the United States wished to station troops on Mexico's western shores, an idea that Mexico was hesitant to embrace.93
However, Mexico was worried that increased development in the
southwestern states would eventually choke off the supply of water to
Mexico from the Colorado River and Rio Grande.94 As no agreement
had ever been reached between the two countries, Mexico was concerned that the United States could effectively deplete the Colorado
River before it ever reached the border, leaving its farmers with nothing.
On February 3, 1944, the two sides executed the Mexican Treaty
and Protocol. 9 The treaty remains in effect today. Articles 10-15 of the
treaty guarantee Mexico an annual delivery of 1.5 million acre-feet and
up to 200,000 additional acre-feet during times of surplus. "7 However,
Mexico does not acquire any right beyond the 1.5 million acre-feet as a
result of any surplus deliveries. 9 Article 10 also allows the United
States, in times of "extraordinary drought or serious accident to the
irrigation system in the United States," to reduce the required amount
of water allocated to Mexico in proportion to the amount that consumptive uses inside the United States are reduced.' To this day, the
United States has never delivered less than the 1.5 million acre-feet
promised in the treaty."
The treaty creates a hierarchy of uses along the river.'9 ' The
agreement gives priority to uses starting with domestic and municipal,
then to agriculture and raising stock, electric power, other industrial
uses, navigation, fishing and hunting, and finally, any other beneficial
uses which may be determined."° The treaty does not envision a beneficial use of water for the purpose of species or ecosystem preservation.
Historical documents provide no indication of any debate or discussion
of the environment at the time the countries negotiated the treaty.' 3
91. Sparks, supra note 2828, at 347.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Schiff, supra note 84, at 119-121.
95. See id.
96. Sparks, supra note 28, at 346.
97. 1944 Treaty supra note 23, art. 15.
98. Id. art. 10.
99. Id.
100. Tarlock, supra note 42, at 344.
101. 1944 Treaty, supra note 23, art. 3.
102. Id.
103. Stephen P. Mumme, The Case for Adding an Ecology Minute to the 1944 United
States-Mexico Water Treaty, 15 TUL. ENVTL. LJ. 239, 242 (2002).
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Dam Construction in the United States

Mexico was using approximately half of its allotment of water when
it signed the 1944 Treaty."' However, at the time, the United States
had not developed uses for all of its water, so a regular surplus flow
reached the border, and the Delta never did without. The Colorado
River Compact' 5 and the successful effort by California to construct the
Hoover Dam finally brought the surplus flows to an end.'6
Before agreeing to apportionment of river waters between the
Lower Basin states, California insisted on a storage project to ensure
enough water was available for its agricultural and municipal needs.' 7
Congress acquiesced by signing the Boulder Canyon Project Act in
1928, which provided for the construction of Hoover Dam and created
Lake Mead near the California and Nevada border.' " Lake Mead became the largest reservoir in the United States, and after closing the
gates on the Hoover Dam, the reservoir took six years to fill.'" During
that time, no surplus water beyond the promised 1.5 million acre-feet
passed over the border to Mexico, and virtually no fresh water reached
the Delta."0 Those six years were the beginning of the destruction of
the Delta.
Congress signed the Colorado River Storage Project Act into law in
1956,"' creating the framework for the Glen Canyon Dam in Arizona,
the Flaming Gorge Dam in Utah, the Navajo Dam in New Mexico, and
the Curecanti Dams in Colorado."2 In all, the Colorado River Storage
Act created thirty million acre-feet of storage capacity inside the
United States." 3 This storage capacity increased the ability of the
United States to hold water north of the border and prevent it from
reaching the Delta.
The Glen Canyon Dam at Lake Powell accounts for the largest percentage of the storage as well as serving as a spigot for the Lower Basin."' The Bureau of Reclamation completed the dam in 1963, and at
104. Schiff, supra note 84, at 125.
105. Act to Approve the Colorado River Compact, 1923 Colo. Sess. Law 684 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-61-101 to -104 (2004)) [hereinafter Colorado River Compact].
106. D'Amours, supra note 12, at 184.
107. Sparks, supra note 28, at 342.
108. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) (codified as amended

at 43 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)).
109.

D'Amours, supra note 12, at 184.

110.

Id.

111. Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-485, 70 Stat. 105
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 620 - 620(o) (2000)).
112. Sparks, supra note 28, at 349.

113.

Id.

114. Steven W. Carothers & Dorothy A. House, Decommissioning the Glen Canyon Dam:
The Key to ColoradoRiver Ecosystem Restoration and Recovery of EndangeredSpecies?, 42 ARIZ.
L. REv. 215, 219 (2000).
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that time, the reservoir was capable of storing twenty-seven million
acre-feet of water."' Silt and sediment buildup since 1963 has reduced
that amount to just under twenty-six million acre-feet."6 It took eighteen years for Lake Powell to fill once the Glen Canyon Dam closed in
1963."' During that period, the Delta again saw virtually no fresh water
- another obstacle to survival of the Delta.18
F.

Salinity Agreement

Between 1960 and 1961, salinity in the water reaching Mexico increased to a point that crop yields suffered and farmers could no
longer plant salt-sensitive crops."9 Salinity increased largely because of
the commencement of operations at Arizona's Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District and the filling of Lake Powell behind the
Glen Canyon Dam."n Filling Lake Powell drastically reduced the
amount of water flowing downstream and the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District system began returning brackish water to
the river.'
Salinity increased nearly 100 percent after the WelltonMowhawk system went online."n
Mexico made a formal protest to the United States and the two
countries solved the problem when they agreed upon Minute 242 of
the International Boundary and Water Commission."13 Mexico and the
United States agreed to require the United States to maintain a specified salinity level in waters reaching the Morelos Dam in Mexico."4
The United States bore the entire cost of the construction of a desalting plant near the border and a diversion canal for brackish water.

2

5

Minute 242 represented another compromise between the two
countries. Mexico originally demanded that salinity levels in waters
reaching Mexico equal those above the Mohawk-Wellton Irrigation and
Drainage District.'" The United States preferred what they called an
"equivalent salt balance," which represented little in the way of any
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requirements for water quality. 7 Other concessions on both sides included limits on the pumping of groundwater and compensation to
Mexican farmers. The salinity agreement found its footing somewhere
in between what both sides wanted."
G.

El Nino Weather Events

While the United States and Mexico agreed to the quantity and
quality of water reaching the Mexican-American border, the death of
the Colorado River Delta continued. However, El Nino weather events
of the 1980s and 1990s that hit the southwestern United States and
Mexico changed that." The Delta again witnessed surplus flows when
heavy rains and snow pack in the Rocky Mountains brought more water to the river basin."' As a result, 150,000 acres inside the Delta saw a
dramatic improvement."'
This improvement brought a renewed interest in the Delta. Numerous conservation organizations and governmental agencies recognized its importance. Both countries made several agreements to study
and cooperate for the protection and restoration of the Delta, but
none of these agreements created a bona fide responsibility on either
party to do anything.'
H. The Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program
Federal law prohibits federal agencies inside the United States
from authorizing, funding or implementing programs or projects that
jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species or its
habitat. ' The Endangered Species Act requires all federal agencies to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior before taking any action
which may impact endangered species."'
In 1994, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service designated
critical habitat along the Colorado River for the bonytail chub, razorback sucker, humpback chub, and Colorado River squawfish.'
The
Lower Basin states raised concern as to how these designations would
affect development of the river at a time when the population and de-
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velopment in the West were growing at a rate never seen before.'" As a
result, the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program
came to life.' 7 The participants included the three lower Colorado
River states (Arizona, Nevada, and California), Indian tribes along the
river, non-federal and federal public agencies as well as private organizations.'" The group initiated and continues to implement a planning
process that works toward creating a workable multi-species management program along the Colorado River, taking into account beneficial uses and economic uses as well as protection of the riparian ecosys-

tem.'9
The group has three goals when recommending any plans. First, it
accommodates current water diversions and power production and
optimizes future water and power development opportunities." Second, the group conserves habitat and works toward recovery of endangered species.'' Finally, the group attempts to reduce the likelihood of
additional threatened and endangered species listings.''
The cooperation between these entities represents "an unprecedented attempt at integrated, basin-wide planning."'3 It also represents the changed focus of water users in their recognition of the importance of the river ecosystem and their commitment to preserve
what remains of the riparian environment. However, the plans developed by the Multi-Species Conservation Program (MSCP) end at the
United States' border." While some participants in the MSCP wish to
integrate Mexico in the planning process, as of today, no Mexican participation exists and Mexico alone must implement any plan that
crosses over the border. Critics of the MSCP believe the program
"fails to take an ecosystem approach, arguing that [w]ell accepted
principles of conservation biology, watershed planning, sustainable
development, and international cooperation demand that the River
north and south of the border be managed as a whole[.]'""' The critics believe stopping at the Mexican border is the fatal flaw of the program.
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ANALYSIS

Looking through the lens of the law, nothing has changed for the
Colorado River Delta since the passage of Minute 242 in the early
1960s. While the ethic of customary international law has changed a
great deal, the principles of prior appropriation and beneficial use still
dominate the way the countries utilize and govern the Colorado.'"
Both countries continue to use the river in ways no different from sixty
years ago, and the Delta continues in its decline.
The 1944 Treaty between Mexico and the United States still controls along the Colorado. The treaty makes no mention or allocation
of water for environmental uses.' 7 As a result, environmental applications still receive the lowest priority among all the uses of the river."
Even if governments deemed the Delta important enough to warrant
protection, there is no more water to appropriate for that purpose.' 9
Under current agreements, the river is already over-appropriated." °
Should agreements allocate water under the treaty for Delta rehabilitation purposes, these allocations would take a back seat to all the agricultural, municipal, power production and other uses on the Colorado.
As a result, the only water that can reach the Delta is the excess
flow, which Mexico cannot consume, that crosses the border during
times of increased precipitation. Mexico was already using approximately half of the water it was allocated in 1944,' and the 1944 Treaty
did not provide for a significant increase in future uses on the Mexican
side of the border. That lack of foresight, or lack of power at the bargaining table, leaves no water for Mexico to allocate to the Delta. Currently, the Delta can only wait for the unused excess flows.
During the 1980s and 1990s, El Nino weather patterns allowed part
of the Delta to recover and remain viable. Now, however, drought in
the western United States and Mexico causes the overused river to be
consumed before it ever reaches the Delta. Western states have tapped
into their reservoirs and begun exhaust this resource.' 2 In the spring
of 2004, Lake Powell was at forty-two percent of capacity, a level not
seen since the reservoir was filling in 1971.'1" Even if the drought
ended now, filling Lake Powell to capacity again may take thirteen
years. This would make certain that no more than the agreed 7.5 mil146.
147.
148.
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lion acre-feet would flow to the Lower Basin states, and no more than
1.5 million acre-feet would reach Mexico, placing the Delta last in line
for whatever water remained.' 4 While the U.N. Convention appears to
help, its carefully crafted language still supplies no immediate remedy
for the Delta's problems.
Article 20 of the Convention states, "[w]atercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the
ecosystems of international watercourses."'" The Convention further
elaborates in Article 23:
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in cooperation with other States, take all measures with respect to an international watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the
marine environment, including estuaries, taking into account generally accepted international rules and standards.'The Delta is an estuarine ecosystem created by fresh-water rivers
emptying into a body of salt-water create estuaries."' The U.N. Convention obligates both Mexico and the United States to protect that
ecosystem in both Article 20 and Article 23 regardless of the economic
impact it may have on either country."
Unfortunately for the Delta, the U.N. Convention's obligations are
not as concrete as they first appear. Article 3 states the Convention
does not circumvent any prior agreements.' 9 Therefore, because the
1944 Treaty now regulates the river, the terms of the convention create
no obligations on how countries use and govern the Colorado River.
Article 3 also suggests that states consider harmonizing current agreements with the convention.'" Harmonizing the Convention with the
1944 Treaty would be a Herculean task. In essence, harmonization
would require a renegotiation of the 1944 Treaty. Because of existing
over-appropriation, the renegotiation would require some users to give
up some or all of their water rights. Such a suggestion would surely
meet resistance on both sides of the border. Current water users in the
United States possess their rights in perpetuity and would likely be reluctant to give them up to save an ecosystem many have never seen or
even heard about. Likewise, users in Mexico would be hesitant to sacrifice for an ecosystem that lies downriver from their own interests.
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Article 24 of the Convention concerns the management of a watercourse and its ecosystem."' It states, in part:
[w]atercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into
consultations concerning the management *ofan international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management
2
mechanism.9'

This article obligates the United States to consult with Mexico regarding the protection of the Delta upon Mexico's request. However,
while the spirit of Article 24 may force the parties to come to the table,
like the rest of the Convention, it does not require either country to
actually assist the other when a prior management agreement, like the
1944 Treaty, exists.
Accordingly, the terms of the U.N. Convention as a whole create
little obligation for either Mexico or the United States to change the
management of the Colorado. It is the spirit of that agreement which
creates hope for the Delta.
Agreements made over the last decade, including the U. N. Convention, indicate that both the United States and Mexico recognize the
importance of trying to preserve ecosystems like the Delta. While none
of those treaties or agreements makes a binding commitment on either
country to provide water to the Delta, the act of recognition provides a
starting point for protecting and restoring that ecosystem.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the law does nothing to protect the Delta now, current
agreements provide the framework for an international agreement that
could, at the least, preserve what is left of the Delta, and at best, help
the Delta regain its lost territory. Because only 20-25 percent of the
Colorado's waters reach Mexico as a result of upstream diversions," it
is necessity that international law help bring about a solution to the
Delta's problems. The solutions and subsequent required water allocation to the Delta need not be great in scope. It is estimated that to
maintain the Delta at its current size, only 32,000 acre/feet are needed
each year along with pulse flows of 260,000 acre/feet every four years
to simulate natural flooding.' This represents only 0.2 percent of the
current river allocations during normal years, and 1.5 percent of allocations during the pulse flow years - levels that are far from impossible
to meet.
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Amending the 1944 Treaty to recognize the needs of a new century
and new vision of the river ecosystem is the first and most dramatic
step that the two countries must take. By harmonizing the provisions
of the U.N. Convention inside a new treaty, the concept of equitable
use, development, and ecosystem protection can finally be realized
along the Colorado River on both sides of the border. While improved
efficiency in use of Mexico's allocated waters is a necessary first step,
the treaty would likely have to promise Mexico more water. The Delta
simply cannot survive if it only receives water in during surplus years.
On the United States side of the border, merely curtailing current
water use by less than 1 percent of current allocations and transferring
that water downstream to the Delta could provide the necessary
amount of water. Cutting usage by 0.5 percent could create enough
flow to preserve the Delta at its current size during "normal" years and
create enough surplus for storage in United States reservoirs for use in
pulse flows every four years. The countries could use additional
amounts to actually improve and return the Delta to its original territory.
In the case of an amended treaty, simply promising more water to
Mexico could create this surplus allowing some regular flow and some
additional flow only during pulse years. Users inside the United States
could then determine domestically how to provide that water. While
the solution seems simple enough, the implementation of such an
agreement is far from easy.
This change of agreement would raise several problems. First, current water users would be reluctant to give up rights to water they currently hold in perpetuity. Should drought continue across the West,
those rights will likely become more valuable. As a result, forcing users
to give up some of their rights could cause endless litigation and constitutional challenges.
Another concern is that if given a new supply of water for the
Delta, Mexico could make a permanent claim for rights to that water
even in times of extreme drought. This would necessitate continued
flows to Mexico to the direct detriment of upstream users in the
United States. However, language indicating that no absolute right is
gained in any new agreement could circumvent this problem. Language in the current agreement already addresses extraordinary
drought and a renegotiated agreement could extend those concepts to
cover water destined for the Delta. Reducing or eliminating the flows
to the Delta first in the event of extreme need on either side of the
border, would create a buffer for use before either country had to give
up waters intended for consumptive or economic use.
The only means of finding those waters inside the United States,
outside of drought periods, may be an across-the-board reduction in
privately owned water rights. Decreased usage could facilitate reduction and theoretically create a surplus of water, which could be sent
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down the river. However, without purchasing those rights, the possibility of further appropriation of that water would always remain.
If owners and users cannot produce enough water through increased efficiency, the government could get some or all the necessary
water using their police power or the power of eminent domain. A
deprivation by in this manner would more than likely constitute a taking under the United States Constitution, entitling the owners of those
water rights to fair market value for the water forcibly sent downstream. Non-governmental conservation and environmental agencies
would likely have to play a role raising funds for the purchase of rights
through private donations and other means of fundraising.
There is also a possibility that any flows sent to Mexico would not
reach the Delta. Instead, Mexico might use the water for further agricultural and municipal development in the valleys surrounding the
Colorado River. While certainly a foreseeable abuse of efforts to preserve the Delta, the renegotiated treaty could easily overcome this
problem with language revoking water rights and returning them to
users in the United States if water intended for the Delta did not reach
the Delta.
Another solution involves funding more efficient irrigation in Mexico. Mexico still irrigates much of its land by flooding fields from
earthen ditches." By some estimates, this method results in the loss of
65 percent of the water appropriated for irrigation before it ever
reaches the crops.' Reduction of water used and lost while irrigating
crops could produce a surplus. The Mexican Constitution dictates the
federal government owns all waters within Mexican territory unless
given over as private property.167 So long as political will existed, and
the Mexican government retained possession of the surplus flows, it
could send those waters south of the Morelos Dam to benefit the Delta.
Again, there is a risk the Mexican government would not use excess
water for the Delta, and instead direct excess water for increased development. However, non-governmental agencies could purchase the
rights to the excess water as private property and hold them in perpetuity for the Delta.
Another, less dramatic measure to preserve the Delta would be inviting Mexico to join the Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program. The group already provides planning for the river
basin but their work ends at the border between Mexico and the
United States." By inviting Mexico into the planning process, the
MSCP could extend those plans already underway to the additional
ninety miles ending at the Gulf of California. In doing so, both coun165.
166.
167.
168.
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tries could work to preserve the habitat for species that each country is
trying to protect. If one country provides protected habitat for a species in need across the border, the reciprocal can be done; a concept
already embraced in the Endangered Species Act.'69 Countries could
then make maximum use of the natural resources on both sides of the
border while having a minimum impact on development.
The Delta could provide much of the required habitat for species
preservation. The land in the Delta is not suited for a great deal of
development and most has in fact been declared a biosphere preserve,
a great deal of habitat needed for species recovery in the United States
could be created in Mexico. Many of the species listed as endangered
in the United States are birds that already migrate between the two
countries.
Preserving existing breeding grounds in the Delta, and
possibly restoring ground already lost, could relieve the impact of the
Endangered Species Act on upstream users of the river and allow for
continued human use of water and space.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Colorado River Delta, once one of the world's largest desert
oases, is dying. Its lifeblood is the most litigated international watercourse in the world. As a result, the Delta needs an international solution for the its survival. While history, water law, and current drought
conditions indicate countries and private organizations by themselves
can do little to facilitate the survival of the Delta, modern international
customary law along with unprecedented cooperation between government and private organizations could form a possible solution to
the Delta's problems.
Entities both in and outside of government on both sides of the
Mexico-United States border have recognized the importance of saving
the Delta's rare ecosystem. Now, harmonizing current water law along
the Colorado with the U.N. Convention on the Non-navigational Uses
of International Watercourses can provide a framework to stabilize the
Delta at its current level and even return the Delta to its former self.
Delta restoration requires cooperation and a common vision, and international law can provide the necessary structure to start this restoration.
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FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Alaska v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2137 (2005) (holding submerged
lands under the waters of the Alexander Archipelago were neither historic inland waters nor part of ajuridical bay, and holding the United
States had expressly reserved submerged lands under Glacier Bay, making the disputed lands property of the United States).
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Alaska invoked original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve its dispute with the United States over title to submerged lands
underlying waters in the Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay in
southeastern Alaska. The Supreme Court appointed a Special Master,
who recommended summary judgment in favor of the United States
on each of Alaska's claims. Alaska then issued exceptions to the Special Master's report.
The Court began its analysis with a review of the general principles
of law governing submerged lands. Under the equal footing doctrine
and the Submerged Lands Act, "[s] tates enjoy a presumption of title to
submerged lands beneath inland navigable waters within their boundaries and beneath territorial waters within three nautical miles of their
coasts." The Federal Government can overcome the presumption and
defeat a future state's title to submerged lands by setting the lands
aside before statehood in a way that shows a definitely declared or otherwise very plain intent to retain title.
Alaska's first claim was for the submerged lands beneath the waters
of the Alexander Archipelago. All the submerged lands lie more than
three miles off the coast, and if the waters are not inland, they qualify
as a territorial sea and belong to the United States. Therefore, Alaska
based its claim on two grounds: (1) the waters were historic inland waters, and (2) the waters were part of two juridical bays.
Alaska alleged the waters of the Alexander Archipelago were historic inland waters. In order to claim submerged lands based on an
area's status as historic inland waters, Alaska must show that the United
States: "(1) exercises authority over the area; (2) has done so continuously; and (3) has done so with the acquiescence of foreign nations."
The exercise of sovereignty is required to have been an assertion of
power to exclude all foreign vessels and navigation, including "innocent passage" - passage that is "not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." The Court has also considered the
"vital interests of the United States" in designating historic inland waters.
The Court held the waters of Alexander Archipelago were not historic inland waters, based on a review encompassing the history of the
area from Russian sovereignty through Alaskan statehood. During that
period, the Court found that the United States had made only one
statement which described the waters as inland, and it seized only one
foreign vessel in a manner consistent with the status of the waters as
inland. The Court held that these incidents were not enough to establish continuous assertion of exclusive authority, and therefore not
enough to support an inland historic waters claim.
Alaska alternatively alleged the waters of the Alexander Archipelago were part of two juridical bays. Juridical bays, which are deemed
inland waters, require "a well-marked indentation" having an area "as
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large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line
drawn across the mouth of that indentation." Alaska alleged that the
Court should consider the four islands in the Alexander Archipelago
connected to each other and the mainland creating juridical bays to
the north and south.
The Court assumed, arguendo, that they should consider the islands
connected as part of a peninsula, but found the waters to the north
and south of that peninsula still did not meet the criteria of ajuridical
bay. Neither the waters on the north, nor the waters on the south
formed the requisite well-marked indentations. The Court found these
hypothetical bays would not be evident to the eye of a mariner, therefore rejecting Alaska's juridical bay theory.
Alaska's second claim was to the submerged lands beneath Glacier
Bay within Glacier Bay National Park (formerly Glacier Bay National
Monument) ("Park"). These lands are undisputedly part of an inland
bay. Alaska would have title to these lands unless the United States
could rebut the strong presumption that title to these lands passed to
Alaska at statehood. The United States could defeat a future state's
presumed title by setting submerged lands aside as part of a federal
reservation. To prevail, the United States must have clearly intended
to include submerged lands within the reservation and must have expressed its intent.
The Court found that the United States clearly intended to include
the submerged lands under the waters of Glacier Bay when it created
the Park in the 1930s. The purposes of the Park's creation included
conservation and scientific study of the glaciers and the wildlife within
Glacier Bay, which included studying the submerged lands. The Court
also found that the United States expressed its intent through the
Alaska Statehood Act ("ASA"). After considering the context within
which Congress enacted the ASA, the text of the ASA, and a prior case
on the ASA, the Court concluded that the ASA did express the intent
of the United States to retain the submerged lands under Glacier Bay
when it granted Alaska statehood. The Court held the United States
successfully rebutted Alaska's presumptive title.
The Court concluded by rejecting Alaska's claims to the submerged
lands under Alexander Archipelago and Glacier Bay and directed the
parties to prepare and submit to the Special Master a decree for the
Court's consideration.
JulieM. Schmidt

Orff v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2606 (2005) (holding that Section
390uu of the Reclamation Reform Act does not waive sovereign immunity from suits directly against the United States, but constitutes a limited waiver to join the United States as a necessary party defendant to
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permit a complete adjudication of rights under a reclamation contract).
Francis A. Orff, individual farmers, and farming entities in California ("Farmers") purchased water from the Westlands Water District
("District"). The District received water from the United States Bureau
of Reclamation ("Bureau") under a 1963 contract between the District
and the Bureau, which specified annual quantities of water that the
United States would furnish to the District. The District then supplied
water to the farmers. In 1992, the enactment of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act required the Bureau to meet all obligations under the Federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and to annually dedicate certain amounts of water to implement fish, wildlife, and habitat
restoration. The Bureau concluded that pumps used to deliver water
south of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta could harm the Sacramento River winter-run Chinook salmon and the delta smelt, both of
which were listed as threatened species under the ESA. Therefore,
during the 1993 and 1994 water year, the Bureau reduced the contractual delivery of water to the District by 50 percent.
The Farmers brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California, alleging that the United States
breached its contract with the District by reducing the allocation of
water. The district court ruled for the government, and the farmers
appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. The Farmers appealed to the Supreme Court, maintaining
that that they were third-party beneficiaries entitled to enforce the contract and that the United States waived its sovereign immunity in section 390uu of the Reclamation Reform Act.
In affirming the court of appeal's decision, the United States Supreme Court identified two reasons why the lower court properly interpreted section 390uu as not waiving the government's sovereign
immunity from suits directly against the United States. First, applying
the principle that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign, the Court found terms of art contained in the language of section 390uu, supporting interpreting section 390uu as permitting the traditional requirements ofjoinder under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a). Second, contrasting the language of section 390uu
with the broader language of the Tucker Act, which contains express
terms waiving immunity from suits against the United States alone, the
Court concluded that the proper construction of section 390uu was a
limited waiver sovereign immunity, allowing parties to join the United
States as a necessary party defendant.
Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, holding
that the language of section 390uu grants consent to join the United
States in an action between other parties when the action requires construction of a reclamation contract and joinder of the United States is

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

necessary, but it does not permit a plaintiff to sue the United States
alone.
Charles P. Kersch,Jr.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Tex. Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. EPA, 410 F.3d 964
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding: (1) NRDC failed to show causal connection
between compliance with the EPA's General Permit and violation of
the Clean Water Act; (2) EPA's General Permit did not violate the
Clean Water Act requirement for public notice and public hearing; (3)
the EPA complied with the Endangered Species Act when issuing the
General Permit; and (4) a stay ofjudgment on whether Clean Water
Act permit requirements affected oil and gas companies).
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") requires that the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") or authorized states issue permits to dischargers of pollutants. The EPA created a General Permit ("GP") for
storm water discharges from both large and small construction sites.
This GP only applied in jurisdictions where the EPA had not authorized the state or Indian Tribe to administer its own permitting program. Operators of large and small construction sites who desired to
discharge storm water under this GP had to submit a Notice of Intent
("NOI") to the EPA. Next, they had to create, maintain, and implement a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan ("SWPPP"). Finally,
they had to implement best management practices to ensure compliance with water quality standards.
The National Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") and several
organizations filed petitions for review of the EPA's Final Action creating the GP in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. The NRDC
alleged the GP violated the CWA by allowing discharge of pollutants
without ensuring the discharge satisfied the standards set by the CWA.
The NRDC also alleged the GP failed to provide a public hearing for
complaints and that it violated the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
Several organizations representing business interests in the oil and gas
industry (collectively "Oil and Gas") challenged a regulation contained
in the EPA GP, which required permit authorization for oil and gas
companies and conflicted with a prior statute passed by Congress that
granted the oil and gas companies some immunity from EPA regulation.
The NRDC represented members in potentially affected areas, but
it failed to show a link between pollution from local construction activities and its members' reduced aesthetic and recreational enjoyment of
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the affected waters. The court found the NRDC did not have standing
to sue based on the lack of causal evidence between the storm water
discharge and any violation of the CWA.
The NRDC claimed that filing a NOI and SWPPP should entail a
public hearing and public notice in accordance with the CWA. The
CWA requires public notice and a public hearing for all permit applications and permits relating to the discharge of pollutants into water.
When proposing a GP, the EPA filed notice in the Federal Register
subsequently soliciting and receiving public comments, satisfying the
CWA public notice and public hearing requirements. The court held
that the statute defining this process was ambiguous as to whether
Congress intended to treat NOIs and SWPPPs in the same manner as
permits and permit applications.
NRDC also claimed the EPA violated Section 7 of the ESA. This
provision requires a consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service
and/or the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively "Service").
The NRDC claimed this process should occur each time an operator
receives a NOI or a completed SWPPP. The court held that the EPA
fulfilled this requirement when it initially filed the GP.
Oil and Gas argued the EPA lacked authority to require a permit
for construction activities related to oil and gas exploration. Since a
case was pending before the Fifth Circuit regarding the issue, the court
stayed consideration until the Fifth Circuit court decided that case.
In conclusion, the court held the NRDC lacked standing to challenge a violation of the CWA by the EPA, the EPA fulfilled the public
notice and public hearing requirements set forth by the CWA when
initially filing a GP, and the EPA's consultation with the Service fulfilled ESA requirements. The court stayed consideration of the Oil
and Gas claim, which claimed the EPA lacked authority to regulate
storm water discharge from oil and gas companies, until the Fifth Circuit court decided a similar case.
Amy M. Petri

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., 419 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding a cleaning barge constituted a "vessel in navigation" under
the Jones Act and an employee who had a substantial connection to
the barge was a "seaman" eligible for benefits under that Act).
Canton Marine Towing Company, Inc. ("Canton") employed Ashley Bunch as a barge cleaner at Canton's Missouri facility, which consisted of a cleaning barge moored to the bed of the Missouri River.
Bunch injured himself aboard Canton's tugboat, the Sir Joseph. Canton used the tugboat to ferry Bunch to the cleaning barge from Can-
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ton's Illinois facilities. On most days, Bunch spent about twenty minutes aboard the SirJoseph.
Although the cleaning barge was originally built for navigation,
Canton generally kept it secured in position. Strong currents would
shift the position of barge slightly. During Bunch's tenure, Canton
moved the cleaning barge only once from the Illinois side of the river
to the Missouri side. The cleaning barge did not have propellers and
did not move by itself. On April 20, 2001, as Bunch traveled from the
cleaning barge to the Illinois facilities aboard the Sir Joseph, Bunch
stopped the tug to inspect other barges. After inspecting the other
barges, Bunch fell climbing back aboard the Sir Joseph and sustained
injuries.
Bunch sued Canton and the Sir Joseph under the Jones Act
("Act"), section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 688. The United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for
determining seaman status under the Act in Chandris,Inc. v. Latsis- (1)
the "employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or
to the accomplishment of its mission," and (2) the employee "must
have a connection to a vessel in navigation .

.

. that is substantial in

terms of both its duration and its nature." Applying this test, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted
summary judgment to Canton, concluding Bunch was not a "seaman"
covered by the Jones Act because Bunch "simply did not have a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit needed only to consider whether the cleaning barge, upon which
Bunch spent the majority of his work time, qualified as a "vessel in
navigation." The court applied the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., wherein the Supreme Court clarified the definition of "vessel" under the Act. Based
on Stewart, the court focused on Canton's use of the cleaning barge,
questioning whether the cleaning barge could operate "as a means of
transportation on water." The court concluded the cleaning barge was
a "vessel in navigation" because Canton had not permanently moored
or anchored the cleaning barge to the river bed, and Canton had
moved the barge from its mooring to travel across the river during the
time Bunch worked for Canton. The fact that currents would move the
barge also demonstrated the mooring was not permanent. Lastly,
there was no evidence showing that Canton had taken the barge out of
service or rendered the barge incapable of maritime transportation.
The court remanded the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with its decision.
Kevin Kennedy
In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d 915; 421 F.3d 618
(8th Cir. 2005) (multiple states and conservation organizations initi-
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ated litigation seeking declaration that federal management of the
Missouri River violated state and environmental standards, and sought
injunctive relief requiring that the agencies comply with the standards).
Background
The Missouri River begins in Montana, runs through North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri, then flows
into the Mississippi River. To try to control spring flooding of the
river, Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944 ("FCA"), which
authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to construct a
dam and reservoir system on the upper part of the river. Congress also
authorized the Corps to manage the main stem reservoir system by
using the reservoirs as a water source for irrigation projects, slowly releasing water from the reservoirs during the summer to facilitate downstream navigation, providing hydroelectric power, and generally providing a site for water recreation. In balancing these competing interests, the U.S. Supreme Court, in South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, held "the
Corps's primary concerns should be flood control and navigation."
The Corps published its general operational guidelines for the Missouri River reservoir system in a Master Manual, the most recent version being the 2004 Master Manual. The Corps' overall operation of
the river system included capturing water upstream using dams and
reservoirs, thereby eliminating flooding, then slowly releasing water
from the reservoirs during the summer and fall to enable downstream
navigation.
In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir.
2005) (affirming summary judgment for the Corps and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service because (1) the Master Manual was not invalid because
the Corps properly considered downstream navigation; (2) the Corps
could comply with the ESA and still meet its statutory duty under the
FCA, because the Corps had discretion in balancing navigation with
the other interests; (3) the FWS considered the best scientific data with
respect to the summer low flow and met the required rational connection between the decision and the facts; (4) the FWS and Corps demonstrated a proper rational connection between the scientific evidence
and the decision to use habitat restoration for the flow requirements
mandated by the 2000 Opinion; and (5) the information presented by
the Corps for the preferred alternative was sufficient.)
In addition to balancing competing goals of the river system, the
Corps must operate in accordance with the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"). If the Corps' operation of the river threatens the existence of
a species protected under the ESA, or hurts its critical habitat, the FWS
must analyze the degree of impact. The FWS issues a Biological Opin-
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ion ("Opinion") describing the impact using the "best scientific and
commercial data available." If the Opinion concludes that the agency
action would harm a protected species, the Opinion must include an
alternative plan for the agency.
The FWS issued an Opinion in 2000, finding that continued operation of the river system would threaten the existence of three protected
species: the pallid sturgeon, the least tern, and the piping plover. As a
reasonable and prudent alternative, the FWS mandated flow changes
and habitat restoration for the species. In 2003, the FWS issued a Supplemental Opinion allowing the Corps to avoid the flows mandated in
the 2000 Opinion for the period of May 1, 2003 through August 15,
2003, but after this time the Corps must comply with the 2000 Opinion. Litigation ensued in various federal district courts with respect to
the Corps' planned operation of the Missouri River System, so the Federal Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated all litigation concerning the Missouri River main stem river system operation in
the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
In 2003, the FWS issued an Amended Opinion permitting the
Corps to avoid the summer low flow requirement of the 2000 Opinion
if the Corps constructed a habitat for one of the protected species.
Finally, in 2004, the Corps issued its 2004 Master Manual and 2004
Operating Plan. Thereafter, various parties brought suit against both
the Corps and FWS based on the Corps' anticipated operation of the
Missouri River system. The court granted summary judgment to the
Corps and FWS on all claims. The parties appealed to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The court rejected Missouri, Nebraska, and Nebraska Public Power
District's ("NPPD") argument that the 2004 Master Manual was invalid
because it allowed cancellation of navigation under certain drought
conditions to allow for upstream recreation. The court first noted that
the functions of the river are set forth in the FCA as primarily allowing
for navigation and preventing flooding, and secondarily to allow for
irrigation, recreation, and supporting fish and wildlife. Further, the
FCA does not specify a minimum maintenance level of downstream
navigation before the Corps can consider a secondary interest such as
recreation. The Corps must, however, consider each interest. Therefore, the court held that the Corps properly considered downstream
navigation.
The court also rejected North Dakota and South Dakota's argument that recreation deserves higher priority than navigation because
damage to recreation would cause a greater economic impact. The
FCA does not mention considering the economic impact of each interest when balancing the competing interests, and therefore the court
held that economic impact cannot be considered. Therefore, the
court upheld the Corps' 2004 Master Manual as properly balancing
water-use interests, affirming the decision of the district court.
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Secondly, Nebraska and NPPD argued that the ESA does not apply
to operation of the river system because the Corps must allow for
downstream navigation and compliance with the ESA would defeat this
requirement. The court noted that environmental or wildlife statutes
do not apply if, by application, they would result in an agency, such as
the Corps, being unable to comply with its non-discretionary statutory
purpose. However, here the Corps could comply with the ESA and still
meet its statutory duty under the FCA, because the Corps had discretion in balancing navigation with the other interests. Therefore, the
court held that the Corps was subject to the ESA because it can exercise discretion in fulfilling the reservoir system's purpose, and that the
Corps properly consulted with the FWS.
NPPD and American Rivers set forth various arguments challenging the validity of the 2003 Amended Opinion. NPPD challenged the
2003 Amended Opinion as allegedly not using the best scientific data
as required by the ESA. The court found that, based on the administrative record, the FWS considered the best scientific data with respect
to the summer low flow, and met the required rational connection between the decision and the facts, affirming the decision of the district
court.
The court also rejected American Rivers' allegations that the FWS's
decision to replace the flow requirements in the 2000 Opinion with the
habitat restoration in the 2003 Amended Opinion was arbitrary and
capricious. The court found the FWS properly concluded that the
habitat restoration was a rational alternative. Further, the court noted
that an agency does not have to expressly state every detail of its decision in the Biological Opinions, and that the rationale can be found
instead in the administrative record. Therefore, the court held the
FWS and Corps demonstrated a proper rational connection between
the scientific evidence and the decision to use habitat restoration for
the flow requirements mandated by the 2000 Opinion, again affirming
the decision of the district court.
Finally, American Rivers argued that the Corps' selection of the
preferred alternative was in error because the Corps failed to properly
explain its reasoning for choosing it. NEPA requires that alternatives
be set forth by "sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis
for choosing among options by the decision-maker and the public."
The court held that the information presented by the Corps was sufficient, by presenting the alternatives in a series of tables, including a
comparison of effects on downstream navigation and floodplain crop
damages. Therefore, the court affirmed district court's order of summary judgment.
Kate Brewer
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In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d 915 (8th Cir.
2005) (holding the United States Army Corps of Engineers was exempt
from state water quality standards where standards presented an obstacle to the Corps fulfilling its duty to maintain navigation of water).
Lake Sakakawea ("the Lake") is a main stem reservoir located in
North Dakota and created from Garrison Dam. North Dakota brought
suit to enjoin the Corps from releasing water from the Lake into the
Missouri River. The Corps sought to release the water so that it could
maintain downstream navigation on the Missouri River pursuant to its
duties under the FCA.
North Dakota alleged that lowering the water level of the Lake
would violate its state water-quality standards enacted under § 1313 of
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). These standards designated the Lake as
a "cold water fishery," and required the Lake to sustain salmonid fish
growth and associated water life. North Dakota further alleged the
amount of water left in the Lake after reduction would not support a
cold-water fishery ecosystem and therefore would frustrate the standard. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota
dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Corps had sovereign immunity. North Dakota appealed the decision.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that the
Corps is a federal agency and therefore had sovereign immunity.
However, the court noted that if the Corps waived sovereign immunity,
North Dakota could enforce its state water quality standards against the
Corps. Although the CWA does state a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity, there is a strong policy to construe such waivers strictly in
favor of the sovereign. Section 1371 of the CWA expressly states, "[the
CWA] shall not be construed as.. .affecting or impairing the authority
of the Secretary of the Army... to maintain navigation." The court
held the statute unambiguously exempts the Corps from complying
with the CWA in this narrow area of maintaining navigation, and a
state cannot use its water-quality standard to control how the Corps
releases water from the main stem reservoirs.
The court denied North Dakota's argument that the Corps must
comply with the CWA based on the legislative history of the 1977
amendments to the CWA. The court reasoned that the amendment
retained the wording in the CWA providing for a navigation exception
and that the unambiguous express words of a statute must prevail over
legislative history.
Lastly, the court applied the principles of preemption to support its
finding. In the FCA, Congress stated the primary purpose of the Missouri River main stem reservoir system was to provide flood control and
down stream navigation. Of secondary importance was irrigation, recreation, fish and wildlife. In order to effectuate these purposes, Congress granted the Corps authority to balance the interests. The court
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held that to allow states such as North Dakota to enforce their waterquality standards against the Corps when it is acting to balance these
interests would be contrary to the intended purposes of the FCA.
Therefore, the court upheld the decision of the district court dismissing North Dakota's complaint, based on the Corps' sovereign immunity and North Dakota's preemption from enforcing its state waterquality standards against the Corps.
Kate Brewer

NINTH CIRCUIT
Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 420 F.3d 946 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding the Environmental Protection Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to consider impact on endangered species, as required by the Endangered Species Act, in transferring Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
authority to Arizona).
Defenders of Wildlife ("Defenders") challenged the Environmental
Protection Agency's ("EPA") decision to transfer administration of the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") National Pollution Discharge Elimination
("pollution permitting") System to Arizona. When deciding whether
to transfer pollution permitting authority, the EPA relied on a biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), which was
premised on the proposition that the EPA lacked authority to take into
account the impact of transfer on endangered species and their habitat.
The court began by explaining the background of the applicable
statutes. Under the CWA, the EPA has authority to issue permits for
the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters through the pollution
permitting system. The CWA further provides that states may apply to
the EPA to administer the pollution permitting program within their
borders, whereupon the EPA must determine whether the state has
met nine specified criteria and "shall approve" applications that meet
those criteria. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") applies to all federal agencies carrying out actions in which they have discretionary involvement or control. It does not apply to state governmental bodies. Under section 7, federal agencies must determine if
proposed actions may affect endangered species or their habitat and
must then seek formal consultation with the FWS. As part of this process, the FWS issues a biological opinion analyzing direct and indirect
effects of the proposed action to determine whether that action is
likely to jeopardize endangered species or their habitats. Agencies rely
heavily on biological opinions when making a final determination on a
proposed action.
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When Arizona applied for transfer of pollution permitting authority, the EPA determined the transfer could affect endangered species
and initiated formal section 7 consultations with the FWS. FWS staff
concluded the transfer would result in a loss of section 7 protections,
which might affect conservation benefits. The FWS staff expressed
further concerns that federal and state laws such as Section 9 of the
ESA do not sufficiently protect endangered plant species and wideranging rare species. However, the FWS ultimately issued a biological
opinion concluding other federal and state laws would sufficiently protect endangered species. The EPA approved the permitting authority
transfer two days after the FWS issued its biological opinion, basing the
approval upon the EPA's belief the biological opinion "appropriately
considered all relevant information regarding the effects of the approval."
Defenders challenged the pollution permitting transfer in two lawsuits, one before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review the EPA's transfer decision, and a second in the District
Court of Arizona alleging multiple claims, including non-compliance
with ESA standards. The district court severed, transferred, and consolidated the non-compliance claim into this suit.
The Administrative Procedure Act provides an arbitrary and capricious standard of review for the EPA's requirements under the ESA to
"'insure' that any action it takes is 'not likely to jeopardize' listed species or their critical habitats." In order to meet the standard, the EPA
must show it considered all the relevant ESA factors and had a plausible and internally coherent rationale for its decision to transfer the
pollution permitting authority. The court held the transfer decision
did not survive arbitrary and capricious review.
The court determined the EPA's propositions underlying its transfer decision included: (1) it must consult concerning transfers, and (2)
it is not permitted as a matter of law, to take impact on endangered
species into account when making transfer decisions. The court held
the propositions could not both be true and were therefore not reasoned decision making. Further, the court determined the Biological
Opinion's exclusion of private development from its impact analysis
was irrational. The court remanded to the EPA for a plausible, coherent interpretation of its actions pursuant to the Endangered Species
Act.
Next, the court reviewed the EPA's conclusion that it had no statutory authority to refuse transfer under the CWA, even if the transfer
would violate the ESA. The EPA did have control over the indirect
effects which could endanger species resulting from its transfer decision, because the transfer decision was discretionary. The court held
even if the agency met its CWA obligations, it still must meet the ESA
obligations. The court held that section 7 gave the EPA statutory authority to make pollution permitting transfer decisions on behalf of
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endangered species and their habitat. The biological opinion the EPA
relied on was fatally deficient in ignoring indirect effects of the loss of
section 7 consultation.
The court then looked for other independent bases on which the
EPA could have rationally relied for its transfer decision. The court
held the EPA did not give a sufficiently detailed discussion of effects on
all listed species, resulting in a failure to consider an important aspect
of the transfer decision. The court held the protections the EPA
claimed could substitute for section 7 protections were insufficient.
These protections included a Memorandum of Agreement between
the EPA and an Arizona agency, EPA oversight, the ESA's anti-take
provisions, and Arizona state law. The EPA's own Biological Evaluation
report did not give sufficient devotion to endangered species protection. The EPA's reliance on assurances from one Arizona state agency
was not comprehensive enough to be sufficient.
The court concluded the EPA erred in relying on the biological
opinion when it made its transfer decision. Further, the EPA did not
provide sufficient independent bases to support its transfer decision.
Thus, the EPA entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, making its transfer decision arbitrary and capricious.
The court concluded by vacating the EPA's decision to approve Arizona's pollution permitting application, transferring Defenders' suit
challenging the validity of the biological opinion back to the district
court, and granting and remanding to the EPA the petition for review
for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Julie M. Schmidt
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 418 F.3d 971 (9th
Cir. 2005) (granting preliminary injunction to environmental and conservation organizations based on violation of the Endangered Species
Act; ordering the federal agency in charge of the Columbia River
Power System to provide summer water spill rather than pass water
through turbines in order to avoid harm to threatened species; holding that the district court did not apply an incorrect legal standard by
failing to weigh economic harm to the public in reaching its conclusion).
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") operates the dams and
power plants comprising the Federal Columbia River Power System
("FCRPS"), which consists of fourteen sets of dams. The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon granted the National Wildlife
Foundation ("NWF") a preliminary injunction order, requiring NMFS
to pass a specified amount of water through the spill gates of dams
rather than through turbines for power generation, in order to avoid
irreparable harm to threatened species.
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The Columbia River is the fourth largest river on the North American continent. It drains approximately 259,000 square miles, including
territory in seven states and one Canadian province. It flows for more
than 1,200 miles from the base of the Canadian Rockies to the Pacific
Ocean. Every year, hundreds of thousands of salmon and steelhead
travel up and down the river and its tributaries. There are now thirteen species of salmon and steelhead protected by the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"), each of which migrate to different parts of the
Columbia Basin. The management of the Columbia River System has
been heavily influenced by the ESA, which imposes a consultation duty
upon federal agencies in an effort to conserve ESA listed species.
From the consultation process, the federal agency produces a biological opinion, which assesses the effects of a proposed agency action on
the survival of species based on potential harm to the habitat.
In granting the preliminary injunction order, the district court
held that NMFS violated the ESA in the issuance of its 2004 biological
opinion ("2004 BiOp"). The 2004 BiOp failed to aggregate the impacts from the proposed action, the environmental baseline, and the
cumulative impacts as the basis for its jeopardy analysis. Concluding
that it could not distinguish between the effects of discretionary and
nondiscretionary FCRPS operations, the NMFS created a hypothetical
"reference operation" in the 2004 BiOp, to which it compared the discretionary proposed action. Instead of evaluating whether the aggregate of the proposed agency action, the environmental baseline, cumulative effects, and current status of the species would jeopardize the
salmon and steelhead, NMFS evaluated whether the proposed agency
action, consisting of only the proposed discretionary operation of the
FCRPS, would have no net effect on a species when compared to the
environmental baseline.
The district court also found that the 2004 BiOp was not entitled to
deference because it represented a complete reversal from the prior
2000 opinion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction, finding the district court's conclusions were grounded in the
ESA. The court rejected the NMFS argument that the district court
erred as a matter of law by failing to weigh economic harm to the public in its preliminary injunction analysis. The court reasoned that such
analysis does not apply to ESA cases because Congress has struck the
balance in favor of affording endangered species the highest priority.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, but remanded the question of whether the injunction should be more narrowly tailored or modified to the district court.
The court expressed no opinion on the ultimate merits of the summary judgment decision before the district court.
Keely Downs
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Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding pesticides
discharged into navigable waters in compliance with FIFRA that leave
no excess material after fulfilling their intended purpose, are not "pollutants" requiring an NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act).
Jeff Hagener, director of the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife
and Parks ("Department"), initiated a ten-year program to reintroduce
a threatened species of fish, the westslope cutthroat trout, into Cherry
Creek. Competition from a non-native trout species threatened the
westslope cutthroat trout's survival. The program included a plan to
remove the non-native trout. This removal involved applying the pesticide amtimycin into the water for short durations over a period of several years before the westslope cutthroat trout reintroduction.
Cherry Lake, Cherry Creek, and all of its tributaries are navigable
waters subject to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Department applied antimycin in accordance with the requirements of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), but did not
obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit pursuant to the CWA. The antimycin discharge served the project's purpose by eradicating the non-native trout species as planned.
William Fairhurst brought suit against Hagener under the citizen
suit provision in the CWA. Fairhurst alleged that Hagener violated the
Clean Water Act when the Department applied antimycin without an
NPDES permit. Fairhurst sought an injunction prohibiting any future
antimycin application without an NPDES permit. The District Court
for the District of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of
Hagener. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether a pesticide applied directly and
intentionally to navigable waters is a "pollutant" for purposes of the
CWA, when such administration was performed in accordance with an
EPA-approved FIFRA label, and when the pesticide performed as intended.
The court examined the meaning of "chemical waste" for purposes

of the CWA. The court found the plain meaning of "waste" referred to
damaged, defective, or superfluous material produced by a manufacturing process. The court applied this definition to the Department's
antimycin use and determined that the antimycin was not a "chemical
waste" because the Department applied it and it functioned as intended, leaving no residual excess portions after performing its intended use. Moreover, the court cited and afforded deference to an
EPA Interpretative Statement from February 2005 that concluded pesticides that are administered in conformance with FIFRA are not
"chemical wastes."
The Ninth Circuit held that when pesticides are (1) intentionally
applied for a beneficial purpose in compliance with FIFRA, (2) produce no unintended effects, and (3) leave no excess material, they are
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not "chemical wastes," and thus are not "pollutants" requiring an
NPDES permit. The court held that Hagener was not in violation of
the CWA because the antimycin discharge did not require an NPDES
permit. However, the Ninth Circuit did express that registration and
labeling under FIFRA does not necessarily preclude the NPDES permit
requirement under the CWA.
Michael Graetz
Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding the conservation district's master federal contract and
the irrigation districts' subcontracts precluded landowners' enforcement of contractual terms as third-party beneficiaries).
Landowners within the Maricopa-Stanfield Irrigation and Drainage
District and the Central Arizona Irrigation and Drainage District ("irrigation districts") brought an action for declaratory relief against the
Central Arizona Water Conservation District ("Conservation District")
as third-party beneficiaries to contracts between the Conservation District and the federal government ("master contract") and the irrigation
districts ("subcontracts"), for operation and water delivery under the
Colorado Basin River Project Act. The landowners sought to prevent
the Conservation District from negotiating new contractual terms to
alter the amount of water the irrigation districts, and therefore landowners, received each year. The landowners claimed the Conservation
District had obligations, based on vested water rights under both the
master and subcontracts, to deliver project water to the irrigation districts for the benefit of the landowners.
The Conservation District removed the case to federal court. The
federal district court dismissed the action on summary judgment because the landowners were neither parties to nor third-party beneficiaries of the master contract or subcontracts, and they were therefore unable to enforce contractual terms. The landowners appealed.
The ninth circuit upheld the district court. After review of the
master and subcontracts' language, the appellate court determined
that neither contract manifested intent to create third-party beneficiary
status for the landowners regarding vested water rights from the irrigation districts. The court reasoned that because the master contract
and the subcontracts did not clearly intend to allow third-party beneficiary status to all groups potentially benefited, the contracts did not
confer vested rights to agricultural priority water. Consequently, the
landowners were merely incidental beneficiaries to the subcontracts
without a vested fight to the irrigation districts' water. The appellate
court upheld the district court's dismissal on summary judgment.
Amy Mockenhaupt
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TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisworth v. Tuttle, No. 03-4253, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11897 (10th
Cir. June 20, 2005) (affirming the district court's findings in an action
involving sellers' misrepresentation of legally irrigated land acreage to
buyers, (1) that a certificate of appropriation constitutes a final and
justiciable statement of a water user's rights; (2) that expert testimony
regarding the nature of the appropriation certificates and land is permissible; and (3) that the buyers' duty to mitigate does not extend to
challenging the certificate of appropriation).
In 1998, William and Charlene Tuttle, and their son and daughterin-law Kenton and Lori Tuttle (collectively "Tuttle") decided to sell
their farms. In the real estate listing for the property, Tuttle represented that 1,559 acres of the total 1,740 acres consisted of legally irrigated land. In October 1998, Grant and Fern Ellsworth (collectively
"Ellsworth") offered to purchase the entire acreage. When Ellsworth
toured the property, Tuttle assured Ellsworth the farm had "plenty of
water" and provided Ellsworth with state-issued, certificates of appropriation. Tuttle failed to disclose any potential issues with the onsite
diesel irrigation well. After the sale of the land, the Assistant State Engineer informed Ellsworth that the certificates of appropriation only
provided water rights to 932.6 acres of the land, rather than 1,559 acres
as Tuttle stated. The Assistant State Engineer's letter also stated the
diesel irrigation well was not a legal point of diversion.
Ellsworth sued Tuttle for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of
warranty, breach of contract and conversion in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The jury trial returned verdicts in
favor of Ellsworth on all counts. Tuttle appealed each claim, along
with the amount of the judgment award, to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
On appeal, Tuttle asserted that Ellsworth's claims lacked ripeness,
because Ellsworth did not validate the certificates of appropriation with
the State Engineer before bringing suit. Tuttle argued that, without a
judicial or administrative declaration, the certificates were legally insufficient to define Ellsworth's water rights. The court held that the certificates of appropriation constituted the State Engineer's final statement and therefore, no other adjudication was necessary. The certificates defined Ellsworth's real property rights with sufficient certainty to
render Ellsworth's claims justiciable.
Tuttle also claimed the court should not have admitted Ellsworth's
expert witnesses' testimony. Ellsworth's first expert witness explained
the certificates, specifying the number of acres that could be irrigated
pursuant to each certificate. Ellsworth's second expert testified as to
the difference in the value of the land with appurtenant water rights
compared to the land without water rights. Tuttle's expert agreed with
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Ellsworth's expert regarding the number of acres that could be legally
irrigated under the certificates. Ellsworth's expert employed different
terminology in his oral testimony than his prior report; during his oral
testimony, he referred to acreage with a water right as "sole-supply
acreage" and acreage with no water right as "supplemental supply
acreage." The court found that the altered terminology did not
amount to a material change from the expert report and could not
have reasonably surprised Tuttle. In holding that the expert testimony
did not prejudice the jury, the court noted that Tuttle had the opportunity to challenge Ellsworth's experts at trial. The court held any error in admitted the expert testimony was harmless.
Tuttle further argued the trial court erred by excluding Tuttle's evidence regarding Ellsworth's failure to mitigate damages.
Tuttle
claimed Ellsworth had a duty to challenge the State Engineer's determination of water rights under the appropriation certificates, either
through an appeal or an equitable estoppel claim. Ellsworth responded that an equitable estoppel claim would be unlikely to succeed
and that Ellsworth should not be required to pay for frivolous and expensive litigation, after already paying a substantial amount for the
land. The court held Tuttle's mitigation theory was too speculative to
impose a duty upon on Ellsworth, and therefore, the district court's
exclusion of these issues was proper.
The court upheld the district court rulings on all counts, finding
Tuttle fraudulently misrepresented the appurtenant water rights to the
acreage bought by Ellsworth. Consequently, the court held Tuttle also
breached the warranty, breached the contract, and was liable for the
tort of conversion.
Amy M. Petri

UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Kiamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. CI. 504 (Fed. CI.
2005) (holding that landowners' and districts' claims were contract
issues, not takings, and that their claims are subject to the terms of
their contract, including limitations imposed by the Endangered Species Act).
The Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau")
operates the Klamath Project, which provides water to 240,000 acres of
irrigable land and several national wildlife refuges in the semi-arid
Klamath River Basin of northern California and southern Oregon. In
operating the Klamath Project, the Bureau must comply with the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and ensure that its project operations
are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species. In 2001, water levels in the basin were so low that they threat-
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ened three endangered species including the coho salmon, short nose
suckerfish, and Lost River suckerfish. This forced the Bureau to terminate the delivery of irrigation water to Klamath water users. Subsequently, thirteen agricultural landowners ("landowners") and fourteen
water, drainage or irrigation districts ("districts"), who either directly
or indirectly receive water from the Bureau's irrigation works, brought
this case seeking just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and
damages for breach of contract.
The landowners and districts brought this case against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The landowners
sought just compensation both as beneficiaries of district contracts
with the United States and as independent owners of Klamath Project
water rights. The districts sought damages for breach of contract and
damages on behalf of their members - the beneficiaries of the district
contracts and those whom the Bureau's reduction in water deliveries
affected in 2001. Although the districts' contracts with the Bureau supersede many of the individual water users' contracts with the Bureau,
several landowners and districts claim other sources of property rights
in Klamath Project water, such as patent deeds, water rights permits, or
treaties. This includes a number of Oregon tribes, including the
Klamath and Yurok, who hold fishing and water rights in the Klamath
Project water under treaties, statutes, and executive orders.
In their initial complaint, the landowners and districts presented a
claim for just compensation for their water rights, as well as another
claim for just compensation for the impairment of their water rights.
In a subsequent amended complaint, the landowners and districts
added a claim for breach of contract. The landowners and districts
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the issues of the nature
and scope of their property interest and whether the United States was
liable to pay just compensation for the taking of that interest.
The court began its analysis by reiterating that water belongs to the
public and is generally held in trust by the states. The court stated that
this is true for Oregon and California, but that this case also involves
usufructuary rights, which are the rights to use the water for a particular purpose and with specified limitations and priorities. Based on
these principles, the court looked to three possible sources for such
rights: federal law apart from the Constitution; Oregon and California
law; and potentially, contract law.
The court reviewed the landowners' and districts' assertion that
their property interests in the Klamath water arose from federal law,
specifically, the Reclamation Act of 1902. The court found this argument to be lacking because although the Reclamation Act indicates
that the right to the use of certain water shall be appurtenant to the
land irrigated, this language refers only to the water acquired under
the provisions of the Act. In fact, the provisions of the Reclamation
Act require the claimant to obtain those rights in accordance with state
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law. The Reclamation Act does not independently define who owns
interests in the water of Bureau projects. Thus, the court held that
state law, and not the Reclamation Act, controls who owns interests in
the water of the Bureau projects.
Next, the court considered state law in determining whether the
landowners and districts have property rights in the waters of the
Klamath Project. The United States claimed it owned controlling
rights in the Klamath Project water based on the Act of February 22,
1905 by the Oregon legislature, which provided that when the proper
officers of the United States filed a written notice, filed plans, and received authorization from the United States such rights were acquired.
In contrast, the landowners and districts cite a 1950 Oregon Attorney
General opinion which held that by filing its notice under the 1905
Act, the United States acquired the unappropriated water of the
Klamath Basin reasonably necessary to the Klamath Project only to the
extent that that United States put those waters to beneficial use. Unmoved by this argument, the court maintained that when the Bureau
posted notices of appropriation in 1905, those notices triggered the
provisions of the 1905 Oregon legislation, thereby vesting in the
United States the appropriative water rights associated with the
Klamath Project that were unappropriated as of the date of the filing.
In arriving at its decision, the court recognized that other state courts
construing state law provisions identical to the Oregon law have similarly concluded that the United States obtained all available appropriative water rights in given reclamation water simply by filing an appropriate notice. Thus, the court concluded that, pursuant to the 1905
Oregon law, the United States obtained rights to the unappropriated
water of the Klamath Basin and associated tributaries.
The court held that the individuals who own patent deeds and water permits have interests in the Klamath Project. However, the court
stated that even if these patent deeds and water permits reflect perfected interests in water, they cannot give rise to interests that cannot
be taken or infringed upon. This is so because although Congress consented to the Klamath River Basin Compact (the "Compact"), the
United States was not a party to it and therefore could not have conveyed its interests. The Compact states that nothing in it shall be
deemed to impair or affect any rights, powers or jurisdictions in the
United States, its agencies or those acting by or under its authority, in,
over, and to the waters of the Klamath River Basin. The Ninth Circuit
construed this language in accordance with its plain meaning as preserving all federal rights, powers and jurisdiction except as explicitly
conceded. Therefore, nothing in the Compact enhances the rights of
any of the landowners and districts against the United States.
In conclusion, the court returned to fundamental principles of
contract law and statutory interpretation and held that although there
was the potential for contractual recovery, landowners could not ex-
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pect more property rights against the United States than they actually
obtained and possess. This is because, despite the landowners' expectations and needs, water rights are subject to the same rules that govern all forms of property.
The court granted in part and denied in part the parties' crossmotions for partial summary judgment. On or before October 4, 2005,
the parties are to file a joint status report indicating how this case
should proceed.
Kathleen Potter
City of Gettysburg v. United States, 64 Fed. C1. 429 (Fed. C1. 2005)
(holding that damage to the City of Gettysburg's water delivery system
was not a taking due to the release language in the easement and permit granted by the U.S. Corps of Engineers in spite of the absence of
the city's signature on both documents).
In the 1960s, the City of Gettysburg, South Dakota ("City") contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to construct a
system to transport water from the Oahe Reservoir to the city. In 1972,
the City requested a right-of-way easement from the Corps to build and
maintain portions of the water transport system on government property. In 1973, the Corps forwarded a proposed easement to the City.
That same year, the City received a Section 10 permit under the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, allowing the City to maintain
the water intake structure, lay an intake line, and construct a pumphouse on the Reservoir. After completing the project in 1975, the
City informed the Corps that it had not yet issued the requested easement. The Corps proceeded to send four different easement proposals
over the next three years, but it was not until March 7, 1978 that the
Corps formally granted and issued an easement to the City. The easement contained boilerplate release language to the effect that the
United States would not be liable for any damages to property or injuries to persons which arose from or were incidental to the use and occupation of the property ("hold harmless clause"). On that same date,
the Corps also issued a license as a corollary to the easement, giving
the City right-of-use of a nearby strip of land for a period of two years
as a temporary work site. The City did not sign the easement or the
license, and it contended that it therefore did not accept the terms of
either document, in particular the hold harmless clause. Beginning in
1995, periodic landslides on the Reservoir's slope caused damage to
the intake structure, pumphouse and underground transmission lines.
By 1997, the damage had become so severe that the City had to abandon the water supply system in its entirety.
In this dispute, the City contended that the damage to the water
supply system resulted from the Corps' construction, management and
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operation of the Reservoir and that the damage constituted a taking of
the City's property without just compensation in violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Corps moved for summary judgment.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims first addressed the jurisdictional
elements as to (1) whether the City had a property interest on which it
could base a takings claim and (2) whether the Corps' laches defense
barred the City's claim. Regarding the property interest, the Corps
argued that the permit did not convey any property right and the pipe
itself had no value without connection to the water source. The City
countered that at minimum it had a property interest in the portions
of the pipeline not located on government property and landslide
damage to those sections of pipeline alone rendered the rest useless.
The court found that the City did have a cognizable property interest
for the purposes of a takings claim. First, the permit merely limited
the transfer of an additional property interest. Second, the court
found that although the City did not have a property interest in the
permit itself, it did have a property interest in its damaged pipeline.
The court noted the importance of the fact that the City limited its
claim to the physical pipelines and did not argue a taking of water
rights or a right to maintain its structures in navigable waters. The
court also rejected the Corps' argument that the government's navigational servitude would preclude the City from presenting a cognizable
property interest. The Corps argued that the City could not have a
property interest requiring compensation because large portions of the
water system were located below the mean high-water mark for the
Reservoir. The court found the argument inapplicable to the facts at
hand because the City was not claiming a loss of access to water or
some interference based on the raising or lowering of water levels.
Regarding the second jurisdictional element, the court rejected the
Corps' laches claim because the Corps did not show that the City delayed unreasonably in asserting its cause of action.
The court then turned to the substantive issues of the takings
claim, beginning with whether the release language in the easement
and the permit barred the City's claim. The court found that the City
was estopped from asserting that it did not agree to the terms of the
easement and the permit. The government's silence as to its acceptance of the terms of the easement was misleading conduct. The Corps
also relied upon that conduct when it allowed the City to construct its
water supply system. Finally, there would be material prejudice if the
City were allowed to declare the easement unenforceable decades after
its issuance. Therefore, the court rejected the City's argument that it
was not bound to the terms of the easement and the permit due to the
absent signatures. Consequentially, the hold harmless clauses in the
easement and the permit applied to the City.
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The court next rejected the City's contractual argument that the
easement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion, noting that if the
easement had been unenforceable, the City would have been trespassing on government land. Finally, the court turned to the ultimate
analysis of whether the permit's release clause was applicable to the
landslide damage. The court found the language to be unambiguous
in application to all damage resulting to the intake structure, the pumphouse and the intake line. Therefore, the court denied the City's
takings claim with respect to all damage to those structures.
Michelle Young
Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. C1. 76 (Fed. C1. 2005) (holding that a
direct and substantial contamination of ground water constituted a
Fifth Amendment takings claim).
James A. Hansen brought a Fifth Amendment takings claim in the
Court of Federal Claims against the Department of Agriculture Forest
Service ("Forest Service") for the contamination of groundwater under
the Guest Nemo Ranch ("Ranch"). In the 1970s, the Forest Service
used ethylene dibromide ("EBD") mixed with diesel fuel as a pesticide
against a beetle infestation in the Black Hills National Forest. In 1976,
the Forest Service disposed of its EBD surplus by burying large quantities of it in unsealed containers. The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") published several studies in the 1970s concerning the
harmful effects of EBD such as increased risk of cancer, mutations, and
adverse reproductive effects. In 1983, the EPA banned the use of EBD
as an agricultural fumigant.
Hansen acquired the Ranch on October 29, 1998 from Dale
Deverman. Prior to Hansen's ownership, the Forest Service found
EBD in 10 of the 18 wells located in the town of Nemo through tests
done by a commercial testing company called Envirosearch International ("Envirosearch"). Envirosearch also found EBD in one of the
Ranch's wells. Both Hansen and Deverman were unaware of the well's
contamination at the time of the sale. In 2000, Hansen learned that
two of the Ranch's five wells were contaminated. Because three of the
wells were not contaminated and the Ranch was commercial in nature,
the Forest Service refused to supply the Ranch with clean water. Hansen subsequently sold the Ranch to Ron Wick via a contract for deed
which set forth that Wick would receive the deed to the Ranch upon
making the last payment. Furthermore, the contract required Hansen
to ensure the Ranch had clean water. If the Ranch became inoperable
due to contamination, the contract allowed Wick to withhold payments
and even receive interest on the payments he had already made.
Hansen filed a takings claim against the Forest Service, arguing the
Forest Service unconstitutionally took the Ranch by contaminating the
Ranch's groundwater. Hansen sought compensation for the entire
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Ranch. In response, the Forest Service filed several motions for summary judgment, claiming in part that Hansen's claim was tortious in
nature and therefore the Tucker Act prevented the Court of Claims
from adjudicating Hansen's claim. The court noted that the nature of
Hansen's case did not prevent him from seeking a takings claim. The
court analyzed whether Hansen's claims met the requirements for a
takings claim. By applying a two-prong test, the court determined that
Hansen's claim could qualify as a taking.
The first prong required that the alleged taking be intentional or
direct and not incidental. The court reasoned that Hansen would satisfy the first prong if a jury found that the seepage of EBD into the
Ranch's groundwater directly resulted from the Forest Services burying
cans of EBD.
The second prong of the test required the taking to be substantial.
The court held that ajury could find the second prong satisfied due to
the known effects of EBD and the fact that two of the Ranch's wells
were already contaminated. The Forest Service argued that the contamination was not substantial. The Forest Service relied on Envirosearch's original opinion, which stated the Ranch was hydraulically
isolated from the contaminated groundwater and therefore unlikely to
become completely contaminated. Hansen's experts, however, stated
that contamination of the entire Ranch's groundwater was likely. The
experts further opined that it could take over 50 years for the EBD to
migrate out of the Ranch's groundwater. The court held that, based
on Hansen's evidence, ajury could find a valid the takings claim.
The court also considered whether Hansen had a sufficient property right to justify a takings claim. In South Dakota, unappropriated
water belongs to the public through the public use doctrine. However,
a landowner with a permit or a vested right to a defined amount of
water can appropriate that amount. A vested right requires the water
to have been put to beneficial use prior to the 1955 change in South
Dakota's water laws. In asserting his right, Hansen relied on a 1946
document issued by the South Dakota Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, which allowed the Ranch to appropriate 26
gallons of water per minute. The court determined that Hansen had a
vested right to that amount of water and that Hansen's water right constituted a viable property interest, further justifying Hansen's takings
claim.
Next, the court denied the Forest Service's motions for summary
judgment, which claimed Hansen lacked standing and that the claim
was not ripe for review. The Forest Service asserted that because Hansen did not own the Ranch when it became contaminated, he lacked
standing. The Forest Service alternatively argued that Hansen further
lacked standing because he sold his interest in the Ranch. The court
rejected both of these arguments, noting that no claim can accrue until the landowner becomes aware of the taking. Because neither Han-
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sen nor Deverman were aware of the contamination, Hansen's claim
had not accrued. Furthermore, the court held that due to the nature
of a contract for deed and the specific nature of Hansen's agreement
with Wick, Hansen had a sufficient interest in the Ranch. Finally, the
court rejected the Forest Service's argument that because the Ranch
still had three uncontaminated wells and enough water to operate,
Hansen's claim was not yet ripe. The court held that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the contamination would spread to the remaining
wells, and therefore Hansen's claim was ripe for adjudication.
In conclusion, the court determined a trier of fact could reach the
conclusion that the Forest Service contaminated the Ranch's ground
water and that such contamination may constitute a Fifth Amendment
Takings claim. The court also determined that Hansen had a viable
interest in the Ranch at the time of the taking. The court denied the
Forest Service's motions for summary judgment on standing and ripeness and granted Hansen's partial motion for summary judgment that
the taking occurred when Hansen learned about the contamination.
Brian Stewart
Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States, No. 03-1942L, 2005 U.S. Claims
LEXIS 267 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (holding state water rights did not create a
property right to graze cattle on federal public land and BLM's denial
of an application to graze cattle on federal lands was not a taking of
water rights).
In 2005, Colvin Cattle Co. ("Colvin"), the owner of 520 acres near
the publicly-held Montezuma Allotment in Nevada ("Allotment"),
brought suit against the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") after
BLM denied Colvin's application to graze cattle on the Allotment.
Colvin had grazed cattle on the allotment since 1970. Colvin also possessed water rights, which it used to provide water to the cattle. In
1995, Colvin failed to pay grazing fees and BLM cancelled its grazing
lease. Over the next few years, BLM issued numerous notices of trespass and intent to remove Colvin's cattle from the Allotment. Colvin
appealed BLM's decision first to the agency and then the Interior
Board of Land Appeals. BLM issued a final trespass decision in 2003
requiring Colvin to remove all cattle and range improvements, except
for wells and other facilities Colvin needed to access its water rights.
BLM also granted a lease to a third party, Bud Johns, to graze cattle on
the Allotment.
In this suit before the United States Court of Federal Claims,
Colvin claimed (1) the denial of its application to graze cattle was a
taking of its water rights, and (2) the cancellation of its grazing lease
was a breach of contract. Colvin based its takings claim on the belief
that a right to beneficial use of water carries an attendant right to graze
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cattle on federal land, because grazing is the only beneficial use to
which the water can be put. Further, by denying the right to use the
land for grazing, the government denied Colvin its right to use its own
water. Colvin based its argument on three sources: the Supreme Court
decision in Buford v. Houtz, Nevada's 1925 Stockwatering Act, and the
Mining Act of 1866.
The court in Buford recognized that land on the public range can
only be subject to the beneficial use of grazing. Based on this case,
Colvin argued that a water right carries with it an attendant right to
graze cattle on federal land. Thus, Colvin argued the federal government had not created the right to graze cattle on federal land through
a permitting process, but instead it was a right under Nevada's appropriation laws. However, the court did not believe the Buford decision
altered the federal government's ownership and control of public
lands.
Second, Colvin's water rights traced back to Nevada's 1925 Stockwatering Act. Colvin argued that through the Act, the state of Nevada
recognized a connection between the water rights and the right to
graze, and conferred a right to graze on federal lands. However, based
on case precedent, the court found the state did not intend to create
any right or title to public lands by passing the Act.
Third, Colvin argued its takings claim based on a valid property
right, which was a water right confirmed in the Mining Act of 1866,
and not on a federal permit or license to graze. However, the court
rejected this argument because the Supreme Court interpreted the
Mining Act to recognize only two possessory rights: the right to use
water on public lands for "mining, manufacturing, or other beneficial
purposes," and the right of way for improvements to carry water for
those purposes. The Court never recognized grazing as creating a
property right.
Finally, Colvin argued BLM had an obligation to prevent Bud
Johns' cattle from infringing on Colvin's water rights. However, the
court found the federal government could not be responsible for trespass of water rights by a private party.
Because Colvin's water rights did not create a property right to
graze cattle on the federal Allotment, the court dismissed the suit and
confirmed BLM's right to deny Colvin a grazing permit.
Kathryn Lane Garner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, No. 03-05760, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5373, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency exceeded its authority by promulgating a
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regulation allowing ships to discharge ballast water without a permit in
violation of the Clean Water Act).
Northwest Environmental Advocates ("Northwest") contested the
Environment Protection Agency's ("EPA") implementation of a regulation that allowed ships to discharge waste "incidental to the normal
operation of a vessel" without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems ("NPDES") permit. Northwest attempted to force the
EPA to change the regulation with a petition. When the EPA refused
to change the regulation, Northwest filed suit in the U.S. District Court
of Northern California. At trial, Northwest argued that the regulation
was inconsistent with the EPA's authority under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). Northwest also argued that the EPA's failure to rescind the
regulation was an abuse of discretion and therefore subject to judicial
review. The CWA required a NPDES permit for the "addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source."
Ballast water is water ships taken on to help stabilize the vessel.
The amount of ballast water a ship takes on depends on the cargo of
the ship. Once a ship takes on ballast water, it does not typically release it until the ship's crew unloads the cargo. Northwest argued that
ships' ballast discharges pollute water and introduce invasive species to
fragile environments by transporting fish and other marine species in
the ballast tanks. Northwest referenced the zebra mussel invasion of
the Great Lakes. Zebra mussels migrated into the Great Lakes via ballast water discharges, causing several millions of dollars of damage to
businesses and local industries. Under the CWA, the term "pollutant"
includes biological material such as fish and fish remains, as well as
waste, sewage and garbage. The court held that ballast water's fishy
mix combined with other chemicals, such as fuel residue, sediment,
rust, and debris rendered it a pollutant under the CWA. The court
also noted that the EPA does not contest that ships discharging ballast
water meet the other requirements rendering the discharge governable by the CWA: (1) the discharge of a pollutant, (2) into navigable
waters, (3) from a point source. The court ruled that ballast water discharges fall under the CWA and therefore, that ships discharging ballast water must have a NPDES permit.
The EPA asserted a congressional acquiescence theory arguing that
the EPA has never interpreted the CWA to require a permit for ballast
water discharges. The EPA alleged that Congress acquiesced to the
EPA's interpretation of the CWA by not revising the CWA to require a
different interpretation or repealing the regulation. A party who asserts a congressional acquiescence theory must support it with "overwhelming evidence of acquiescence." Mere lack of revision was not
sufficient to meet the burden under congressional acquiescence theory. Holding the EPA failed to provide overwhelming evidence, the
court granted Northwest's motion for summary judgment.
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.1 ;'In conclusion, the court determined that the EPA exceeded its
power by enacting the regulation. The court.granted Northwest's motion for summary judgment and ordered the EPA to repeal the regula,tion.
Brian Stewart
Southeastern Fed. Power Customers v. Harvey, 400 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (holding that the execution of a settlement agreement for contracts allotting water storage space was conditioned on vacatur of a preliminary injunction).
In 1946, Congress authorized the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to design and construct the Buford Dam project on
the Chattahoochee River. The Corps finished the dam in 1956, forming a reservoir called Lake Sidney Lanier. During the 1970s and 1980s,
the Corps entered into renewable five-year contracts with various
Georgia municipal and county water authorities ("Water Supply Providers"), which allowed the Water Supply Providers to withdraw water
from the Chattahoochee or Lake Lanier for a fee. The last of these
contracts expired in 1990; however, the Corps permitted the Water
Supply Providers to continue withdrawing water under the terms of the
expired contracts in increasing amounts. In October 1989, the Corps
released a draft proposal to significantly increase the amount of the
daily water withdrawal. In response, Alabama filed suit against the
Corps in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama in June 1990, alleging that the Corps violated the National
Environmental Policy Act by failing to consider the potential effects of
the increased withdrawals. Upon motion of the parties, the Alabama
district court issued a stay order on September 19, 1990, which incorporated the parties' stipulation that they would not execute contracts
or agreements that were the subject of the complaint in the action.
On December 12, 2000, Southeastern Federal Power Customers,
Inc. ("Southeastern"), a non-profit association that represents rural
electric cooperatives and municipal electric systems utilities that purchase hydropower from federal projects, filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Southeastern sought
to enjoin the Corps from permitting the increased water withdrawals,
which Southeastern claimed impaired the hydropower capacity of the
Buford dam project to their financial detriment. Georgia and the Water Supply Providers moved to intervene in February 2001. OnJanuary
9, 2003, the parties concluded a settlement agreement which allowed
for renewable interim ten-year contracts allocating water storage space
in Lake Lanier to the Water Supply Providers, who were to pay higher
fees for the storage to compensate Southeastern for lost hydropower.
On January 16, 2003, the parties filed the settlement agreement with

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

the D.C. district court. In February 2003, Florida and Alabama moved
to intervene in this action, and the D.C. district court granted the motion in October 2003. In February 2003, the states also moved to abate
or transfer the action in the Northern District of Alabama, where, in
January 2003, they had filed a motion in the Alabama action to enjoin
and declare void the settlement agreement, claiming that it violated
the 1990 stay of that action.
On October 15, 2003, the Alabama district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Corps and Georgia from filing or implementing settlement agreements or entering into any contracts affecting the Chattahoochee basin without approval of the court. On
November 7, 2003, the D.C. district court denied the motion to dismiss, transfer, or abate this action. On November 24, 2003, the Alabama district court issued a stay on all activity in that action until the
D.C. district court issued an order deciding the validity of the settlement agreement. On February 10, 2004, the D.C. district court rejected Florida's and Alabama's challenge and directed the settlement
agreement was valid and may be executed provided that the Alabama
district court vacate the preliminary injunction. Then, the D.C. district
court issued an order dismissing the action as moot since it approved
the settlement agreement. Florida and Alabama filed an appeal challenging the D.C. district court's approval of the agreement with the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. However,
the court determined that the February 10 decision did not render all
claims moot, since the D.C. district court approved the settlement
agreement conditionally, if the Alabama district court vacated the preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court vacated the D.C. district
court's dismissal order, dismissed the appeals of the orders for lack of
jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the district court.
Stacy Hochman
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Brownlee, No. 03-1392, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5688 (D.D.C. April 6, 2005) (holding the Army Corps of Engineers
violated the Endangered Species Act by failing to consult with the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service before issuing nationwide permits to dredge
and fill wetlands as allowed by the Clean Water Act).
National Wildlife Federation ("NWF") filed suit against the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, challenging four nationwide permits
("NWP") that the Corps issued. NWF alleged that the Corps violated
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), and Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by failing to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
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Service ("FWS") when it issued permits for projects that may affect the
endangered Florida panther. Most of the Florida panther's habitat is
on wetlands. Under the CWA, the Corps regulates the dredging and
filling of wetlands by issuing individual site permits after notice and
public hearing. The Corps may also issue general NWPs for activities
that the Corps finds "are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have
only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment." The
Corps renews the permits every five years, and the projects proceed
without interaction with the Corps. NWPs prohibit activities that are in
the vicinity or may affect threatened or endangered species without
notifying the District Engineer that the activities met the requirements
of the ESA. Section 7(a) (2) of the ESA compels the Corps to consult
with the FWS whenever its actions "may affect" endangered species.
Furthermore, under NEPA, the Corps must produce either an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact
("FONSI"). In this case, the Corps issued four NWPs with accompanying documentation alleging "minimal impact" under the CWA, compliance with the ESA, and FONSIs for each permit.
NWF requested summary judgment on the following claims alleging that the Corps: 1) violated the ESA by not consulting with the FWS
prior to issuing the four NWPs; 2) violated the ESA by not developing
or implementing a conservation program for the panther; 3) violated
the CWA and APA by arbitrarily, capriciously, and without required
documentation, finding that the NWPs would have minimal individual
and cumulative impact on the environment; and 4) violated NEPA and
APA by arbitrarily, capriciously, and without proper evaluations, finding that the NWPs would have no significant impact on the environment. The court dismissed the second allegation, having already adjudicated the matter in a previous case. With regard to the first allegation, the Corps argued that while some of the actions covered by the
NWPs "may affect" the panther, they would consult with the FWS on a
case-by-case basis for each of the permits. The court held that the
Corps was not entitled to deference in interpreting the ESA. It further
held that the purpose of Section 7 of the ESA was to allow FWS consultation at the earliest time possible in order to provide a cumulative
analysis of the combined proposed permits. Further, the Corps' failure
to consult with the FWS on the four challenged NWPs violated the
ESA. Because the finding of "minimal impact" under the CWA and the
FONSI under NEPA are intertwined with compliance with Section 7 of
the ESA, the court denied summary judgment on the third and fourth
claims.
The court held that the Corps was in violation of the ESA for not
consulting with the FWS when it issued nationwide permits.
Jacki Lopez
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United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 88-1886, 2005 U.S. Dist'
LEXIS 11600 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2005) (holding the United States,
South Florida Water Management District, and the State of Florida
Department of Environmental Protection violated a consent decree to
reduce phosphorus levels in the Florida Everglades and Loxahatchee
National Wildlife Refuge by allowing multiple exceedances to occur).
This suit stems from a 1991 settlement to an action filed by the
United States alleging pollution in the Florida Everglades and Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge") due to agricultural production resulting in phosphorus accumulations. The United States,
the South Florida Water Management District, and the State of Florida
Department of Environmental Protection incorporated the settlement
agreement into a consent decree with self-imposed deadlines. In 1992,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted intervention rights to the Miccosukee Tribe ("Tribe"), enabling the court to enforce the settlement agreement to protect the
Tribe's rights and interests. The Tribe asked the United States to seek
mediation on the issues. After the United States declined, the Tribe
filed this suit. The Tribe sought relief alleging that there were: 1) violations of the decree due to elevated phosphorus levels at the Refuge
that were not the result of error or extraordinary phenomena, and 2)
for failing to timely contrast storm-water treatment areas ("STAs").
The consent decree required water sampling on an ongoing basis
at 14 different sampling points throughout the Refuge, and provided
both interim and long-term phosphorus concentration level goals.
The consent decree described that an exceedance occurred when the
monthly geometric mean was greater than the interim level two or
more times in any twelve consecutive samplings. It also stated that exceedances could occur only when there were no errors or extraordinary natural phenomena. Based on sampling performed by the parties, testimony from the Technical Oversight Committee (created by
the parties to monitor compliance), and testimony from the parties
that the exceedances did occur, the court found that the phosphorus
levels exceeded the interim level multiple times. It also found that
neither error nor extraordinary phenomena caused the exceedances.
Therefore, the court held that each elevated sample constituted an
additional violation of the consent decree.
The consent decree also called for the construction of STAs designed to decrease the amount of phosphorus from farm water run-off
discharged into the Refuge. The Tribe alleged that STA 3/4 was not
operational by the deadline prescribed in the decree. The United
States alleged it met the terms of the decree regarding the STA because it built the STA on time, but it was not yet operating as intended.
The court found that the consent decree intended the STA be constructed and operating in order to perform its function of decreasing
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the amount of phosphorus in the water. The court held that the
United States had violated the consent decree by not having STA 3/4
operational.
The court held that the United States violated the consent decree
due to exceedances and the failure to meet the deadline for making
STA 3/4 operational. The court ordered the Special Master to hold a
hearing to determine remedies for the violations, and to file a recommendation with the court. It also ordered that while the parties await
the court's imposed remedies, the United States and the state agencies
should implement their own remedies and provide the court more
details about the alleged exceedances as well as create a new schedule
for making 3/4 operational.
Jacki Lopez
United States v. Metro Dist. Comm'n, No. 85-0489-RGS, 83-1614-RGS,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5649 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Apr. 6, 2005) (holding the
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority should submit an amended
project schedule after receiving assurances from the United States that
an agreement to provide stormwater control on a portion of the project would not be construed as setting precedent).
The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") filed its
Quarterly Compliance and Progress Report ("Quarterly Report") and
Combined Sewer Overflow ("CSO") Control Plan Annual Progress Report for 2004 ("Annual Report") on March 15, 2005. The United
States and the Conservation Law Foundation ("CLF") brought this action in response. The Annual Report provided a status summary of
ongoing CSO control plan projects. The MWRA listed 14 of 25 CSO
project components as complete. The MWRA also included a proposed schedule for other project components. Two proposed projects
involved stormwater control plans: a storage tunnel in North Dorchester Bay and a Reserved Channel sewer separation project.
Despite the MWRA's inclusion of the proposed schedules in the
Annual Report, the MWRA declined to file a motion to amend the
main CSO project schedule, Schedule Six, to incorporate the new construction milestones until it reached an agreement with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") on "all outstanding issues" regarding the
long term CSO control plan. The MWRA's Board of Directors
("Board") was concerned about the MWRA's agreement to accept responsibility for stormwater control for the North Dorchester Bay and
Reserved Channel projects. The MWRA insisted that its acceptance of
stormwater control for the North Dorchester Bay and Reserved Channel projects must not be viewed as establishing precedent for its other
CSO control projects. The Board requested assurances from the EPA
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and DEP that the MWRA would not be obligated to provide stormwater
control for any other CSO control projects.
The United States argued that it was inappropriate for the MWRA
to condition the incorporation of construction milestones for the
North Dorchester Bay and Reserved Channel projects into Schedule
Six upon reaching an agreement with the EPA and DEP. However, the
United States maintained that it did not consider the MWRA's assumption of responsibility for stormwater control in North Dorchester Bay
to be precedent for other CSO projects that remained to be completed. The EPA provided the MWRA with a letter stating the MWRA
would not be liable for stormwater control on other project components.
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
found the concerns of the Board had been alleviated because no party
had contested the MWRA's position that the MWRA was not liable for
stormwater control in other CSO projects, and because the EPA provided the Board with written assurance that the stormwater control
related only to the North Dorchester Bay and Reserved Channel projects. The Court ordered the MWRA to submit proposed milestones
for incorporation into Schedule Six with its next Quarterly Progress
Report.
Kevin Kennedy

No Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, No. 005395, 2005 US Dist.
LEXIS 11097 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005) (denying motions for summary
judgment because issues of material fact existed in determining
whether the City of New York discharged a pollutant from a point
source into navigable waters without a permit).
No Spray Coalition, Inc. ("Coalition"), a collection of non-profit
organizations and individuals, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of
New York against New York City ("City") to enjoin the City from conducting its spraying program, which defends against the spread of West
Nile Virus by killing mosquitoes and larvae that carry West Nile Virus.
Coalition alleged that the City violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
by discharging pollutants into the waters in and around the City without a permit. The district court denied Coalition's request for a preliminary injunction, but did not rule on the claims under the CWA.
Following discovery, Coalition moved for summary judgment, and the
City cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the City's motion for summary judgment, holding that the CWA did
not allow Coalition to bring a citizen suit. The Second Circuit vacated
the judgment and remanded the case, ruling that the CWA authorizes
citizens to file lawsuits to enforce its requirements. Both parties sought
to renew their summary judgment motions. The district court denied
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both motions because there were issues of material fact as to whether
the City discharged pollutants into navigable waters without a permit.
On remand, Coalition and the City disputed whether the City's
conduct constituted a violation of the CWA. Coalition argued that the
City's actions were subject to the CWA, and since the City failed to obtain a permit to spray over water, the City violated the CWA. The City
argued that the spraying program did not discharge pollutants, so a
permit was not required. The second issue was whether Coalition offered sufficient evidence to find as a matter of law that the City violated
the CWA. The City disputed most of the offered evidence.
The main goal of the CWA is to eliminate the discharge of all pollutants into navigable waters by restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of America's waters. The CWA
defines "discharge of a pollutant" to include any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") regulates the issuance
of permits that allow the holder to discharge pollutants at levels below
the thresholds incorporated in the permit. When sprayed into navigable waters, pesticides may constitute "an addition" under the CWA.
The amount of pollutants discharged does not affect whether an addition took place.
Courts have loosely interpreted the definition of "point source" as
any discrete conveyance that discharges or may discharge pollutants.
The City's helicopters and trucks served to convey pollutants from
their original source to the navigable water.
The definition of "pollutant" was the primary controversy in this
case. According to the legislative history, courts should interpret "pollutant" broadly. The court noted that although the CWA includes
chemical waste in the definition of "pollutant," it failed to define the
meaning of chemical waste. The Environmental Protection Agency's
position is that pesticides are not chemical waste because pesticides
target organisms and remain useful when they are in the environment.
Unlike chemical waste discarded in the air, the pesticides had the intended purpose of reaching and killing mosquitoes. Pesticides sprayed
by the City could become chemical waste if they were no longer useful
and the City discarded them.
Because the court faced disputed issues of material fact, the court
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. The issues of
material fact need to be resolved by the trial court.
Tomi L. Hanson

In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., Master File No.
1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M21-88, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10781
(S.D.N.Y., May 31, 2005) (holding a claim for damages under the relevant California statute did not apply to groundwater contamination).
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The cities of Fresno, Riverside, Roseville, Sacramento, and other
private citizens and water districts ("California Cities") asserted causesof action under the California Civil Code ("Statute") against Atlantic.
Richfield Co. and Alon USA Energy, Inc. ("Companies") in the United,
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The California Cities sought relief from the actual and threatened contamination of their water supply with the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE"). Companies moved to dismiss the claims under the
Statute, arguing the provision does not apply to the alleged contamination of water, and they moved to strike California Cities' prayers for
treble damages and attorneys' fees pursuant to the Statute.
The Statute provided that a utility may bring a civil action for damages against any person who "tampers with any property owned or used
by the utility to provide utility services." Companies contended that
the district court must dismiss California Cities' claims since the Statute
did not apply to the contamination of water, and maintained that the
Statute's plain language and legislative history demonstrated that it
addressed tampering with equipment used to provide utility services.
Specifically, Companies argued that "property" does not include
groundwater and "tamper" does not include contamination of
groundwater.
California Cities responded that groundwater constituted "property
used to provide utility services" since California Cities had usufructuary
rights in the water pumped by their wells, and California Cities used it
to deliver potable drinking water to consumers. California Cities also
asserted that the term tamper covered contamination, as it constituted
injury to, alteration of, and interference with property under state law.
The district court looked to the plain meaning of the Statute and
to the legislative intent. It noted the concept of property in California
is extremely broad, and stated that a liberal interpretation of the word
property in the statute would cover California Cities' usufructuary
rights. However, when the district court read the term property in conjunction with the rest of the statute, it determined that it did not mean
property rights, but rather the physical object to which those rights
attach-the instruments used to provide utility services. The district
court concluded that to read the Statute as including the right to sue
for groundwater contamination would conflict with the rest of the
Statute, and conflict with the Statute's legislative history.
California Cities argued the proposition that the legislative purpose
does not affect or limit the broad reach of a statute's plain language,
citing a California Supreme Court decision. The district court responded, first, that it already determined that the plain language of the
Statute precluded California Cities' claims based on groundwater contamination, and second, that the legislative purpose in the Statute was
to deter the theft of utility services, not to protect environmental resources, and it could not be interpreted to include it. The district
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court then dismissed a claim by private citizens under the Statute, since
the ,Statute only provided for a utility to bring a civil action for damages, which did not include owners of a mobile home park that provide
water service. Thus, the district court granted the Companies' motion
to dismiss California Cities' cause of action under the Statute and
granted Companies' motion to strike California Cities' prayers for
treble damages and attorney's fees.
Stacy Hochman
Or. State Pub. Interest Research Group v. Pac. Coast Seafoods Co.,
374 F.Supp. 2d 902 (D. Or. 2005) (enjoining Pacific Surimi from
processing food due to the irreparable harm pollutant discharges
cause to the Skipanon River until Pacific Surimi could obtain a NPDES
permit).
On March 15, 2004, the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon held Pacific Coast Seafoods Company, Inc., Pacific Surimi
Joint Venture, LLC, and Pacific Surimi Co., Inc. (collectively "Pacific
Surimi") in violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for discharging
pollutants into the Skipanon River. Oregon State Public Research
Group ("Group") conducted an on-site inspection of Pacific Surimi
and took wastewater samples. The Group filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Pacific Surimi from beginning summertime processing until Pacific Surimi either obtained a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit or treated
the water to reduce pollutant discharges.
The court found Pacific Surimi's discharge harmful to both aquatic
life and humans due to the exacerbation of already dangerous
amounts of ammonia and sulfides, low levels of oxygen, and high levels
of bacteria in the Skipanon River. Furthermore, the court found Pacific Surimi in violation of the CWA for each day Pacific Surimi discharged without an NPDES permit. The court ordered a preliminary
injunction because Pacific Surimi could not provide credible assurance
that they could reroute discharges and not cause irreparable harm.
The CWA authorizes the district court to grant preliminary injunctions to redress violations of the CWA. For the court to grant a preliminary injunction, the Group must show either a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that there
are serious questions based on the merits, the balance of hardships tips
sharply in the Group's favor, and that there is no adequate remedy at
law. The court found the Group sufficiently demonstrated a risk of
irreparable harm and demonstrated likely success on the merits. Additionally, the court found an equitable balancing analysis unnecessary
because the CWA violations were willful.
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The court enjoined Pacific Surimi from beginning summertime
production until Pacific Surimi could obtain a NPDES permit allowing
discharges to the Columbia River.
Alexandra Farkouh

N. Penn Water Auth. v. BAE Sys., No. 04-4446, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14773 (E.D. Pa.July 19, 2005) (holding section 113(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
prevents an injunction under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act for treatment of a public well when the Environmental Protection
Agency considered and rejected installing treatment in their Record of
Decision).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed BAE Systems's motion to dismiss all claims brought
by North Penn Water Authority ("NPWA"). BAE Systems argued that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over NWPA's claims because section 113(h) of CERCLA eliminates the court's ability to review
federal government response actions until the cleanup is complete.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had ongoing activities
at the North Penn Superfund Site; therefore, section 113(h) would
prohibit any challenge to the EPA's activities at that site.
The court found no jurisdiction under section 113(h) of CERCLA
over NPWA's RCRA claim. NWPA sought a declaration of liability under RCRA that BAE Systems's contamination of groundwater created
an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health.
NWPA also sought an injunction requiring BAE Systems to abate the
violations and provide treatment of a public well to put it back into
service for public water. The court determined that subject matter
jurisdiction over the RCRA claim depended on whether the claim was a
challenge to the ongoing federal cleanup at the North Penn Superfund Site. The EPA's Record of Decision, issued before cleanup began
at the site, showed that the EPA considered and rejected installing a
treatment system on the public well. The EPA's ongoing cleanup activities included restoration of the groundwater quality in the public
well. The court noted that although treatment on the public well may
not obstruct the EPA's clean up activities, the section 113(h) prohibition ofjudicial review is not dependent on the facts of each case. Since
the EPA considered and rejected treatment of the well, an injunction
issued by the court for treatment of the public well would be a challenge to the current cleanup of the Superfund site. The court found it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the RCRA claim. The
court also dismissed NWPA's claims under Pennsylvania state hazardous waste laws seeking treatment of the public well. The court found
these claims were also challenges to the current cleanup of the Superfund site, and therefore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Issue I

COURTREPORTS

However, the court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction
over the CERCLA claim because NPWA's claim was to recover response
costs under section 107, and section 113(h) (1) permits judicial review
of this type of action. BAE Systems also argued that NPWA failed to
state a claim under CERCLA section 107 because their response costs
were inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan. The court
found this was a question of fact for trial. The court also permitted
NPWA's claims under the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act
since that statute permitted a private party to bring a claim for recovery
of response costs.
BAE Systems challenged the timeliness of NPWA's state tort law
claims, claiming NPWA was aware of the contamination 25 years ago
and there is a two-year statute of limitations on tort claims. Pennsylvania law allows for tolling of the statute of limitations until a plaintiff
knows or reasonably should know that he or she has sustained an injury caused by another person. When there is a continuing violation,
Pennsylvania law also tolls the statute of limitations until the contamination ceases. Although the court questioned whether the statute of
limitations would bar the state law claims, the court would not dismiss
the claims without more of a record.
The court dismissed BAE Systems's claim for injunction under
RCRA, but permitted its recovery of response costs and state tort law
claims to continue.
HeatherHeinlein
United States v. Washington, Dep't of Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050
(W.D. Wash. 2005) (holding: (1) water rights are impliedly reserved to
fulfill the primary purpose or purposes of an Indian reservation; (2)
the practicable irrigable acreage method is an appropriate means of
quantifying impliedly reserved agricultural water rights, but impliedly
reserved domestic water rights are to be quantified independently of
the agricultural rights; (3) under these circumstances, the quantification of impliedly reserved water rights does not necessitate the quantification of those rights for the entire Reservation or the inclusion of
sources beyond the Reservation, except as they pertain to the practicable irrigable acreage calculation; (4) an Indian is able to transfer impliedly reserved water rights, even to a non-Indian successor, but the
non-Indian successor may lose the rights through non-use, and the
rights are then lost to the tribe).
In 1855, the Treaty of Point Elliot ("Treaty") created the Lummi
Reservation ("Reservation") which covers two peninsulas in Washington. Both the Treaty and deeds conveying parcels of land to nonIndian successors in interest made no mention of water rights. The
portion of the Lummi Reservation involved in this dispute ("Case
Area") comprises just over half of the reservation, and the parties
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agreed that only seven percent of the Case Area is suitable for agriculture.
The United States and the intervening Lummi Indian Nation (collectively "United States") sought a declaration stating that the Treaty
impliedly reserved the groundwater under the Lummi Peninsula for
the use of the Lummi Nation. The State of Washington, Department
of Ecology ("Ecology") claimed the Treaty did not impliedly reserve
groundwater in the amount claimed by the United States. In addition,
the water associations ("Associations") who held permits to withdraw
and deliver the groundwater of the Lummi Peninsula, claimed a right
to withdraw the disputed groundwater. The parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment and the court granted Motions to Reconsider
to both parties.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington's analysis relied on the decision in Winters v. United States. In
Winters, the Supreme Court held water rights are impliedly reserved for
Indians where a treaty does not mention water rights because they are
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation ("Winters rights").
This court noted the federal government's intent at the time of the
reservation's creation determines the purpose of a reservation, and
federal law limits Winters rights to the amount necessary to fulfill a
reservation's primary purpose. Furthermore, the court made several
statements regarding a reservation's primary purpose: a reservation
may have more than one primary purpose; a primary purpose is more
than a valuable secondary use; and Winters rights are the amount necessary to fulfill the reservation's primary purpose, no more. As such,
the United States was only entitled to Winters rights sufficient to fulfill
the Reservation's primary purpose or purposes.
The parties claimed the Reservation had different primary purposes, which lead to substantially different calculations of Winters
rights. The United States contended the Treaty's primary purpose was
to create a homeland. The United States further argued the court
should find sufficient Winters rights to provide for all domestic, agricultural, community, commercial, and industrial purposes. Ecology
and the Associations asserted the primary purpose was agricultural because the drafters of the Treaty intended the Reservation to transform
the Lummi Nation into an agricultural community. The parties agreed
the Treaty impliedly reserved water rights for domestic and agricultural
purposes. The court rejected the homeland purpose by noting it was
contrary to the primary purpose test under federal law and it conflicted
with Ninth Circuit precedent. The court ruled the primary purposes of
the Reservation were agricultural and domestic.
Furthermore, the court recognized the need to quantify the Winters rights as part of the proceeding. The parties agreed the practicably irrigable acreage method ("PIA") was the appropriate means of
quantifying the agricultural Winters rights. The PIA is a two-part test:
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-the land must be susceptible to sustained irrigation and it must be irrigable at a reasonable cost. However, the United States objected to the
use of the PIA for quantification of domestic Winters rights because
-only roughly seven percent of the Case Area was suitable for agriculSture. The court agreed with the United States, stating Winters rights
are reserved in quantities to make the entire Case Area livable, not just
,those areas suitable for agriculture. Therefore, the court ruled the
quantification of domestic Winters rights was independent of the agricultural quantification.
The parties continued to dispute whether the quantification should
encompass the entire Lummi Reservation and whether the quantification should include water sources beyond the Lummi Reservation.
The court ruled the quantification of Winters rights within the Case
Area did not necessitate a quantification for the entire Lummi Reservation. Still, Ecology claimed the quantification of the Winters rights
needed to include surface and groundwater sources beyond the
Lummi Peninsula. The court refused to consider other sources of water except as they related to the calculation of the Lummi's PIA because consideration of all available sources would maximize the determination of the Lummi's agricultural Winters rights. The parties
agreed the Lummi's Winters rights should be quantified based solely
on Case Area usage, and should not include uses beyond the Lummi
Peninsula.
Lastly, the court addressed the use and transferability of the
Lummi's Winters rights. The court held as a matter of law the Lummi
may use their Winters rights for any purpose. However, the parties
raised several questions regarding the transferability of the Lummi's
Winters rights, especially in relation to non-Lummi successors. The
court's analysis relied on a pair of cases. Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton ("Walton II") held an Indian must be able to sell all of his rights
in the Tribe's reserved waters. In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton
("Walton III"), the Ninth Circuit ruled non-Indian successors in interest must maintain Winters rights through continuous use. Based on
Walton II, the court held the Lummi may sell or transfer their agricultural and domestic Winters rights to Lummi and non-Lummi successors alike. Next, the court addressed the question of whether a nonIndian successor's interest becomes subject to loss through non-use. In
accordance with Walton III, the court reasoned the Lummi's nonIndian successors must exercise due diligence in perfecting their rights
or they become subject to loss through non-use. The court further
reasoned it would turn to state law in determining due diligence. After
an examination of Washington law, the court found a non-Lummi successor must exercise due diligence within 15 years of the transfer or his
or her right is lost through non-use. The next question pertained to
the reacquisition of Case Area land from non-Lummi successors where
the Winters rights had been lost through non-use. The court found
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where the Lummi Nation reacquires Case Area land, it only reacquires
Winters rights which were perfected by the non-Lummi successor
through due diligence.
Nathan Whitney

STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Water, 1 CA-CV 04-0491, 2005
Ariz. App. LEXIS 108 (Ariz. App. Sept. 1, 2005) (holding that Arizona's
statutes do not require a physical diversion for a valid appropriation of
instream water rights).
The United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") applied to the
Arizona Department of Water Resources ("ADWR') for a permit to
appropriate the waters of Cherry Creek, a tributary of the Salt River
located in the Tonto National Forest. The permit would grant the
Forest Service the right to certain instream flows for fish, wildlife, and
recreation purposes. The ADWR issued a notice to interested parties
concerning their right to file protests to the Forest Service's application. Phelps Dodge Corporation ("Phelps Dodge") filed a protest to
the Forest Service's application. Phelps Dodge argued that the ADWR
may not issue a permit for instream flows because the ADWR had no
explicit statutory authority to issue such permits, and that the ADWR
violated the Arizona Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by relying
upon the Guide to Filing Applications for Instream Flow Water Rights
in Arizona ("1991 Instream Flow Guide") without promulgating it as a
rule.
The ADWR referred the protest to the Office of Administrative
Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on
whether the ADWR had the authority to issue permits for instream
rights. The ALJ concluded that the ADWR had the authority to issue
permits to appropriate water for instream flows, and on appeal, the
Superior Court in Maricopa County affirmed. Phelps Dodge appealed
to the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, Department D.
Phelps Dodge argued that under a prior appropriation system, a
physical diversion of water is an essential element of an appropriation,
and that the legislature implicitly adopted the diversion requirement
into Arizona's statutory scheme. Since an instream water right does
not involve a physical diversion, Phelps Dodge contended it may not be
a valid appropriation of water necessary to effect a water right. Therefore, Phelps Dodge reasoned the ADWR was without authority under
Arizona law to issue instream water rights. In response, the ADWR
argued that Arizona statutes conferred the necessary authority to issue
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instream water permits, and that Arizona's prior appropriation system
did not require an actual physical diversion of water where no diversion was necessary, to put the water to beneficial use.
The court reviewed Arizona's statutes concerning general water usage rights to decide whether the ADWR had the authority to issue the
permit and if a physical diversion was a necessary element for a valid
appropriation. In interpreting the statutes, the court assessed the legislative intent of the statutes and examined their historical background,
effects, consequences, spirit, and purpose.
The court found that under the statutory scheme, beneficial use
was the basis, measure, and limit to the use of water, and that beneficial uses included recreation, wildlife, and fishing. In addition, the
court determined that surface waters of lakes, ponds, or streams are all
subject to appropriation and beneficial use. However, the court noted
that the sections defining an acceptable appropriation and beneficial
use did not explicitly refer to either instream flows or a diversion requirement.
When looking at the historical context of the statutes, the court
found that the focus of early.water use law concerned the appropriator's intent to use, and that diversion was acknowledged only as a practical necessity for irrigation and other off-site uses. The court noted
Arizona common law did not require that a diversion occur for an appropriation to be valid. Additionally, the court stated that Arizona's
common law principles regarding notice to effect an appropriation,
abandonment, or forfeiture of a water right did not reference a diversion requirement. The court concluded the statutory analysis by stating that had the legislature intended to require a diversion for a successful application for a water use permit, it could have done so in the
applicable statutes.
The court acknowledged that it should award great deference to
ADWR's interpretation of Arizona's water law. The court reasoned
that absent clear statutory guidance to the contrary, the ADWR decision should not be overturned since the ADWR has consistently interpreted the statutes and made decisions regarding instream flow rights
since 1983.
The court briefly addressed Phelps Dodge's argument that ADWR
violated the APA and negated its authority to issue a permit by applying the 1991 Instream Flow Guide without codifying it as a regulation.
Although Phelps Dodge did not adequately address the issue on appeal, the court held that ADWR did not violate the APA. The court
noted that ADWR adopted the 1991 Instream Flow Guide as a substantive policy statement in accordance with Arizona Revised Statute § 411091, and that the statute permits an agency to adopt a written expression that "informs the general public of an agency's current approach
to, or opinion of, the requirements of... [the]state statute."
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The court affirmed the district court's holding that Arizona statutes
do not require a physical diversion for a valid appropriation of instream water rights. The ADWR thus had the authority to issue permits
for instream water rights under Arizona law.
JamesE. Downing

CAIFORNIA
City of Burbank v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 108 P.3d 862 (Cal.
2005) (holding that regional water quality boards may not consider
economic factors to justify restrictions that are less stringent than federal standards, and therefore publicly operated waste water treatment
facilities must comply with the federal Clean Water Act, but California
law allows regional water quality boards to consider economic factors
when deciding whether to make pollutant restrictions in a waste water
discharge permit more stringent than federal law requires).
Three publicly owned treatment plants discharge wastewater under
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits
issued by the Los Angeles Regional Board. Together the Donald C.
Tillman and Los Angeles-Glendale Water Reclamation Plants, owned
and operated by the City of Los Angeles, and the Burbank Water Reclamation Plant, owned and operated by the City of Burbank ("Cities"),
process and release hundreds of millions of gallons of sewage each day.
The treated wastewater released is sufficiently safe for watering crops
and human contact. California's State Board and nine Water Quality
Control Boards ("Boards") are responsible for coordinating and controlling California's water quality. Prior to 1998, the Boards enforced
effluent limitations and standards under the federal Clean Water Act
by issuing NPDES permits containing broad statements of desirable
water quality goals. This controversy arose in 1998 when the Board
sought to replace the narrative water quality criteria with specific numeric pollutant concentrations.
The Cities filed petitions for writs of administrative mandate in Superior Court, alleging the Board failed to comply with Sections 13241
and 13263 of California's Porter-Cologne Act ("Act"), requiring Boards
to consider the economic burden on Cities having to substantially reduce the pollutant content of their discharged wastewater. Additionally, the Cities claimed that compliance with the numeric pollution
restrictions would collectively increase their treatment costs by $68.7
million per year. The Board responded that sections 13241 and 13263
do not require Water Quality Control Boards to consider compliance
costs when issuing a NPDES permit that restricts the pollutant content
of discharged water. The trial court stayed the contested pollutant
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restrictions. The Board appealed, and the Court of Appeal of California reversed.
In deciding whether Boards must consider a wastewater treatment
facility's compliance costs when issuing a NPDES permit, the Supreme
Court of California examined the statute governing the Board's issuance of wastewater permits, the Act. Section 13263 of the statute prescribes water quality requirements of wastewater discharge, and makes
express reference to the provisions of Section 13241. Section 13241
lists several factors regional boards shall consider in establishing water
quality objectives, including economic considerations. The court
found the plain language of Sections 13263 and 13241 indicated the
Legislature's intent that the regional boards consider the cost of compliance when setting effluent limitations in a wastewater discharge
permit.

However, the court further analyzed Sections 13263 and 13241
within the context of the Act's statutory scheme. Enacted shortly after
the adoption of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,
the Court found that Section 13377 specifies that water discharge permits issued by California's regional boards must meet the federal standards set by federal law. Moreover, under Article VI of the United
States Constitution ("Supremacy Clause"), a state law that conflicts with
federal law is without effect. Thus, the Court concluded that California law cannot authorize what federal law forbids.
Because California's Porter-Cologne Act and federal law require
regional boards to comply with federal clean water standards, and because the Supremacy Clause requires state law to yield to federal law,
regional boards may not consider economic factors to justify restrictions that are less stringent than federal standards require. Rather,
wastewater treatment plants must comply with federal clean water
standards regardless of cost. However, California law allows regional
boards to consider economic factors when deciding whether to make
pollutant restrictions in a wastewater discharge permit more stringent
than federal law requires. The court remanded the matter as to
whether the numeric pollutant restriction set out in the NPDES permits meet or exceed the requirements of the federal Clean Water Act,
and whether the Boards should have complied with Sections 13241 and
13263 of the Porter-Cologne Act by considering economic factors.
CharlesP. Kersch, Jr.

Coshow v. City of Escondido, No. D045382, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS
1484 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2005) (holding there is no violation of a
fundamental constitutional right when the Safe Drinking Water Act
regulates drinking water standards, and that the City's choice of hydrofluorosilicic acid is a function of the legislature, and fluoridation is not
forced medication so there is no violation of the right to privacy or
bodily integrity).
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Paul Coshow and several residents of Escondido, California
("Coshow") sued the City of Escondido ("City") and California Department of Health Services ("Department") challenging the City's
plan to fluoridate its drinking water with hydrofluorosilicic acid
("HFSA"). Coshow claimed the use of HFSA violated his constitutional
rights and exposed the public to unnecessary health risks. The trial
court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the City and Department after finding Coshow failed to state a cause of action for declaratory or injunctive relief. Coshow appealed on six main points.
Coshow filed his first complaint in September 2001, and subsequently filed four amended complaints. The relevant pleading for this
case is the fourth amended complaint, challenging the constitutionality of using HFSA to fluoridate the City's public water supply. Coshow
claimed the City's fluoridation plan violated his fundamental rights
under the state and federal constitutions because the City planned to
use HFSA without his informed consent. In addition, Coshow asserted
the contracts signed by City were illegal and void for violating his constitutional rights.
The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One upheld the decision of the Superior Court of San Diego in
refusing Coshow's cause of action for declaratory or injunctive relief
based on a violation of a fundamental constitutional right. In making
this decision, the trial court evaluated the state Safe Drinking Water
Act ("SDWA") and its implementing regulations, the legislature's effect
on the City's choice of HFSA as a fluoridation agent, and Coshow's
claim for violation of the right to privacy or bodily integrity.
Congress enacted the federal SDWA to reduce contamination of
drinking water and to establish uniform quality standards for the public water system. State drinking water laws cannot be less stringent
than those established by the Environmental Protection Agency. California's legislature enacted the state SDWA in 1976, adopting procedures that would ensure water delivered by the public water systems is
pure, wholesome and potable at all times. The purpose of the SDWA is
to be more protective than the minimum federal standards. The legislature delegated the responsibility for establishing drinking water standards, including determining the maximum levels of contaminants, to
the Department in the SDWA. To ensure the City's compliance with
the standards set forth by the Department, the SDWA sets forth a permitting system to operate public water systems, regulate the quality of
the water supply, enforce regulations, and if necessary, impose penalties.
In September 1996, the legislature added a section to the SDWA
requiring fluoridation of public water systems with at least 10,000 service connections to promote public health through the maintenance
of dental health. Coshow challenged the manner of fluoridation set
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forth by the SDWA and its implementing regulations, which established the concentration of fluoride in drinking water supplied to the
public. The SDWA provides strict compliance and reporting requirements in regulating fluoridating water systems. However, it is not
mandatory that water be completely free of contaminants when there
are maximum contaminant levels ("MCL's") and detection limits.
HFSA met the standards of the American National Standard Institute/National Sanitation Foundation Standard 60 and therefore, the
statutory and regulatory schemes allow HFSA as a fluoridating agent if
it complies with MCL's and detection limits for the contaminants it
contains.
Coshow protested the choice of HFSA as a fluoridating agent. The
legislature chooses the fluoridating agent and the court does not have
the authority to exercise its independent judgment with respect to the
performance of legislative functions. Under the SDWA, the Department has the authority to approve the method of fluoridation. The
court held that Coshow should have brought his challenge to the use
of HFSA at the administrative level due to the procedures the SDWA
establishes to ensure public water systems deliver pure and safe water.
The court determined that Coshow could not state a claim for violation of the right to privacy or bodily integrity. The court found no
fundamental constitutional right exists because neither the state nor
federal constitution guarantees a right to a healthful or contaminantfree environment. In addition, the court established that using HFSA
is not forced medication because Coshow can choose not to ingest
HFSA by refusing to drink the water. Finally, the court determined
that fluoridation with HFSA satisfies the rational basis test under due
process principles. The challenged action is primarily concerned with
health and safety, therefore no fundamental right is at stake. The legislature mandates and regulations permit the actions to fluoridate the
public drinking water with HFSA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
trial court's judgment on all accounts.
Tracy M. Talbot
Cmtys. for a Better Env't v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 34 Cal. Rptr.
3d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the 2000 permit for the
Golden Eagle Refinery is valid because a water quality-based effluent
limit does not always have to be numeric, and affirming the trial
court's decision that the environmental groups were not entitled to
mandate relief because the standard of review must extend appropriate
deference to administrative agencies and their technical expertise in
determining that (1) the permit did not violate the antibacksliding
provisions of the Clean Water Act and (2) the permit schedule of compliance was valid).
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Communities for a Better Environment and San Francisco Bay
Keeper (collectively "environmental groups") appealed the decision of
the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco denying a
petition for a writ of mandate challenging the issuance of a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit to Tesoro
Refining and Marketing Company ("Tesoro"). Tesoro owned the
Golden Eagle Refinery ("the Refinery") near Avon, California. The
Refinery, a gasoline and diesel fuel producer, discharged treated
wastewater containing dioxins into the Suisun Bay. In their appeal, the
environmental groups raised three issues: (1) the 2000 permit issued
to the Refinery violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and federal
regulations because it failed to set a numeric "water quality based effluent limit" ("WQBEL") for dioxins; (2) the permit violates the antibacksliding provisions of the CWA because additional permit effluent
limits are generally not allowed to "backslide" in comparison to earlier
ones; and (3) the permit's schedule of compliance is invalid because it
is not authorized by the 1995 basin plan, it violates the CWA, the 10year schedule of compliance is invalid, and it does not fit the definitions of 'schedule of compliance' as defined in statutes and regulations.
The Superior Court agreed with the environmental groups on the
first issue and granted the petition without examining issues two and
three. The Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division One reversed because under the CWA, WQBELs are not always
required to be numeric. This is evident by the fact that three administrative agencies properly approved the amended permit without numeric WQBELs. The court remanded the last two issues for the trial
court to resolve. The trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate on both issues.
The goal of the CWA is to provide regulations to maintain the integrity of the Nation's water biologically, chemically and physically.
Generally, the CWA only allows discharge of pollutants when it complies with a statutory exception, such as an NPDES permit establishing
technology-based and water quality-based effluent limitations for a polluter. The CWA's NPDES permit system establishes water quality standards and water quality criteria and a polluter must comply with effluent limitations to meet these standards. The state assigns a total
maximum daily load ("TMDL") for each point source once the Regional Water Quality Control Board ("Regional Board") grants an
NPDES permit. Here, the NPDES permit governs the Refinery's discharges, which the court reaffirmed with directions to improve the
amount of dioxin waste it dumps into the water. The Regional Board
found that the Refinery reduced the dioxins in their discharge by 85%,
and that even though the Refinery contributes greatly to the high
amount of dioxin in the water, the dioxins also enter the water by atmospheric deposition. Because the Refinery created a reasonable po-
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tential for causing or contributing to the violation of water quality
standards, the State Board concluded that the Regional Board complied with the CWA in assessing that a NPDES permit requires a
WQBEL.
The trial court denied the environmental groups' mandate petition
on issues two and three noting that three administrative agencies - the
Regional Board, the State Board, and the EPA - all reviewed and approved the regulation of dioxins in the Refinery's permit. The legislature charged these agencies with overseeing the NPDES permit program in California and the administrative record supported their findings, analysis, and conclusions. Thus, the permit's compliance schedule did not violate the CWA, the antibacksliding provisions, or the implementing regulations.
The CWA's general prohibition on backsliding disallows a permit
containing less stringent effluent limitations than the comparable effluent limitations in the previous permit. Here, the administrative
agencies determined the proper effluent limitations were not comparable. Thus, the court found the less stringent guidelines in the subsequent permit do not violate the CWA's guidelines on antibacksliding.
During the TMDL preparation, the Refinery's permit allowed it to
discharge waste at current levels, which were not a significant source of
the dioxin problem. After the TMDL is determined, the Refinery will
be required to comply with the new regulations or reduce the dioxin
discharge to zero. The environmental groups argued that this schedule of compliance was invalid for four reasons. First, the trial court
could construe the 1995 basin plan to adapt to interpretations of existing standards due to the Whole Effluent Toxicity Control Policy ("WET
Policy") and three administrative agencies approved the schedule of
compliance. Second, the trial court held that the schedule of compliance does not violate the CWA, as contended by the environmental
groups. Again, the trial court determined the WET Policy authorized a
schedule of compliance for revisions of an existing water quality standard. Third, the environmental groups argued the 10-year schedule of
compliance is invalid, but the trial court concluded that a schedule of
compliance can have a life longer than its corresponding permit. Finally, the trial court determined the schedule of compliance is valid
because it fits within statutory and regulatory definitions.
The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's evaluation of the two
remaining issues. Thus, the court ruled against the environmental
groups on all three issues.
Tracy M. Talbot
Commc'ns Relay Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 1
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a state statute authorized only licensed water well contractors to construct water wells).
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Property owners in Malibu, California applied for permits from Los
Angeles County ("County") to drill water wells on their respective
properties. The County refused to issue the permits, stating only licensed contractors could obtain permits to drill water wells under the
Water Code § 13750.5 ("Code"). The relevant portion of the Code
states, " [n] o person shall undertake to dig, bore, or drill a water well..
. unless the person . . . possesses a C-57 Water Well Contractor's Li-

cense." The property owners filed a petition for writ of mandate with
the Los Angeles County Superior Court to compel the County to issue
the permits, arguing they were exempt from the C-57 licensing requirement under the Contractors' State License Law § 7044(a) ("License Law"). The License Law governs contractor licensing, such as
the C-57 license, and provides an exemption for persons that build on
their own property without the use of a contractor. The trial court
rejected the property owners' argument, reasoning that the License
Law did not provide an exemption to specific license requirements
under other statutes, such as the C-57 license requirement under the
Code, and denied the property owners' writ of mandate. The property
owners appealed the decision to the California Court of Appeal for the
Second District.
The issue on appeal was whether the License Law provided an exemption for owner-builders to the licensing requirement of the Code.
The court looked at the express language of the Code and found it to
be clear and unambiguous because it did not provide any exemption
to the requirement that well builders possess a C-57 license. The property owners argued that, in the building and construction context, the
word "undertake" in the Code "connotes an agreement with another
person," and therefore the Code did not apply to them because they
did not make an agreement with a contractor. The court rejected the
argument, reasoning the statutory language of the Code did not support the property owners' definition.
The property owners next argued that the court must use License
Law to interpret the portion of the Code that discussed a C-57 contractor license because the License Law governs such licenses. Since the
License Law provides an exemption for owner-builders to the licensing
requirement, the property owners alleged they were exempt from the
C-57 licensing requirement. The court denied the argument, noting
the legislative purpose behind the Code was to "protect the public
health and welfare by preventing underground water from being contaminated due to improperly constructed or abandoned water wells."
The legislature enforced this intent by requiring that only qualified
persons build water wells. The court found that the purpose of the
Code could not be effectuated if the License Law exemption was incorporated into the Code.
Lastly, the court rejected the property owners' argument that the
court should read the License Law exemption into the Code because
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the Department of Water Resources issued a regulation incorporating
the License Law exemption into the Code. The court reasoned the
legislature failed to incorporate the regulation into later amendments
to the statute, and an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute
cannot enlarge the scope of a statute.
The court held the Code required builders of water wells to possess
a C-57 license, and upheld the decision of the trial court denying the
property owners' petition for a writ of mandate.
Kate Brewer
Sierra Club v. W. Side Irrigation Dist., 128 CalApp.4th 690 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding a city does not need to consider allocations of
water rights from two separate irrigation districts jointly for purposes of
the California Environmental Quality Act).
The Sierra Club brought suit against two California irrigation districts, the West Side Irrigation District and the Banta-Carbona Irrigation District, (collectively "Districts") alleging the Districts' decision to
assign water rights to the City of Tracy ("City") violated the California
Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). In 1993, the City adopted a
general plan for directing future development, which predicted the
City's population would quadruple over a twenty-year period. The
general plan calculated the City would need an additional 29,000 acrefeet of water to sustain the projected growth. In 2001, as part of the
City's plan to obtain the additional 29,000 acre-feet, the City negotiated with two separate irrigation districts for water rights. Both districts assigned 5,000 acre-feet to the City on the condition that all parties comply with CEQA. In 2002, both districts decided not to prepare
environmental impact reports ("EIR") and instead issued negative declarations.
The Sierra Club claimed the assignments were sufficiently related
to require a joint EIR, and that the Districts' decisions to issue negative
declarations violated CEQA. The trial court ruled the Sierra Club
failed to prove the projects would have a significant impact on the environment, and therefore a joint EIR was not required. The Sierra
Club appealed the decision to the California Court of Appeals for the
Third District.
On appeal, the Sierra Club argued the two water assignments were
one project for purposes of CEQA, and therefore the parties had to
prepare one joint EIR. The court disagreed and ruled that the assignments were two separate projects and entirely independent of each
other. Specifically, the court noted that the Districts did not contemplate the second project as a future part of the first project, and that
the District required approval from different agencies for each project.
Next, the Sierra Club argued the Districts failed to analyze the effect of the assignments as cumulative impacts and therefore violated
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CEQA. CEQA required the City to prepare an EIR if the cumulative
impacts would be significant and if the project's incremental effect
would be considerable when viewed in connection with the effects of
past projects, current projects, and probable future projects. The
court found the Districts had indirectly studied potential cumulative
impacts by looking at ongoing and proposed development plans. The
court found that these studies determined the assignments would have
no significant cumulative impacts, and therefore, the Districts did not
need to prepare an EIR to consider cumulative impacts. In addition,
the court said the mere presence of other projects in the area, which
might cause significant cumulative impacts, was not evidence that the
assignments' impacts would be cumulatively considerable.
The Sierra Club also argued the Districts failed to analyze whether
assigning water rights to the City would cause the City to grow beyond
the growth approved in the general plan. However, the court found
no evidence to support this contention because the City's initial study
clearly states the City would assign the water only to those areas already
subject to the general plan. The court also sharply rebuked the Sierra
Club for using CEQA to cause delays.
Finally, the Sierra Club argued the Districts failed to consider the
possibility of drought because both Districts received water from the
Bureau of Reclamation, which could not guarantee full allotment of
water rights during drought years. Therefore, the possibility existed
during drought years that the Bureau of Reclamation would cut back
the water supply to the Districts, and consequently to the City. However, the court noted that the City's initial study acknowledged the Bureau would cut back deliveries. In fact, the previous environmental
analysis addressed the very situation about which the Sierra Club complained.
Thus, the court held that under the CEQA, the irrigation districts
could separately assign water rights to the City without performing a
joint EIR.
Kathryn Lane Garner
Cal. Earth Corps v. Cal. State Lands Comm'n, No. C041603, 2005 Cal.
App. LEXIS 627 (Cal. App. Apr. 21, 2005) (holding that the California
State Lands Commission's exchange of land held by the public trust
doctrine to allow the city developer to construct a retail complex violated the California Public Resources Code because the exchange did
not enhance the configuration of the shoreline as required by the statute).
California Earth Corps ("Earth Corps") appealed a judgment that
denied its petition challenging the validity of a land exchange agreement ("Exchange") between the California State Lands Commission
("Commission") and the City of Long Beach ("City").
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The Commission exchanged three acres of protected tidelands
owned through the public trust doctrine out of the public trust and to
the City's real party in interest, Developers Diversified Realty ("Diversified Realty"). The City's development plan included construction of a
large multi-use retail complex on the site. The City had previously
covered the three acres in question with dirt and asphalt over 45 years
ago and a main arterial road separated the acreage from the nearby
tidelands.
The Exchange would transfer the land out of the public trust to Diversified Realty in exchange for other tidelands property as mandated
by the California Public Resources Code section 6307 ("section 6307").
The public trust doctrine gives the state ownership of all of the navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them as trustee of a public
trust for the benefit of the citizens. The exchanged-for property consisted of three separate parcels along the Los Angeles River totaling 10
acres.
The Earth Corps subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandate
in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, claiming the Commission's approval of the Exchange violated section 6307, the California
Constitution, and was not statutorily exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") as relied on by the Commission. The
district court denied Earth Corps' petition. The court held that the
Earth Corps failed to show the Commission's actions were either arbitrary or capricious, and found that the Exchange would improve access
and use to the shoreline and water.
On appeal, in addition to the three claims raised in their petition,
Earth Corps argued that the district court erred in using an arbitrary
and capricious standard of review, and the appropriate standard was an
independentjudgment standard of review.
Upon review of the district court's decision, the California Court of
Appeals found that (1) a highly deferential, arbitrary and capricious
standard of review was appropriate, and (2) in granting the exchange,
the Commission lacked evidentiary support required by section 6307.
The court first evaluated the appropriate standard of review. The
court found that the Earth Corps' request for an independent judgment standard of review would have applied only if an administrative
agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity had made a factual determination. However, in approving the exchange, the Commission was an
administrative agency, acting in a quasi-legislative capacity and therefore the lower court appropriately applied the arbitrary and capricious
standard in its decision.
Second, the court determined that the language of the section
6307 only permitted land exchange for situations that create improvements for the public good, and which specifically "enhance the configuration of the shoreline for the improvement of the water and upland." The Commission argued that the Exchange allowed for a rear-
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rangement of the tidelands, but the court found that a simple rearrangement of two parcels of land was not analogous to the statutorily
required "enhancement of the shoreline."
The court, in adopting Earth Corps' argument, found that the requirement of enhancing the configuration of the shoreline required a
specific change to the physical geography of the area or the construction of an improvement to the shoreline. The court held that the Exchange neither changed the physical geography nor added improvement to the shoreline. Therefore, the Commission's finding that the
Exchange enhanced the configuration of the shoreline lacked evidentiary support, and in the absence of such evidence, the court found
that the Commission erred in finding the exchange met the criteria
required by the section 6307. Because the Commission did not meet
the statutory conditions, the Commission lacked the legislative power
to facilitate the exchange of the parcels.
The court reversed the district court's decision and granted Earth
Corp's petition for writ of mandate.
Brandon Saxon
COLORADO
Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 115
P.3d 638 (Colo. 2005) (holding that the plain language of the 1918
decree and referee's report demonstrated that the ditch water right
was for tributary South Platte Basin water, not developed water, and
return flows from the decreed irrigation use belonged to the river system for use by other appropriators).
Ready Mixed Concrete filed an application to quantify and change
its McCanne Ditch water right for use in augmentation. The McCanne
ditch collects water from percolating springs, drainage and seepage
water gathered along the first three miles of its course. Ready Mixed
Concrete's 1918 decree recognizes an appropriation date of March 16,
1892, a rate of flow of 4.0 cubic feet per second for irrigation use on
300 acres, not to exceed 900 acre-feet of water annually. The decree
requires the water remaining after irrigation to be returned to the
South Platte River system directly or by percolation through the soil.
The 1918 McCanne Ditch decree was for irrigation use of seepage waters. Ready Mixed Concrete filed the change application to store water
under the McCanne ditch priority in a newly excavated gravel pit and
release it to the South Platte River to replace evaporation depletions
injurious to other rights from gravel pits the company operates.
Ready Mixed Concrete, by a motion for summary judgment,
claimed entitlement under the 1918 decree to 900 acre-feet of fully
consumable "developed water" for its use by augmentation or replacement, free of the river's call. Several parties, including Farmers Reser-
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voir and Irrigation Co. ("Farmers"), filed statements of opposition.
They claimed the application would alter historic stream conditions as
they had existed under the decreed irrigation use for McCanne Ditch
water. The District Court for Water Division No. 1 denied summary
judgment and dismissed the application when Ready Mixed Concrete
failed to carry its burden of proof to demonstrate historical consumptive use of the McCanne Ditch water. Ready Mixed Concrete appealed
to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
On review, the court turned to the plain language of the 1918
McCanne Ditch decree and the accompanying referee's report. The
court observed that the referee's report and the decree clearly stated
that the decreed use of McCanne ditch water was for irrigation of 300
acres of land, not to exceed 900 acre-feet per year. The decree stated
that, "[a]ny amount greater than what is necessary under the present
method of use to maintain the flow and needs herein established and
limited, shall be delivered into the South Platte River." The "method
of use" referred to by the referee is collection of the water by the ditch
and field irrigation using the water; the "need" referred to is crop production; and the "limitation" referred to is the requirement of returning to the river all water not needed for crop production. Based on
the language in the decree provisions, the court found that the 900
acre-foot volumetric limitation was a condition to prohibit wasteful
irrigation of the 300 acres, and was not intended to be a volumetric
water consumption allowance. The court found that the 1918 decree
and referee's report cannot be read as a whole and given effect unless
water not consumed by the decreed irrigation use for growing crops on
the 300 acres is returned to the stream.
The court also addressed Ready Mixed Concrete's burden of quantifying the beneficial consumptive use made of the McCanne Ditch
water for irrigation of the 300 acres of land. A change of water right
application reopens the prior decree for determination of the true
measure of the appropriative water right's consumptive use draw on
the river system. Ready Mixed Concrete requested a change to the
irrigation right in order to augment surface evaporation from mined
gravel pits. In proposing the change from its prior decree, Ready
Mixed Concrete altered the subject matter, the cause of action, and the
parties affected by the proposed action in contrast to the existing decree. The court held that resjudicata principles of claim or issue preclusion do not apply in a change case to allow Ready Mix Concrete the
benefit of a priority independent of other priorities to South Platte
River water. The court affirmed the water court's judgment.
James E. Downing
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High Plains A & M, LLC v. Southeastern Colo.Water Conservancy
Dist., 120 P.3d 710 (Colo. 2005) (holding that to obtain a decree for a
change of water fight, an applicant must sufficiently demonstrate an
actual beneficial use to be made at an identified location).
The Fort Lyon Canal Company ("FLCC"), a mutual ditch company,
operates an extensive system of canals and reservoirs with decreed water rights in the Arkansas River Basin in southeastern Colorado. The
system provides irrigation water to nearly 93,000 acres of land between
the towns of La Junta and Lamar. High Plains A & M ("High Plains"),
a private water investment company, purchased 20,000 shares in the
FLCC, with options to purchase an additional 8,000 shares, together
constituting roughly 30 percent of all outstanding shares in the FLCC.
High Plains filed two separate applications with the District Court
for Water Division 2 to change the use of its FLCC ownership from
irrigation to municipal and other related uses, as well as for alternate
points of diversion and alternate places of use. High Plains also proposed a change in place of use of the water rights to any one of twentyeight counties located from southeastern to northern Colorado, but
did not identify any particular municipal or quasi-municipal entity with
which High Plains had an agreement for actual beneficial use of the
water.
Multiple parties filed statements of opposition to High Plains's two
applications. The water court consolidated the applications, and High
Plains filed a motion for determination of a question of law pursuant
to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 56(h), arguing that Colorado's
anti-speculation doctrine did not apply to changes of water rights. The
objectors in the case subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that High Plains' applications violated the antispeculation doctrine and that High Plains presented no specific plan
for the water court to assess injury to other water users. At the time the
water court ruled on the motion for summary judgment, High Plains
had obtained no agreements or contracts with other entities to use the
water rights it sought to change.
The water court granted the objectors' motion for summary judgment, holding that the anti-speculation doctrine applied to changes of
water rights, and found High Plains's applications in violation of the
doctrine. The water court found High Plains's application "so expansive and nebulous" that rendering a judicial determination of injury to
other water right holders was impossible. High Plains subsequently
appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court for a determination of
whether Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine applied to changes of
water fights.
On appeal, the court looked to the fundamental requirements for
any appropriation of water in Colorado. Reasoning that a change of
water fight is simply a changed form of the original appropriation, the
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requirements for a change of water right encapsulate the elements of
the original appropriation. The court noted that because appropriators can only perfect water rights by actual use, all water rights have a
situs that includes the point of diversion and the place where actual
beneficial use occurs. In addition, an essential element of a perfected
water right is actual beneficial use of the water appropriated, and the
actual beneficial use of a water right is the basis, measure, and limit of
an appropriation. In a change of use proceeding, the court must ensure that the perfected water right is the one that continues in its
changed form under the new decree.
Further, as a requirement of a valid appropriation of water, Colorado law requires a purported appropriator to have a legally vested
interest, or a reasonable expectation of procuring such interest, in the
land or facilities such appropriation will serve. Therefore, the court
held that as a basic predicate of an application for a decree changing
the type and place of use of a water right, the applicant must sufficiently demonstrate an actual beneficial use at an identified location or
locations under the change decree.
High Plains argued that the water court's decision would prejudice
High Plains's investment, because it could not enter into contracts with
end users until the water court approved the change of its water rights,
thereby diminishing the value of its investment. The court rejected
High Plains's argument of prejudice on several grounds, stating,
among other things, that the purchase of shares in a mutual ditch
company guaranteed only a proportionate interest in the water rights
held by the mutual ditch company and continued delivery of the water
to their historic place of use. The court noted that shares in a mutual
ditch company are valuable assets, and High Plains could use its ownership in the FLCC on lands under the FLCC system "to the benefit of
the local economy and to consumers of agricultural products." Further, according to the court, basic tenets of Colorado water law, which
entitle an owner to a change of water rights, would still apply if High
Plains contracted with other entities to use its FLCC shares. This
would allow High Plains to seek adjudication of a change of water
rights at that time.
In its disposition of the case, the court affirmed the water court's
dismissal of High Plains's applications without prejudice to consideration of future applications for change of the water rights owned by
High Plains in the FLCC.
Donald E. Frick
ISG, LLC v. Ark. Valley Ditch Ass'n, 120 P.3d 724 (Colo. 2005) (affirming the water court's sua sponte summary judgment of a change decree
because the losing party had sufficient opportunity to argue against
dismissal and the shareholder group's members will not lose decreed
water rights when making temporary changes authorized by statute).
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Independent Shareholders Group, LLC ("ISG") is a group of fortyfive ranchers and farmers who owned shares in the largest mutual
ditch company along the Arkansas River. ISG proposed permanent
changes to its water rights but did not specifically identify the location
or the beneficial use of the water under the proposed change decree.
Upon ISG's motion, the District Court Water Division 2 consolidated
ISG's application for a change decree with another similar application.
Subsequently, the Southeastern Water Conservancy District ("Southeastern") moved for summary judgment against the similar application,
but not against ISG's application. The water court dismissed both applications.
ISG appealed the water court's summary judgment of the application directly to the Supreme Court of Colorado based on two arguments. First, ISG claimed that since no party moved for summary
judgment against ISG's application specifically, the water court's sua
sponte dismissal on summary judgment was improper. The court affirmed the water court's sua sponte summary judgment motion by
comparing the unusual procedure to the federal court system. The
court adopted the notion used in federal courts that appellate courts
will affirm a technically flawed summary judgment as long as the losing
party had an opportunity to argue against the dismissal and the losing
party is not subject to undue prejudice. Here, ISG had notice of the
possibility for summary judgment against its change decree, ISG asserted its position on the issues in its own motion, and ISG was not unduly prejudiced. Therefore, the court found the sua sponte summary
judgment was not a reversible error. Additionally, the court affirmed
the water court's award of costs to Southeastern, even though Southeastern had not moved for summary judgment against ISG, because
Southeastern was the adverse party.
ISG's second claim on appeal rests on the argument that its members could lose their historic consumption rates if they make temporary changes through water leases, exchanges, or loans. The court
dismissed this theory by pointing out the numerous legislative concessions which allow for temporary changes to water rights without penalizing the original water appropriator.
In conclusion, the court affirmed the water court's sua sponte dismissal of the change decree without prejudice, allowing for a reapplication, because ISG had an opportunity to present its case against
dismissal and the members would not lose their consumptive rights by
making statutorily authorized short term changes.
David B. Oakley
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E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro.
Dist., 109 P.3d 154 (Colo. 2005) (holding that the anti-speculation
doctrine requiring demonstration of non-speculative, beneficial use
does not apply to nontributary groundwater, and thus affirming a Water Court decree modifying nontributary groundwater rights).
In June 1985, the Colorado District Court, Water Division 1 ("Water Court") issued a decree creating a vested right in the Colorado
State Land Board ("Board") and its lessee to appropriate up to 85% of
the available nontributary groundwater underlying its lands at the former Lowry Range. The 1985 decree granted the Board the right to
develop 85% of the nontributary groundwater, and placed volumetric
and annual appropriation restrictions on each of the wells planned to
develop the right. In September 2002, the Board and Rangeview Metropolitan District ("Rangeview"), successor in interest to the Board's
previous lessee, resurrected an earlier Application for Change of Water
Right, which sought relief from the 1985 Decree's restrictions and the
right to construct additional wells to develop the decreed water right.
East Cherry Creek and the state and division engineers ("Engineers")
opposed the application on two grounds. First, East Cherry Creek argued the requested changes would injure its existing water rights. Second, East Cherry Creek and the Engineers argued that amending the
1985 Decree as requested would entitle Rangeview to withdraw additional water, thus expanding its existing right, without demonstrating a
non-speculative, beneficial use for the water. The Water Court rejected both claims, and decreed a right to the full amount of available
water to Rangeview, subject only to existing statutory and groundwater
rules. East Cherry Creek appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court,
maintaining only its challenge to Rangeview's right to develop additional groundwater without being required to show a non-speculative,
beneficial use.
The Colorado Supreme Court first established the nature and intent of Colorado law governing the establishment of nontributary
groundwater rights. The court noted that an overlying landowner may
establish a vested right to use nontributary groundwater either by constructing a well in accordance with a permit from the state engineer or
by adjudication. A decreed right to nontributary groundwater does
not imply an obligation on the right-holder to construct a well or withdraw and use the decreed water within any specified timeframe. The
court stressed the legislature's intent to enable adjudication of future
uses without requiring current development, as well as the legislature's
reserved right to impose beneficial use restrictions on such rights in
the future.
Next, the court discussed why the anti-speculation doctrine does
not apply to nontributary groundwater. In Colorado Ground Water Commission v. North Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Management Disrict, the court
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held that the anti-speculation doctrine requires a threshold showing of
non-speculative, beneficial use to acquire groundwater rights in designated groundwater basins. However, the court explained that the antispeculation doctrine does not apply to nontributary groundwater outside of designated basins for three primary reasons. First, the protection of potential appropriators is unnecessary because only overlying
landowners have potential development rights. Second, protection
against waste at the adjudication stage is unnecessary because any decreed rights will still be subject to state engineer approval. Third, and
most importantly, to require a threshold showing of non-speculative,
beneficial use would "thwart a clearly expressed legislative intent to
permit adjudication for future uses without a corresponding obligation
to develop them." Finally, the court held the applicants complied with
procedural requirements to adjudicate nontributary rights, so no procedural challenge could undermine the application.
As a result, the court upheld the Water Court's ruling that Rangeview's claim did not require a showing of non-speculative, beneficial
use.
ChristopherJensen
Carbondale v. GSS Properties, LLC, No. 03CA2523, 2005 Colo. App.
LEXIS 1473 (Colo. App. Sept. 8, 2005) (holding that operational conflicts allowing for the preemption of local watershed ordinances by
state or federal law were matters of fact to be resolved through the evidentiary record).
In 1999, GSS Properties, LLC ("GSS") purchased a fifty-five acre
parcel located above Carbondale, Colorado's Nettle Creek water plant.
When GSS began construction and earthmoving activities on the property, it used herbicides and other chemicals to eradicate noxious
weeds. In 2001, the town of Carbondale ("Town") sued GSS seeking
damages and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The Town
alleged that GSS's construction activities led to a rupture of the Town's
water main and that GSS's use of chemicals and herbicides constituted
a public nuisance that the Town's watershed ordinance entitled it to
abate. In 2003, GSS moved to amend its answer to the Town's complaint to add an affirmative defense that state law preempted the
Town's ordinance. The trial court denied the motion, stating that it
would "substantially change the nature of the trial and put the trial
date in jeopardy."
At a bench trial, the court addressed whether the Town could enjoin GSS's use of herbicides and chemicals as allowed by its ordinance.
The trial court, based on its denial of GSS's motion to amend, refused
to allow GSS to introduce evidence regarding state and federal standards for water quality and agricultural use of chemicals, or evidence
regarding the Town's authority to enforce its ordinance. The trial
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court found for the Town, ordering GSS to cease using chemicals in
violation of the Town's ordinance. GSS appealed, claiming that the
trial court erred in denying GSS's motion to amend and precluding
the introduction of evidence regarding the preemption of the Town's
ordinance by state and federal law.
In its review of the case, the Colorado Court of Appeals addressed
GSS's contention that five state statutes preempted the Town's ordinance. The Town claimed that even if the trial court's preclusion of
GSS's evidence was in error, the ordinance did not conflict with the
statutes and therefore the error was harmless. The court noted that
ordinances may be within a municipality's authority to enact but might
be invalid due to conflict with state law. The court stated a three-part
test to determine whether an ordinance might conflict with, and therefore be subject to preemption by state law. First, the language of the
statute might expressly indicate state preemption of local authority.
Second, an implied preemption may exist based on the legislature's
intent in passing the statute. Third, the operational effect of a local
ordinance may conflict with or materially impede the application of a
state statute, partially preempting the ordinance. The court concluded
that none of the five statutes GSS cited expressly or impliedly prohibited all local authority over their subject matter. However, the court
pointed out that an operational conflict may exist between any one of
the cited statutes and the Town's ordinance.
In its review of the Colorado Water Quality Control Act
("CWQCA"), the court noted that an operational conflict might exist
even though the Town's ordinance imposed more stringent requirements than those under state law rather than allowing activities prohibited by state law. The trial court precluded GSS from introducing any
evidence of an operational conflict between the ordinance and the
CWQCA. The trial court also precluded introduction of any evidence
of an operational conflict between the ordinance and the Colorado
Drinking Water Quality Act ("CDWQA"). The CDWQA states that the
standards for the quality of water supplied to the public shall not be
more stringent than those of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act. The
court remanded to allow GSS to present evidence showing an operational conflict for both statutes.
The court also pointed out that the trial court's preclusion of GSS's
evidence prohibited GSS from showing that its pesticides were acceptable under state and federal law. In regards to the Pesticide Applicator's Act, the court concluded that GSS might have been able to make
an evidentiary showing that its use of agricultural chemicals was consistent with state and federal regulation of drinking water supplies.
The remaining two statutes might also have an operational conflict
with the Town's ordinance. One of the statutes allows local governments to protect groundwater drinking water supplies so long as its
regulation was in accordance with state and federal law. The other
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statute requires that in order for a court not to find a certain practice a
public nuisance, the practice must be reasonably associated with agricultural production. The court again concluded that the trial court's
preclusion of GSS's evidence prevented it from determining whether it
could find an operational conflict that would preempt the local ordinance by state and/or federal law.
The court concluded that identifying an operational conflict was a
matter of fact that must be resolved using the evidentiary record. The
court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
William S. Hoebel, III
CONNECTICUT
Osborn v. Town of Easton Conservation Conm'n, No. CV030406547S,
2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 999 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2005) (holding the Easton Conservation Commission's regulations do not require
a public hearing for the Commission to grant an inland wetlands permit to conduct a regulated activity, when the activity did not have a
significant impact on the wetlands).
Leslie and William Osborn ("Osborn") filed suit in the Superior
Court of Connecticut to appeal the Easton Conservation Commission's
("Commission") grant of a building permit to property owner Paul
Russo and builder Rami Rachamkin. Osborn sued the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection, the Commission, Russo, and
Rachamkin (collectively "CDEP"), alleging the Commission abused its
own discretion by not requiring a public hearing before granting the
permit and that the permit was incomplete. Osborn had statutory
standing to bring the appeal because Osbom owned property abutting
the proposed building site.
Easton, Connecticut's Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Regulations require a public hearing for an inland wetlands permit when the
"application involves a significant activity which may have a significant
impact on the area for which the application has been filed." CDEP's
application involved the construction of a house within a designated
inland wetlands area. The court evaluated the application to determine whether the construction of a house qualified as a significant
activity. A significant activity can include: (1) deposition or removal of
material that will have a major effect on the inland wetland; (2) a substantial change to the natural channel or natural dynamics of a watercourse system; (3) substantial diminishment of the natural capacity of
the inland wetlands to support wildlife and prevent flooding; (4) an
activity which causes siltation or sedimentation in the wetlands; or (5)
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an activity which destroys unique educational or scientific value of the
inland wetlands.
The court held the construction of the house did not create a significant impact based on any of the significant impact factors. Citing
past decisions, the court held an "activity that merely impacts or affects
wetlands is not a significant activity." Accordingly, the Commission did
not have to hold a public hearing. The court also noted that the Osborns were present and able to communicate their concerns about the
permit during the Commission's regular meetings.
After finding no requirement for a public hearing to grant the
permit, the court analyzed whether the permit was complete. A complete permit required a proper application and a record of why the
Commission granted the permit. The court does not require specific
reasons for granting the permit if the record contains substantial evidence supporting the conclusion to approve the permit.
In finding the permit was complete and the record was sufficient,
the court looked at the entire application process and the restrictions
placed on building permit as granted. The Commission met four
times to discuss the permit application. During the meetings, the
Commission and Osborn communicated concerns about how the proposed building would affect the inland wetlands. Between meetings,
Rachamkin revised his application to address the concerns of the
Commission. To comply with the Commission's grant of the permit,
Rachamkin reduced the proposed size of his house, changed the location, and agreed to build a silt fence and stone wall to protect the
inland wetlands. Rachamkin also provided the Commission soil science reports showing that the building site was suitable. The court
found this evidence sufficient to consider the permit complete.
The court dismissed the appeal holding no public hearings were
required and the permit was complete.
ThomasJantunen
Ace Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2005) (reversing adoption of the civil law rule that afforded an inherent riparian
right by virtue of abutting property ownership).
Ace Equipment Sales, Inc., Willington Fish and Game Club, LLC,
and Willington Fish and Game Club, Inc. (collectively "Ace"), were
owners in fee simple of ninety-nine percent of the bed underlying a
man-made, non-navigable pond formed by a dam that impounded waters from a non-navigable brook. Thomas and Irma Buccino ("Buccinos") owned the dam and downstream mill property that abutted the
southwesterly end of the pond. The Buccinos' deed contained an
easement for flow rights to use pond water for industrial purposes and
a right-of-way across Ace's property for pond access. The deed also
required that the Buccinos maintain minimum water levels in the
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pond. Ace licensed the pond to Willington Fish and Game Club for
recreational purposes but never gave permission to the Buccinos to use
the pond for the same.
In 1999, the Buccinos began leasing the rights to use the pond for
recreational purposes. In response, Ace brought suit in the Superior
Court, Judicial District of Tolland seeking to enjoin the Buccinos' recreational use as well as damages for trespass. The Buccinos counterclaimed, requesting a determination of their rights to use the pond.
The court found in favor of the Buccinos and adopted the civil law rule
that affords riparian rights as an incident to ownership of abutting
land, irregardless of underlying bed ownership or navigability. Under
this rule, all abutting property owners have a right to make reasonable
use of the entire surface in common with all other abutting property
owners. The Appellate Court of Connecticut affirmed the lower
court's ruling.
The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Ace's
appeal. Ace asserted that the lower courts erred by adopting the civil
law rule of riparian rights. Instead, Ace advocated adoption of the
common law rule that grants exclusive riparian rights to the owners of
an entire bed of a non-navigable body of water. In such cases, riparian
rights do not extend to abutting land owners. Ace also claimed that
the Buccinos had no right to enter and use the pond for recreational
purposes, because the Buccino's deed limited their access and use to
industrial purposes. The Buccinos countered with the arguments that:
(1) the pond had become a natural body of water because it had existed for a long period of time, (2) navigability or lack thereof is irrelevant to riparian rights, and (3) the easement granted recreational use
as an extension of their rights and duties as the dam owners.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found no compelling policy rationale for adopting
the civil law rule, and noted those states that adopted the civil law rule
tended to have an extensive number of natural lakes and a policy for
favoring maximum recreational use. Connecticut lacked topography
requiring a departure from the common law rule. Connecticut also
has a strong policy of protecting private property rights.
The court declined to rule on the relevancy between man-made
and naturally occurring bodies of water and instead based its decision
on the distinction between navigability and non-navigability for common law purposes. The court concluded that Ace's ownership of the
underlying bed of a non-navigable pond afforded them an absolute
right to exclude the Buccinos' recreational use. The court further
held that the Buccinos' deed restricted their pond use to industrial
operations.
The court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the factual issue of
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whether the Buccinos owned one percent of the underlying bed and
the rights that accompany such ownership.
Michael Graetz

DELAWARE
Wien v. Delaware, 882 A.2d 183 (Del. 2005) (holding that a statute requiring a permit for wetland activity was not unconstitutionally vague
because states have legitimate power to regulate private riparian rights
and that requiring a permit for activity is not an absolute prohibition
of access to navigable waters).
Under the Delaware Wetlands Act, portions of appellant Daniel
Wien's land fell within the definition of "wetlands." The statute prohibits a person from constructing any structure on wetlands without a
permit. Wien was aware of the wetland designation, but proceeded to
build a concrete "erosion barrier" on a wetland portion of his land.
The Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control
("DNREC") issued a cease and desist order, but only after the barrier
was over 400 feet long.
Following the receipt of a complaint about activities on Wien's wetlands, a DNREC officer determined that appellant did not have any
permits for wetland activity, and went to observe appellant's property.
From the road, the officer could see the barrier, which was made of
forty-pound bags of concrete. The Superior Court charged and convicted Wien for conducting activity on wetlands without a permit.
On appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Wien contended that
the statute at issue was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Wien
asserted that the statute was vague and overbroad because (1) it unnecessarily restricted his constitutional right to access navigable waterways, (2) it did not precisely define the term "construction," and (3) it
did not provide minimum guidelines for enforcement. The court
found that because Delaware has legitimate power to regulate private
riparian rights, the Wetlands Act did not regulate constitutionally protected conduct. The statute does not prohibit access to navigable waters; it merely requires a landowner to obtain a permit before conducting activities on wetlands. The court also held that although the statute did not specifically define "construction," the general public understands the ordinary meaning of the term and the statute is therefore not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, by articulating six criteria
that the DNREC must consider when issuing wetland permits, the statute satisfied the constitutional requirement that legislative mandates
provide adequate standards to guide discretion. The court affirmed
the Superior Court's conviction on all three counts.
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Wien also asserted that the lower court made evidentiary errors and
gave improperjury instructions, but the court dismissed these claims.
Andrew L. Ellis

IDAHO
A & B Irrigation Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls Ground Water Dist.
(In re SRBA Case No. 39576), 118 P.3d 78 (Idaho 2005) (holding appellant's claim for superior enlargement of an existing groundwater
right failed whether the water at issue was groundwater or waste or
drain water because all proposed enlargements cause per se injury to
junior appropriators, and therefore, even if the water was treated as
groundwater, the statute required subordination of the enlargement to
water rights established prior to the statute's enactment).
Appellant A & B Irrigation District ("A & B") had the right to divert
1,100 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of groundwater from the Eastern
Snake River Plain Aquifer for the irrigation of more than 62,000 acres
in Jerome and Minidoka Counties. Due to the geographic layout and
soil conditions of A & B's land, A & B did not consume all of the 1,100
cfs for irrigation. A portion of the irrigation water became runoff and
collected in ponds and drains at the end of A & B's fields. Beginning
in March 1963, A & B used some of this captured runoff to irrigate
land not included within the scope of its water right.
In November 1984, A & B and its predecessor in interest, the
United States Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), filed an application
with the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") for an expansion of their right to irrigate an additional 2,363.1 acres of land
with the excess run-off. A & B and BOR subsequently withdrew the
1984 application, due to the enactment of Idaho Code § 42-1416. This
new statute provided a rebuttable presumption in favor of water right
holders who expanded their water rights in violation of Idaho's statutory permitting scheme, but who caused no injuries to other water
right holders in doing so. Seeking a formal decree of the enlarged
right, A & B and BOR filed an application in the Snake River Basin
Adjudication ("SRBA'). In 1992, IDWR recommended approval of A
& B and BOR's requested enlargement, subject to determination of
the enlargement's priority dates based on evidence of when A & B
started using the extra water.
In February 1994, the SRBA court held Idaho Code § 42-1416(2)
unconstitutional, and the Idaho Legislature subsequently enacted
Idaho Code § 42-1426. Section 42-1426 granted amnesty for enlargements where there was no additional diversion and no injury to junior
appropriators. Where either additional diversion or injury to junior
appropriators occurs, section 42-1426 required subordination of the
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enlarged rights to junior rights. In 1996, the Idaho Supreme Court
held section 42-1426 constitutional in Freemont-Madisonv. Idaho Ground
Water Appropriators.
In September 1997, IDWR filed an Amended Director's Report to
reflect the holding in Freemont-Madison. This report recommended
approval of A & B and BOR's enlargement application subject to subordination to all junior rights appropriated prior to April 12, 1994, the
date Idaho's legislature enacted section 42-1426.
In January 2001, appellees Ralph E. Breeding, Tim Deeg, and the
Estate of Mack Neibaur (collectively "Groundwater Users") and Idaho
moved for partial summary judgment against A & B. The special master determined that the source of A & B's enlargement right was
groundwater, and that the enlargement right's priority date should be
the date of the water's first beneficial use, subject to IDWR's April 12,
1994 subordination recommendation. The Snake River Basin Adjudication Court of the Fifth Judicial District affirmed the special master's
determination and rejected A & B's motion to reconsider. A & B appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.
On appeal, A & B challenged the district court's determination
that the source of its enlargement was groundwater. It argued instead
that, following irrigation, the water collected with other diffuse water
in irrigation drains and thus transformed into "waste" or "drain" water
independent from appropriated groundwater. A & B further argued
the court should grant its enlargement amnesty under section 42-1426.
The Groundwater Users countered that the district court correctly determined the source of the enlargement to be groundwater, and that
the enlargement should not be granted amnesty because section 421426(2) required that the source of an enlarged right must be tied to
the diversion of an existing right.
The court held that, whether or not the source of A & B's enlarged
right was waste or drain water or groundwater, A & B was not entitled
to a superior enlargement of its original water right.
The court analyzed the enlargement as if its source were waste or
drain water. Section 42-1426 specifically allows for declaration of new
water rights only for enlarged uses of existing water rights. Since A & B
claimed its enlargement would use waste or drain water independent
from its appropriated groundwater, the court held that treating the
water as anything other than groundwater would require A & B to apply for a new water right for that source prior to any future use on A &
B's 2,363.1 acres.
The court held the district court properly determined the source of
the enlargement was groundwater, stating, to the extent IDWR or the
district court can identify the source of the appropriated water, the
water retains that characterization. Thus, the court held the district
court properly treated the water as groundwater under the original
right and applied the law applicable to enlargements.
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The court applied both section 42-1426(2) and section 42-1416 (repealed) to A & B's proposed enlargement, treating the source of the
enlargement as groundwater. Both sections prohibit a proposed
enlarged water right that injures junior appropriators. The court held
that, under the Freemont-Madisondecision, proposed enlargements constitute per se injuries to junior appropriators. Treating A & B's proposed enlargement as a per se injury to junior appropriators, the court
ruled that section 42-1426(2) requires that an injurious enlargement
must become subordinate to a junior right by advancing its priority
date to a date one day later than the junior appropriator's priority
date. The court also noted that, even though the district court declared section 42-1416 unconstitutional, A & B still would not receive
the statute's rebuttable presumption because of its per se injury to junior appropriators. In applying both the current and repealed version
of the Idaho statute, the court held all proposed enlargements must be
subordinate to junior rights, since a per se injury to junior appropriators
cannot by definition be mitigated.
The court held that the Groundwater Users' recommendation in
support of IDWR's Amended Director's Report was a sufficient procedural action to preserve and establish the Groundwater Users' interests
and rights in the case.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Groundwater Users, the
State, and the Groundwater Districts.
ChristopherJensen
ILLINOIS
Valstad v. Cipriano, 828 N.E.2d 854 (II. App. Ct. 2005) (holding the
state's imposition of fees on NPDES permit holders is justified and is
not preempted by the federal Clean Water Act where a legally sufficient justification exists which is reasonably related to the legislative
purpose and it advances the objective of the imposing Act).
The Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 93-32 ("Public
Act"), effective in relevant partJuly 1, 2003. The Public Act added section 12.5 to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act ("Act") requiring
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ("Illinois EPA") to collect annual fees from certain holders of National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permits. In June 2003, the Illinois EPA
requested such fees from Harold Valstad, the owner and operator of
Valstad Quarry, Inc., and 40 other quarry owners (collectively "Valstad"). Valstad paid the fees under protest. In August 2003, Valstad
filed a revised complaint against the Illinois EPA director, Renee
Cipriano ("Cipriano"), the Illinois EPA, and the Illinois State Treas-
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urer alleging, in part, that section 12.5 of the Act violated 1) the uniformity clause, equal protection clause, and the due-process clause of
the Illinois Constitution; 2) the Federal Clean Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act ("CWA") under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution; and 3) regulations promulgated under the
CWA. In September 2003, the Circuit Court of Sangamon County
granted Cipriano's motion to dismiss. Valstad appealed the dismissal
to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.
Valstad argued that section 12.5 of the Act violated the uniformity
clause of the Illinois Constitution because there is no real and substantial difference between private and governmental agencies or between
point sources of pollutants and non-point sources of pollutants. To
survive scrutiny under the uniformity clause, the fee classification must
be based on a real and substantial difference between the people taxed
and those not taxed and bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. Additionally, the scope of
inquiry under the uniformity clause is relatively narrow and the court is
not required to have perfect rationality as to each and every fee payer.
The court rejected Valstad's argument, finding a legally sufficient justification existed for the imposition of fees on aggregate mines holding
NPDES permits, and that a real and substantial difference existed between governmental and private NPDES permit holders.
In support of the first claim, Valstad contended the Act violated the
uniformity clause because no real and substantial difference existed
between private aggregate mines, which are required to have NPDES
permits and pay fees, and Illinois public school districts, which are required to have NPDES permits but are not required to pay fees. Rejecting this argument, the court noted that section 12.5 of the Act specifically excludes the state or any department or agency of the state, as
well as any school district from NPDES permit fees. Furthermore, because the purpose of the Public Act is to increase state revenue for
both the CWA fund and the general revenue fund, imposing a fee on
school districts would not advance the objective of the Public Act. Accordingly, the court found a real and substantial difference existed
between the fee-paying aggregate mines and non fee-paying school
districts that was reasonably related to the legislative purpose of the
Public Act.
Second, Valstad contended that no real and substantial difference
existed between aggregate mines, which constitute point sources of
pollutants, and entities which constitute non-point-sources of pollutants. In its defense, Cipriano explained that the CWA requires point
sources of pollutants to obtain NPDES permits, but it does not require
non-point sources of pollutants to hold such permits. As a result, the
Illinois EPA bears expenses in administering the NPDES permits to
point sources of pollutants whereas it bears no expense on behalf of
non-point sources of pollutants. Furthermore, Cipriano argued if the
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court interpreted the uniformity clause to mandate administration on
non-point sources of pollutants it would defeat the purpose of the Public Act, to increase revenue. The court agreed with Cipriano, finding a
real and substantial difference existed between point sources of pollutants and non-point sources of pollutants that was reasonably related to
the legislative purpose of the Act.
Next, Valstad argued that section 12.5's imposition of fees was not
reasonably related to the purpose of the Act because the $26 million
generated by the imposed fees exceeded the $6.4 million costs of clean
water activities. Rejecting this argument, the court noted the costs of
clean water activities did not reflect the state's total expenditures for
such activities, including overhead and expenditures. Additionally, the
transfer of money from a special fund to a general revenue fund is
generally within the legislature's authority, and Valstad received a
benefit from the expenditures made out of the general revenue fund.
Moreover, the uniformity clause does not require the taxed group to
be the sole or even primary beneficiary of the tax.
Valstad further contended, based on the supremacy clause of the
U. S. Constitution, that the CWA preempts the imposition of fees under section 12.5. First, Valstad argued section 301(o) of the CWA,
which prescribes fees for applications for modification, expressly preempts the imposition of NPDES permit fees. Unpersuaded, the court
held that the requirement of fees under one section of the CWA does
not, by itself, expressly preclude states from imposing fees upon
NPDES permit holders. Valstad's argument that the CWA is so comprehensive so as to exclude any state regulation also did not persuade
the court. Instead, it noted Congress intended that the states retain
much of the authority for administration and enforcement of the
NPDES permit program. Under the same analysis, the court rejected
Valstad's third argument and held that Congress' decision to affirmatively decline to restrict the availability of NPDES permits to those with
thousands of dollars to spare does not preempt the states from imposing NPDES permit fees, reiterating that Congress intended that each
state assume responsibility for its own NPDES program.
Finally, relying on section 123.62 of the Code of Federal Regulation ("section 123.62 "), Valstad argued that the imposition of fees under section 12.5 of the Act is a violation of the regulations promulgated
under the CWA in that it constitutes a revision of the Illinois NPDES
permit program, which requires approval by the United States EPA
administrator. Referring to the language of section 123.62, the court
found that the imposition of permit fees does not rise to the level of
"revision" as implied in that section. For initial approval of a state's
NPDES program, a large amount of information is required; however,
a state is not required to submit its NPDES permit-fee structure at that
time. Accordingly, the court held it would not stand to reason that a
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state would later be required to submit information regarding its permit fees.
Unpersuaded by Valstad's arguments, the court affirmed the motion to dismiss.
Kelly L. Snodgrass

INDIANA
Parkison v. McCue, 831 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the
trial court's grant of summary judgment on grounds that: (1) title to
lands submerged under water reverted to the state; (2) easements over
such lands were terminated; (3) accretion caused title of such land to
revert to original riparian owner free of easements; and (4) constructing piers over beach easements severely limited the rights of riparian
owners and rendered the easement appreciably less useful for other
easement holders).
Lakefront lot owners filed an ejectment and trespass suit when
back lot owners constructed a pier over an easement bordering Clear
Lake. The lakefront lot owners argued that flooding extinguished the
easement bordering lakefront properties and neighboring back lot
owners must remove the pier built over that easement. In response,
Andrew Parkison argued that the back lot owner's easement still existed and that the easement language unambiguously granted pier
rights, or in the alternative, if the language was ambiguous, then evidence showed the grantor's intent to provide pier rights. On motions
for summary judgment from both parties, the Steuben County Superior Court held flooding did not terminate the easement and the plain
language of the easement prohibited construction of a pier. On appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals, Parkison argued that the trial
court erred in determining the scope of the easement because the language of the easement was ambiguous. On cross-appeal, the lakefront
lot owners argued that the trial court erred in finding that flooding did
not extinguish an easement.
The court began by noting that easements over lands with riparian
rights do not necessarily entitle easement holders to use of those riparian rights. The court determined that it must interpret the language of
the deed granting the easement to find which rights the grantor provided for the easement holders. The court addressed the lakefront
property owners' argument to determine if an easement existed to interpret. The court viewed flooding as a temporary condition that subsides as water levels recede. However, because the lakefront lot owners
provided evidence showing the easement in question had been under
water since 2002, the court held that it was not a temporary condition
of flooding. Parkison asserted that the easement over the land re-
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mained, even though the land was under water. The court rejected
this argument, adopting the opinion that title to submerged lands
shifts from the riparian owners to the state while the lands are under
water, extinguishing any easements on those lands. Because Indiana
code provided access to public water for all citizens, there was still a
public lakefront easement on these lands while they remained submerged. However, the state's entitlement to the land terminated the
original easement over that land. If the water levels receded, title to
the land would revert to the riparian owners without the burden of an
easement. The court found the original easement still existed over any
lands not submerged under water.
The court addressed the language of the easement to determine
the rights granted. In interpreting the language, the court found that
the grantor provided dominant easement holders a right to use "for
recreation purposes." The court then considered the meaning of "recreation purposes." First, the court stated that easement holders could
not severely limit the riparian rights of the servient owner. The court
noted that if all easement holders placed piers on the easement, the
midpoint of each pier would be closer than one foot apart. Therefore,
the court found that allowing easement holders to place piers on the
easement would severely limit the riparian rights of the servient owner.
Next, the court noted that an owner of an easement may not render
the easement appreciably less convenient and useful for other coowners. The court noted that piers physically restrict co-owners from
using the beach, a use expressly granted in the easement. Therefore,
the court found that piers would render the easement appreciably less
convenient and useful for other co-owners. Finally, the court held that
placement of piers was not a "recreational purpose."
The court affirmed the trial court's holding that the easement did
not grant the right to build piers over riparian waters.
JonathanP. Long
MASSACHUSETTS
Moot v. Golledge, No. 04-2096, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 220 (Mass.
Super. May 4, 2005) (holding the General Laws of Massachusetts do
not require North Point Cambridge Land Company to obtain a license
to build on the proposed site because the site was comprised of landlocked tidelands that are not subject to the Waterways Act).
John Moot, with officers, directors, and members of the Association
of Cambridge Neighborhoods and Efekta Schools, Inc. (collectively
"Moot") filed a Request for Determination of Applicability with the
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") for a determination
of whether North Point Cambridge Land Company ("NPCLC") had to
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obtain a waterways license before building a new neighborhood. The
intended site of the neighborhood ("Site") was forty-eight acres of
land, thirteen of which were filled tidelands. The DEP had previously
determined twice that the Site included landlocked tidelands that were
not subject to DEP's Waterways Regulation Program. The DEP found
for the third time the Site was located on landlocked tidelands and was
not within an area subject to jurisdiction or licensing. Moot appealed.
At a pretrial conference, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determined the only relevant issue was whether the Site was a landlocked
tideland. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the ALJ
granted NPCLC's motion.
The DEP's Commissioner, Robert
Golledge, adopted the ALJ's decision and Moot appealed to the Superior Court of Massachusetts.
The DEP promulgated a regulation providing that any construction, addition, improvement, or maintenance not previously authorized required a license from the DEP if the project site covered filled
tidelands, except for landlocked tidelands. The court acknowledged
the DEP's wide range of discretion and Moot's burden to show the decision was invalid. The legislature delegated the authority to license
the tidelands to the DEP, so that inhabitants could only use the tidelands for water-dependent projects or another proper public purpose.
Because the legislature instructed the DEP to regulate licensure of
tidelands and because water-dependent uses cannot be located inland,
the court found the DEP did not exceed its authority when it exempted landlocked tidelands from licensing requirements.
Landlocked tidelands are filled tidelands entirely separated from
flowed tidelands by a public way or interconnected public ways before
January 1, 1984, except for the portions of filled tidelands located
within 250 feet of the high water mark, or within any Designated Port
Area. Moot conceded the tidelands were filled, that the Site had not
significantly changed since January 1, 1984, that the Site was not within
250 feet of the high water mark, and not within a Designated Port
Area. However, Moot argued the Site did not constitute landlocked
tidelands because the public way was elevated and open to passage at
ground level. Moot claimed since there was no physical separation
between the Site and the Charles River Basin, the Site was not landlocked. However, the regulation does not require a physical barrier
between filled and flowed tidelands. The regulation required that the
public way must completely divide or isolate the filled tidelands from
the flowed tidelands. The Site's filled tidelands were adjacent to filled
tidelands, and the closest flowed tidelands were 400 feet from the Site.
If a person drew a straight line from the flowed tidelands to the filled
tidelands on the Site, the line would cross one of the two public ways to
get to the filled tidelands. Therefore, the Site satisfied the entirely
separated requirement.
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Moot also argued that Golledge's citation to Opinion of the Justices
was inconsistent with the delegation of licensing authority to the DEP.
However, the court agreed with the Supreme Judicial Court, stating
there was no constitutional barrier to the legislature's right to delegate
authority. The legislature could therefore use its authority to surrender public rights in the tidelands, because neither the public nor the
Commonwealth had an interest in the tidelands. Finally, Moot argued
that NPCLC's predecessor's license to fill in the Site from 1962 had an
express provision, stating that no one could build any structures on the
fill without authorization from the Department of Public Works or its
successors, and the exemption does not apply because of the previous
license. However, the procedures for obtaining a license require a new
license if the use of the site changes. The DEP issues licenses for specific uses but applicants do not have the ability to use the tidelands in
any way they wish. Therefore, NPCLC had to seek a new license for the
Site because they were going to change the use of the tideland. Since
NPCLC wanted to use landlocked tidelands and requiring NPCLC to
obtain a license for the new neighborhood on the Site would not further the DEP's goal to ensure inhabitants use tidelands only for waterdependent purposes, NPCLC was not required to obtain a license.
Accordingly, the court affirmed Golledge's Final Decision.
Tomi L. Hanson
MICHIGAN
Cox v. Musson Sand & Stone, Inc., No. 251936, 2005 Mich. App.
LEXIS 856 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005) (holding failure to show a
correlation between mining activity on adjacent property and water
loss and quality concerns based on diametrically opposed scientific
evidence is insufficient to prove causation).
In 1980, Olivia and Terrence Cox ("Coxes") purchased and built a
home on property that included a pond adjacent to the mining operation of Musson Sand & Stone ("Musson"). The Coxes were aware of
the mining operation, and they initially had no objection to the activity. However, they became concerned when the pond's water level
dropped substantially. Based on an evaluation of the pond, the Coxes
concluded the adjacent mining activity caused the drop in the water
level and changed the direction of the groundwater on the property.
As a result, the Coxes suspended use of the pond for recreation and,
although they never received confirmation that.the drinking water was
unsafe, began using bottled water. Additionally, the Coxes notified
local, state, and federal authorities regarding the mining activities, who
subsequently found the activities to be in violation of permit conditions; however, the mining continued. The Coxes filed suit to recoup
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damages for loss of water quality and quantity as a result of Musson's
mining activities.
To establish scientific support, the Coxes had an environmental assessment performed, which concluded that the drop in the pond's water level and the supposed water quality diminution resulted from the
mining activity. Dr. Huang, an environmental engineer, also performed an assessment and concluded the same. Ron Gallagher, a professor from the University of Toledo, performed a second assessment
and found a minimal effect on the pond as a result of the mining activity and concluded the methodology employed by Huang was inaccurate. Based on testimony presented at trial, the trial court concluded
the Coxes failed to prove causation and damages, and awarded costs
and attorney fees to Musson. The Coxes appealed to the Michigan
Court of Appeals.
The Coxes first alleged the trial court erred in dismissing the nuisance per se claim based on the erroneous belief that loss of water was
not a real damage or injury. The court explained that it gives substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial and
reviews the finding for clear error, but it reviews conclusions of law de
novo. Based on its review of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court held the Coxes' allegation was without merit.
It noted the trial court never concluded that loss of water was not a
compensable injury, and that the Coxes failed to correlate any purported losses in water quantity and quality to the mining activity.
Additionally, the Coxes alleged the trial court erred in failing to
render an equitable decision regarding their environmental claim.
Basing its holding on the trial court's findings, the court held the trial
court did not err. The trial court found no correlation between Musson's property and the Coxes' water conditions. Furthermore, there
was no current testimony from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality regarding the status of Musson's property, and Musson
did not attempt to seek remediation. Finally, at the time of trial, Musson was no longer conducting the mining activities. As a result, there
was no need to order abatement.
Giving substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and
finding no clear error on behalf of the trial court, the court of appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Kelly L. Snodgrass

NEBRASKA
In re Cent. Neb. Pub. Power and Irrigation Dist., 699 N.W.2d 372 (Neb.
2005) (holding the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources lacked
jurisdiction because the legislature had not created an appropriation
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system that addressed direct conflicts between users of surface water
and groundwater that is hydrologically connected).
Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District ("Central")
filed an amended complaint with the Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources ("Department") claiming that groundwater diversions by
registered irrigation well owners in the Platte River watershed deprived
Central of approximately 100,000 acre-feet in annual surface water appropriations. Central asserted that groundwater users were subject to
prior appropriations and requested that the Department order the well
owners to cease unappropriated diversions. The Department dismissed Central's amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction to grant
the relief requested.
On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, Central argued that
the Nebraska Constitution granted the Department jurisdiction to
regulate groundwater users or administer groundwater rights for the
benefit of surface water appropriators. The Department argued that
the Nebraska Constitution limited its authority to the regulation of
surface water and that the legislature statutorily delegated the regulation of groundwater to natural resource districts.
In rejecting Central's argument, the court first noted that Nebraska
had separate systems for distributing and regulating surface water and
groundwater. The court recognized that the Department regulated
surface water appropriators, while natural resources districts regulated
groundwater users pursuant to the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act. Next, the court stated that the Nebraska
Constitution did not address the use of groundwater and that the reasonable use rule historically governed groundwater regulation. Finally,
the court reemphasized its finding in Spear T Ranch v. Knaub that the
legislature had not created an appropriation system to address direct
conflicts between users of surface water and groundwater that is hydrologically connected.
After reviewing the legislative and case law histories, the court
found no authority or rationale for applying the rules of surface water
appropriations to groundwater use. Therefore, the court held that the
Department's authority to regulate surface water appropriators did not
give it authority to regulate groundwater users or administer groundwater rights for the benefit of surface water appropriators. The court
affirmed the Department's dismissal of Central's amended complaint.
JonathanP. Long
Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Neb. Dep't. of Natural Res., 699 N.W.2d 379
(Neb. 2005) (holding that the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources has no common law or statutory duty to regulate groundwater
use or administer groundwater appropriations with respect to surface
water appropriations).
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Spear T Ranch, Inc. ("Spear T") owned a ranch adjacent to Pumpkin Creek in western Nebraska, where it held two surface water appropriation permits for irrigation and raising livestock. Spear T filed an
action against the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources ("DNR")
in the Morrill County District Court, alleging that DNR's failure to curtail groundwater withdrawals within the drainage basin of Pumpkin
Creek caused the water in the creek to become brackish and unsuitable for the uses to which Spear T had a senior right. The district
court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of DNR on all
allegations, and Spear T appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
On appeal, Spear T argued that DNR had both a common law duty
and a statutory duty to protect the rights of surface water appropriators, which DNR negligently breached. In establishing its common law
negligence claim, Spear T relied on the court's decision in State, ex rel.
Sorensen v. Mitchell IrrigationDistrict, which held that "the [s]tate ha [s]
the right to enforce compliance with laws that [will] protect the rights
of all users of water for irrigation purposes." The court held the language did not imply a duty on DNR to resolve conflicts between surface
water appropriators and groundwater users. Instead, the court held
that because statutory and constitutional provisions establish the rights
to appropriate water, such rights are limited in their scope by the language of their creation.
For its claim that DNR had a statutory duty to protect surface water
appropriators, Spear T relied on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-226, which required DNR to "make proper arrangements for the determination of
priorities of the right to use the public waters of the state and to determine the same." DNR argued in response that the Nebraska legislature delegated authority to regulate surface water appropriations to
DNR, but left the regulatory authority over groundwater to individual
water or groundwater districts. The court agreed.
According to the court, Spear T based its statutory cause of action
on the presumption that DNR had a duty to resolve conflicts between
surface water appropriators and groundwater users. However, DNR
has only that authority which the legislature has specifically conferred
upon it by statute or construction necessary to achieve the purpose of
the relevant act. Nebraska has two systems for the distribution of water
resources: DNR regulates surface water appropriators, and natural resource districts regulate groundwater users. For this reason, there was
no statutory authority for DNR to regulate the use of groundwater, and
DNR therefore had no legal duty to resolve conflicts between surface
water appropriators and groundwater users.
Finally, Spear T argued a separate cause of action for inverse condemnation. The Nebraska constitution requires just compensation for
takings of private property. The court upheld the district court's dismissal of the cause of action, reasoning that because DNR did not have
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authority to regulate groundwater users, or administer groundwater
rights for the benefit of surface water appropriators, neither its action
nor inaction amounted to a taking.
In conclusion, the court upheld the district court'sjudgment granting summary judgment in favor of DNR on Spear T's claims for negligently failing to curtail groundwater use and dismissing Spear T's claim
of inverse condemnation.
DonaldE. Frick
Montross v. Burks Ranch, Inc., No. A-03-1164, 2005 Neb. App. LEXIS
165 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2005) (holding that the trial court did not
err in setting an equitable riparian boundary or in dismissing claims of
acquiescence and damages).
Ronald and Janice Montross ("Montrosses") filed this action in the
district court for Hitchcock County, Nebraska, seeking a determination
of the boundary line between their property and that of their adjoining
neighbor, Burks Ranch, Inc. ("Burks"). The Montrosses set forth a
claim for adverse possession; they alleged that the parties and their
predecessors in title recognized that the boundary line between the
properties was the centerline of "the meandering channel of the Republican River," and they sought damages for Burks' alleged trespass
on and removal of trees from their property. Burks filed a counterclaim, seeking to set the legal boundary between the properties at the
northern-most meander line of the Republican River and claiming the
Montrosses' predecessor in title had agreed to that boundary. The
trial court dismissed the Montrosses' claims of adverse possession, acquiescence in a boundary, and damages, and dismissed Burks' crossclaim, holding that there was no evidence supporting any finding of a
mutual agreement or acquiescence in light of an outstanding lease
agreement between the parties and their predecessors in tile. The
trial court set the boundary line at the mean of the river's northernmost and southern-most meander lines. Both parties appealed the
decision.
In 1872, the Republican River represented the boundary line between the Montross property to the north and the Burks property to
the south. In 1935, a flood caused the river to change its course and
begin flowing in an easterly direction to the north of its original channel. By 1943, the Republican River had returned to its original channel. However, a series of flash floods between 1945 and 1952 caused
the river to again flow north of its original channel, where it has remained since. The change in the river's course left approximately 70
to 80 acres of the Montross property lying south of the river channel
and approximately 15 to 20 acres of the Burks property lying north of
the channel. A 1952 survey completed to resolve the boundary dispute
located and marked the north meander line of the original river chan-
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nel. In January 2001, a licensed line surveyor determined the northern-most and southern-most meander lines of the Republican River.
From his findings, he derived a legal description of the Montross and
Burks properties, setting the boundary at the mean between the north
and south meander lines of the river.
In its de novo review, the Nebraska Court of Appeals noted that
under Nebraska law, title to riparian land runs to the thread or center
of the contiguous stream. The thread of a channel is the line that gives
the landowners on either side access to the water whatever its stage
might be, particularly at its lowest flow. Where the thread of the main
channel of a river is the boundary line between two estates and it
changes by the slow and natural processes of accretion and reliction,
the boundary follows the channel. Avulsion occurs when a stream
forming the boundary between two properties suddenly abandons its
old bed and seeks a new one. Such a change of channel does not
change the boundary line. The boundary remains as it was in the center of the old channel. The court reasoned that the avulsive event of
1935 did not effect a change to the boundary between the Montross
and Burks properties. It would remain as it was, in the center of the
old channel rather than shifting to the thread of the new channel.
On appeal, the Montrosses claimed that the boundary should have
been set at the southern-most boundary of their property, the pre-1935
position of the Republican River. This claim suggested that the river
meandered south between 1872 and 1935. The court noted that a
party seeking to have title quieted to him or her on the ground of accretion maintained the burden of proving such accretion by a preponderance of the evidence. The court found no evidence to support the
Montrosses' claim. The court affirmed the rulings of the trial court,
finding no error in recognizing the mean between the meander lines,
rather than the location of the thread of the river, as the most equitable solution for all parties.
William S. Hoebel, III
Edlund v. 4-S, LLC, 702 N.W.2d 812 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005) (holding the
trial court erred in determining that, because no channel was conclusively established as the thread of the stream, the property line lay
equidistant between two main channels of the stream).
Eleanor M. Edlund ("Edlund") brought an action to ascertain and
establish the boundary line between her land and the land of 4-S, LLC
("4-S"), a landowner to her north. The parties agreed that the boundary line between their properties was the thread of the stream of the
Platte River, but disagreed on the location of the thread. Where the
thread of a stream is the boundary between estates and the stream has
two channels, the thread of the main channel is the boundary between
the estates. Holding the evidence to be inconclusive, the District
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Court, Dawson County, determined the boundary to be between two
channels.
The district court found that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that any of the channels exhibited any characteristics establishing it as the main channel or the thread of the stream. The district
court stated that the weight of the evidence established that the Platte
River is composed of at least three main threads. Finding a lack of
conclusive data as to which was the main channel, the district court
determined that the geographical centerline between the thread of the
middle channel and thread of the south channel was the boundary
between the Edlund land and the 4-S land.
Edlund appealed the decision to the Nebraska Court of Appeals,
arguing that the district court erred in finding that the Nebraska Public Power District ("NPPD") survey did not correctly and accurately
depict the location of the thread of the stream of the Platte River, main
channel. Additionally, he alleged that the district court erred in finding that such depiction was not a factual determination by the surveyor, which could conclusively establish the boundary between Edlund's property and the 4-S property.
The NPPD survey, which both parties conceded as genuine and accurate, does not directly determine the location of the thread of the
Platte River, main channel, forming the boundary between Edlund's
property and the 4-S property. Rather, that survey depicts the land and
the river channels immediately to the west of the property and river
channels at issue. The court found that the NPPD survey provided
conclusive evidence that the thread existed in the middle channel on
the property along the western boundary of the land at issue. The
court further determined that the NPPD survey raised a compelling
inference that the thread continued in that channel as it crossed the
boundary and continued between the lands belonging to Edlund and
to 4-S.
Upon the court's de novo review, it concluded that a preponderance
of the evidence supported Edlund's position that the thread of the
stream of the Platte River, main channel, as supported by the NPPD
survey, was located in the middle channel. Therefore, the court reversed that portion of the district court's decision and remanded the
case with directions to quiet title to the disputed property in Edlund,
establishing the northern boundary line at the thread of the stream of
the middle channel, as depicted in the NPPD survey.
Robert Stevens
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NEWJERSEY
Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112
(N.J. 2005) (holding the public trust doctrine requires the Atlantis
beachfront property to be open to the general public at a reasonable
fee for services provided by the owner and approved by the Department of Environmental Protection).
Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. ("Atlantis"), owner of private beachfront
property in Lower Township, NewJersey, filed suit against certain individuals and entities, including New Jersey, seeking to enjoin nonmembers from using Atlantis's beachfront property. Furthermore,
Atlantis sought a declaration that it was not required to provide the
public with access to, or use of, any portion of its property or the adjacent ocean. Raleigh Avenue Beach Association ("Association") subsequently filed an action against Atlantis and other entities claiming violation of the public trust doctrine and seeking free public access
through the Atlantis property to the beach for beach related activities.
The court consolidated the two actions.
The Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), the state
entity with regulatory responsibility in the matter, alleged that Atlantis
engaged in prohibited conduct related to development of the beachfront property. The DEP sought a ruling from the trial court to resolve
the question of whether the beach along the Atlantic Ocean in the
Diamond Beach area was subject to the "public trust doctrine" such
that the public had free access to its use. The "public trust doctrine" is
derived from the English common law principle that the sovereign
holds all coastal land in trust for the people's use.
The trial court held that the public was entitled to a right of horizontal access to the ocean through a three-foot wide strip of dry sand
that the public may utilize at no charge for the purpose of entering
and exiting the area immediately adjacent to the ocean. The court
also held that the public was entitled to limited vertical access to the
ocean. However, the public trust doctrine does not apply to allow the
DEP to regulate the use of the beach area. Finally, the court prohibited Atlantis from charging a fee or otherwise restricting the public's
right to horizontal or vertical ocean access. However, Atlantis could
charge a "commercially reasonable fee" to members of the public who
use horizontal access to swim in the ocean and benefit from such services as lifeguards, equipment, or other facilities provided by Atlantis,
contingent upon DEP approval. New Jersey and the Association appealed. Atlantis moved for clarification.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed the
lower court's order, clarifying the uses available to the public and the
fees Atlantis was entitled to charge for services provided, conditioned
upon DEP approval. However, the Appellate Division held that the
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public may access all the dry sand area, not just the three-foot wide
area as prescribed by the trial court. To this point, Atlantis petitioned
for certification to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The court reviewed the history of the public trust doctrine, from its
origins in Roman jurisprudence to its application in Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass'n. In Matthews, the court articulated the implied
concept from case law that reasonable access to the sea is integral to
the public trust doctrine. Matthews further held that the public trust
doctrine extends to the right to enjoy the dry sand area immediately
adjacent to the sea. Matthews established the framework for application of the public trust doctrine to privately owned upland sand
beaches. The Matthews approach begins with the general principle that
public use of the upland sands is subject to accommodation of the interests of the owner. Additionally, the case sets forth the criteria used
when considering the appropriate level of accommodation including:
(1) location of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, (2) extent and availability of publicly owned upland sand area, (3) nature
and extent of the public demand, and (4) usage of the upland sand
land by the owner.
After applying the Matthews factors to the case at hand, the court
affirmed the Appellate Division ruling.
RogerJ. Lucas
In reAdoption of N.J.A.C. 7:26E-1.13, 871 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2005) (deferring to the expertise of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and upholding regulation N.J.A.C.
7:26E-1.13, making groundwater quality standards the remediation
standards for cleanup of contaminated property).
Federal Pacific Electric Company ("FPEC") and the New Jersey
State Chamber of Commerce ("NJCC") challenged the validity of regulation N.J.A.C. 7:26E-1.13 adopted by the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP") in February 2003. FPEC and NJCC
appealed the adoption of the regulation to the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division. DEP adopted the regulation under the
Brownfield and Contaminated Site Remediation Act ("Brownfield
Act"). The regulation set minimum groundwater and surface water
remediation standards for the cleanup of contaminated property under New Jersey environmental remediation laws. DEP used existing
Ground Water Quality Standards ("GWQS") for the groundwater
remediation standards. FPEC and NJCC challenged the DEP's use of
GWQS, arguing the Brownfield Act required the DEP to promulgate
new, less strict, site-specific standards.
To determine whether the DEP's regulation conformed to the
Brownfield Act, the court looked to statutory language and legislative
history. The Brownfield Act requires standards that minimized poten-
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tial harm to public health, safety and the environment to "acceptable
levels." This was a change from an earlier version of the statute, the
Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, which required minimizing
the potential for harm to the "maximum extent practicable." At the
time of the change, there was a legislative declaration that protection
of public heath and safety and protection of the environment required
strict remediation standards. The legislature also declared that previous strict standards would remain in place. The court found the
change in statutory language was not enough to require the adoption
of less strict remediation standards because the legislative history
showed intent to keep the strict environmental standards in place.
In addition, the court noted that the legislature was fully aware the
DEP was using GWQS as groundwater remediation standards when the
legislature failed to adopt an amendment to the Brownfield Act in June
2003. This amendment would have made the use of GWQS inconsistent with legislative intent and statutory requirements under the
Brownfield Act.
The Brownfield Act authorized the DEP to take into account the
current, planned, or potential uses of the water when creating the
remediation standards. This same legislative and administrative standard applied under the Water Pollution Control Act. DEP promulgated GWQS in 1997 under the Water Quality Planning Act and the
Water Pollution Control Act. GWQS classified water according to current, planned, and potential uses of the water. The court found that
since the legislature used the same standards under both statutes it
intended that enforcement under the two statutes should be the same.
FPEC and NJCC challenged the regulation for failure to use appropriate scientific evidence and failure to avoid redundant conservative estimates as required by the Brownfield Act. The DEP's regulation
added narrative standards to the GWQS and provided for deviation
when the specifically listed number was no longer appropriate according to current scientific information. The administrative regulation
came before the court with a presumption of validity, and the burden
was upon FPEC and NJCC to prove that the regulation frustrated legislative policy or was arbitrary. FPEC and NJCC did not meet this burden since the arguments they made before the court were not clearly
convincing. The court gave deference to DEP's expertise since the
regulation involved a complex technical matter.
The court upheld N.J.A.C. 7:26E-1.13, adopted by the DEP under
the Brownfield Act.
HeatherHeinlein
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OREGON
Coussens v. Stevens 113 P.3d 952 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
where a landowner conveyed land by laying out a plat which details
specific blocks and lots, there is a presumption that any portion of land
not explicitly conveyed in that plat was not part of the conveyance).
A group of residents in the Elk Creek Park subdivision ("Landowners") in the City of Cannon Beach ("City") owned lots in a subdivision
adjacent to Ocean Avenue, which runs parallel to the shoreline of the
Pacific Ocean. All lots owned by the Landowners were on the east side
of Ocean Avenue. Irving and Jeanette Stevens ("Stevens") owned similarly situated oceanfront property outside of the Elk Creek Park subdivision, directly to the south.
The dispute surrounded a disagreement between the parties concerning the Landowners' proposed dune creation, sand grading and
vegetation management plan ("management plan") for the waterfront
area between Ocean Avenue and the mean high tide line. Both parties
claimed title to the disputed area.
In 1903, Otto Kraemer, the former owner of the area, recorded a
subdivision plat that laid out lots along identified streets in the present
day Elk Creek Park subdivision. Kraemer also owned the land west of
Ocean Avenue, but he did not specifically convey that land in the 1903
subdivision deed.
In 1983, the Stevens purchased quitclaim deeds to land south of
the subdivision, including the disputed area west of Ocean Avenue,
from one of the original landowners. In 1988, the Stevens filed an action to quiet title to a large portion of the disputed area west of Ocean
Avenue. In their 1988 action, the Stevens did not personally serve any
party in interest; notification of service was only by publication. The
Clatsop County Circuit Court granted the Stevens a default judgment
quieting title to the land in question.
In 1999, the Landowners formed a Management Association in order to implement the management plan. At that time, after reviewing
the Landowners' plans, the City considered the Stevens to be the owners of the land where the proposed grading was to occur. Prior to approving the plan, the city deemed the Stevens' approval of the project
necessary; however, the parties could not reach an agreement.
The Landowners then filed suit to quiet title in themselves for the
disputed area in Clatsop County Circuit Court. Citing the 1903 charter
document of the subdivision, the Landowners claimed that their lots
extended from Ocean Avenue to the mean high water line of the Pacific Ocean. The Stevens opposed the motion, claiming that they held
superior title to the disputed land either by the 1998 default judgment,
or alternatively by adverse possession. The trial court granted sum-
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mary judgment for the Landowners on the basis that the 1903 conveyance from Kraemer included the disputed area west of Ocean Avenue.
The Stevens appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals. On appeal,
the only issue the court considered was whether the Landowners' title
extended west, past Ocean Avenue and into the disputed area. Before
evaluating the case on its merits, the court established the Landowners'
specific burden of proof. Citing previous Oregon Supreme Court
cases, the court held that for the Landowners to secure a judgment
quieting title, they must prevail on the strength of their own title, and
not on the weaknesses of the Stevens title.
The court then evaluated the 1903 deed from Kraemer and found
that it conveyed only specific lots within the plat of the subdivision located east of Ocean Avenue and retained for Kraemer the area west of
Ocean Avenue, including the disputed land. The court then turned to
an analogous Oregon Supreme Court case, and found that where a
street separated platted lots from the waterfront, a conveyance of lots
and street blocks located across the street from the waterfront, there
was no implied conveyance of the land between the conveyed street
and the waterfront. Rather, such a conveyance indicated the owner's
intent to reserve the waterfront property to the grantor.
Applying that reasoning to the facts, the court found that Kraemer
conveyed only specific platted parcels that were all located east of
Ocean Avenue. The court explained that when a street separates platted lots from waterfront property, Kraemer's conveyance by designating lots and blocks of parcels located across the street from the waterfront did not convey the waterfront or any of its appurtenant rights.
Rather, his conveyance "by lots and blocks" indicated Kramer's intent
to reserve the shoreline for himself.
The court reasoned that Kraemer's conveyance specifically identified the blocks and lots conveyed in the deed, and was silent as to the
parcel west of Ocean Avenue. As such, the court found that the disputed parcel belonged to the original grantor and his successors in
interest.
The court found that the Landowners' ownership of the lots extended no further on the west than Ocean Avenue, and did not extend
to any portion between the road and the high tide line. Therefore, the
court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
the Landowners and reversed the decision of the lower court.
Brandon Saxon
Waterwatch of Or. Inc. v. Water Res. Comm'n, 112 P.3d 443 (Or. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding administrative rules that allow water users to moderate rather than maintain the free-flowing nature of the scenic waterways in the Deschutes Basin invalid because Oregon statutes require
that appropriated stream flows be fully replaced, not moderated, to
lessen the environmental impact of appropriation).
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Waterwatch of Oregon Incorporated and individual flyfisherman
(collectively "Waterwatch") challenged the validity of two sets of Water
Resources Commission ("Commission") rules in the Court of Appeals
The first set of administrative rules amended the
of Oregon.
Deschutes Basin water management program by permitting the appropriation of groundwater in the basin and establishing mitigation requirements. The second set of administrative rules provided for the
creation of a mitigation bank and mitigation credits system in the basin.
Waterwatch argued that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority when it created the rules because 1) the rules do not comply
with Or. Rev. Stat. § 390.835 (2004), 2) the rules overallocate surface
waters in the basin, and 3) the Commission violated its public trust
responsibility. The court considered Waterwatch's first argument sufficient to hold the rules invalid.
Section 390.835 requires that "the free-flowing character of these
[scenic] waters shall be maintained in quantities necessary for recreation, fish and wildlife uses." The court adopted the purpose and meaning of the statute described in Diack v. City of Portland. The Diack court
held the operative part of the statute is the requirement that waters be
'maintained' in sufficient quantities for recreation, fish and wildlife
uses. This requirement created a standard that the Commission must
apply. The court further stated that the term "free-flowing" is purely
descriptive and does not create a separate statutory standard that the
Commission may follow. Accordingly, the Commission is required to
determine the level of water necessary to maintain the free-flowing
character of scenic waterways. Once the level is determined, any appropriation beyond that level which measurably reduces the flow must
be fully mitigated. Thus, for an administrative rule to comply with section 390.835, the rule must require full mitigation of appropriated
groundwater.
Since the administrative rules created by the Commission only required that mitigation "moderate" the effect of groundwater use, the
court held the administrative rules invalid. The court held moderation
differs from maintenance because moderation does not require full
replacement of stream flows.
ThomasJantunen
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RHODE ISLAND
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, CA. No. WM 88-0297, 2005 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 108, (R.I. July 5, 2005) (holding that the denial of Palazollo's
permit to develop tidal lands was not a taking due to anticipatory nuisance, the limitations resulting from the Public Trust Doctrine, and
failure to satisfy the Penn Central test).
Anthony Palazzolo brought an inverse condemnation action
against Rhode Island's Coastal Resources Management Council
("CRMC"). Palazollo sought to fill 18 acres of saltwater marsh to construct a residential development. In 1976, the CRMC adopted a plan
prohibiting all filling of coastal wedands without a special exception.
Upon denial of his permit request, Palazollo brought suit alleging that
the CRMC's action constituted a taking for which he was entitled to
compensation. At the initial bench trial in 1997, the Superior Court of
Rhode Island entered judgment for the state. On appeal, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeal was not ripe
for decision because Palazollo had never properly submitted a development application to the CRMC. On writ of certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and found that the case was ripe for review. The
Court remanded the case back to the Superior Court of Rhode Island
with instructions to perform an analysis under Penn Central v. City of
New York.
Palazollo's property was located on the south side of a tidal saltwater pool. Much of the site was subject to daily tidal inundation, and
surveys indicated that approximately one-half of the property lay below
mean high water. In order to develop the site into the proposed subdivision, Palazollo needed to remove the mucky peat on the surface
and add as much as six feet of fill in some areas. Evidence at trial indicated that the filling of Palazollo's site would have resulted in 12% less
salt marsh and a reduction of pollutant and nitrogen filtering by the
pond's salt marsh ecosystem.
At issue in the initial trial and in this appeal was whether the contemplated development would constitute a nuisance and whether such
a finding precluded Palazollo's takings claim. The trial court originally
found that the loss of the marsh filtering effect and the loss of wildlife
habitat would amount to a nuisance. On remand, the Superior Court
of Rhode Island considered whether the original nuisance holding was
law of the case or was still an open issue. Because the record had been
expanded with an additional two weeks of evidence presentation, the
court chose not to invoke the law of the case and reviewed the issue de
novo. Under Rhode Island state law, a public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public or behavior that unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort
or convenience of the general public. Claims can be brought for an-
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ticipatory nuisances when it is clearly established that the nuisance
would necessarily arise from the contemplated activity. The trial court
held that Palazollo's development would constitute a public nuisance
as a result of the significant and negative effects that the development
would have on the pond. Under the takings claim test of Lucas v. South
Carolina, nuisance law prohibits ab initio a takings claim. Therefore,
the denial of Palazollo's permit did not constitute a taking.
Second, the Superior Court considered whether Palazollo was subject to the public trust doctrine ("doctrine"). The doctrine mandates
that the state hold title to all land below the high-water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the public. Although the doctrine
can be limited by legislative decree, the Superior Court found that
there had been no such express or implied legislative transfer of the
state's public trust rights. Accordingly, the court found that the doctrine barred Palazollo from ever filling or developing the portion of
the site that was below mean high water. Although the doctrine did
not completely bar Palazollo's recovery, it did constitute a factor in his
investment-backed expectations for the purposes of a partial takings
claim.
The court then turned to the application of a Penn Central analysis
to Palazollo's partial takings claim. The court first considered whether
the government singled out Palazollo (by denying his permit) and
therefore forced him to bear a burden that should have been born by
the larger taxpaying public. After noting that the government need
not compensate property owners every time it enacted regulations to
promote the general welfare, health and safety of the public, the court
found that the regulatory scheme was not directed at Palazollo in particular and it had an identical impact on all property owners of tidal
salt marsh.
Second, the court conducted a thorough analysis regarding the
economic impact of the regulations on Palazollo and determined that
Palazollo was actually receiving more economic benefit by the regulations due to the high costs of developing his proposed subdivision.
Regardless of the diminution of Palazollo's parcel size, the unique factors of this case did not create any adverse economic impact on Palazollo.
Finally, the court turned to Palazollo's reasonable investmentbacked expectations, a subject to which the Supreme Court ordered
particular attention on remand. The court held that Palazollo's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable and therefore he
failed to satisfy the third prong of the Penn Central test. Palazollo was
aware or should have been aware that the property was subject to the
doctrine. He was aware of the engineering difficulties surrounding the
site, as well as state regulations regarding the dredging and filling of
tidal waters. Although he may have made a bad business decision, the
purpose of the takings clause is not to compensate such decisions.
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Thus, the court held that no taking had occurred and Palazollo was
not entitled to compensation because (1) his proposed development
would have constituted a nuisance, (2) the regulation was not directed
at Palazollo in particular, (3) the economic impact of the regulations
were actually beneficial to Palazollo, and (4) Palazollo failed to satisfy
the third prong of the Penn Central test because his investment-backed
expectations were not reasonable.
Michelle Young
TEXAS
Cummins v. Travis County Water Control and Improvement Dist., 175
S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding private ownership of land adjacent to a public reservoir did not include vested riparian rights, was
subject to state regulation under the public trust, and such regulations
did not constitute a compensable exercise of condemnation power).
The Cumminses own land adjacent to and overlooking Lake Travis.
The Travis County Water Control and Improvement District ("District") controls the water and shoreline of Lake Travis. After the District denied the Cumminses' application to build a boat dock on the
lake, the Cumminses brought this action for declaratory judgment to
use and enjoy their land as waterfront property. They challenged the
validity of District's regulations protecting areas around a water intake
used to supply public drinking water from Lake Travis. The district
court dismissed the claims on summary judgment and found the
Cumminses lacked riparian rights to the shoreline of Lake Travis.
Consequently, they were not entitled to construct a boat dock on stateowned land held for the public trust under District regulations. The
Cumminses appealed to the Texas State Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court delineated the test establishing a landowner's
riparian rights to a body of water adjacent to his land. The court stated
a waterfront property owner must: (1) trace his title to a sovereign
grant prior to 1895 or obtain a certificate of adjudication from the
state of Texas, and (2) establish that the land, as granted by deed, borders a natural lake with a normal flow of water. Because the Cumminses did not adjudicate their right, they did not have riparian rights
enabling construction of a boat dock. Furthermore, they could not
trace their title prior to 1895, nor was the land adjacent to a natural
body of water because Lake Travis, a reservoir, constituted an artificial
waterbody.
Furthermore, the court justified the District's denial of the application because Texas state law entitled the District to regulate land submerged under water to protect public health and safety under the public trust doctrine. Therefore, the owners of land abutting a waterway
do not have title to submerged land, only a right of access based on

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 9

prior use. Because the Cumminses' prior use of the land did not include docking structures, the court held construction of a private boat
dock was not a reasonable use of public trust land as regulated by the
District.
The court also denied the Cumminses' claim of an easement entitling use of their land as waterfront property. The court stated an
easement holder is only entitled to do what is reasonably necessary to
enjoy expressly granted rights. The Cumminses' deed did not expressly provide use of the land as a waterfront property and therefore,
the deed did not establish an express easement. In the alternative, the
Cumminses claimed an implied easement. The court dismissed this
claim, stating apparent, continuous, and necessary use of the land for
the desired purpose to predicate existence of an implied easement.
Therefore, because the Cumminses had not used their land for boat
mooring, no implied easement existed.
Regarding the Cumminses' challenge of the validity of the District's
regulations restricting recreation and other activities near the drinking
water intake, the court determined the legislature gave the District express authority to enact regulations to protect the health and safety of
citizens and natural resources. Therefore, because the District did not
enforce the restricted intake barge zones differently against the Cumminses than against any other Lake Travis users, the public interest
trumped the private user's right.
Finally, the Cumminses claimed the District's regulation prohibiting all activity within a restricted area surrounding the drinking water
intake was inverse condemnation and therefore a compensable taking.
They contended that, because the regulation prohibited all activity, it
prevented making any productive, economic use of the property and
interfered with their investment-backed expectations. The court disagreed and determined a compensable taking had not occurred because the District's restriction of permissible uses did not decrease the
property's value, nor substantially interfere with a particular activity
nor use and enjoyment of the land. Furthermore, the District's requirement for shoreline warning signs was not a physical invasion and
did not constitute a per se taking. The appellate court affirmed the
district court's summary judgment on all claims.
Amy Mockenhaupt
Malcomson Rd. Util. Dist. v. Newsom, 171 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.
2005) (holding that (1) Malcomson Road Utility District conclusively
proved that proposed retention pond and drainage ditch expansion on
landowner's property were for public uses; and (2) genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Malcomson Road Utility District acted arbitrarily and capriciously by abdicating its discretion to determine
whether and how much property to condemn precluded summary
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judgment on issue of whether taking was necessary for declared public
use).
Malcomson Road Utility District ("District") sought review of the
judgments of the County Civil Court at Law No. 3, Harris County,
Texas, which denied the District the right to condemn Frank George
Newsom's property and awarded Newsom possession of and improvements on the property sought for condemnation.
Newsom owned a tract of undeveloped land outside the District's
boundaries. Newsom declined the offers of two residential subdivision
developers, David Garrett and John Santasiero, who tried to purchase
roughly 2.5 acres each of Newsom's land to build a drainage ditch and
a retention pond respectively, as required by the Harris County Flood
Control District ("HCFCD"). After the developers asked the District to
condemn the lands, the District's board determined that the taking of
Newsom's land in the requested amounts for the retention pond and
ditch expansion was a public necessity that would serve the public purpose of drainage. The District made an offer to Newsom. Newsom
rejected the placement of a pond on his property, refused the amount
offered for the land for the ditch expansion, and counter-offered with
a higher price. The District filed condemnation proceedings, took
Newsom filed objections.
possession, and began improvements.
Newsom argued that the District had not made good faith offers of
damages before filing suit, that his property was being taken for private
uses and without public necessity, that the takings were arbitrary, capricious and fraudulent, and that the District improperly "delegated"
its eminent domain powers to the nearby competing developers. The
Texas First Court of Appeals held that the District conclusively proved
that the proposed retention pond and drainage ditch expansion on
Newsom's property were for public uses, and a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the District acted arbitrarily and capriciously by abdicating its discretion on the necessity issue.
The court identified several factual issues, the first of which was
whether the District sought the property for public purposes. The
court found that the legislature delegated the power of eminent domain, which extended to conducting activities such as building retention ponds and expanding drainage ditches, and which was tantamount to a legislative determination that such projects were public
uses. Such a legislative determination was binding unless the uses were
"clearly and palpably" private.
Newsom argued that factual issues existed as to whether the takings
were for public use, because the improvements benefited only the developers' lands. Newsom cited the District's statements that the pond
was necessary to "serve" Santasiero's property, that the pond was of the
size to handle the amount of estimated overflow from Santasiero's development only, and that Garrett was building the ditch to facilitate
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HCFCD's approval of the Lakewood Grove subdivision. The court
found that the important factor in the public-use determination was
the character of the right inuring to the public, not the extent to which
the public exercised its right. Thus, it was immaterial if the use was
limited to citizens of a local neighborhood, so long as it was open to all
who choose to avail themselves of it. The court found that the District's evidence that both the ditch expansion and the pond construction would serve the public purpose of draining excess water from the
area sufficed for a showing of public use.
Courts do not review a condemnor's exercise of its discretion to determine public necessity without a showing that the condemnor acted
fraudulently, in bad faith, or arbitrarily and capriciously. Therefore,
the second issue of disputed fact reviewed by the court was whether the
District acted fraudulently or arbitrarily in concluding that public necessity justified condemning the property. Newsom argued that the
District did not use a reasonable basis for their determination of necessity, but rather abdicated its responsibilities to the developers. The
court found that the condemnation agreements signed by the District
and the private developers, requiring the developers to front all costs
of the condemnation and providing that the District would not have to
reimburse the developers if the condemnation proceedings were unsuccessful for any reason, raised an inference that the District had abdicated its discretion to determine whether the condemnation was
backed by public necessity. Thus, the court found that a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the utility district acted arbitrarily and
capriciously precluded summary judgment.
Keely Downs
Grimes v. Texas, No. 03-04-00154, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6963 (Tex.
App. Aug. 26, 2005) (holding that the order from the Texas Railroad
Commission granting a permit to Endeavor Energy Resources to operate a saltwater disposal well was supported by substantial evidence, in
the public interest, and not arbitrary or capricious).
The Texas Railroad Commission ("Commission") granted a permit
to Endeavor Energy Resources ("Endeavor") to operate a saltwater disposal well located on one-third of a surface estate, which Endeavor
leased from Howard Hill Grimes ("Grimes"). Grimes, the owner of
two-thirds of the surface estate and an undivided interest in the mineral estate of the tract that he leased to Endeavor, opposed Endeavor's
permit application because he feared the saltwater operations on the
adjacent land would damage his groundwater and surface estate.
After the Commission granted a permit to Endeavor to operate a
saltwater disposal well, Grimes brought suit appealing the Commission's order issuing the permit. The District Court of Travis County,
53rd Judicial District, affirmed the Commission's order granting the
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permit to Endeavor to operate a saltwater disposal well. Grimes appealed the district court's decision to the Texas Court of Appeals.
Grimes asserted that the Commission's decision to grant the permit
to operate the saltwater disposal well was arbitrary and capricious and,
therefore, the court must overturn it. He claimed that there was not
substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision because it
failed to take into account the public interest requirement of the permitting process under the water code.
The crux of the substantial evidence analysis is whether the
agency's factual findings are reasonable in light of the evidence from
which they were purportedly inferred. In this case, the court had to
consider whether the Commission's factual findings supported its decision in light of the public interest requirement process under the water
code.
The court determined there is no controlling precedent interpreting what considerations the Commission may weigh when deciding
whether granting a disposal well operating permit is in the public interest. However, the Commission's purpose includes preventing waste,
conserving natural resources, and preventing pollution. The Commission considered these issues in reaching its decision and determined
that the disposal operations, if conducted under certain conditions
specified in the permit, would not endanger certain natural resource
or cause pollution of the fresh water stratum.
The court found the Commission's determination that the well
would help conserve some natural resources and prevent pollution of
the stratum satisfied the Commission's public interest requirement
under the water code. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's
holding that the Commission's decision was reasonable in light of the
evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.
Robert Stevens
City of Shoreacres v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 166 S.W.3d 825
(Tex. App. 2005) (holding city of Shoreacres' claims were moot because the Port of Houston Authority was not required to obtain state
authorization from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
independent of the federal dredge-and-fill permit it received from the
Army Corps of Engineers).
The Port of Houston Authority ("Port") sought to obtain a federal
Clean Water Act dredge-and-fill permit ("404 permit") from the Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") and a section 401 certification from the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality ("Commission") in relation to the construction of a cargo and cruise ship terminal complex
called the Bayport Project. 401 certification requires a project to meet
state water quality standards and be consistent with state coastal management. On December 16, 2005, the Commission issued the 401 cer-
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tification to the Port. The following day, the cities of Shoreacres, Taylor Lake Village, Seabrook, and the Galveston Bay Conservation and
Preservation Association (collectively "Cities") filed an administrative
appeal seeking reversal of the 401 certification and remand to the
Commission, claiming that issuance of a 401 certification was not a
final action and the Corps could not rely upon it in granting a 404
permit. The Corps issued the Port a 404 permit on January 5, 2005,
and the Port began construction thereafter. On April 29, 2005, the
Port filed a motion for summary judgment stating the Cities' claim was
moot because the Corps issued a 404 permit in reliance on the 401
certification and revocation of the 401 certification would not affect
the validity of the 404 permit. The Travis County District Court
granted the Port's motion on May 28, 2005.
The court examined Texas' statutory scheme regarding dredgeand-fill permits and the Clean Water Act. The Texas Water Code expressly forbids the Commission from issuing dredge-and-fill permits.
However, under the Clean Water Act, the Commission is capable of
vetoing the issuance of the 404 permit by denying the 401 certification
because a 404 permit is contingent upon issuance of 401 certification.
The Commission chose to grant the 401 certification. As a result, the
issuance of 401 certification terminated the Commission's veto power.
The court reasoned that federal permit rather than state certification authorized the Bayport Project's progress. Therefore, the court
affirmed the trial court and concluded the Cities' claim was moot because a state court's ruling on the validity of the Commission's 401 certification could have no legal effect on the project. In sum, by choosing to grant 401 certification, the Commission lost its veto power, rendering the Cities' claim moot.
Nathan Whitney
Ward County Irrigation Dist. No. 1 v. Red Bluff Water Power Control
Dist., 08-04000322-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 5063 (Tex. App. Jun. 30,
2005) (holding membership in power control districts is not limited to
improvement districts, but may also include irrigation districts).
Red Bluff District is a power control district, whose members consist of seven improvement districts including Ward County Irrigation
District No. 1 ("Ward District 1") and Ward County Irrigation District
No. 3 ("Ward District 3"). In 1977, the Texas legislature adopted
Chapter 58 to the Texas Water Code, which provided that any improvement district or control and improvement district could convert
into an irrigation district. In 2001 and 2003, respectively, Ward District
1 and Ward District 3 converted under this provision.
Following their conversion, Ward District 1 and Ward District 3
sent representatives to sit on the Red Bluff District Board of Directors
("the Board"). Red Bluff District, however, refused to seat the two rep-
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resentatives, claiming that the conversion of these districts disqualified
them as organized divisions of the Red Bluff District and prevented
them from electing representatives to the board. Both sides sought
declaratory relief and, following a bench trial, the 143rd District Court
of Ward County entered judgment in favor of Red Bluff District. Ward
District 1 and Ward District 3 appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Texas, Eighth District.
In interpreting the statute de novo, the court observed that the legislature initially approved control and improvement districts for inclusions in power control districts such as Red Bluff, but later amended
the statute to omit them. Red Bluff maintained, as did the trial court,
that this change in the statute indicated an intention by the legislature
to restrict membership in power control districts to improvement districts. However, the court held that, rather than evidencing an intent
to forever restrict membership to improvement districts, the legislature
intended only to exclude the more powerful control and improvement
districts from inclusion in power control districts. Furthermore, the
trial court's restrictive approach to the statute was inconsistent with a
general legislative intent to permit conversion of one type of water district to another. As such, Ward Districts 1 and 3 could remain functional members of the Red Bluff District.
Red Bluff also claimed that Chapter 58 irrigation districts could not
elect representatives to its board because the election procedures provided for these districts would lead to voter disenfranchisement. Under Chapter 58, eligibility to vote in irrigation district elections is based
on ownership of irrigable land, excluding non-landowners. The court,
however, pointed to United States Supreme Court precedent concluding that such elections do not violate equal protection because of the
special limited purpose of water districts. The court concluded that
the issue was irrelevant here because Chapter 58 only applies to elections of the irrigation district's own board of directors and does not
apply to the election of representatives to the Board. Thus, the court
reversed the trial court in favor of the irrigation and water improvement districts.
Noah Klug

UTAH
Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., No. 20040406, 2005 Utah LEXIS 98
(Utah Sept. 2, 2005) (holding: (1) an applicant seeking a change in
water use need only show reason to believe approval of an application
will not result in impairment of a vested water right; (2) applicant
bears the burden of persuasion throughout the application process;
and (3) protestant may successfully oppose an application approval by
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producing direct or circumstantial evidence that undermines an applicant's showing).
Lawrence and Ann Searle ("Searles") purchased a water right in
Sanpete County, Utah. To comply with requirements necessary to obtain a building permit, the Searles filed a change application with the
State Engineer to change the point of diversion, place of use, and nature of use of the water right. Milburn Irrigation Company ("Milburn") opposed this application, claiming it would impair its prior existing rights. After an informal adjudicative hearing in which both parties presented argument and testimony, the State Engineer rejected
the Searles' application, as well as the Searles' subsequent request for
reconsideration.
The Searles filed suit in the District Court for the Sixth District
seeking judicial review of the State Engineer's decision. At trial, the
Searles offered testimony from an expert witness supporting their contention that their requested change application would not impair Milburn's water rights. Milburn, in turn, offered testimony from two expert witnesses supporting its contention that the change would impair
its rights. The district court reached the same conclusion as the State
Engineer and denied the Searles' application.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, the Searles and the State
Engineer took exception to the approach adopted by the district court
in which the burden of persuasion "shifted from the applicant to the
protestant" and that the "standard of proof was by a preponderance of
the evidence." The State Engineer argued that the burden of persuasion remained on the Searles, whereas the Searles argued that the
standard of proof placed on Milburn should have been more akin to
clear and convincing evidence, rather than proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.
The court addressed three areas of concern with the approach that
the district court adopted. It analyzed whether the district court: (1)
properly invoked the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof; (2) appropriately allocated the burden of proof; and (3) correctly concluded that a change applicant's prima facie showing that no
impairment will result from application approval could be undermined
by circumstantial evidence demonstrating the probability of impairment.
The court first provided a brief overview of the change application
process itself, as well as the procedural course followed by the district
court in the present case. The court noted that the lower court relied
on its decisions in Crafts v. Hansen and Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs
Water Users Ass'n to justify applying a "burden shifting scheme" as well
as utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. However, the court distinguished the applicability of the language in those
cases to the case at hand, reasoning that the proper procedure to fol-
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low when considering the merits of a change application is to analyze
those cases in conjunction with the Utah Code.
In establishing the appropriate procedure for determining the
merits of a change application, the court balanced the two policy goals
of putting water to the most beneficial use possible while simultaneously guarding vested rights. The court distinguished the standard of
proof applicable to the application process from the standard applicable to a final adjudication of rights. A review of case law established
that an applicant need only show a reason to believe that a proposed
change would not impair any vested right. The court analogized the
application stage where a reason to believe is appropriate, to the preliminary phase of a criminal trial where probable cause is sufficient to
allow the case to proceed. It reasoned that allowing for a less onerous
burden at the application stage allows for the development of water
uses to the maximum extent possible.
The procedures already in place would also guard against harming
existing rights. The burden remains on the applicant to invest the resources necessary to develop the proposed change. After the change is
implemented, the applicant still bears the burden of showing that the
implemented changes do not impair other rights. If an impairment of
vested rights occurs, the burden is on the applicant to sustain the loss
for the development. This system ensures that the applicant will take
all the necessary precautions to ensure that his proposed change will
not adversely affect the rights of others.
The court reasoned that the burden of persuasion remains on the
applicant for the duration of the application process because it is the
applicant who is disturbing the existing order. It also reasoned that
circumstantial evidence can undermine an applicant's proposed
change because determinations of impairment often hinge on probabilities and not on direct observation, measurement and calculation.
The court noted there could be situations in which circumstantial evidence could successfully undermine an applicant's evidence to such an
extent that it would be unreasonable to believe that the proposed
change could be accomplished without impairing vested rights.
The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong standard of proof. The court also held that the parties improperly allocated the burdens of proof. The court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration under the standard outlined.
Rogerj. Lucas
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VIRGINIA
Crutchfield v. State Water Control Bd., 612 S.E.2d 249 (Va. Ct. App.
2005) (affirming the trial court's approval of the State Water Control
Board's decision to issue an effluent discharge permit to Hanover
County, Virginia because state law dictates deferential treatment of
agency decisions when supported by substantial evidence in the record).
In 1997, Hanover County in Virginia ("County") applied for a Virginia Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("VPDES") permit to
discharge treated wastewater into the Pamunkey River.
Frances
Broaddus Crutchfield and Henry Ruffin Broaddus (collectively
"Crutchfield") owned a farm along the Pamunkey River where the discharge would occur under the permit. Crutchfield and others opposed the permit during the public hearing held by the State Water
Control Board ("SWCB"). On April 28, 1999 the SWCB approved the
County's VPDES permit. Crutchfield appealed the SWCB decision to
the Circuit Court, City of Richmond. The trial court found the SWCB
properly issued the permit, and Crutchfield appealed again to the
Court of Appeals of Virginia, Alexandria.
On appeal, Crutchfield argued the trial court improperly affirmed
the SWCB's decision to approve the permit because: (1) the record did
not contain substantial evidence the effluent discharge would not further degrade the water quality, and (2) state statute requires the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("VDEQ") to perform a
load allocation prior to permit issuance to determine if the river can
support new discharges if the water segment already does not meet
water quality standards.
The court found the record did contain substantial evidence to
support the VPDES permit approval. Since established state law principles required deference to agency decisions, the court reasoned the
numerous technical reports, consultation with other state and federal
agencies, issuance of stricter permit requirements in response to public
comments, and additional scientific evidence in the agency record established substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. Specifically, the court noted the technical reports indicated the effluent
restrictions placed on the permit were "self-sustaining."
In other
words, the discharges into the river would not exceed water quality
standards even if the river contained only effluent. The court also refused to consider new evidence introduced by Crutchfield during the
appeal. The Virginia Administrative Procedure Act only allows supplementation of the record when no record exists. Here, a sufficient
agency record already existed.
Next, the court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of
VPDES regulations concerning the permitting process. The VPDES
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regulation required a permittee seeking a permit for a water segment
that does not already meet water quality standards to show the segment
could support additional effluent based on a VDEQ load allocation.
Crutchfield argued the regulation required a VDEQ load allocation
prior to permit issuance. The court reasoned the permitting process
did not trigger this provision merely because the Pamunkey River did
not meet water quality standards at the time of permit issuance. Instead, the court found the VDEQ could only trigger this provision if
they perform the load allocation first, and the regulations did not require the VDEQ to perform the load allocation. Here, the record did
not show any load allocation by the VDEQ. Therefore, the court decided the VDEQ did not trigger the provision.
In conclusion, by deferring to the agency decision-making process,
the court affirmed the trial court's findings that the record contained
substantial evidence to support the VPDES permit issuance, and regulations governing the permit application process do not require the
VDEQ to perform a load allocation prior to permit approval.
David B. Oakley

WASHINGTON
Nelson v. Shorewood Hills Homeowners Assoc., No. 53891-8-I, 2005
Wash. App. LEXIS 1573 (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 5, 2005) (holding adjacent property owners did not violate the surface water common enemy
doctrine by paving and grading their property).
Homeowners in Shorewood Hills, a private housing community,
sued Shorewood Hills Homeowners Association (the "Association") for
damages stemming from a severely eroded ravine adjacent to their
property. In turn, the Association sued the City of Shoreline (the
"City") and Shoreline Community College (the "College") as third
party defendants for contribution. The Superior Court of King County
denied the Association's motion for summary judgment and granted
the City and College's motion. The Association appealed to the Court
of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
The Association first asserted that the City and College were liable
because they trespassed by water by overburdening an easement and
their actions did not fall under any of the exceptions to the common
enemy doctrine. The common enemy doctrine has been the foundation of surface water law in Washington since 1896. This doctrine
states that landowners may use any means to protect their land from
unwanted surface water without incurring liability to neighboring
landowners. The doctrine has three exceptions: (1) landowners may
not inhibit the flow of a natural watercourse; (2) landowners may not
collect, channel, and thrust water, whether by gutter, culvert, street, or
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other mechanism, onto a neighbor's land in a manner or quantity different from its natural flow; and (3) landowners who alter the flow of
surface water must act in good faith and avoid unnecessary damage to
adjacent property. The Association argued the City and College's actions fell under the second and third exceptions.
To establish the second exception, the Association produced a declaration and three-page report from an expert. The expert opined that
paving and grading the property altered the land from its natural forested state in which the water would have percolated into the ground.
However, the court held that paving and grading alone are insufficient
to establish liability in the absence of specific facts showing that the
paving and grading collected, concentrated, and channeled the water
in an unnatural manner. The Association made no such showing here.
As to the third exception, also known as the "due care exception,"
the Association contended that the City and College failed to act in
good faith because they were aware that surface water was draining
into the ravine causing damage, yet they took no action. The court
disagreed, noting the due care exception applies only when the landowner alters the water's natural flow, which the Association failed to
establish. The court further noted that the College pre-dated the
Shorewood Hills subdivision by fifteen years. Thus, when it was developed, the College had no reason to suspect that its actions would burden a neighboring housing development with excess water.
The court also rejected the Association's claims that the City assumed a statutory duty from King County to maintain the ravine when
the City incorporated. The court affirmed the summary judgment motion in favor of the City and College.
Noah Klug
WYOMING
Snider v. Kirchhefer, 115 P.3d 1 (Wyo. 2005) (denying a petition for
abandonment of water rights because of failure to show reasonable
likelihood that injury would result from reactivation of the water
right).
Yvonne Snider had a 1915 water appropriation right on Six Mile
Creek. The appropriation permitted the diversion of water from Six
Mile Creek at a point on Fred and Donita Kirchhefers' ("Kirchhefers")
land. An easement to construct, maintain, and repair the ditch as well
as a right of way across the Kirchhefers' land accompanied Snider's
appropriation. The Kirchhefers had no surface appropriation rights
for Six Mile Creek but possessed a ground water permit from the
Kirchhefer Spring No. 1, a well built into the creek bank of Six Mile
Creek approximately 100 feet upstream from the point of diversion.
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On August 29, 2001, Snider entered the Kirchhefers' land to repair
Budget No. 2 Ditch after at least five years of no beneficial use. The
Kirchhefers objected to the construction activities, alleging that Snider
was outside her easement at the wrong point of diversion. The
Kirchhefers sought and received a temporary restraining order to stop
construction activities. On August 31, 2001, the Kirchhefers filed a
petition for abandonment of the appropriation, alleging Snider had
not used the appropriation for more than five years. On May 9, 2002,
the Board of Control ("Board") ordered the abandonment of the appropriation. Snider appealed to the district court. The court remanded the case to the Board because the Board's order contained no
findings of fact or conclusions of law to establish a reasonable likelihood that abandonment would benefit or injure the Kirchhefers' water
right. On August 28, 2003, the Board found that the Kirchhefers
proved a reasonable likelihood that benefit from abandonment or injury by resuscitation would result. Snider appealed again to the district
court and the court found that the Board made appropriate findings
and affirmed the decision. Snider appealed.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the Wyoming statute governing the abandonment of water rights. In order to have standing to
petition for abandonment, the Kirchhefers needed to prove three essential elements: 1) that they possessed a valid water right of equal or
junior status to the water right sought to be abandoned, 2) that the
water right relied upon by the Kirchhefers and the water right for
which a declaration of abandonment was sought are from the same
source of supply, and 3) that they stand to benefit from a declaration
of abandonment or to sustain an injury by reactivation of the contested
water right.
The court focused on the third element, and found that the
Kirchhefers must prove they have a reasonable likelihood that the
abandonment would benefit their water right or reactivation would
injure it. The court examined the Board's findings and found the
Board's inquiry focused on the Kirchhefers' appropriation only if subject to regulation. The court found that injury to the Kirchhefers
would only result if regulation occurs. The court held that evidence
was absent to support a finding that there was a reasonable likelihood
that regulation would actually occur because there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation that Six Mile Creek was limited in supply or that the creek experienced historical shortages.
Consequently, the court found that the Kirchhefers failed to provide sufficient evidence to show a reasonable likelihood that benefit
from abandonment or injury by resuscitation would result. The court
reversed the district court's order upholding the abandonment and
remanded with directions to deny the petition for abandonment.
Laura L. Chartrand

SECOND ANNUAL
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
WATER LAW CONFERENCE
Steamboat Springs, Colorado

June 17-18, 2005

The Second Annual Colorado Bar Association ("CBA") Water Law
Conference, sponsored by the Water Law Section of the CBA, took
place at the Sheraton Steamboat Resort and Conference Center for the
second year in a row. The Agricultural and Rural Law Round Up,
sponsored by the Agricultural and Rural Law Section of the CBA, and
an Environmental Law Conference, sponsored by the Natural Resources and Energy Section of the CBA, were held simultaneously with
the Water Law Conference. Speakers gave presentations consistent
with these three topics. Conference organizers allowed and encouraged conference participants to attend presentations on all three topics.
DAY ONE: FRIDAYJUNE 17,2005

The day began with a General Session entitled Purchaseand Sale of
Real Property:A Case Study. The session focused on the various due diligence requirements involved in the purchase or sale of land. Joseph B.
Dischinger moderated the session, and John L. Watson presented the
water-related portion of the session. Mr. Watson identified and discussed five major water-related due diligence issues: (1) assessment of
legal and physical water supply; (2) water rights title and conveyance;
(3) recreational access to streams running through private property;
(4) water rights and wetlands issues involving fish habitat enhancements; and (5) possible construction in marshy areas.
After the General Session, each of the three sections of the conference held three subsequent presentations relating to their specific section. The first Water Law Section presentation was the Legislative and
Case Law Update presented by David A. Bailey. Mr. Bailey identified
and summarized both Colorado water case law and pertinent federal
cases involving water issues. Mr. Bailey also discussed legislation recently passed or rejected by the Colorado Legislature. Dave Akers, the
Water Quality Protection Manager of the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment, presented the second Water Law Section presentation, Water Quality, Including Brine Disposal. Mr. Akers discussed the different methods, requirements, and challenges involving
the discharge of water containing high total dissolved solids.
Dr. Ali Harivandi from the University of California Davis, presented
the third and final Water Law Section presentation of the day, Challenges Involved in the use of Recycled Water for Irrigation Purposes. Dr.
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Harivandi is an environmental horticulturist who specializes in turf,
soil, and water. His presentation focused on the advantages, disadvantages, and challenges of using recycled wastewater to irrigate golf
courses, which is becoming a common practice as the availability of
water decreases.
Day one concluded with a Water Law Section Awards Banquet
Dinner. This dinner included the induction of the Ancient and Honorable Order of the Water Buffaloes, which recognizes and honors
individuals who have made special contributions to the area of water
law. Colorado Supreme CourtJustice GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr. oversaw the
event and entertained banquet attendees by reading selections of his
original poetry.
DAYTWO: SATURDAY,JUNE 17, 2005

The second day of the conference began with breakfast, followed
by two presentations from each of the sections represented. The first
water law section presentation was State EngineerPolicies-Agency Legislation or Legislative Interpretation? The presenters included: Hal D. Simpson, State Engineer for the Colorado Division of Water Resources; Alexandra L. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources Division; and David S. Hayes, Esq. Mr. Simpson went over many of the
various policies, guidelines, and rules and regulations of the Division of
Water Resources. Mr. Hayes discussed important administrative legal
issues, including the differences between a rule and policy, and the
differences between specific rulemaking authority and general rulemaking authority of the State Engineer. There was some discussion
that the Engineer's Office should possibly adopt a formal process for
public comment before adopting policies. Currently, the Attorney
General's Office is the only entity that allows input before adopting a
policy.
Peter Ampe, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources and
Environmental Law Section and Mary "Mooey" Hammond, Esq. presented the second and final Water Law Section presentation, Status of
GroundwaterRegulations on the Republican, Rio Grande, South Platte, and
Arkansas River Basins. Mr. Ampe discussed the rules governing the Rio
Grande and Republican River Basins. He went over the history that
lead to the current rules, and discussed rules that are likely to become
effective in the near future, including rules on measurement for the
Rio Grande River Basin. Ms. Hammond gave an overview of the rules
governing well regulation in the South Platte and Arkansas River Basins. She discussed the historical legislation and case law that has
formed the modern rules and regulations of the basins. This concluded the Second Annual CBA Water Law Conference.
Andrew L. Ellis

